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Abstract 
 
Listening to music can arouse a variety of affective responses. The study of this 
phenomenon has flourished during the last two decades, particularly thanks to the 
contribution of the BRECVEMA theory and the Multifactorial Process Model. 
Nevertheless, these theoretical frameworks have adopted a psychological reductionist 
approach that neglects the symbolic dimension of music, and the effect of situational 
factors. The first aim of this thesis is to overcome these shortcomings by proposing a 
theory based on contemporary constructionist theories of emotion. This novel theory 
proposes that listening to music activates automatic perceptual mechanisms that 
produce fluctuations of affect, and that the activation of associative and appraisal 
mechanisms transform the fluctuations of affect into a variety of emotional and 
nonemotional responses. The second aim was to test some of the hypotheses derived 
from this framework. The first experiment tests the prediction that listening to music 
while engaging in motor rhythmic entrainment leads to fluctuations of valence and 
arousal. Although the results did not support the hypothesis, they suggest that the 
phenomena of rhythmic entrainment, musical expectancy, and motor planning arise 
from shared perceptual principles. The second and third experiments investigate the 
phenomenon of emotional contagion with music. The results suggest that embodied 
simulation does not contribute significantly to listeners’ affective reactions, and that 
semantic knowledge activated by the music, by personal associations, and by extra-
musical information biases the type of perceived and induced emotions experienced by 
the listeners. The third aim of the thesis was to explore alternative ways of measuring 
musically-induced emotions. Two indirect techniques are implemented and evaluated, 
and a novel questionnaire of subjective experiences is developed. The main conclusion 
of the thesis is that the constructionist theory here proposed constitutes a fruitful 
approach, as it provides a non-reductionist heuristic framework that produces new 
hypotheses for future investigation. 
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1. Introduction: aims and object of 
study 
 
Listening to music can arouse a wide variety of affective experiences. At times, listening 
to music helps us evoke emotional experiences from the past (F.S. Barrett et al., 2010), 
at other times, music helps us focus on the present situation (Diaz, 2011; Lamont, 2011). 
Music can facilitate feeling more connected to other people (Boer et al., 2011), and it 
can relieve our feelings of loneliness when we listen to it on our own (Van den Tol & 
Edwards, 2014). Music can motivate us to move along to it (Witek, Clarke, Wallentin, 
Kringelbach, & Vuust, 2014), or to adopt an attitude of still and quiet contemplation 
(DeNora, 2000). Listening to music can elicit positive feelings of calm and joy, and have 
positive effects on our mental and physical health (Papinczak, Dingle, Stoyanov, Hides, & 
Zelenko, 2015), but it can also arouse negative feelings such as grief, irritation, anxiety 
and boredom (Sloboda, O’Neill, & Ivaldi, 2001). Sometimes these emotional experiences 
with music can be so striking that we can remember them for years (Gabrielsson, 2001). 
Many other times, by contrast, these experiences are fleeting and unmemorable, and 
sometimes barely accessible to consciousness. Moreover, even people for whom music 
plays a central role in their identity have had the experience that at times, listening to a 
favourite piece of music can transform their mood, while at other times, it leaves them 
indifferent. 
During the last two decades, this power of music to move us emotionally has 
received increasing interest from researchers, as demonstrated by the publication of 
two editions of the seminal edited book Music and Emotion (Juslin & Sloboda, 2001, 
2010a), the organisation of four specialised conferences about this topic, and the 
publication of more than 250 research articles addressing this phenomenon (in the 
period between 1998 and 2009) (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2013). However, it is fair to say 
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that while this wave of scientific interest has advanced our understanding of musical 
emotions, the importance that music has in our lives is not exhausted by its emotional 
dimension. Across cultures all over the world music is part of cultural events fulfilling 
functions and acquiring meanings that are not necessarily emotional (Clarke, 2014). 
What is it about music that can evoke such a wide variety of emotional and non-
emotional experiences? The paradigmatic example that almost every psychological 
theory of emotion has used to explain how emotions are elicited is the experience of 
fear provoked by suddenly encountering a bear in the woods. According to this account, 
the evaluation of the event as threatening triggers the emotional response with its 
associated physiological, behavioural, and motivational components. This paradigmatic 
explanation (which, incidentally, does not apply to many other emotional experiences in 
everyday life), is inadequate to answer the question about how music arouses emotional 
and non-emotional experiences. Listening to musical sounds does not seem to have any 
immediate consequence for our survival or for the realisation of our goals. And clearly, 
the construction of culturally-relative meanings in music cannot be accounted for by the 
activation of automatic survival mechanisms. Hence, it is apparent that traditional 
psychological approaches to emotion cannot fully explain musical emotions. 
Several theories have embraced the challenge of providing explanations that 
circumvent the problem of the apparent irrelevance of music for the realisation of goals 
(e.g. Colling & Thompson, 2013; Davies, 2013; Huron, 2006; Meyer, 1956). And in the 
last years, two groups of investigators have proposed theoretical frameworks that 
integrate several causal mechanisms: Juslin and collaborators’ BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 
2013a; Juslin, Liljeström, & Västfjäll, 2010; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008), and Scherer and 
colleagues’ Multifactorial Process Model (Scherer, 2004; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013; 
Scherer & Zentner, 2001). These two theories coincide in the assumption that musically-
induced emotions emerge from the interaction of factors in the music, the individual, 
and the situation (Juslin et al., 2010, p. 607; Scherer & Zentner, 2001, p. 365). However, 
as I demonstrate in the first three chapters of this thesis, the approach taken by these 
theories is still based on the notion that emotions are produced thanks to the activation 
of mechanisms in the individual’s mind that process music as mere acoustic stimulus. 
Consequently, these theories neglect the symbolic dimension of music, and find it 
difficult to account for the wide variety of emotional and non-emotional experiences 
with music outlined above.  
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The first aim of this thesis is to overcome these shortcomings by proposing an 
alternative theory based on the principles of constructionist theories of emotion, 
exemplified by Lisa Feldman Barett’s Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett, 2006b, 2011, 
2012). This type of theory adopts a non-psychological reductionist approach, and 
therefore, their principles can be adapted to explain how the listener’s bodily and 
affective state is influenced by factors such as the musical structure, the meaning of the 
situation, the symbolic connotations of the music, and extra-musical information, 
producing a variety of emotional and non-emotional responses. To my knowledge, this is 
the first time anyone has attempted to produce a full account of musically-induced 
emotions using the principles of constructionist theories.  
The second aim of the thesis is to test some of the empirical predictions derived from 
this new theoretical framework. To this end, I carried out three experimental studies, all 
related to the predictions that listening to music induces overt and covert embodied 
responses, that these embodied response produce changes in our underlying affective 
tone, and that these changes can become discrete emotional experiences influenced by 
semantic associations.  
The third aim of the thesis is to explore alternative techniques for measuring 
musically-induced emotions. Based on the constructionist principles introduced in the 
theoretical chapters, I adapted two techniques that indirectly detect the presence of 
subtle affective responses in the participants, and developed a new questionnaire that 
taps into previously unexplored dimensions of emotional responses. 
In the first part of this chapter, based on a short review of the main psychological 
theoretical traditions in the study of emotions, I propose a consensual definition of 
emotion that guides the theoretical and empirical work carried out in the thesis. In the 
second part, I review evidence that suggests that music can induce a variety of affective 
states, and I present three essential questions that a theory of induction of emotions by 
music should answer.  
1.1 What are emotions? 
More than a hundred years after James’ foundational attempt to define the term 
“emotion” (1884), affective scientists still find it difficult to reach an agreement on how 
to conceptualize this construct (Beck, 2015; Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981; Russell, 
2012; Scarantino, 2012; Scherer, 2005). This lack of consensus stems from the roots that 
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every emotion theory has in different philosophical and psychological traditions. These 
epistemological differences have led each theory to focus on different aspects of 
emotional phenomena, and to use different premises and constructs to explain them, as 
I explain below.  
There are several ways to classify psychological theories of emotion according to 
different criteria (e.g. Gross & Barrett, 2011; Moors, 2009; Scherer, 2000). Here I 
organize them into four groups according to their historical origins and the main 
assumptions they share:  
Basic-Emotions theories. This tradition was inspired by Darwin’s investigation into the 
similarity of expression of emotions in animals and humans (1872), and was 
later elaborated as a psychological theory by Tomkins (1962, 1963), Izard (1977) 
and Ekman (1992). The basic premise of this tradition is that human emotions 
have developed in evolution to fulfil fundamental adaptive functions, and are 
organised into discrete affect programs with distinctive expressive, behavioural, 
and neurophysiological patterns.  
Jamesian, Somatic, Perceptual, or Psychological Constructionist theories. This 
theoretical tradition has roots in the work of James (1884), who proposed that 
emotions are not organised into naturally-predetermined types, but emerge 
when we feel the bodily changes that occur after the perception of an exciting 
stimulus (James, 1884, pp. 189–190). This emphasis on the interaction between 
perception of bodily feelings and contextual information is still the central 
assumption present in all the theories within this approach (Barrett, 2006b; J. J. 
Prinz, 2004; Russell, 2003; Schachter & Singer, 1962). – A notable exception is 
Damasio’s theory, according to which emotions occur thanks to the re-activation 
of neural patterns that represent bodily states as if they were actually 
happening. This theory is also different from the rest in that it proposes that the 
resulting emotions correspond to basic emotions (Damasio, 1994). 
Social constructionist theories. These theories are inspired by sociological theories 
such as Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) and by the culturalist approach to 
cognitive development proposed by Vygotsky (1978). For these theories, 
emotions are determined by the sociocultural context in which they occur, and 
are considered as culturally-prescribed performances that regulate and 
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constrain the roles that individuals have in a given social context (e.g. Averill, 
1980; Boiger & Mesquita, 2012; Harré, 1986). 
Appraisal theories. This tradition started with the work of Arnold (1960), who 
proposed that emotions are caused by processes of cognitive evaluation of the 
meaning of a stimulus. Although this premise is still central to contemporary 
appraisal theories, they vary in the number of appraisals they propose, and in 
the number and type of emotions that result from the process of evaluation 
(Lazarus, 1966; Moors, 2013; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Scherer, 2009a; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
The different ways in these theories conceptualise their object of study entail other 
fundamental disagreements among them, as I summarise below. 
 
1.1.1 Disagreement 1: The Process of Emotion Causation 
Theories vary in the importance they have allocated to the question of how emotions 
are elicited, and therefore, they also differ in the level of detail they have provided 
about this process. 
The main concern of researchers working in the Basic Emotion tradition has been to 
demonstrate the phylogenetic origin of emotions, and therefore, they have 
concentrated on finding evidence for the existence of universal expressions of emotion, 
not on explaining how emotions are aroused. Hence, these theories simply propose that 
emotions are triggered when we face the same fundamental life-tasks that our 
ancestors did during the evolution of the species (Ekman, 1992). 
For the Social Constructionist approach, the question of how emotions are caused is 
also secondary. For these theories, having an emotional response depends on learning a 
socially-prescribed script that determines how to interpret situations, how to display the 
emotional state, and how to label it. Consequently, researchers in this approach have 
been less concerned with the mental and bodily aspects of emotion, and have focused 
instead on finding evidence for cultural and historical differences in people’s emotional 
vocabulary (e.g. Harré, 1986; Hurtado de Mendoza, Fernández-Dols, Parrott, & Carrera, 
2010). 
The question about emotion causation is more important for the Jamesian or 
Constructionist approach, where the focus has been on explaining the nature of the 
6 
 
subjective feelings that are essential to emotional experiences. Since this tradition 
explains emotions as emerging from the interaction of proprioceptive feelings of bodily 
changes and contextual information, researchers in this tradition have attempted to 
demonstrate how different contextual situations produce a variety of emotional 
responses (e.g. Carroll & Russell, 1996; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; Schachter & Singer, 
1962). 
The Appraisal theories tradition considers the elicitation question as crucial. For 
these theories, emotions are triggered when we encounter a stimulus or situation that 
we evaluate as relevant for our goals and well-being. Hence, investigators within this 
paradigm have concentrated on identifying the dimensions in which stimuli are 
appraised, and the effects of those appraisals on different aspects of emotional 
responses (e.g. Bossuyt, Moors, & De Houwer, 2014; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Scherer, 
2009b). 
 
1.1.2 Disagreement 2: The Relationship between Emotional 
Categories 
Most theoretical traditions share the assumption that emotions are “continuous and 
continuously varying phenomena” (Frijda, 2008, p. 73), instead of psychologically or 
biologically discrete events (Barrett, 2006; Harré, 1986; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2009a). 
This premise has three implications. First, there is a potentially infinite number of 
emotional categories (Scherer, 2009b). Second, the difference between an emotion 
category and another is a matter of degree. And third, the boundaries between 
emotions and other affective states categories depend on linguistic and conceptual 
distinctions, rather than on biological ones (Fugate & Barrett, 2014; Lindquist, Barrett, 
Bliss-Moreau, & Russell, 2006). 
For the Basic Emotion tradition, by contrast, emotions are essentially discrete 
phenomena. The central claim of these theories is that each fundamental “basic” 
emotion is associated with biologically distinctive sub-systems, and forms the basis of all 
other emotions.1 
 
                                                            
1
 I provide a more detailed and critical review of the claims of Basic Emotion theories in Chapter 
3. 
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1.1.3 Disagreement 3: Affective Dimensions 
All theories coincide in that emotions can be described by using at least two dimensions: 
valence and activation. Valence consists in the degree to which an experience, a 
stimulus, or situation, is experienced as pleasant/unpleasant, good/bad, 
appetitive/aversive, etc. Activation or arousal, in turn, refers to the degree of 
mobilization or energy involved in any affective reaction (Russell & Barrett, 1999). From 
a physiological point of view, arousal refers to the level of excitation of the autonomic 
nervous system, whereas from a subjective point of view, it refers to the felt intensity of 
the emotional response (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012).  
Some theorists have proposed to further distinguish the arousal dimension as 
constituted by two components: energetic arousal, which consists of the degree of 
experienced wakefulness (ranging from feeling sleepy to feeling awake), and tense 
arousal, which consists of the degree of experienced mental stress (ranging from feeling 
calm to feeling nervous) (Schimmack & Rainer, 2002; Thayer, 1989). Furthermore, based 
on analyses of linguistic categories, several authors have proposed a third emotional 
dimension, consisting of the degree of experienced control or power that we have over 
the eliciting situation, and that ranges from feelings of weakness, submission or 
vulnerability, to feelings of strength, domination and power (Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, 
& Ellsworth, 2007; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). 
Despite this relative consensus around the concepts of valence and arousal, a further 
disagreement between theories is that some researchers consider these affective 
dimensions mere conceptual characterisations (e.g. Ekman, 1992; Mulligan & Scherer, 
2012), whereas others regard them as the fundamental psychological and physiological 
building blocks of all affects (e.g. Russell, 2003). 
 
1.1.4 Disagreement 4: The Components of Emotions 
An analysis of the empirical strategies used in affective science shows that 
independently of their theoretical paradigm, all researchers have explicitly or implicitly 
acknowledged that emotions are made up of several components, and consequently 
they have investigated them by measuring one or several of these components at a 
time. Thus, researchers have studied the feeling component of emotions (by asking 
people to report how they feel), the motor or expressive component (by observing the 
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facial, vocal, and postural changes associated with emotional states), the somatic 
component (by studying patterns of neural activity and physiological changes), the 
cognitive component (e.g. by examining the way people evaluate the situation that 
elicits the emotional response), and the motivational component (by exploring the urges 
or impulses that people experience when they undergo an emotion).  
It is possible to find points of disagreement in this point, too. Emotion theories vary 
in the number of components they include, and the relative importance that they 
allocate to them (Moors, 2009). For instance, Basic Emotion theories regard the motor-
expressive component of emotions as the most informative one (e.g. Matsumoto & 
Willingham, 2009), whereas Appraisal theories consider the cognitive component as the 
essential one (e.g. Moors, 2013).  
 
1.2 A consensual definition 
Despite the diverse panorama presented so far, I do not draw from it the pessimistic 
conclusion that it is not possible to reach accord about the definition of emotion in the 
near future. Indeed, a review of the definitions proposed by authors as varied as Scherer 
(Mulligan & Scherer, 2012; Scherer, 2005), Moors (2009), Frijda (2008), Juslin & Sloboda 
(2010b), Clore & Ortony (2013), Cunningham et al. (Cunningham, Dunfield, & Stillman, 
2013), and Barrett (2014), yields several points of agreement that can be summarized as 
follows: 
Emotions are reactions of short duration to events or objects that are valued as 
relevant for the person’s well-being, goals, and/or personal values. This 
evaluation of an object or event as good/bad, pleasant/unpleasant, 
attractive/repulsive, moral/immoral, etc. occurs in several subsystems or 
components which tend to become synchronized. The components involved in 
emotional episodes (can) include: a cognitive component (i.e. appraisals of the 
meaning of the event, situation or object), a somatic component (i.e. central and 
peripheral neurophysiological changes), a motor component (i.e. expressive 
behaviour), a motivational component (i.e. action tendencies, urges, or states of 
action readiness), and a feeling component (i.e. the subjective emotional 
experience).  
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In this thesis, I adopt this consensual definition of emotion as the starting point for 
building operational definitions, and for establishing conceptual boundaries between 
emotions proper, and other related affective states: 
1. This definition implies that states that are not clearly valenced (i.e. experienced as 
good or bad) are not emotions. Thus, it excludes affective states such as interest, 
expectation, and surprise (at least during the first few seconds of this reaction), or 
physiological states such as heightened arousal. 
2. The presence of changes in a single component in isolation cannot be taken as sign 
of the presence of an emotional episode. This means that the mere presence of 
behaviours (such as tapping a foot), of facial expressions (such as smiling or 
frowning), of evaluations (such as judgements about the beauty of a musical piece), 
of motivations (such as an urge to dance), or of physiological changes (such as chills) 
should not be considered, by themselves, as indicators of emotional states. 
3. Feelings, the subjective experience of having an emotion, constitute only one of the 
components of emotion, albeit a very important one. It can be argued that learning 
about this subjective aspect of people’s emotional experiences can provide us with 
information about how the person construes the current situation that we cannot 
access with any other measurement technique. However, feelings are not exclusive 
to emotions: other affective states, such as moods and preferences are also “felt”, 
and even non-emotional states such as curiosity, physical pain, and hunger involve 
subjective feelings. Therefore, asking people to report how they feel is useful, but at 
the same time, it does not provide us with sufficient information to establish that 
they are undergoing an emotional episode.  
4. Emotions can be distinguished from moods in that emotions are intentional (i.e. 
they are directed towards objects or events which are perceived as causes of the 
reaction). Also, emotions are more intense, and of shorter duration than moods.  
5. Attitudes are beliefs and predispositions towards objects or people (Scherer, 2005, 
p. 703). This implies that while attitudes can predispose a person to have certain 
emotional reactions, emotional reactions are always situated reactions, and 
therefore involve specific objects or events that are experienced as present or 
imminent in a specific context. 
6. Preferences are more basic affective reactions than emotions. Preferences are 
simply evaluative judgments of stimuli in terms of liking or disliking, and of 
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predilection over another stimulus. Preferences are associated with basic 
approaching/avoiding tendencies (Scherer, 2005, p. 703). 
7. There are other affective states that are not as diffuse and long-lasting as moods, 
but at the same time, are less discrete and object-focused than full-blown emotions. 
Several authors have proposed slightly different conceptual categories to describe 
them:  
 Ortony, Norman and Revelle (2005) distinguish between proto-affect, 
primitive emotions, and emotions. Proto-affects consist of basic approach 
and avoidance responses. Primitive emotions comprise automatic responses 
to present or expected events, and include awareness (but not self-
awareness). Emotions consist of cognitively elaborated states of affective 
feeling, experienced as discrete states with a cause.  
 Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007) distinguish between automatic 
affect and emotions. Automatic affects consist of fleeting automatic 
responses that are not more than a quick twinge of feeling that something is 
good or bad, or liking or disliking for something. These responses arise and 
dissipate quickly, involve very little cognitive elaboration, and drive 
behavioural responses. Emotions by contrast, consist of conscious reactions 
experienced as discrete states, that arise and dissipate slowly, result from 
appraisals, are experienced as saturated with cognitions, and do not directly 
drive behaviours.  
 Cunningham and Zelazo (2007) take a slightly different approach to 
distinguish affective states from one another: instead of talking of different 
categories, they suggest that the affective evaluation of an object takes 
place through an iterative sequence. The first iterations of this cycle occur 
exclusively within evolutionary primitive neural structures like the amygdala, 
but the subsequent iterations involve progressively cortical ones. The result 
of this process is that every iteration yields progressively richer and 
contextually meaningful representations. Evaluations based on few 
iterations are unconscious and automatic, whereas evaluations based on 
additional iterations become relatively reflective.  
As can be seen from this brief summary, despite their differences, all these 
theories share the assumption that, besides the traditional distinction between 
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moods and emotions, a complete description of affects should include basic 
responses characterised by being quick, automatic, unconscious, and by containing 
little cognitive elaboration. 
8. The existence of these quick, automatic and primitive responses highlights the 
importance that consciousness has in distinguishing emotions from other affective 
states. Recent evidence has shown that presenting subliminal stimuli to participants 
can make them undergo unconscious affective reactions, as demonstrated by their 
subsequent evaluations of stimuli (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993), and by their behaviour 
(Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). However, the type of affective reactions 
demonstrated in these studies only amounts to preferences. That is, these affective 
reactions are no more than automatic evaluations about the “goodness” or 
“badness” of an object, which correlate with approach or avoidance behaviours. To 
my knowledge, no research so far has demonstrated this type of unconscious effect 
beyond this basic level (Schooler, Mrazek, Baird, & Winkielman, 2015).  
9. In contrast, defining emotions as intense affective reactions to personally relevant 
objects and events implies that these affective reactions cannot be completely 
unconscious. In other words, emotions are always felt, they are experienced as part 
of the content of the individual’s perceptual present, and therefore, they always 
involve first order awareness (Edelman, 2001). At the same time, however, this 
definition does not require emotions to involve self-reflective awareness or higher-
order consciousness. In other words, having an emotional experience is independent 
of perceiving that one is undergoing that emotional reaction, and of labelling with 
an emotional adjective (e.g. “I am feeling sad”, or “this music makes me happy”).  
Lambie and Marcel’s theory (2002) about the role of consciousness in emotional 
experiences offers a useful classification that can further clarify this point. According 
to these authors, it is possible to have two types of emotional reactions depending 
on where the focus of attention is placed. In world-focused emotions, our attention 
is placed on the properties of the object or event, which we perceive as inviting or 
repulsive, moral or immoral, welcoming or threatening, etc. In self-focused 
emotions, we take a reflective attitude, and therefore our attention is placed on how 
we feel enhanced or diminished, powerful or weak, rightful or morally stained, etc. 
This distinction parallels Clarke’s (2014) discussion about how music can also be 
experienced in different levels of consciousness, which do not always involve high-
order consciousness. 
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From my point of view, embracing the consensual and restrictive definition of 
emotion proposed above has the advantage of defining the object of study that theories 
of musically-induced emotions should aim to explain. However, at the same time, there 
is also the risk of adopting a definition so restrictive that it excludes other important 
affective reactions that people experience with music and that may possibly be more 
common than emotional episodes. I dedicate the next section to discuss the extent to 
which music elicits a variety of affective states beyond emotions. 
 
1.3 What type of affective reactions can music induce? 
A recent review of studies on music and emotion (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2013) found that 
more than half of the reviewed papers (53.49%) measured the participants’ induced 
affective states by asking them to select one or more adjectives from a list. Most of 
these studies (75%) included basic emotions in their questionnaires (usually joy, 
sadness, and anger), frequently mixed with other adjectives considered to be relevant 
for musical experiences (e.g. peacefulness, solemnity, tenderness, distress and surprise) 
(p. 312). Other studies, in contrast, used ad-hoc lists of emotional adjectives constructed 
by the researchers, in many cases without clear theoretical basis – a situation that 
makes comparing the results from different studies very difficult. This methodological 
tendency to use self-report questionnaires of emotional adjectives suggests that the 
majority of researchers have implicitly or explicitly assumed that music generally induces 
a relatively small number of full-blown, discrete emotions. However, once we step out 
of the laboratory and study people’s everyday experiences with music, we start to find 
that affective experiences with music are much more varied, and probably much less 
discrete than experimental research has assumed (c.f. Sloboda, 2010).  
First, studies using in-depth interviews about uses of music in everyday life have 
found that people use music for a variety of functions, such as relaxing, passing the time, 
creating an atmosphere, accompanying other activities, and helping concentration 
(Greasley & Lamont, 2011). In many of these situations music seems to fulfil these 
functions at least in part thanks to the effects that it has on people’s moods and 
emotional states (Sloboda & O’Neill, 2001). However, even though most participants in 
these studies display detailed knowledge about the type of music that they need to 
listen in every circumstance, they do not always choose to talk about these emotional 
effects in terms of specific emotions. Thus, in studies with adolescents, adults, and older 
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people, many participants use eloquent but unspecific expressions such as music 
“creating an atmosphere”, helping them “release tension”, “lifting them up”, helping 
them “become energized”, or “having a better feeling” (Saarikallio & Erkkila, 2007); 
music getting them “going” or “in the mood”, making them “feel good”, “keeping their 
mind working” (DeNora, 2000); music making them feel “awake, thinking well, 
functioning well”, giving them “pleasure”; experiencing music as a “reflection”, 
“complement” or “extension” of themselves; and music “clarifying” their current mood 
(Hays & Minichiello, 2005). 
A second line of enquiry that demonstrates the existence of a great diversity in 
affective experiences with music is Gabrielsson’s research into strong experiences with 
music (Gabrielsson, 2001). In his studies participants reported a variety of positive and 
negative feelings that go beyond basic emotions (e.g. gratitude, bliss, sexual feelings, 
pride, patriotism, jealousy, despair, worry, confusion, longing, etc.), and include mixed 
feelings (e.g. feeling tired and happy at the same time), quasi-physical reactions (e.g. 
feeling weightless, floating, carried away, charged, “out of the body”), and feelings that 
they could not describe with words (e.g. "it was an experience that goes far beyond my 
verbal and intellectual capacity, something I can only slightly touch with words") 
(Gabrielsson & Lindström, 2003, p. 170). Similarly, in a study using an open-ended 
questionnaire with music experts, Scherer, Zentner and Schacht (2002) found that 
participants perceived that music expresses and induces both discrete emotions and 
unspecific feelings, but they reported the later type more frequently.  
This variety of types of affective responses is evident even in the results of two 
recent research programs that have tried to create standard questionnaires of musically-
induced emotions. One of these projects has been carried out by Juslin and 
collaborators. In a series of studies using the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) and 
close-ended questionnaires they have identified what they consider to be the seven 
most frequently induced emotions (Juslin & Laukka, 2004; Juslin, Liljeström, Laukka, 
Västfjäll, & Lundqvist, 2011; Juslin, Liljeström, Västfjäll, Barradas, & Silva, 2008). An 
examination of this list makes it evident that some of these affective responses 
correspond to moods and other diffuse affective reactions, rather than to full-blown, 
discrete emotions, namely: calm-contentment, pleasure, interest and expectancy. (The 
remaining categories do correspond to discrete emotions: happiness, elation, nostalgia-
longing, sadness-melancholy, and anger-irritation). The same conclusion can be reached 
by analysing the Geneva Music-Induced Affect Checklist (Coutinho & Scherer, 2015) 
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developed at the University of Geneva as an update of their GEMS instrument (Zentner, 
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2008). Some of the factors they propose are better described as 
moods (and even as action tendencies) than as discrete emotions: relaxed-peaceful, 
powerful-strong, tense-nervous, moved-touched, energized-lively, and wanting to 
dance. (The other factors in this instrument consist of a mixture of everyday emotions 
and aesthetic evaluations: joyful, sad-melancholic, nostalgic-sentimental, feeling 
tenderness-affection, indifferent-bored, fascinated-captivated, filled with wonder-
amazed, feeling transcendence-experiencing the sublime, feeling perfection-
experiencing beauty). 
Finally, the results of several recent studies on experiences with sad sounding music 
also show that far from being a single phenomenon, there are important sub-types of 
emotional experiences with this music: while some listeners undergo painful feelings of 
misery and grief, others become filled with bittersweet feelings of nostalgia, and yet 
others, experience mostly positive feelings of calm, relaxation and admiration of the 
music’s beauty (Eerola, Peltola, & Vuoskoski, 2015; Garrido & Schubert, 2011; Van den 
Tol & Edwards, 2011). It is easy to see how these subtle but important variations in 
people’s affective experiences with sad music would probably go “under the radar” of 
close-ended questionnaires which only include basic emotions as response options (e.g. 
sad, happy, angry, and scared).  
Two conclusions can be drawn at this point. First, that the evidence from 
contemporary research indicates that people’s affective experiences with music are 
varied, and do not always correspond to full-blown, discrete emotions. Second, that 
while the efforts for identifying frequently induced emotions and constructing 
standardised questionnaires have the advantage of increasing comparability among 
studies, they also entail the risk of narrowing the scope of research to a handful of 
discrete emotions deemed as more important or fundamental. In other words, there is 
the risk of becoming effectively “blind” to interesting and relevant affective phenomena 
by implicitly assuming that the emotions that we can manipulate and measure, are the 
only ones that music induces, or the only ones worth studying. In this sense, research 
into music-induced emotion runs the risk of making the same mistake that affective 
science has made through the years, where there is a great imbalance between the 
study of the so-called basic emotions and the rest of emotions in human experience. 
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1.4 What should a psychological theory of musically-
induced emotions include? 
In a review of philosophical and psychological theories of emotion causation, Moors 
(2009) proposes that ideally, an emotion theory should aim to address three types of 
questions or “problems”: 
The elicitation problem. A good theory should be able to explain which stimuli elicit an 
emotion, which do not, and how the organism determines this2.  
The intensity problem. A good theory should explain which stimuli elicit weak emotions, 
and which elicit strong ones; and what mechanisms determine these variations 
in intensity.  
The differentiation problem. A good theory should explain which stimuli, mechanisms 
and representations determine the elicitation of positive vs. negative emotions, 
and which of these mechanisms determine the elicitation of specific emotions 
(anger, fear, sadness, joy, etc.) 
I suggest that a theory of musically-induced emotions should also attempt to answer 
these questions. Moreover, in line with the evidence presented in the previous section, I 
submit that in the context of music, the intensity problem should also include a 
satisfying explanation of how and why people’s affective experiences with music vary in 
a continuum that goes from mild, fleeting, unmemorable, world-focused affective 
reactions, to strong, long-lasting, memorable, self-focused emotional episodes. 
My hope is that, by aiming to answer these questions, this ideal theory would not 
only be scientifically valid, but also relevant beyond the boundaries of the fields of music 
psychology and empirical musicology. From my point of view, a theory that manages to 
offer such a comprehensive account of musical affects would enable us, music 
psychologists, to dialogue with other disciplines such as music therapy, historical 
musicology, ethnomusicology, popular music studies, sociology of music, etc., where 
individual, historical, and sociocultural variability are essential. 
 
                                                            
2 Research has estimated that music induces emotions in only about 55-65% of the music 
listening episodes (Sloboda & O’Neill, 2001). 
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1.5 Structure of the rest of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter, I present a critical 
review of the two most influential contemporary theories of induction of musical 
emotions: Juslin and colleagues’ BRECVEMA (Juslin, 2013a; Juslin et al., 2010; Juslin & 
Västfjäll, 2008), and Scherer and colleagues’ Multifactorial Process Model (Scherer, 
2004; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013; Scherer & Zentner, 2001). I also argue that the most 
important limitation of these theories is that they have adopted a psychological 
reductionist approach, which neglects the social and symbolic dimensions of musical 
experiences, and the way these affective reactions emerge from the interaction of 
bodily, psychological, and situational factors. As part of this critical review, in chapters 
two and three I also present theoretical and empirical arguments to refute the claim, 
present in the BRECVEMA theory, that the activation of individual psychological 
mechanisms can lead to the induction of full-blown emotions. Chapter 3 in particular, 
examines the hypothesis proposed by that theory that emotions are induced via a 
process of emotional contagion. There, I criticise the assumption that this phenomenon 
occurs thanks to the existence of a shared acoustic code in vocalizations and music, 
which is organised around a set of basic emotions. I show the problems with the concept 
of basic emotions, and with the empirical evidence that proponents of the BRECVEMA 
theory have presented to support their claims, and I propose an alternative 
interpretation of that evidence.  
In chapters four and five I present a theoretical proposal that aims to overcome the 
shortcomings I identified in contemporary theories of musical emotions. Chapter four 
describes the main theoretical assumptions shared by constructionist theories of 
emotion: the principle that emotions are situated affective states, the principle that 
emotions emerge from the interaction of systems that are not specific to emotions, and 
the principle that emotions have properties that are not evident in their components. I 
also dedicate that chapter to explain how these theories account for the process of 
emotion elicitation (emphasising Barrett’s Conceptual Act Theory, 2006).  
In chapter five I present a theoretical proposal that adapts these principles to explain 
the phenomena of musically-induced emotions. This theory suggests that when we 
listen to music, two types of mechanisms become activated, and that their interaction 
can lead to the emergence of a variety of emotional and non-emotional states. The first 
type of mechanisms consists of embodied perceptual processes that induce fluctuations 
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in valence and arousal. The second type consists of a group of conceptual mechanisms 
that become activated by the music and the listening situation, and shape the 
fluctuations in core affect, producing the emergence of emotional and non-emotional 
responses.  
Chapters six, seven, and eight present three empirical studies that test some of the 
hypotheses derived from my theoretical proposal. In general terms, these experiments 
test the claim that embodied processes of perceptual resonance produce fluctuations in 
core affect, and that the activation of associative mechanisms transform those 
fluctuations into a variety of emotional experiences. More specifically, the experiment in 
chapter six tests the hypothesis that listening to music while engaging in motor 
entrainment (as compared to listening without moving) leads to the induction of 
fluctuations in core affect. The experiment in chapter seven tests the hypothesis that 
processes of embodied simulation underlie emotional contagion with music. Chapter 
eight also tests this hypothesis by using a different method, and explores how these 
simulation mechanisms interact with associative processes activated by extra-musical 
information. Besides pursuing these theoretical aims, these experiments also involved 
the exploration of two indirect techniques for the measurement of musically-induced 
changes in affect, and the development of a novel questionnaire that measures the 
action tendencies, physical sensations, and appraisals that listeners experience while 
listening to the music. 
Finally, in chapter nine, I evaluate the achievements and shortcoming of the thesis. I 
identify the strengths of my theoretical proposal, and its points of coincidence and 
difference with other contemporary theories of emotion elicitation. I also show how the 
findings of my empirical studies led me to rethink and revise some of the claims of my 
theory, and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the methodological strategies 
I adopted in those studies. Finally, I discuss the implications of my theory for future 
research.  
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2. Current theories of musically-
induced emotions 
Several theorists have proposed mechanisms to explain the induction of musical 
emotions. Meyer (1956) and Huron (2006) have proposed that the fulfilment, 
postponement or violation of expectancies evoked by music can lead to the induction of 
emotions. Davis (2013), Overy and Molnar- Szakacs (2009) and Cochrane (2010a) have 
proposed that listening to music can arouse emotional reactions in listeners thanks to 
the activation of emotional contagion mechanisms. Several authors have focused on 
how experiences of sensorimotor engagement with music (e.g. rhythmic entrainment) 
lead to affective reactions to music (Colling & Thompson, 2013; Trost & Vuilleumier, 
2013; Witek et al. 2014). Instead of addressing all of these theories in detail, I 
concentrate the following critical review on the two perspectives that have integrated 
these and other mechanisms into theoretical systems, thus offering comprehensive 
explanations of all the possible ways in which music can induce emotions in listeners: 
Juslin’s BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 2013b; Juslin et al., 2010; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) and 
Scherer’s Multifactorial Process Model (Scherer, 2004; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013; 
Scherer & Zentner, 2001). 
 
2.1 Juslin and colleagues’ BRECVEMA theory 
The BRECVEMA theory assumes as its starting point that musical emotions cannot be 
accounted for by mechanisms of cognitive appraisal because, unlike everyday emotions, 
musical stimuli are not generally relevant for the individual’s goals and survival. With 
this premise, Juslin and collaborators have identified eight psychological mechanisms, 
which according to them, do not involve cognitive appraisal, and that lead to the 
induction of a variety of affective states, from general arousal, to full-blown, discrete 
emotions. These mechanisms are not exclusively dedicated to processing musical 
19 
 
information, but have developed through evolution to process auditory events and to 
guide future behaviour (Juslin, 2013b, p. 240). 
Brain stem reflex. A primitive and automatic response to sudden acoustic events in 
the music (sudden, loud, dissonant or accelerating sounds) which would induce 
feelings of surprise and increased arousal in the listener.  
Rhythmic entrainment. A mechanism activated when the music has marked rhythm, 
so that “some internal bodily rhythm of the listener” adjusts and locks-in to a 
common periodicity (Juslin et al. 2010, p. 621). This synchronization, in turn, 
would lead to increased arousal, and it could also potentially induce feelings of 
communion. 
Evaluative conditioning. A mechanism activated because of the repeated association 
of a piece of music with other positive or negative stimuli. It would lead to the 
induction of the same basic emotions even in absence of the other stimuli. 
Emotional contagion. A process of internal mimicry of basic emotions expressed by 
the music that would lead to the induction of the same basic emotion in the 
listener. 
 Visual imagery. A mechanism whereby the listener builds inner images of an 
emotional character through metaphorical mapping of the changes in the 
musical stream. This would usually induce feelings of pleasure and deep 
relaxation, but it could potentially induce any emotion. 
Episodic memory. The process of conscious association of a particular piece of music 
with a specific emotional event in the listener’s life which produces the 
reinstatement of the same emotion in the present situation. This mechanism 
could potentially induce any emotion, but it would frequently lead to the 
induction of feelings of nostalgia, pride and longing. 
Music expectancy. A mechanism whereby emotions are induced when the schematic 
expectations aroused by the music are violated, delayed or confirmed. This 
mechanism would induce feelings of interest, anxiety, surprise, hope, 
disappointment and chills. 
Aesthetic Judgment. A mechanism activated when a listener assumes a 
contemplative or evaluative attitude towards music. It would lead to 
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experiences of wonder, satisfaction, admiration or merely pleasure (or of 
boredom, irritation, or frustration if the evaluation of the music is negative).  
 
2.2 Scherer and colleagues’ Multifactorial Process Model 
Scherer’s theory of induction of musical emotions is an extension of his theory of 
emotion causation, the Components Process Model (CPM) (Scherer, 2009b). Developed 
within the tradition of appraisal theories (e.g. Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), the CPM theory proposes that emotions are elicited 
when an event is evaluated in terms of its relevance, its consequences for the person’s 
goals, the person’s ability to cope with those consequences, and the significance of the 
event for the person’s self-concept and social norms. All of these appraisal checks 
happen in quick succession, producing changes in multiple physiological and behavioural 
subsystems which, when coordinated, produce the event-focused responses that we call 
emotional episodes.  
Perhaps because of the emphasis that the CPM model places on cognitive appraisal, 
Scherer has proposed that musical emotions cannot be fully accounted for by this type 
of processing, and therefore, they constitute a different type of emotional experience. In 
his view, even though appraisals can still be present when we experience music, they 
play a small role in the production of musically-induced emotions, because musical 
events do not usually have any urgent consequences for the individual’s survival or well-
being. Thus, Scherer proposes that musical emotions (and emotions elicited by art 
objects in general) are better thought of as aesthetic and epistemic emotions (Scherer, 
2004). These emotions are different from regular, utilitarian emotions in that rather 
than being driven by concerns about our adaptation and well-being, aesthetic and 
epistemic emotions are driven by the evaluation of the intrinsic qualities of the piece of 
art, and “the degree of discovery and insight one achieves through novel and complex 
simulation in different modalities” (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013, p. 125). Hence, besides 
the appraisal checks involved in the elicitation of any emotion (relevance, implications, 
coping potential, and normative significance), Scherer and Coutinho have proposed four 
additional routes to the induction of musical emotions: memory associations, contagion 
and empathy, entrainment, and facilitation of pre-existing emotions (2013). 
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Appraisal. This route consists of the appraisal checks proposed for utilitarian 
emotions adapted to the case of music listening. Thus, Scherer and colleagues 
consider that low-level detection mechanisms such as brainstem reflexes and 
evaluative conditioning correspond to checks of novelty and intrinsic 
pleasantness; whereas the mechanism of musical expectancies corresponds to 
the discrepancy from expectation check. They also adapt the coping potential 
check from the CPM to include evaluations of agency (e.g. who is responsible for 
what happens the music?) and control (e.g. to what extent can I control what 
happens in/with the music?). Finally, they adapt the normative significance 
check to include the assessment of the aesthetic value of music (equivalent to 
Juslin’s aesthetic judgments mechanism). 
Memory Associations. In this route, past emotional events are evoked or re-
combined, producing re-instatements of previous emotions. Thus, this route 
encompasses Juslin’s episodic memory and visual imagery mechanisms.  
Entrainment. This route coincides with the rhythmic entrainment mechanism 
proposed by Juslin. However, unlike Juslin et al. (2010), Scherer and colleagues 
do not specify which specific emotions this mechanism can induce. They just 
speculate that this mechanisms either “produces” or “intensifies” subjective 
feelings (2013, p. 125). 
Emotional contagion. This route corresponds to Juslin’s mechanism of the same 
name. The main difference with Juslin’s proposal, is that for Scherer and 
colleagues, not only the acoustic characteristics of music can induce contagion; 
for them, the observation (or imagining) of the motor expressions involved in 
making the musical sounds can also lead to motor mimicry, and to emotional 
contagion.  
Empathy. This route is different from contagion, in that the listener does not merely 
mimic the emotions expressed by the music or the musicians, but assumes an 
understanding attitude towards the observed persons, so that empathic feelings 
are aroused. They propose that this mechanism would be particularly important 
in live performances and in social listening settings.  
Facilitation. In this route, emotional responses to music are aroused because the 
listening experience weakens or eliminates the control over the expression of a 
pre-existing emotion, producing a disinhibition effect.  
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2.3 Points of coincidence: types of mechanisms 
As was probably made evident in the previous section, despite their apparent 
differences, there are several points of coincide between the BRECVEMA and the 
Multifactorial approaches. I summarise these coincidences below, using the 
classification of mechanisms of emotion elicitation proposed by Moors (2009). This 
classification shows how both theories propose the same types of psychological 
processing: rule-based mechanisms, association mechanisms, and sensorimotor 
mechanisms: 
Rule-based mechanisms involve on-line computation of appraisals, that is, evaluations of 
the significance of the musical stimulus for the individual’s goals (Clore & 
Ortony, 2000; Moors, 2009). These goals can be implicit, and based on 
perceptual representations (such as the goal of predicting how a musical phrase 
will continue), or explicit, and based on propositional representations (such as 
the goal of listening to a piece of music in order to evoke cherished memories). 
Hence, appraisal mechanisms range from very quick, primitive, and automatic 
computations, to slow, sophisticated, and deliberative ones. This broad view of 
appraisal as a process of stimulus evaluation (Moors, 2013), implies that, 
contrary to the Juslin and colleagues’ claims (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008), their 
theory includes cognitive appraisal mechanisms. 
Among the group of mechanisms based on quick, non-conscious appraisals 
we find the musical expectancy mechanism, included in both theories. Since in 
this mechanism the listener’s implicit goal is to predict how the music will unfold 
(Huron, 2006), then this mechanism can be regarded as a form of appraisal 
where the brain evaluates the success of its predictions by comparing the 
discrepancy between the expected sound and the actual sound in the musical 
stimulus. The results of this evaluation (i.e. the detected level of discrepancy), 
triggers an affective evaluation of the music. The intrinsic pleasantness check 
proposed by Scherer also belongs to this category, because in this mechanism, 
some aspects of the music (e.g. consonant sounds or soft timbres vs. dissonant 
and rough timbres) are implicitly and automatically appraised as good or bad. 
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Both theories also include mechanisms that involve slow, conscious 
appraisals. Evaluations about the aesthetic value of the music are likely to 
depend on conscious considerations about the music’s novelty, message, 
expressiveness, beauty, and its accordance to stylistic conventions. 
Furthermore, many of Scherer’s appraisal checks relate to how well the music 
fits the current goals of the individual and so also fall into this category: the 
extent to which the music fulfils the goal of the listener (e.g. relaxing, producing 
enjoyment, acquiring knowledge, etc.), the extent to which it relates to the 
listeners’ social identity, and the level of control or agency that the listener has 
over the music. 
The empathy route proposed by Scherer and colleagues can also be assigned 
to this second slow and conscious category, because when listeners empathize 
with the musician’s emotions, the argument is they simulate the motivations 
and appraisal processes that cause the musicians to feel the way they do 
(Scherer & Coutinho, 2013, p. 139) 
Associative mechanisms lead to the induction of emotions through the reinstatement of 
previously computed and stored appraisal patterns (Moors, 2009). These 
mechanisms work by detecting similarities between the present situation and 
past situations with emotional significance for the individual. 
In the case of music this implies that previous associations of music with past 
emotional experiences lead to the reinstatement of those emotions when the 
listener encounters the same (or similar) pieces of music. This can occur without 
any conscious awareness of this link between both stimuli, as in the case of 
evaluative conditioning, or with complete awareness of the associations, as in 
the case of the episodic memories mechanism (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008).  
The visual imagery mechanism proposed by Juslin et al. (2008, 2010, 2013) 
can also be included in this category, because the images and narratives that the 
listener evokes while listening to the music are not completely new, but 
dependent on the activation of past emotional concepts and events. 
Sensorimotor mechanisms. These mechanisms lead to the induction of emotions 
because an aspect of the music generates a sensorimotor resonance in the 
listener’s brain, and this activation in turn activates other components of the 
emotional response. 
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The brain-stem reflexes mechanism proposed by Juslin (and included by 
Scherer as part of the novelty check) works under this principle. This mechanism 
produces innate, fixed and automatic responses to sudden musical events as if 
they signalled threat, thus inducing a startle response. 
The synchronization of the listener’s body to the musical rhythm in the 
entrainment mechanism also belongs to this category, because rather than 
depending on an evaluation of the significance of the musical stimulus, or on 
associations with previous experiences, the rhythmic synchronization occurs 
thanks to a sensorimotor resonance of bodily rhythms with musical ones. This 
resonance in turn produces a cascading effect (i.e. a spreading of activation) to 
other components of the emotion system. 
A similar cascading effect is present in these theories’ proposal of the 
emotional contagion mechanism. In this case, the internal mimicry of either the 
melodic aspects of the music (Juslin et al., 2010), or the motor expressions 
involved in the production of the music (Scherer & Coutinho 2013) produces the 
activation of the whole emotional response. 
 
2.4 Points of discrepancy: predicted induced affective 
states 
Besides the explicit emphasis that Scherer’s theory has on appraisal mechanisms, the 
most important difference between these two theoretical approaches is the predictions 
they make about the type of affective states that the mechanisms induce. For Scherer 
and colleagues, in line with the principles of the CPM model, the role of the theory is not 
to identify how the mechanisms cause specific emotions. Instead, the role of the theory 
is to identify the changes that these mechanisms produce in other subsystems 
(physiological reactions, action tendencies, behaviours, attention shifts, etc.) which 
when combined, produce the emergence of an emotion (Moors, 2014). Therefore, for 
these authors, even though music is more likely to induce some aesthetic emotions, in 
theory, the activation of the different routes and mechanisms can produce the 
activation of patterns of components that can potentially correspond to an infinite 
number of emotions. The authors behind the BRECVEMA theory, by contrast, have 
attempted to map the correspondence between the some of the BRECVEMA 
mechanisms (rhythmic entrainment, evaluative conditioning, visual imagery, episodic 
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memory, expectancy, and emotional contagion) and the induction of discrete emotions, 
regardless of the influence of contextual and personal factors (Juslin, 2013b). 
 
2.5 Strengths and limitations of these theories 
I consider that by proposing these mechanisms and routes, both Juslin and his 
collaborators and Scherer and colleagues have made significant contributions to our 
understanding of how musical emotions are aroused. These theoretical frameworks are 
specific enough to derive empirical hypotheses, and at the same time, interpret past 
results. Nevertheless, I submit that they also have important limitations, most of which 
are related to the psychological reductionist approach that their authors have adopted: 
1. Although these theories acknowledge that musical emotions emerge from the 
interaction of factors in the music, the listening situation and the individual, they 
lack detail about how this interaction occurs, or how it leads to different emotional 
experiences with music. Ultimately, both of these theories assume a psychological 
reductionist approach, focused on the intra-individual mechanisms underlying the 
processing of the musical stimulus. This is more evident in the case of Juslin’s 
BRECVEMA theory, which does not take into consideration the role of the listener’s 
present goals in her emotional responses.  
2. These theories neglect the cultural dimension that is inherent to any musical 
experience. People do not only hear music as a flow of acoustical stimuli, people 
also perceive meanings as if they were embedded “in the music”, and these 
meanings certainly go beyond a limited set of basic emotions. That is, when a 
person listens to music, he or she experiences it as a symbolic object loaded with 
cultural connotations which are contingent on the context of listening, and his or 
her abilities and goals (Clarke, 2005; Dibben, 2001). And in turn, the interaction 
between these culturally-constructed meanings, the structure of the music, and the 
idiosyncrasy of the individual produces particular and contextualized emotional 
experiences (cf. Dibben, 2006).  
3. These theories do not explicitly address the intensity problem (Moors, 2009). They 
do not contain any explanations or predictions about how and why affective 
reactions to music vary in intensity. What makes a person react with an intense 
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emotional response to a piece of music on one occasion, and with a mild emotion 
(or even not react emotionally) on another occasion, or to a similar musical piece? 
4. In making predictions about how different mechanisms lead to the elicitation of 
particular discrete emotions, the BRECVEMA theory addresses the differentiation 
problem (Moors, 2009). However, it does not address the more general question 
about which stimuli and mechanisms determine the induction of positive emotions, 
and which determine the induction of negative ones. 
Scherer’s Multifactorial Process Model does not probe the question of 
differentiation of discrete emotions, because, as mentioned above, this approach 
proposes that the different routes can potentially result in the induction of an 
infinite number of emotions. However, unlike the BRECVEMA theory, Scherer’s 
theory does include some predictions about how musical experiences lead to 
positive or negative affective reactions. Thus, if the results of the cognitive 
appraisals of goal conduciveness, coping potential and compatibility with social 
norms are negative then the listener will probably experience a negative emotional 
reaction. Moreover, this theory also predicts that some basic psychoacoustic 
parameters such as dissonance can intrinsically (and perhaps universally) be 
appraised as negative, and induce feelings of unpleasantness. 
5. Although both the BRECVEMA theory and the Multifactorial Process Model aim to 
explain the emotions most frequently aroused by music, this epistemological 
decision has left unanswered the question of variability. In other words, this narrow 
focus has excluded numerous and important experiences that are certainly 
affective, but cannot be completely captured by the rather restricting concept of 
“emotion”. Among these experiences are: moods, preferences, and quasi-physical 
sensations that are almost ineffable. And of course, by excluding these kinds of 
experiences, these theories have also left unanswered the question about the 
conditions under which these affective states relate to, or become discrete, full-
blown emotions. 
6. Unlike the Multifactorial Process Model, which is embedded within the CPM model 
of emotion causation, Juslin’s BRECVEMA theory does not represent a “unified 
theoretical framework” (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013, p. 132). The mechanisms 
included in the BRECVEMA theory correspond to different levels of psychological 
functioning (e.g. some are thought to be automatic, unconscious and innate, 
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whereas other are thought to be slow, conscious and learned). However, Juslin and 
colleagues have yet to construct a systematic account of how these different levels 
and mechanisms interact with each other. They do not specify, for example, what 
would be the listener’s emotional reaction if two or more mechanisms become 
activated simultaneously, producing different, or even incompatible emotional 
reactions. For example, according to their theory, a sad piece of music could at the 
same time, generate sadness via emotional contagion, evoke feelings of joy via 
episodic memories, and feelings of anxiety through the musical expectancy 
mechanism. Would any of these emotional reactions take prominence in the 
listener’s experience? Or would the listener experience a blend of mixed-emotions? 
Which processes decide between these two alternatives? The BRECVEMA theory 
does not offer any predictions about this type of questions. The only case where 
the theory addresses the case of mixed emotions is that of musically-induced 
sadness, which Juslin speculates can be generated when a contagion response of 
sadness is co-activated with an aesthetic evaluation of the music as beautiful 
(Juslin, 2013b, pp. 258–259). 
7. Finally, given the definition of emotions adopted at the start of this chapter, 
according to which emotional episodes are always directed toward an object, I find 
Juslin and colleagues’ predictions about how the activation of some of the 
BRECVEMA mechanisms can on their own lead to discrete emotions unlikely (Juslin 
& Västfjäll 2008, p. 571, table 4). This prediction seems difficult to reconcile with 
the premise, (shared by both Juslin’s and Scherer’s theories), that musical emotions 
are the product of the interaction of factors in the music, the listener and the 
context. Moreover, the authors of the BRECVEMA theory have backed this 
assumption on the findings of studies that did not control for the simultaneous 
activation of other mechanisms, nor for the influence of personal and contextual 
factors (e.g. Janata, Tomic, & Rakowski, 2007; McKinney, Antoni, Kumar, Tims, & 
McCabe, 1997; Sloboda, 1991). Hence, this lack of control makes it hard to 
conclude the extent to which a single factor was responsible for the induction of 
the observed discrete emotion. 
I dedicate the next section of this chapter to controvert the assumption that the 
activation of single mechanisms can lead, on its own, to the induction of discrete 
emotions. 
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2.6 Can full-blown emotions be induced by the activation of 
single mechanisms? 
Two essential elements in the consensual definition of emotion proposed in chapter one 
are that emotional episodes are always felt as caused by an object, and that they are 
always elicited by personally-relevant events. Several of the mechanisms proposed in 
the BRECVEMA theory (some of which are also included in Scherer’s proposal) can 
clearly lead to the induction of emotions thus defined, because they imply establishing 
associations between the musical stimulus and emotionally meaningful events in the 
listener’s past. As mentioned in section 2.3 above, the episodic memories, evaluative 
conditioning, and visual imagery mechanisms share the same underlying associative 
processing: they activate emotional memories, and this activation in turn re-instates the 
same emotions that the person experienced in the past. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the affective responses activated by these mechanisms constitute emotions proper, 
because these retrieved memories provide them with an element of personal relevance, 
and a sense of “aboutness” (i.e. the memories provide them with objects towards which 
the affective response is directed).  
Controversially, according to the BRECVEMA theory, even mechanisms that do not 
involve associative processing can also induce discrete, full-blown emotional responses. 
Thus, according to Juslin and colleagues, the musical expectancy mechanism leads to the 
induction of anxiety and disappointment, the entrainment mechanism leads to feelings 
of communion, and the emotional contagion mechanism leads to the elicitation of basic 
emotions (Juslin et al. 2008, 2010, 2013). I critically analyse these assumptions in the 
expectancy and the rhythmic entrainment mechanisms in the final sections of this 
chapter. Since the emotional contagion mechanism requires a more exhaustive 
argumentation, I devote the next chapter in its entirety to it. 
 
2.6.1 The Musical Expectancy Mechanism 
My suggestion is that the expectancy mechanism by itself can only lead to the induction 
of quick and diffuse affective responses, the majority of which correspond to small 
changes in arousal that are only detectable by using physiological measurement 
techniques. Several theoretical and empirical arguments support this claim. The 
theoretical arguments can be found in Huron’s ITPRA theory (2006), according to which, 
whenever a piece of music violates a listener’s expectation, the initial “reaction 
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response” is limited to detecting the failure of a prediction. On most occasions this 
response is non-conscious, and only observable in subtle changes in skin conductivity, 
and small variations of electrical activity of the brain (Koelsch, Kilches, Steinbeis, & 
Schelinski, 2008; Steinbeis, Koelsch, & Sloboda, 2006). On other occasions, the violation 
of the expectation can be so obvious that the listener consciously experiences surprise. 
In any case, since these initial responses are either limited to physiological changes, or 
un-valenced (a surprise, while it lasts, is neither positive nor negative), they cannot be 
considered emotions. Indeed, according to Huron’s theory, the reaction response is 
followed by the activation of “slow and more complex” appraisal mechanisms, which 
attribute meaning to the initial startle-like response (Huron, 2006, p. 14). In the ITPRA 
theory, this meaning attribution leads to the induction of conscious affective responses 
such as awe, laughter, comfort, jealousy, contempt, loneliness, compassion, pride and 
humour3 (p. 18). 
Empirical evidence for the claim that the musical expectancy mechanism provokes 
mainly quick changes in arousal can be found in several investigations: First, Sloboda 
(Sloboda, 1991) found that expert musicians’ reports of musically-induced chills tended 
to occur in moments where the music violated harmonic expectations. (According to the 
consensual definition proposed in section 1.2 of Chapter 1, chills are physiological 
responses whose occurrence cannot by itself be considered full-blown emotions). 
Second, an fMRI study conducted by Koelsch and colleagues (Koelsch, Fritz, Schulze, 
Alsop, & Schlaug, 2005) found that violation of harmonic expectations correlated with 
the activation of the orbital frontolateral cortex, a brain area associated with evaluating 
the emotional valence of stimuli. However, in a subsequent experiment Steinbeis, 
Koelsch and Sloboda (Steinbeis et al., 2006) found that violations of musical 
expectancies correlated with measures related to arousal, not with valence. Their results 
indicated that the more the musical stimuli violated the listeners’ harmonic 
expectations, the higher their skin conductance response, their ratings of perceived 
musical tension, and of induced emotional intensity. In contrast, their heart rate activity 
(a physiological measure associated with valence), did not correlate with expectation 
violations. These findings led these researchers to conclude that “harmonic expectancy 
violations lead only to an increase in arousal, rather than bearing on the valence of the 
emotional experience” (p. 1390). A third experiment confirmed this conclusion: Koelsch 
                                                            
3
 It is important to note that for Huron, these appraisal mechanisms are not only slow, but 
conscious.  
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and colleagues (2008) found that unexpected chords were associated with increased 
skin conductance responses, and with neuroelectric responses in the brain, but not with 
changes in heart rate.  
The conclusions of these studies, which focused on violations of harmonic 
expectations, were largely confirmed in a recent experiment that focused on violations 
of melodic expectations. Egermann and colleagues (Egermann, Pearce, Wiggins, & 
McAdams, 2013) asked participants to listen to a live performance of solo flute pieces, 
to rate how unexpected they found the events in the music, and to rate their affective 
experience on the two-dimensional space (i.e. arousal and valence). Additionally, they 
measured the participants’ heart rate, respiration rate, skin conductance response, and 
facial EMG (corrugator and zygomaticus activity). The researchers found that compared 
to melodic events subjectively experienced as very expected, unexpected events were 
associated with higher ratings of experienced arousal, increased skin conductance 
response, and decrease heart rate; but not with changes in experienced valence, 
respiratory rate, nor facial EMG. When the researchers used an objective measure of 
melodic unexpectedness, they observed a small and negative association of highly 
unexpected events with ratings of valence (the regression mode yielded a Beta value of 
.001 for this variable, Table 5 p. 545). Moreover, neither the objective nor the subjective 
measures of unexpectedness (objective and subjective) correlated significantly with the 
participants’ facial behaviour, as measured with EMG. 
In contrast with these studies, which concluded that violations of musical 
expectations are mainly associated with changes in arousal, a couple of studies carried 
out by Juslin and colleagues (2013, 2015) reported that the musical expectancy 
mechanism led to the induction of full-blown emotions. However, as I go on to argue 
below, these results can still be interpreted as supporting the above-mentioned claim. In 
the first of these studies, Juslin, Harmat and Eerola (Juslin, Harmat, & Eerola, 2013) 
synthesised four versions of a musical piece, with the objective of selectively activating 
four mechanisms from the BRECVEMA framework: brain stem responses, emotional 
contagion, episodic memory, and musical expectancy. They found that contrary to their 
prediction, the version intended to activate the expectancy mechanism did not arouse 
anxiety, but irritation. In the second study, Juslin, Barradas and Eerola (Juslin, Barradas, 
& Eerola, 2015) used existing pieces of music with the objective of activating the same 
four mechanisms. Their results showed that as predicted, the pieces aimed at activating 
the expectancy mechanism led to the highest ratings of anxiety, but also, surprisingly, of 
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sadness. They also found that the pieces associated with the induction of negative 
emotions (such as the pieces designed to activate the expectancy mechanism), led to 
increased activation of the corrugator muscle in the participants’ faces (i.e. frowning). 
Why did Juslin and colleagues hypothesise that the expectancy mechanism would 
induce anxiety, and not a more “neutral” response such as surprise, bewilderment or 
confusion? An examination of the stimuli they used can help explain their prediction. In 
the first study, the harmonic structure of the musical stimulus was manipulated to make 
it less conventional, so it ended up resembling “the harmonic choices characteristic of 
Stravinsky’s serial period” (Juslin et al., 2013). In the second study (Juslin et al., 2015), 
the musical pieces intended to activate the expectancy mechanism were avant-garde 
pieces of classical music which depart largely from the harmonic and melodic 
conventions of the common practice period (i.e. pieces by Stravinsky and Berg from the 
first three decades of the 20thcentury). The implication of these methodological 
decisions is that in both studies, the musical stimuli made it really hard to establish any 
stable expectations at all. Moreover, the pieces used in the second study were 
characterised by the presence of dissonant intervals, frequent subito forte sounds, and 
strange melodies, which make them sound like horror movie soundtracks. It is telling 
that in both studies the pieces aimed at activating the expectancy mechanism were the 
least liked overall (except for a repetitive piece used as “neutral” stimulus in the second 
study). Moreover, in the second study, three out of the four stimuli aimed at activating 
the expectancy mechanism elicited the same levels of anxiety as the stimuli aimed at 
activating the brain stem mechanism, which was itself supposed to elicit surprise. 
I believe that given these characteristics of the stimuli, rather than testing the effects 
of violation of expectations per se, these authors tested the effects of being exposed to 
unpleasant music. Taken together, the results of these two studies can be interpreted as 
suggesting that the unpredictability of the music, its constant dissonance, and its subito 
forte sounds, led to increased feelings of negative valence, and to associations of the 
music with horror movie scenes. Thus, an alternative explanation of the finding that 
participants chose discrete emotion adjectives to describe their feelings is that the 
questionnaires used by the researchers contained only discrete emotions as response 
options, and not adjectives describing more general and abstract affective states. 
Perhaps, if presented with the choice between reported they felt “tense”, 
“uncomfortable” or just “bad”, instead of “nervous”, “angry”, or “sad”, the participants 
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would have chosen the first type of general affective adjectives, instead of the discrete 
ones.  
Additionally, the observed variability in the emotions reported by the participants 
can be explained by the activation of associative mechanisms. Thus, the more the 
participants associated the induced unpleasantness with past memories (of movies, for 
example), the more likely they were to report they felt anxious or sad. And the less they 
managed to make those associations, the more they simply felt a state of frustration, 
and chose the “irritation” option in the questionnaire, accordingly. 
 
2.6.2 The Rhythmic Entrainment Mechanism 
A similar argument to the one presented in the previous section can be put forward for 
the case of the rhythmic entrainment mechanism: without the co-activation of 
associative mechanisms and of relevant contextual information, the activation of this 
mechanism can only lead, on its own, to the induction of basic affective responses.  
According to the BRECVEMA theory, in the rhythmic entrainment mechanism, the 
synchronization of “some internal bodily rhythm of the listener” to a “powerful, external 
rhythm in the music” does not only lead to increased arousal, but also to the induction 
of more sophisticated emotional states such as feelings of “communion”, of being 
“connected” and of “emotional bonding” (Juslin, 2013b, p. 241). My suggestion, by 
contrast, is that it is unlikely that a mechanism that involves only the activation of non-
conscious sensorimotor processes such as physiological synchrony has the potential to 
lead to affective reactions beyond fluctuations of arousal and valence. Moreover, I 
propose that only the presence of a relevant listening context in which there are other 
people playing, dancing, or simply moving in synchrony with the music can lead to the 
induction of feelings of communion and of emotional bonding. 
The evidence for the effects of rhythmic entrainment on affective responses is so far 
scarce. (Chapter 6 tests the hypothesis that rhythmic entrainment induces changes in 
arousal and valence). To my knowledge, three recently published experiments have 
provided partial, and somewhat contradictory findings in relation to the hypothesis that 
entrainment leads to changes in arousal, and/or valence, as summarised below. 
The first of these studies aimed at showing how the construct of “groove” is manifest 
in musical behaviour and thinking (Janata, Tomic, & Haberman, 2012). The researchers 
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found that, contrary to their prediction that moving in time with groovy music would be 
pleasant, asking participants to tap along with the music hampered their enjoyment, and 
that the participants’ mood became more negative during the experiment. 
In second place, two research teams carried out experiments investigating rhythmic 
entrainment, but unlike Janata and colleagues, they did not ask the participants to 
produce any observable motor responses to the music, and they did not measure their 
level of physiological entrainment either, a limitation that makes their conclusions 
problematic, since they did not provide any evidence that an aspect of the participants’ 
bodily rhythms synchronized to the music. Thus, using a web-based questionnaire, 
Witek et al. (Witek et al., 2014) asked participants to listen to drum-breaks with 
different levels of syncopation, and found that participants reported higher feelings of 
induced pleasure when listening to stimuli with an intermediate syncopation level. 
Labbé and Grandjean (Labbé & Grandjean, 2014) asked participants to listen to 
pieces for solo violin played in a deadpan, regular, or exaggerated expressive way, and 
to rate their feelings of entrainment, their level of emotionally involvement, and their 
induced emotions in the GEMS scale (Zentner et al., 2008). The results indicated that, as 
expected, the deadpan pieces were associated with the lowest ratings of aroused 
emotionality. A factorial analysis of the participants’ feelings of entrainment categorised 
their ratings into two dimensions: feelings of bodily agitation (which the authors call 
“visceral entrainment”), and urges to move in time with the music (which they call 
“motor entrainment”). Although this finding is compatible with Juslin and colleagues’ 
hypothesis about how rhythmic entrainment leads to increased arousal, Labbé and 
Grandjean propose that the two dimensions are associated with different emotions 
from the GEMS questionnaire. An alternative explanation, not explored by these 
researchers, is that the observed discrete emotions are on the one hand, an artefact of 
asking participants to rate their experience using emotional adjectives, and on the other, 
that the discrete emotional states were induced by other mechanisms which were not 
controlled for in the experiment. For example, how could it be possible for a participant 
to report having feelings of “spirituality” or “transcendence” without having associated 
them with some sort of religious or metaphysical meaning? 
If the evidence so far is at least partially compatible with the BRECVEMA hypothesis 
that rhythmic entrainment leads to increased arousal, the evidence for the hypothesis 
that it leads to feelings of emotional bonding supports it more clearly. However, at the 
same time, the evidence is also compatible with my proposal that these kind of feelings 
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can only be induced in relevant listening contexts, where the listener is in the presence 
of other people synchronizing their movements to the music; as summarised below.  
Demos and colleagues (2012) instructed pairs of participants to rock their chairs side 
by side, and found that participants who coupled their movement more strongly with 
the music reported feeling more connected to their partners. Kirschner and Tomasello 
(2010) compared the prosocial behaviour of two groups of four years-old children who 
engaged in tasks involving synchronization. They found that compared to pairs of 
children who engaged in a synchronized but non-musical task, children who did a similar 
musical task exhibited more subsequent cooperative and helpful behaviour. Finally, Tarr 
and colleagues (Tarr, Launay, Cohen, & Dunbar, 2015), asked four groups of adolescents 
to dance with different levels of synchronization and physical exertion to music, and 
measured their mood, change in pain threshold, and closeness towards other 
adolescents. Their results indicate that higher levels of synchronization and exertion 
were associated with increased pain threshold; that none of these variables had an 
effect on the participants’ mood, and that increased synchronization and exertion were 
associated with self-reported closeness towards members of the adolescents’ in-group. 
In summary, the results of research so far do not allow to draw solid conclusions 
about the effects of rhythmic entrainment on affective states when the participants 
engage in individual listening tasks. While some studies have found positive effects on 
ratings of pleasure, other have found null results, or have suggested that the effects are 
more marked at the level of arousal (as predicted by Juslin and colleagues), or at the 
level of discrete emotions. The evidence for the BRECVEMA prediction that rhythmic 
entrainment leads to feelings of emotional bonding is, in contrast, more positive and 
consistent, but it is also in accord with my suggestion that this type of feelings only 
emerge in the presence of at least another individual who simultaneously synchronizes 
with the music. (Admittedly, since no study has compared the effects of individual 
entrainment versus collective entrainment, my hypothesis remains speculative).  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented a critical review of the two most comprehensive 
contemporary theories on the induction of emotion by music: the BRECVEMA theory 
and the Multifactorial Process Model. I have shown how these two theories postulate 
the same type of underlying mechanisms, and how their main differences lie in the 
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greater role that the Multifactorial Process Model attributes to appraisal mechanisms, 
and in the predictions of the BRECVEMA theory about the induction of discrete 
emotions by single mechanisms. I have also shown how the psychological reductionist 
approach that these theories have assumed has prevented them from providing 
satisfying answers to some of the central questions that an emotion elicitation theory 
should address, and has made them neglect the role that personal, contextual and 
cultural variability have in musical emotions phenomena. Finally, drawing from these 
criticisms, I have argued against the above-mentioned claim of the BRECVEMA theory 
that the activation of the expectancy and entrainment mechanisms can lead to the 
induction of full-blown emotions. I continue this critique in the next chapter, where I 
address this problematic assumption in the case of the emotional contagion mechanism. 
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3. The problematic case of the 
emotional contagion mechanism 
On many music listening situations, when we perceive that a piece of music expresses a 
particular emotion, we have the feeling that the same emotion is aroused in ourselves. 
This phenomenon has been dubbed “emotional contagion” (Davies, 2010; Schubert, 
2013), and is considered by the BRECVEMA theory as one mechanism of emotion 
elicitation by music. According to this theory, musical emotional contagion occurs thanks 
to the existence of a shared acoustic code to the expression of emotions in music and 
speech prosody (Juslin & Laukka, 2003). Drawing from theories such as Ekman’s (1992) 
and Panksepp’s (2000), Juslin and colleagues theorise that this code is organised into 
discrete categories, called “basic emotions”. In this perspective, basic emotions are 
considered innate and universal affect programs, which evolved through phylogenesis to 
serve important survival functions. This view carries several empirical predictions: facial 
and vocal expressions of emotions (and therefore musical expressions of emotions too) 
are more readily perceived than other non-basic emotions, are expressed and perceived 
equally across cultures, appear early in development (Izard & Malatesta, 1987), have 
distinct brain substrates (Panksepp, 2000), are associated with distinct patterns of 
physiological activation (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983), and form the basis for 
other, non-basic emotions (Izard, 1992; Plutchik, 1980). Additionally, vocal and facial 
emotional expressions can also be identified in other species (Geen, 1992). 
For the BRECVEMA theory, the existence of this shared code in vocal and musical 
expression of basic emotions explains the frequently observed coherence between 
perceiving an emotion expressed by the music, and the induction of the same emotion 
in the listener (Schubert, 2013). According to this theory, this process of emotional 
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contagion occurs thanks to the activation of a brain module that responds automatically 
to voice-like aspects of music as if they were coming from a “super-expressive” human 
voice, triggering process of internal mimicry: 
“Emotional contagion refers to a process whereby an emotion is induced by a 
piece of music because the listener perceives the emotional expression of the 
music, and then “mimics” this expression internally, which by means of either 
peripheral feedback from muscles, or a more direct activation of the relevant 
emotional representations in the brain, leads to an induction of the same 
emotion.” (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008, p. 565) 
The BRECVEMA theory of emotional contagion is in turn based on its authors’ two 
models of musical meaning: their theory of musical expressivity, and their model of 
musical communication.  
The first model, Juslin’s theory of musical expressivity, proposes that perception of 
musical emotions is based on three “layers” of coding of musical expression (Juslin, 
2013). The first layer is constituted by iconic resemblances between musical sounds and 
the expression of basic emotions in vocalizations. The second layer, called intrinsic 
coding, consists of patterns of harmonic change in the music that can denote 
fluctuations of tension and relaxation. The third layer, called associative coding, consists 
of arbitrary associations of musical sounds with objects and events, which provide cues 
to contents expressed by the music for a listener familiarised with those associations. 
Clearly, the emotional contagion mechanism, as described by the BRECVEMA theory, 
depends on the existence of the first, iconic coding layer.  
The second model of musical meaning proposed by the BRECVEMA theory consists of 
a functionalist model of musical communication (Juslin, 2003). It proposes that senders 
(i.e. music performers or people talking emotionally) use a number of probabilistic and 
partly redundant acoustic cues to encode their emotional message. These cues leave 
traces in the acoustic object which can be subsequently detected by receivers (i.e. music 
listeners or conversation partners), who use them to decode and identify the intended 
emotion. Each cue in isolation is not a perfect indicator of the expressed emotion, and 
therefore the more cues are present in the acoustic object, and the more cues are used 
by decoders, the more likely it is that accurate communication takes place. Additionally, 
because some of the cues are partly redundant (i.e. they are associated with the same 
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expressive intention), there are several cue combinations that can lead to successful 
communication. 
As can be seen from the preceding paragraphs, the emotional contagion mechanism 
is the aspect of the BRECVEMA theory where its authors most clearly adhere to a 
psychological reductionist view according to which, the power of music to communicate 
and to induce emotional experiences depends only on the process of encoding and 
decoding of acoustic information present in the musical object. In other words, despite 
their claim that their theory allows for the contribution of factors in the person, and in 
the listening context (Juslin, 2013, p. 7), in this point the BRECVEMA theory assumes 
that emotional meanings are somehow, embedded in the music, and that these inherent 
meanings can lead, without the mediation of any personal or contextual factors, to the 
induction of discrete emotions. 
I refute this assumption in this chapter. In the first section, I criticise the concept of 
basic emotions. Subsequently, I review the problematic evidence that supports the 
existence of shared acoustic code to the expression of basic emotions in vocalizations 
and music. Finally, I criticise the application of the concept of Basic Emotions for musical 
expressions of emotion. In the experiments reported in chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis, I 
examine the evidence for the second half of the emotional contagion hypothesis 
proposed by the BRECVEMA theory: the notion that this process of contagion occurs 
thanks to the activation of mechanisms of internal mimicry. 
 
3.1 The problems with the concept of Basic Emotions 
The first group of arguments comprising my critique are concerned with the concept of 
Basic Emotions itself. The authors who defend the concept of Basic Emotions conceive 
them as biologically primitive (i.e. supported by hardwired, discrete biological 
subsystems) and/or as psychologically primitive (i.e. as having elementary eliciting 
conditions, and forming the basis for other emotions) (Ortony & Turner, 1990; 
Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011). The biological primitiveness assumption is contradicted by 
findings that the same biological subsystems serve emotional and non-emotional 
psychological processes, and that even structures traditionally associated with discrete 
emotions (e.g. amygdala and fear), are involved in several emotions such as anger, 
happiness, and sadness (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; Raz et 
al., 2016). The psychological primitiveness assumption, in turn, is challenged by the 
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consideration that several emotions traditionally considered as “basic”, share more 
elementary components. For instance, Anger, Sadness, and Disgust share a component 
of displeasure; and both Anger and Fear involve an evaluation of a situation as 
obstructing the realisation of the individual’s goals (Ortony & Turner, 1990; Scherer, 
2009a).  
An additional problem with the Basic Emotion construct is that those who defend it 
do not agree on which emotions should be considered “basic”. Every author who 
proposes the existence of basic emotions has submitted a different list, ranging from 
two categories (Weiner & Graham, 1984) to ten (Izard, 1977). For instance, whereas 
Panksepp (2007) identifies seven “basic emotional responses” (Seeking, Rage, Fear, Lust, 
Care, Panic, and Play), Ekman and Cordaro (2011) propose slightly different seven 
categories (Anger, Fear, Surprise, Sadness, Disgust, Contempt and Happiness). 
Moreover, “love” or “tenderness”, an emotion included by Juslin in the list of basic 
emotions that vocalizations and music are able to express (2013), only appears in 4 out 
of the 14 theories reviewed by Ortony & Turner (1990), none of which is more recent 
than 1960. This figure increases to five theories if we consider Panksepp’s (2007) “care” 
category as equivalent. 
In a paper dedicated to presenting his theory of how music expresses basic emotions, 
Juslin (2013) argues that these disagreements do not constitute a problem, because the 
concept of basic emotions has heuristic value for the researchers who have adopted it, 
and because there is greater agreement about which emotions should be considered 
basic, than about how emotions should be defined in general (2013, p. 6). In my view, 
these arguments do not solve the problem. First, the fact that affective science has a 
problem agreeing on a definition of emotion is very serious, but probably not as 
unsurmountable as Juslin makes it appear to be, as demonstrated by the consensual 
definition proposed in the first Chapter of this thesis4. Second, the existence of that lack 
of consensus does not make the lack of agreement among Basic Emotion theorists less 
serious. Third, even though it is true that several research programs have used the basic 
emotions concept in a heuristic manner, the fact that their lists and definitions do not 
match completely has made it difficult to accumulate the evidence into a single 
coherent conceptual framework. For instance, since anxiety, stress, distress, fear, and 
terror are similar but not identical states and concepts, the conclusions of research into 
                                                            
4 This consensual definition is in fact, very similar to the one proposed by Juslin and Sloboda in 
the introductory chapter to their Handbook of Music and Emotion (Juslin & Sloboda, 2010b, p. 
10).  
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these affective states are not necessarily consistent (c.f. Kreibig, 2010, p. 410). And 
finally, this narrow focus on a limited set of emotions has made affective science lose 
sight of the great variety of emotional experiences that people have during their life-
span and across different cultures, and of the relationship between these discrete, full-
blown emotions and other affective states such as moods, preferences, and attitudes. 
 
3.2 The problematic evidence for the existence of Basic 
Emotions 
The second group of criticisms of the Basic Emotion approach is the lack of solid 
empirical evidence for their claim that basic emotions are biologically hardwired affect 
programs. After decades of research, there is still no strong evidence for the existence of 
distinctive patterns associated with discrete emotions at the neural, physiological, and 
behavioural levels. 
Regarding the evidence for dedicated brain systems associated with discrete 
emotions, the main conclusion drawn from recent reviews is that instead of discrete 
subsystems associated with each basic emotion, there are specific brain areas associated 
with specific behaviours (e.g. freezing, attacking, smiling), which are sometimes present 
when emotions are elicited (Barrett, 2006a; Lindquist et al., 2012). Similarly, reviews of 
the evidence for distinct patterns of peripheral physiological activation have failed to 
find robust and consistent patterns distinguishing discrete emotion categories 
(Cacioppo, Bertson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000; Kragel & LaBar, 2013; Kreibig, 2010; 
Stephens, Christie, & Friedman, 2010)5. A more parsimonious interpretation of these 
results is that physiological activation is mapped onto more general dimensions 
corresponding to arousal and valence, or to preparation to approach/avoid the eliciting 
stimulus (Barrett, 2006a; Mauss & Robinson, 2009).  
Regarding facial and vocal expressions of emotions, there is little and conflicting 
evidence for the claim that the patterns predicted by Basic Emotion theories such as 
Ekman’s (Ekman & Friesen, 1984) are present in spontaneous emotional expressions 
(Camras et al., 2002; Carroll & Russell, 1997; Gosselin, Kirouac, & Doré, 1995; Scherer & 
                                                            
5 Two of these studies claim to have found distinctive patterns of autonomic activation 
associated with basic emotions. However although these studies used similar pattern 
classification methods and stimuli, they did not replicate each other in the patterns they report 
(Kragel & LaBar, 2013; Stephens et al., 2010).  
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Ellgring, 2007). Vocal expression of emotions have been much less researched than 
facial expressions, and most of this research has been carried out using portrayed 
expressions as stimuli, so there is little data about the extent to which these posed 
expressions correspond to natural ones (Scherer, 2003).  
The strongest piece of empirical support for Basic Emotion theories is the finding that 
participants attribute the same emotional states to photographs of portrayed facial 
expressions above chance level (70% on average, according to Scherer, Clark-Polner, and 
Mortillaro, 2011). Nevertheless, this agreement level lessens when participants are 
asked to rate natural or milder expressions, when participants observe dynamic rather 
than static expressions, when researchers use open-ended questionnaires rather than 
lists of a few emotional adjectives, when participants rate expressions made by people 
from a culture different to their own; and importantly, when the stimuli consist of vocal 
expressions (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2003; Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003). 
Key to the BRECVEMA theory of emotional contagion is the claim that there are 
acoustic patterns in vocalizations associated with discrete, basic emotions (Juslin & 
Laukka, 2003). However, this prediction is not clearly supported by empirical evidence 
so far. The most consistent finding in studies analysing the acoustic qualities of 
emotional prosody is that these psychoacoustic cues correlate most clearly with 
differences in arousal. More specific acoustic patterns distinguishing variations in 
valence, or distinguishing discrete emotional states have been more difficult to identify 
(Bachorowski, 1999; Juslin & Scherer, 2005; Russell et al., 2003; Scherer et al., 2011). 
Scherer, Juslin and colleagues (Juslin & Scherer, 2005; Scherer, 2003; Scherer et al., 
2011) have argued that this situation is due to the fact that most research has studied a 
limited number of acoustic cues, and has neglected arousal differences present within 
“emotion families” (e.g. the differences between repressed anger and explosive anger). 
In their joint paper, Juslin and Scherer go as far as proposing that affective states of a 
relatively weak intensity are probably only differentiated in terms of the arousal and 
valence dimensions (Juslin & Scherer, 2005, p. 91); an observation that suggests that 
clear-cut psychoacoustic patterns could only be identified when emotional expressions 
are intense, that is, when the vocalizations used as stimuli in research are as 
exaggerated as the expressions traditionally used in research on facial expressions of 
emotion. 
In spite of this panorama of inconclusive evidence, Juslin, Scherer, and their 
collaborators have continued to search for acoustic patterns associated with discrete 
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emotions, and they claim to have found them. The evidence they have put forward for 
this assertion, however, is not without problems, as I show in the following paragraphs. 
The first source of evidence for Scherer’s claim is an experiment from 1996, in which 
12 actors portrayed 14 emotions using meaningless sentences (Banse & Scherer, 1996). 
These vocalizations were judged by other 12 drama students, and 29 of their acoustic 
qualities were analysed. They found, as many other studies before, that the clearest 
acoustic differentiation between the stimuli was the differences in mean fundamental 
frequency (F0), which correlated with different degrees of arousal. Additionally, they 
found several statistically significant, but modest differences for discrete emotions. This 
conclusion, however, should be qualified by two observations: a) the tests that yielded 
these different patterns were not carried out on all the 1344 vocal samples obtained 
from the actors, but on a subset of 224 samples that were judged as best acted; b) just 
as in most research on facial expressions of emotion, this study used portrayed 
emotional expressions, which do not necessarily correspond to naturally-produced ones, 
and therefore, these conclusions lack ecological validity. 
The second source of evidence for Scherer’s claim about a link between acoustic 
parameters and discrete emotions is a summary of findings that he has presented in 
several papers (Scherer, 2003; Scherer et al., 2011; Scherer, Johnstone, & Klasmeyer, 
2003). Intriguingly, in none of these papers do Scherer and colleagues clarify how many 
investigations are included in the summary, nor the basis for choosing the “selected 
empirical findings” that they report (Scherer et al., 2011, p. 414). In any case, an analysis 
of this summary leads again to the conclusion that most acoustic parameters are 
associated with variations of arousal. The results suggesting the existence of acoustic 
parameters associated with specific emotions are few, and not robust. For instance, the 
only parameters that distinguish Anger from Fear are the ratio of Harmonic/noise (high 
in Anger, Low in Fear), and the precision of location of the formants, which are higher in 
Anger, and which can be lower or equal in Fear (Scherer et al., 2011, p. 414, Table 3).6  
Juslin’s arguments about the existence of specific acoustic patterns for discrete 
emotions are based on a review that he carried out with Laukka (2003), in which they 
analysed the results of 104 studies on vocal expression of emotion, and 41 studies on 
                                                            
6
 An even more recent study by Scherer and colleagues which compared vocalizations in French 
and German confirmed the finding that most psychoacoustic cues are strongly associated with 
variations in arousal, and that there are small or non-existent associations with variations in 
valence (Bänziger, Patel, & Scherer, 2014). 
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musical expression7. For these authors, the results of this meta-analysis show that there 
are enough acoustic differences in emotional prosody to distinguish five basic emotions: 
Anger, Fear, Happiness, Sadness, and Love-Tenderness. However, a detailed 
examination of this evidence shows that there are at least three reasons to be sceptical 
about this conclusion. 
First, the majority of the studies included in the review (87%) used portrayals by 
actors. This type of studies tells us how actors think emotions should be portrayed, 
rather than how they actually happen. Hence, their usefulness consists in informing us 
about people’s prototype or ideal expressions for hypothetical, full-blown emotional 
states.  
Second, most of the findings about associations between acoustic cues and discrete 
emotions indicate that most of the cues are the same for emotions that have the same 
level of activation (Juslin & Laukka, 2003, pp. 792–795). For instance, Sadness and 
Tenderness, the two emotions with low activation level, correlate with slow speech rate, 
low intensity, low frequency energy, low mean fundamental frequency (F0), and 
downwards contours. Whereas Anger, Fear, and Happiness, the emotions with high 
activation level, correlate with fast speech rate, high intensity, high voice intensity 
variability, high frequency energy, high mean fundamental frequency, low fundamental 
frequency variability, and upwards contours.  
Third, only two of the nine acoustic parameters summarized in the review distinguish 
emotions beyond their level of activation. But even there, the results do not point to 
robust and consistent differences. Juslin and Laukka conclude that F0 variability 
distinguishes Anger (high variability) from Fear (low variability). Nevertheless, there are 
almost as many studies that found that Fear is associated with high or medium F0 
variability (n = 15) than the number of studies that found that it is associated with low 
variability (n = 17). In fact, if we exclude from this list a study that found that Fear is 
associated with both medium and low variability, and a study that found that this 
emotion is associated with both high and low variability, then the number of studies 
reporting low and high or medium variability is the same (n= 15), and the distinction 
between Anger and Fear in terms of F0 variability becomes less clear. The second 
acoustic cue that distinguishes emotional expressions beyond arousal in the review is 
the level of microstructural regularity of the voices. However, this finding is based only 
                                                            
7
 I analyse their evidence for patterns associated with musical expression of emotion in the next 
section of this chapter.  
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on 5 studies (out of 104), and they can be interpreted as distinguishing between positive 
and negative valenced emotions: Happiness and Tenderness are associated with 
microstructural regularity, whereas Anger, Fear, and Sadness are associated with 
microstructural irregularity. 
In summary, in this section I have shown how, despite the predictions of Basic 
Emotion theories, there is little and inconsistent evidence for the existence of distinctive 
patterns associated with discrete emotions at the physiological, neural and expressive 
behaviour levels (i.e. facial expressions and speech prosody).  
Before analysing the evidence that music expresses basic emotions, it is important to 
clarify the scope of the criticism I have presented so far to the notion that emotions 
have associated facial and vocal expressions. My claim is not that emotional episodes 
have absolutely no effects on facial and vocal behaviour. It is very unlikely that emotions 
have no consequences on our facial behaviour and on our speech prosody. Moreover, 
these effects should be more obvious in very intense emotional episodes, when the 
eliciting situation is so personally relevant and urgent that we feel overtaken by urges to 
attack, to hide away, to embrace someone, to be comforted, etc. Since all of these 
action tendencies are associated with physiological changes in the autonomic nervous 
system (Frijda, 1986), they are probably also reflected in our faces and in the acoustic 
features of our voices (see Scherer (1986) for specific hypotheses about the effects of 
appraisals on the physiology of vocalizations). In contrast, less intense emotional 
episodes and more diffuse affective states such as moods probably have less prominent 
physiological effects, and therefore, less clear effects on vocal and facial expressions.  
Nevertheless, acknowledging that intense emotions involve changes in facial and 
vocal behaviours should not be taken as implying that every type of emotion is neatly 
associated with a distinctive pattern of physiological and expressive behaviours, as 
predicted by the Basic Emotions approach and assumed by the BRECVEMA theory. On 
the contrary, since every instance of anger, fear, joy, etc. is different, then there is no 
guarantee that the same action tendencies, physiological changes, and behaviours are 
present every time we experience these emotions. Consider the following examples 
from Ortony and Turner (1990): the experience of running into a bear in the woods, 
sitting in a doctor’s waiting room expecting a diagnosis of cancer, having to answer a 
difficult question in the context of a job interview, and listening to an eerie sound at 
midnight in a house where we assumed we were alone. Even though all of these 
experiences can be considered instances of “fear”, the different contexts in which they 
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occur require us to respond in different ways, and therefore the pattern of physiological 
activation and the observable behavioural expressions (facial, vocal, postural) would 
also be different in every case. Furthermore, since emotional responses are always 
tailored to the demands of the situation, the full pattern of expressive facial and vocal 
behaviours predicted by Basic Emotion theories are very seldom, if ever, observable in 
natural circumstances (Barrett, 2006a). 
 
3.3 Does music express basic emotions? 
Up to this point, my discussion of the emotional contagion mechanism proposed by the 
BRECVEMA theory has consisted of demonstrating the problems in the definition of the 
“Basic Emotion” construct, and in challenging the evidence for patterns of 
psychoacoustic cues associated with discrete emotions. In this section I return to the 
question of whether basic emotions are expressed by music. After all, even though the 
perception of emotion in music may not have its origin in discrete, biologically-
hardwired emotions, it is still possible that people perceive musically-expressed 
emotions in categories that correspond to basic emotions, and that this perception may 
lead to contagion. My arguments in this second part are organised as follows: first I 
question the basis for choosing the particular list of basic emotions proposed the 
BRECVEMA theory. Then I analyse the evidence for cross-cultural perception of 
musically-expressed emotions, and the evidence from developmental studies. Finally, I 
analyse the limits of the evidence for the existence of common psychoacoustic patterns 
in speech prosody and music.  
 
3.3.1 The Basic Emotions Expressed by Music According to the 
BRECVEMA Theory 
The first criticism to the claim that music expresses basic emotions is equivalent to one I 
presented to the Basic Emotion theoretical tradition in general, as it targets the basis for 
selecting the emotional categories that are to be considered “basic”. For the BRECVEMA 
authors –and indeed for many other researchers in music psychology (Eerola & 
Vuoskoski, 2013) - music expresses five basic emotions: Anger, Fear, Happiness, Sadness 
and Love or tenderness (Juslin, 2013c). These emotions are frequently reported in 
studies in which participants are asked about which emotions are commonly expressed 
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by music, along with other non-basic emotion categories such as Calm, Peacefulness, 
Longing, Tension, Solemnity, Loneliness, Desire, and Despair. Furthermore, since most 
studies investigating perception of musical emotions have concentrated on discrete 
categories inspired by Basic Emotion theories, there is abundant empirical evidence that 
the five emotions selected by Juslin and colleagues are reliably recognised by listeners 
(Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2013). In my view, there are three problems with using these 
sources of evidence as the basis for determining which emotions music can express. 
First, asking people which emotions they think music expresses, inform us about their 
ideas about music expressivity, not about their actual experiences of perceiving music as 
expressive of emotion (or of other contents). Second, the evidence from experiments on 
perception of musical emotions involves a circular logic: most researchers assume a 
priori that music expresses a list of emotions, ask their participants to report their 
experience using the categories in that list, and conclude that in effect, music expresses 
the emotions they hypothesised. And finally (and more importantly), the arguments for 
selecting which basic emotions music expresses should not only be empirical, but also, 
theoretical. To my knowledge, Juslin and colleagues have not proposed a systematic 
conceptual account of why music should be able to express the set of basic emotions 
they propose. As a consequence, the BRECVEMA theory has left two crucial questions 
unanswered. 
The first question, as mentioned in section 3.1, is why these researchers have 
decided to include a category that appears in only a few Basic Emotion theories: Love-
Tenderness. If the answer is simply that this category appears frequently in the lists of 
emotions that people more easily perceived in music, then why not include other 
common categories, such as “peacefulness”? Indeed, research into everyday 
experiences with music has found that one of the most common affective reactions to 
music is to feel calm, relaxed (or on in the other extreme, to feel awake and energised) 
(Juslin et al., 2008; Saarikallio & Erkkila, 2007). Moreover, this finding coincides with 
other empirical evidence that some of the affective states more frequently reported as 
perceived in music are calm or peacefulness (Juslin & Laukka, 2004; Lindström, Juslin, 
Bresin, & Williamon, 2003). In this line of argument, why not assume that ‘calm’ is a 
“basic emotion”, and that when music makes people feel calm, this happens because of 
a process of emotional contagion via the activation of a hardwired biological affective 
program? 
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The second question, is why out of all the emotions proposed within the Basic 
Emotions approach, the BRECVEMA theory includes only five categories (Happiness, 
Anger, Fear, Sadness and Tenderness), in neglect of others categories such as Disgust, 
Contempt, Guilt, Shame, and Lust (see Ortony & Turner (1990) for different versions of 
Basic Emotions lists). Perhaps the answer is that the basic emotions included in the 
BRECVEMA theory are affective states that can be experienced without the need for an 
object, whereas Disgust, Guilt, Shame and Lust are always “intentional” states, that is, 
they are experienced directed to an object (e.g. every time we feel guilty, we feel guilty 
about something in particular). And since instrumental music is characterised by its 
inability to specify the object of the emotions it expresses, then musical sounds can only 
express object-less affective states (Cross, 2009; Davies, 2003; Kivy, 1999). Although this 
might be a sensible argument, the BRECVEMA theory could not adopt it, because it 
implies that music cannot express emotions but moods, which are the type of affective 
states that can be experienced without a clear eliciting object. Hence, assuming this 
argument would ultimately contradict the central assumption of the Basic Emotions 
framework, which focuses on the phylogenetically inherited character of emotions (i.e. 
quick, object-directed, motivationally driving reactions), not of moods (i.e. slow, diffuse, 
cognitive-biasing states). 
 
3.3.2 Evidence from Cross-cultural Studies 
An important prediction derived from the adoption of the Basic Emotion approach by 
the BRECVEMA theory is that since expression of emotions in music is based on 
hardwired biological programs, the striking findings about universal perception of facial 
expressions (reviewed in Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, O’Sullivan, & Frank Mark, 2008) 
should be paralleled in music too. That is, musical systems in the world would use similar 
acoustic patterns to communicate basic emotions, and therefore listeners across 
cultures should be able to successfully identify them. Admittedly, just like researchers in 
perception of facial expressions (Matsumoto, 1989), the authors behind the BRECVEMA 
theory have acknowledged the existence of cultural variations in the structure of 
musical systems, and of culture-specific cues to the expression of emotion within those 
systems. Hence, they have embraced Elfenbein’s dialect theory of emotion (Elfenbein, 
Beaupré, Lévesque, & Hess, 2007), and Thompson and Balkwill’s Cue-Redundancy Model 
(Balkwill & Thompson, 1999; Thompson & Balkwill, 2010) according to which cross-
cultural expression and communication of emotion in music is made possible by the 
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existence of both universal and culture-specific cues. The more universal cues are 
present in a piece of music, the more listeners unfamiliar with a piece of music from 
another culture can infer the same emotions expressed in that piece as enculturated 
listeners. 
The evidence from cross-cultural studies on perception of musical emotions supports 
the general hypothesis that listeners are able to identify the intended emotional 
expression of music from a different culture (Thompson & Balkwill, 2010). What is less 
clear from this evidence, however, is that cross-cultural perception of musical emotions 
is organised around basic emotion categories. One reason for this is that some studies 
have used ad-hoc categories rather than standard emotional adjectives as dependent 
measures (Deva & Virmani, 1975; Gundlach, 1932, 1935; Morey, 1940). A second reason 
is that until recently, the studies which have used standard emotional adjectives have 
only explored the perception of three categories: Joy, Sadness, and Anger (e.g. Fritz et 
al., 2009), and therefore their results are open to an alternative, dimensional 
explanation. Thus, since the emotions of Joy, Sadness, and Anger correspond to 
different combinations of activation and valence levels, (i.e. they correspond to three 
distinct areas of the two-dimensional affective space, (Russell & Barrett, 1999)), these 
results make it impossible to discard the hypothesis that the participants’ perception is 
organised around general affective dimensions rather than around discrete categories. 
A recent experiment by Laukka and colleagues (Laukka, Eerola, Thingujam, Yamasaki, 
& Beller, 2013) sought to overcome these and other limitations of past research, such as 
the tendency to use Western music as the normative stimuli that listeners have to judge. 
In this experiment, in addition to using Western classical music excerpts, the researchers 
asked Swedish, Indian and Japanese musicians to create music to express 11 different 
emotions and affective states (anger, fear, happiness, affection, humour, longing, 
peacefulness, sadness, solemnity, spirituality, and neutral), which were later judged by 
listeners from the same three cultures. The researchers also analysed the extent to 
which musicians and listeners use the same acoustic cues to encode and decode the 
intended affective expressions. The results from the experiment largely support the 
researchers’ predictions. The listeners were better at identifying basic emotions (anger, 
fear, happiness, and sadness) than non-basic ones (e.g. solemnity, humour, and longing). 
And even though they were equally good at recognising the emotional expression 
intended by Western classical music excerpts, they were better able to identify the 
intended emotions in music from their own culture than from an unfamiliar one. 
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Moreover, while musicians and listeners used several similar psychoacoustic cues across 
cultures to encode and decode emotions, some cues were culturally specific, that is, 
they were only used by musicians and listeners from the same cultural background. 
As can be seen by the description above, Laukka and colleagues’ experiment 
represents an important contribution to cross-cultural studies of music perception. Its 
combination of the analysis of psychoacoustic cues used by musicians and by listeners, 
and the increased number of emotions analysed should become the standard method in 
this research field. Moreover, the findings from this study are certainly encouraging for 
the hypothesis that music can universally communicate four basic emotions. However, 
this conclusion can be qualified by the following considerations.  
First, the pattern of confusion exhibited by participants, (i.e. the distribution of 
occasions when they misattributed the intended expression in the music) was consistent 
with the view that participants were sensitive to the activity and valence dimensions of 
music.  
Second, the acoustic cues associated with the expression and perception of discrete 
emotions that have the same level of activity and valence show a large number of 
coincidences. These coincidences, however are more marked across those cues that are 
common to vocalizations and music (such as intensity, timbre, and pitch height), than 
across those cues that can only be found in music (such as modality, tonal and rhythmic 
stability). This suggests that even though the listeners’ sensibility to the first type of cues 
may have helped them identify the level of arousal and valence expressed by the music, 
the musically-specific cues were critical for the listeners’ ability to differentiate emotions 
with similar levels on those dimensions.  
Third, some emotions considered “basic”, and therefore universal by the BRECVEMA 
theory, were not correctly identified above chance levels, sometimes even by members 
of the same culture. For example, Happiness was only correctly identified in Western 
classical music and Swedish folk music; Sadness in Japanese music was not recognised 
by most Japanese listeners, and Sadness in Swedish music was not recognised by most 
Indian listeners. Affection, the emotion category most closely related to the 
“tenderness/love” category proposed as a basic emotion by the BRECVEMA theory, was 
not correctly identified in any of the non-Western musical styles (the only exception was 
Indian music, were it was identified only by Indian listeners). This finding that several 
basic emotions were not identified even within listeners of the same culture contrasts 
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starkly with the high accuracy levels exhibited by participants of experiments on cross-
cultural perception of facial and vocal expressions (c.f. Scherer et al., 2011).  
Finally, of all the musical cultures examined in this study, emotional expression in 
Japanese music was the least successfully recognised by the participants. This may be 
part in due to the fact that Japanese music uses fewer acoustic cues that are common to 
Western, Indian and Swedish music. For example, Japanese music is much more 
ambiguous in its use of modes, interval sizes, and scales and their association with 
valence. Japanese music uses combinations of intervals such as 2nd minor, 3rd major, etc. 
(Malm, 2001, p. 160). Again, this observation highlights the importance that culturally-
specific cues have in identifying musically-expressed emotions beyond the general 
dimension of arousal, which is the dimension most clearly expressed by speech prosody.  
In conclusion, the evidence from cross-cultural studies of expression and perception 
of musical emotions supports the hypothesis that expression of emotions in music is 
grounded on acoustic cues shared with vocalizations, and that these cues can at least 
signal variations in levels of arousal and valence. The evidence for universal musical 
expressions associated with discrete emotions is encouraging, but partial, and it 
suggests that this fine-grained differentiation might depend more on cues that are 
present in music, but not in vocalizations. Clearly, further studies using methods such as 
the one implemented by Laukka and colleagues (2013) are needed to advance in 
understanding this phenomenon. 
 
3.3.3 Evidence from Developmental Studies 
Another crucial prediction from the BRECVEMA theory, in line with the claims of the 
Basic Emotions theoretical tradition, is that expression and perception of basic emotions 
appear early in development (Izard, 1992). Hence, it is expected that children’s 
perception of musical emotions should follow the same early developmental path.  
The evidence from developmental studies contradicts this assumption. Thus, until 
approximately age 3, children’s emotional vocabulary and perception is organised into 
broad categories representing the contrast between positive and negative experiences 
(Widen & Russell, 2008). Infants progressively incorporate more fine-grained categories 
such as sadness, anger, and fear when they reach the age of 4 or 5 (Bormann-Kischkel, 
Hildebrand-Pascher, & Stegbauer, 1990; Widen & Russell, 2008). This process of 
evolution is not clearly paralleled in music. The evidence so far indicates that although 
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children show early signs of sensibility to music, such as their preference for the melodic 
contours present in infant-directed speech (Fernald, 1985; Werker, Pegg, & Mcleod, 
1994), and their perceptual sensitivity to consonance and dissonance (Trainor & 
Heinmiller, 1998), their ability to categorise emotions expressed by music emerges years 
later. Their ability to tell the difference between happy and sad music is observable 
around the same age when they develop the ability to entrain to musical rhythms (more 
or less 5 years of age), suggesting the central role that tempo variations have in 
distinguishing these two expressions (Dalla Bella, Peretz, Rousseau, & Gosselin, 2001). 
Furthermore, children develop the ability to distinguish between happy, sad, angry and 
scary music at the same age as they develop the sensitivity to mode (6 to 8 years), a 
musical cue associated with the expression of negative emotions in Western music 
(Gregory, Worrall, & Sarge, 1996). 
 
3.3.4 Evidence for Shared Psychoacoustic Cues in Speech Prosody 
and Western Music 
The strongest piece of evidence invoked by the BRECVEMA theory for the expression of 
basic emotions in music is the already mentioned review of 145 studies into emotional 
expression vocalizations and music carried out by Juslin and Laukka (2003). This 
evidence, however, is not completely unambiguous. On the one hand, the results of 
most studies support the prediction that acoustic parameters associated with the 
expression of emotion in vocalizations show the same patterns of association in music. 
But on the other hand, the evidence for the claim that the acoustic parameters that 
discriminate specific emotions in music are the same for vocalizations is less clear. In 
fact, a detailed examination of the data shows that most of the acoustic parameters that 
discriminate specific emotions in music do not present the same pattern in vocalizations. 
First, in music, Fear and Anger are distinguished by sound level (high in Anger, low in 
Fear), but this distinction is not paralleled in vocalizations, where both emotions are 
associated with high sound level. Second, in music, Happiness is associated with little 
sound level variability, whereas in vocalizations, it is associated with high variability. And 
third, in music, timbres characterised by abundant presence of high-frequencies are 
associated with Anger, timbres with moderate number of high-frequencies are 
associated with Happiness, and timbres with few high-frequencies with Fear. In 
vocalizations, all emotions with high levels of activation (Anger, Fear, and Happiness) are 
associated with abundant presence of high frequencies.  
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The evidence from Juslin and Laukka’s (2003) review can be complemented by more 
recently published experiments into shared psychoacoustic cues to the expression of 
emotions in music and speech (Bowling, Sundararajan, Han, & Purves, 2012; Curtis & 
Bharucha, 2010; Illie & Thompson, 2006; Scherer et al., 2011; Scherer, Sundberg, 
Tamarit, & Salomão, 2013; Weninger, Eyben, Schuller, Mortillaro, & Scherer, 2013); and 
by experiments on musical parameters associated with expression of emotion (Costa, 
Fine, & Ricc Bitti, 2004; Eerola, Friberg, & Bresin, 2013; Juslin & Lindström, 2010; Quinto, 
Thompson, & Taylor, 2014; Schubert, 2004). As can be seen in Table 3.1, in general 
terms this more recent evidence coincides with the results of Juslin and Laukka’s review 
(2003).  
Table 3.1 Summary of findings of psychoacoustic parameters associated with emotional 
expression in vocalizations and music published after Juslin and Laukka’s 2003 review 
Cue Level Music Speech 
Tempo / 
Speech rate 
 
 
High Joyous, Bright, Restless, Agitated (F&S 
2004) 
High Arousal (Schu 2004)  
Anger, Fear (Sche 2013)  
Happiness, Anger (Q 2013; J&L 2010) 
Happiness (E 2013) 
Happiness, Anger, Fear (Sche 
2011) 
Fear (Sche 2013) 
Medium Anxiety, Despair, Joy, Pride (Sche 2013)  
Anger, Neutral (Q 2013)  
Scary (E 2013) 
Happiness (Sche 2011) 
Anxiety, Pride (Sche 2013) 
Low Low Arousal (S 2004)  
Serious, Majestic (F&S 2004) 
Sadness (Sche 2013)  
Tenderness, Sadness, Fear (J&L 2010)  
Calmness/ Serenity, Peace, Sadness, 
Solemnity,  
Sad, Peaceful (E 2013)  
Fear, Sadness, Tenderness (Q 2013) 
Anger, Sadness (Sche 2011) 
Anger, Despair, Joy, Sadness 
(Sche 2013)  
Intensity 
/Sound level 
  
  
Loud Restless, Agitated, Tense (F&S 2003)  
Anger (J&L 2010)  
Positive Arousal (Schu 2004; W 2013)  
Anger, Fear (Sche 2013)  
Anger, Happiness (Q 2013) 
High Arousal (W 2013)  
Scary (E 2013) 
Positive Energetic Arousal, 
Positive Tense Arousal 
(I&T2006)  
Happiness, Anger (Sche 2011) 
Anger, Fear, Joy (Sche 2013)  
High Arousal (W 2013)  
 
Medium Anger, Pride (Sche 2013) Despair, Pride (Sche 2013)  
Soft Delicate, Graceful, Relaxed, Quiet (F&S 
2003)  
Negative Arousal (Schu 2004; W 2013)  
Positive Valence, Negative Tense 
Arousal (I&T 2006)  
Fear, Tenderness (J&L 2010)  
Sad, Peaceful (E 2013)  
Low Arousal (W 2013)  
Sadness, Tenderness (Q 2013) 
Positive Valence, Negative 
Energetic Arousal, Negative 
Tense Arousal (I&T2006)  
Anxiety, Sadness (Sche 2013)  
Low Arousal (W 2013) 
  
53 
 
Table 3.1 (… continued) Summary of findings of psychoacoustic parameters associated 
with emotional expression in vocalizations and music published after Juslin and Laukka’s 
2003 review 
Cue Level Music Speech 
Pitch / 
Fundamental 
Frequency  
  
High Positive Tense Arousal (I&T 2006) 
Anger, Fear (J&L 2010) 
Happiness, Peaceful (E 2013) 
Positive Valence, Positive 
Energetic Arousal (I&T 2006) 
High Arousal (W 2013) 
Happiness, Anger, Fear (Sche 
2011) 
Low Negative Tense Arousal (I&T 2006)  
Happiness, Tenderness (J&L 2010) 
Scary, Sad (E 2013) 
Negative Energetic Arousal (I&T 
2006) 
Sadness (Sche 2011) 
Low Arousal (W 2013) 
Timbre / 
Relative 
spectral 
energy 
  
  
Bright, Sharp Anger (J&L 2010)  
Joy (Sche 2013) 
Scary (E 2013) 
Anger (Sche 2013) 
Medium Anxiety, Despair (Sch 2013);  
Happy (E 2013) 
Anxiety, Despair, Fear, Pride 
(Sch 2013) 
Dull, Soft Sadness, Tenderness (G 2010) 
Fear, Happiness, Tenderness (J&L 
2010) 
Sad, Peaceful (E 2013) 
Sadness (Sche 2013) 
Sadness (Sche 2013) 
Vibrato/Voice 
irregularity  
High  Anger, Fear (J&T 2010) 
High jitter (Vibrato) and high 
shimmer in Anger, Fear, Pride, Joy 
(Sche 2013) 
High Shimmer in Anger, Fear, 
Joy (Sche 2013) 
Low  Low jitter (vibrato) and low shimmer 
in Anxiety, Despair, Sadness (Sche 
2013) 
Low shimmer in Anxiety, Pride, 
Sadness (Sche 2013) 
Melodic/Pitch 
contours 
Rising --- Happiness, Anger (Sche 2011) 
Falling --- Sadness (Sch 2011) 
Interval Size 
/Frequency 
difference 
between 
consecutive 
syllables 
 
 
 
Large Tritones, Intervals larger than octave 
= Dynamism, Instability (C 2004) 
Unison, Octaves = Potency (C 2004) 
Positive/excited emotion (B 2012) 
 
Small Negative/subdued emotion (B 2012) 
 
Minor third in Sad speech (C&B 
2010) 
Negative/ Subdued Emotion in 
English Speakers, not Tamil 
speakers (B 2012) 
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Table 3.1 (… continued) Summary of findings of psychoacoustic parameters associated 
with emotional expression in vocalizations and music published after Juslin and Laukka’s 
2003 review 
Cue Level Music Speech 
Mode Major Positive Valence (C 2004, Q 2013) 
Happiness, Tenderness (J&L 2010, Q 
2013) 
Peaceful (E 2013) 
---- 
Minor Negative Valence (C 2004) 
Sadness, Dreamy, Dignified, Tension, 
Disgust, and  
Anger, Fear, Sadness (J&L 2010) 
Scary, Sad (E 2013) 
Anger, Fear, Sadness (Q 2013) 
---- 
Articulation Staccato High arousal (Q 2013) 
Fear (J&L 2010) 
Happy (E 2013) 
Anger, Fear, Happiness (Q 2013) 
---- 
Legato Low arousal (Q 2013) 
Tenderness, Sadness (J&L 2010; Q 
2013) 
Sad, Peaceful (E 2013) 
---- 
Rhythmic 
Complexity 
Complex Sharp duration contrasts in 
Happiness, Anger,  
Tenderness (J&L 2010) 
Higher rhythmic contrasts for Anger, 
Sadness, Happiness (Q 2013) 
---- 
Simple Soft duration contrasts in Sadness, 
Tenderness (J&T 2010) 
Lower rhythmic contrasts for Neutral 
(Q 2013) 
---- 
Harmonic 
Complexity 
Complex, 
Atonal,  
Dissonant 
Negative Valence (C 2004) 
Sadness (J& L 2010) 
---- 
Simple, Tonal, 
Consonant 
Positive Valence (C 2004) 
 
--- 
Attacks Fast Happiness, Anger (J&T 2010)  
Slow Sadness, Tenderness (J&T 2010)  
Abbreviations used in the table:  
(B 2012) = Bowling, Sundararajan, Han, & Purves, 2012 
(C&B 2010)= Curtis & Bharucha 2010 
(C 2004)= Costa, Fine, & Ricc Bitti, 2004  
(E 2013) = Eerola, Friberg, & Bresin, 2013  
(F&S 2003)= Fabian & Schubert, 2003  
(I&T 2006) = Illie & Thompson, 2006  
(J&L 2010) = Juslin & Lindström, 2010  
(Q 2014) = Quinto, Thompson, & Taylor, 2014  
(Sche 2011) = Scherer, Clark-Polner, & Mortillaro, 2011) 
(Sche 2013) = Scherer, Sundberg, Tamarit, & Salomão, 2013  
(Schu 2004) = Schubert, 2004 
(W 2013) = Weninger, Eyben, Schuller, Mortillaro, & Scherer, 2013) 
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Taken together, the evidence from cross-cultural and developmental studies, and from 
research into the expression of emotion in vocalizations and music leads to the following 
conclusions: 
1. Just as proposed by the authors of the BRECVEMA theory, there are a great 
number of coincidences between acoustic patterns in speech prosody and in 
music. This suggests that the perception of expression of emotions in music and 
in vocalizations depends, at least partly, in shared psychological and neural 
mechanisms (Escoffier, Zhong, Schirmer, & Qiu, 2012).  
2. Just as found in research into emotional vocalizations in general, most of the 
parallels between psychoacoustic cues to emotional expression in speech 
prosody and music can be mapped onto different levels of arousal.  
An exception to these parallel findings is expression of Fear in music, which does 
not share some of the basic psychoacoustic cues found in emotional speech. 
However, an analysis of the features of the “fearful” stimuli in most experiments 
suggests that in this category, the distinction between expressed and induced 
emotions has been blurred. These stimuli are characterised by low overall sound 
level and fast tempo, but also with high levels of loudness and tempo variability. 
This pattern suggests that rather than portraying the subjective experience of a 
scared person, the sudden variations of intensity in the “fearful” musical stimuli 
are aimed at scaring the listener with the presence of unprepared, subito-forte 
sounds and variations in musical speed (c.f. Vieillard et al., 2008). 
3. If we limit the analysis to the cues that are both present in prosody and music, it 
is difficult to find consistent and unambiguous patterns that can be mapped 
onto variations in valence and/or discrete emotions. At the same time, the more 
we include cues present exclusively in music (such as modality, and harmonic 
and rhythmic complexity), the more we find distinct associations between 
configurations of acoustic cues and the expression of specific emotions.8 
4. The fewer music-specific cues are present, the more people who not 
familiarised with them have difficulties identifying the intended expressed 
                                                            
8
 An intriguing exception is a study by Curtis and Bharucha (2010), which found that expression of 
sadness in vocalizations by English participants was associated with pitch variations equivalent to 
the minor third interval in music. This result was replicated by Bowling et al. (2012) with a 
different sample of English speakers, but not with a sample of Tamil speakers (an Indian 
language). Hence, further replications with larger samples of languages are necessary before 
accepting this hypothesis.  
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emotion in music (i.e. children, and listeners from non-Western cultures). 
Nevertheless, the analyses of the pattern of misattribution made by participants 
in the experiments reveals that listeners are sensitive to the levels of activity 
and valence expressed by music. 
5. Conversely, as predicted by Juslin’s model (Juslin, 2003), most studies have 
found that the more cues are present, the more participants can successfully 
recognise discrete emotions. This finding is equivalent to the conclusions from 
experiments into perception of facial expressions: the more an expression is 
portrayed as an exaggerated prototype containing all possible cues, the easier it 
is for observers to recognise it as expressive of a discrete emotion. 
It is unclear, however, the extent to which the music that people choose to 
listen in their everyday lives, (as opposed to music used in experimental studies) 
makes use of these stereotyped acoustic configurations. There is evidence for 
example, that valence is differently expressed across musical genres (Eerola, 
2011); and that attempting to identify excerpts of emotionally-expressive music 
from film soundtracks, (where one of the functions of music is to bring 
emotional depth to the visual narrative), implies a laborious process of selection 
and discarding of potential stimuli (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2011).  
6. The results from some of the reviewed studies contradict the general observed 
trends, and some contradict Juslin and Laukka’s summary (2003). These 
inconsistencies can be attributed to several reasons. First, there are important 
differences in procedures, materials, and measurement scales across studies. In 
particular, discrepancies in the way emotions are labelled can lead to different 
results. For instance, it is not the same to ask musicians to produce music that 
sounds angry than to ask them to produce music that sounds frustrated, 
irritated, or furious; and likewise, these adjectives are not necessarily equivalent 
from a listener’s point of view. Second, it is possible that some of the 
inconsistencies in the psychoacoustic cues associated with the expression of 
emotions are due to the presence of interactions between several cues (Eerola 
et al., 2013; Quinto, Thompson, & Keating, 2013).  
7. Just as in the field of vocalizations research, most music investigators have 
limited their analysis to a few acoustic cues, which they have analysed taking 
averaged measures of variation (e.g. mean tempo, mean fundamental 
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frequency, etc.). Therefore, it is conceivable that studying a greater number of 
acoustic parameters, and analysing the way these acoustic cues evolve in time 
(rather than using averaged measures) can lead to more fine-grained 
associations between acoustic cues and discrete emotions. This is a challenge 
for future research in this field (c.f. Coutinho & Dibben 2012). Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting that research that has assumed the same challenge in other 
domains, such as the physiological changes associated with emotional 
experiences, have not found solid evidence for the expected patterns, even after 
increasing the number of analysed cues.  
 
3.4 The perceptual paradox 
As mentioned above, the best support for the existence of Basic Emotions is the finding 
that when participants are asked to judge the emotion communicated by a portrayed 
facial, vocal or musical expression, they agree in the correct answer above chance level9 
(Scherer et al., 2011). This finding, however, entails a paradox: although there is little 
evidence that the facial and predicted vocal patterns occur in natural circumstances, 
although it has been difficult to establish patterns associated with discrete emotions 
(particularly in vocalizations), and although psychoacoustic cues to expression of 
emotions shared by vocalizations and music are more clearly related to arousal than to 
discrete emotions, people’s perception of these stimuli is clearly organised into 
categories (Laukka, 2005). Moreover, people tend to agree as to which categories 
correspond to every stimulus they judge. In other words, whereas objective measures of 
emotional expression have failed to find distinct categories, people’s subjective 
perception of emotion is categorical (Barrett, 2006b). As I show in the final section of 
this chapter, this paradox can be resolved by considering the way cultural and 
perceptual categories are constructed, and the crucial role that context has in the 
perception of emotional expressions. 
The first of these arguments can be found (surprisingly, given my preceding critique) 
in a passage of a paper by Juslin (Juslin, 2013c). When confronted with the above-
mentioned inconsistency, Juslin concedes that discrete categories exist in people’s 
minds, not in the materials (facial expressions, voices, or music): “it’s clear that the 
                                                            
9
 Admittedly, this level of decoding accuracy is lower for vocal expressions (around 59%) than for 
facial expressions (around 77%).  
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acoustic patterns obtained do not always neatly correspond to categories. But to look 
for discrete categories in the acoustic data is to look at the wrong place altogether. 
Categorical perception is a creation of the mind, it’s not in the physical stimulus” (Juslin, 
2013c, p. 5 italics added). From my point of view, the importance of this observation is 
paramount, because it suggests that the findings about universal perceptions of 
emotions are not due to emotions having a common, discrete biological substrate, but 
to the existence of common emotion concepts that organise people’s perception of 
emotions. Indeed, the existence of a limited, universal set of emotion concepts in 
people’s perceptual systems and languages need not arise from biologically-
predetermined emotions; it can simply occur because all humans across cultures face 
the same relevant events (e.g. facing a threat, losing something valued, confronting 
goal-obstructing situations, discovering outcomes that are better than expected, etc.). If 
all human beings face the same type of goal-relevant situations, and they evaluate them 
in similar ways, then it follows that all cultures must create similar conceptual and 
linguistic categories to denote them (Frijda, 2008). Scherer has proposed to call these 
cross-culturally common emotions, “modal emotions” (Scherer, 1994).  
Nevertheless, the existence of these common conceptual and linguistic categories 
does not completely dissolve the paradox. The existence of cross-culturally shared 
categories does not explain why, when presented with exaggerated expressions, most 
participants attribute the same emotional category to the same stimuli, and why they 
still tend to select the correct category when they judge facial, vocal or musical stimuli 
portrayed by people from other cultures. The answer to this question has two parts, 
both related to the way people use and construct mental prototypes. 
The first part of the answer lies in the fact that caricatured stimuli are easier to 
categorise than typical stimuli when the categories in question are highly interrelated 
(Goldstone, Steyvers, & Rogosky, 2003). Thus, even though these exaggerated, 
caricatured stimuli do not correspond to the most frequently observed expressions in 
natural circumstances, they have a central place in emotional concepts, guiding the 
perception of facial and vocal expressions (Laukka, 2005).  
The second part of the answer lies in the way people construct ideal representations 
to categorise similar objects, even when they have never seen an object containing all 
the features of the ideal representation. Particularly in the case of face recognition, a 
number of studies have demonstrated that when participants are presented with a 
number of similar faces, they implicitly build prototypes “averaging” their features, and 
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that these prototypes are so strong that they create false memories of having seen them 
before (Bruce et al., 1991; Cabeza, Bruce, Kato, & Oda, 1999; Solso & McCarthy, 1981). 
Thus, in the second part of these experiments, participants are asked to perform a 
memory task consisting in discriminating new and previously-presented stimuli. The old 
stimuli consist of the same faces presented in the first part, and the new stimuli are a 
mixture of completely new faces, and faces created by averaging the features of the old 
ones. In all of these experiments researchers found that participants report wrongly, but 
with a high level of confidence, that they remember having seen the new “averaged” 
stimuli during the first part of the experiment.  
The same process of prototype construction probably occurs in perception of 
emotional expressions, including musical ones: even though the exaggerated emotional 
expressions used in experimental research are rarely encountered in natural 
circumstances, they are easily identified because people’s perception of emotion is 
based on categories that use the average prototype as a guide for classification. 
Additionally, it is also likely that at least in the case of Western participants, these 
mental prototypes are derived from their exposure to culturally shared images and 
symbols such as the classic Greek images for comedy and tragedy, the facial and vocal 
expressions of cartoons, and the associations between visual narratives and music 
soundtracks. 
 
3.4.1 The Role of Contexts in the Perception of Emotions in Facial, 
Vocal, and Musical Expressions 
A further argument that can help resolve the perceptual paradox is the consideration of 
the crucial role that contexts play in the perception of emotional expressions; a role that 
both the Basic Emotion tradition and the BRECVEMA theory have largely ignored. These 
two theoretical approaches share the implicit assumption that emotional meanings are 
inherent to facial, vocal, and musical expressions, and therefore they can be readily 
decoded by perceivers. This assumption is based on an evolutionary argument, 
according to which, it is adaptive for animals to communicate discrete emotional 
categories using fixed expressive patterns, which can be recognised by an observer in 
any circumstance (Ekman, 1992; Juslin & Laukka, 2003).  
The problem with this evolutionary argument is that it assumes that expressive 
gestures and vocalizations always originate in an underlying emotional state, and that 
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they are always perceived as communicating emotions by observers, as if humans and 
animals ever expressed and perceived emotions in context-free situations. There is, 
however, evidence that evolution has favoured flexibility over rigidness, and the 
communication of social intentions over emotional states, even in non-human primates 
(e.g. Parr, Waller, & Fugate, 2005). This alternative view proposes that it is usually more 
advantageous for animals (and humans) to use expressions to communicate intentions, 
rather than to openly show their emotional state (Bachorowski, 1999; Fridlund, 1994). 
For example, it is more advantageous for a primate to display an expression of anger 
when it wants to intimidate a rival (thus preventing the confrontation from happening), 
than when it has the intention of attacking and overcoming its rival immediately 
(Fridlund, 1994). Similarly, studies with human participants have shown how emotional 
expressions vary according to the characteristics of the situation, and communicate 
different intentions accordingly. For instance, people do not necessarily smile more 
when they experience positive results on their own, but they do smile more when they 
communicate those positive results to other people (Kraut & Johnston, 1979; Ruiz-Belda, 
Fernandez-Dols, Carrera, & Barchard, 2003). Also, different types of smiles are 
associated with different motives. For example, embarrassment smiles seem to have the 
function of appeasing the negative judgement of observers, whereas enjoyment smiles 
have the function of increasing closeness with others (Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, 
& Hess, 2010). 
This flexibility of expressions is also evident in the way observers perceive different 
meanings in facial expressions and vocalizations according to the context in which they 
occur. Several experiments on perception of emotional expressions have demonstrated 
this effect (see Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011 for a review of the evidence). For 
example, Carroll and Russell (1996) showed how even exaggerated portrayals of 
emotions can be perceived as expressing different emotions, or even non-emotional 
states when they are associated with different contexts. For instance, when participants 
observed a face showing the prototypical anger expression, they perceived it as 
alternatively expressing anger, fear, or physical exertion, depending on the type of 
narrative that they read about the situation that led the person to make that facial 
expression.  
A defender of the Basic Emotion approach could reply to this argumentation saying 
that in a psychological experiment, the participants who judge the portrayed stimuli 
encounter them in a context-free situation. Yet this argument can be challenged by 
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considering that in these experiments, the context is provided by the list of emotional 
adjectives that the participants have to choose from to make their judgement. These 
lists effectively restrict the number and type of inferences that participants can make 
about the psychological state of the person portraying the expression, and therefore 
bias their perception of it (Frank & Stennett, 2001; Russell, 1994). Research has shown 
that when instead of close-ended questionnaires, investigators use open answers, or 
tasks asking participants to match two faces expressing the same emotion, agreement 
among participants diminishes dramatically (Russell et al., 2003).  
In the context of music, the biasing effect that response formats have on perception 
was demonstrated in an experiment by Watt and Ash (1998), where instead of asking 
listeners to rate the emotion expressed by the musical stimuli, the researchers asked 
them to rate the extent to which the music portrayed traits generally associated with a 
person, such as gender (male/female), age (young/old), and friendliness (good/evil). The 
high levels of agreement observed in the participants’ answers suggest that they readily 
used these categories to make their judgments. These results also suggest that musical 
meanings, just like facial and vocal expressions, are flexible, not inherent to the musical 
materials, and not restricted to a few standard emotional categories. 
This observation that people’s perception of meanings in music is flexible and varies 
according to different listening contexts has two larger implications for research into 
musical emotions. On the one hand, this perceptual flexibility suggests that finding that 
listeners can identify discrete emotions in music, does not suggest that people usually 
engage with music with the objective of perceiving emotional contents. Moreover, 
people’s ability to perceive discrete emotions in music does not suggest that when 
people perceive emotions expressed by music, they experience them as discrete 
categories, or that the categories they perceive correspond to the discrete emotional 
adjectives that experimental research has investigated (Clarke, 2014). On the other 
hand, acknowledging people’s perceptual flexibility in relation to music implies that a 
central question that researchers of musical emotions should address is: what are the 
circumstances under which emotional meanings are privileged over non-emotional 
ones? This question, of course, cannot be satisfactorily answered by psychological 
theories that regard musical communication phenomena exclusively in terms of 
processes of encoding and decoding of acoustic information from musicians to listeners 
(Juslin, 2003). 
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In summary, in these two last sections I have shown how the perceptual paradox, 
consisting of the inconsistency of findings from objective and subjective measures of 
emotional expression, can be resolved by considering that the categorical perception of 
emotional expressions emerges from: a) the existence of common linguistic categories, 
b) the construction of ideal representations which create the illusion of the existence of 
prototypical expressions in natural circumstances; and c) the disambiguating effect that 
contextual information has in the perception of emotional expressions. Thus, I submit 
that there is no need to invoke the existence of hardwired basic emotions to explain 
how people perceive categories in vocalizations and in music, as claimed by the 
BRECVEMA theory.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I argued that the theory of emotional contagion with music proposed by 
the BRECVEMA theory faces several difficulties, all of them related to the problems with 
its adoption of the concept of Basic Emotions and the empirical evidence for their 
existence. The main argument I proposed is that although there is evidence for the claim 
that the expression and perception of musical emotions arises from mechanisms that 
are shared with the expression and perception of speech prosody, this common 
biological ground is not organised around discrete categories. Instead, I submit that the 
evidence so far suggests a dimensional interpretation. In other words, the acoustical 
cues present in music can at the very least, be mapped onto variations of activation and 
valence. Moreover, due to the fact that listeners across cultures are sensitive to these 
underlying dimensions, they can express and perceive a wide variety of emotional and 
non-emotional meanings in music.  
It is important to note that my arguments do not amount to saying that musical 
meanings are completely free, idiosyncratic, and as variable as the contexts in which 
they occur. On the contrary, drawing from an ecological perspective to music 
perception, my claim is that musical structures afford certain meanings to be privileged 
over alternative ones. In this approach, emotional meanings emerge from the complex 
interaction of the objective qualities of the music (i.e. the variations associated with 
activation and valence levels), the psychological state, abilities, and motivations of the 
listener, and the cultural and situational context in which the musical event takes place 
(Clarke, 2005; Dibben, 2001). 
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This individual and contextual variability is to some extent acknowledged in Juslin’s 
theory of musical expressivity. According to this model, the three layers of coding make 
it possible that music expresses basic emotions, and other non-basic emotions or 
affective states such as hope, solemnity, spirituality, etc. (Juslin, 2013c, pp. 9–10). The 
problem I see with this theory is that it leaves several crucial questions unanswered:  
 If people can easily perceive basic and non-basic emotions in music, what are the 
conditions under which people perceive basic emotions, and what are the 
conditions under which they perceive other emotional and non-emotional 
meanings?  
 On occasions where non-basic emotions (or other meanings) have priority in the 
listener’s conscious experience, is it still possible that some brain mechanism 
detects the underlying basic emotion expressed by the music in the iconic layer, 
and triggers the emotional contagion mechanism? 
 How clear does the expression of a basic emotion have to be for this process of 
contagion to be triggered? In other words, does it depend on the presence of a 
clear, stereotyped combination of acoustic cues in the music? 
 How does the brain decide whether to give priority to the information provided 
by the contagion mechanism, or to the information provided by other 
simultaneously activated mechanisms of emotion elicitation? 
Finally, I deem it necessary to point to two important areas of coincidence and 
difference between my proposal and the BRECVEMA approach:  
In the first place, the approach here proposed complements, rather than replaces the 
lens model proposed by the authors of the BRECVEMA theory. The lens model, with its 
strong emphasis on the process of encoding and decoding of psychoacoustic cues, finds 
it hard to explain how it is possible that people can identify the correct emotional 
expression when there are few cues present in the musical material, and/or when they 
are not perceived by listeners. From my perspective, this paradox is easily resolved by 
considering the role of contexts in the construction of musical meanings. Thus, 
contextual information such as the social significance of the occasion, the song’s lyrics, 
the presence of visual narratives, the musicians’ gestures, and the listener’s 
psychological dispositions can lead to the perception of emotional and non-emotional 
meanings in the music even when the musical materials are ambiguous. 
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Second, a point of departure from Juslin’s approach is that I consider it unnecessary 
to propose the existence of three layers of coding for explaining the perception of 
musical emotion: an iconic level based on basic emotions, an intrinsic coding level that 
communicates fluctuations of tension, and an associative level that communicates 
“arbitrary” associations (Juslin, 2013c, p. 4). I find it more parsimonious to dispose of the 
idea that the iconic level denotes discrete basic emotions, and to assume that music 
communicates fluctuations of valence and activation that can be mapped onto many 
possible meanings via association mechanisms. This is one of the basic premises of the 
constructionist approach to the induction of musical emotions that I present in next two 
chapters. 
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4. Principles of constructionist 
theories of emotion 
I dedicate this chapter and the next to present my theoretical proposal about how 
musical emotions are elicited. The aim of this proposal is to overcome the shortcomings 
that I identified in contemporary theories in the first three chapters, based on the 
consensual definition of emotion I presented in Chapter 1, and on the principles of social 
and psychological constructionist theories of emotion10 (e.g. Averill, 1980; Barrett, 2006; 
Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Harré, 1986; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Russell, 2003). I 
describe the main principles of constructionist approaches, and I explain how these 
approaches explain the process of emotion elicitation, making emphasis on Barrett’s 
Conceptual Act Theory. In the next chapter I explain how these principles can be 
adapted to account for the phenomena of perception and induction of musical 
emotions.  
 
4.1 What is a constructionist approach to explaining 
emotions? 
In general terms, adopting a constructionist approach means assuming that a given 
social or psychological phenomenon is constituted by an assemblage of more basic 
elements (Faucher, 2013). In both sociological and psychological constructionist 
approaches this assumption implies that the observed phenomena (e.g. notions of 
gender, race, social conflict, etc., or mental skills, emotions, musical meanings, etc.) are 
                                                            
10
 Some authors consider the terms “constructivism” and “constructionism” as equivalent (e.g. 
Cunningham 2013, Faucher 2013). In this thesis, I prefer the second term, in order to distinguish 
theories of emotion from theories of cognitive development such as Piaget’s (1980), which are 
traditionally called “constructivist”. 
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not imminent and exclusively determined by structural and biological conditions (e.g. 
skin colour, income inequality, brain structures, or acoustic parameters), but emerge 
from the interaction of more basic processes. Whereas social constructionist approaches 
emphasise that the human behaviour phenomena result from social interaction (Averill, 
1980; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Harré, 1986), psychological approaches emphasise that 
mental phenomena are engendered by the interaction between basic psychological 
processes (Cunningham, 2013). This focus on interaction also entails the prediction that 
social and psychological phenomena vary considerably depending on the particular 
interaction that takes place in a given historical, cultural, social and/or personal context. 
This emphasis on situational variability and the rejection of biological determinism 
has always placed psychological constructionist theories of emotion in opposition to the 
claims of Basic Emotion theories. Starting with the discussion between James’ (1890) 
and Darwin’s (1872) theories, every constructionist theory in the last hundred years has 
emerged as a response to theories that regard human emotions as biologically 
predetermined categories associated with specific behaviours, physiological patterns, 
and brain structures (Lindquist, 2013).  
Besides the central assumption that emotions are emergent processes that occur 
when information from the body is interpreted in relation to the characteristics of the 
external context (Gross & Barrett, 2011), contemporary constructionist approaches hold 
the same epistemological principles that have been central to this theoretical tradition, 
and which can be summarised as follows (Barrett, 2013):  
The Principle of Variation. Instead of treating variation in the observed behaviours, 
physiological or neural patterns as measurement errors, constructionist 
approaches predict, and aim to explain the observed variation. Emotions are 
considered situated affective states that change in time, according to the 
demands of the context and the goals of the individual. This assumption implies 
three predictions. First, a variety of observed behaviours, physiological changes, 
and brain dynamics can be associated with the elicitation of different instances 
of the same emotional category (e.g. fear of physical harm vs. fear of speaking in 
public). Second, identical behaviours, physiological and neural responses can be 
present in different categories (e.g. fear, anger and sadness). Third, emotion 
categories vary across cultures and across individuals, depending on the way a 
society, or a person has structured their knowledge about emotion. 
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The Principle of Core Systems. All constructionist theories propose that emotions 
emerge from the interaction of core-systems that are not specific to any 
emotion category, or even to the domain of emotion. Although each theory 
proposes slightly different core systems, all theories coincide in that emotions 
emerge when the changes in these core systems are meaningfully related to a 
situation in the world. 
The Principle of Emergentism and Holism. Constructionist theories share the notion 
that emotions, considered as whole systems, have properties that are not 
evident in their individual parts. And conversely, they propose that it is not 
possible to understand how one element of the whole system works without 
considering how it relates to the rest of elements, and the state of the system as 
a whole.  
 
4.2 How emotions are elicited according to constructionist 
theories 
4.2.1 The Concept of Core Affect 
At every waking moment, our brain automatically integrates information coming from 
the senses with information stored in memory in order to create a coherent percept of 
what is going on, and to predict what is going to happen next (Barrett & Bar, 2009; 
Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007). This dynamic of constructing a present experience 
combining prediction and memory does not consist of a cold cognitive process. On the 
contrary, affective evaluations of the situation occur so early in perception, that they are 
involved in the process of knowing “what is out there” and “what is going to happen 
next” in the world. There is evidence that brain areas associated with evaluating the 
relevance and value of objects for our well-being (such as the orbitofrontal cortex and 
the amygdala) receive information from sensorial areas as early as 80ms after the 
presentation of a stimulus, (even before the stimulus is consciously experienced) 
(Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Kveraga et al., 2007). Moreover, this process of integration of 
sensorial information with information stored in memory, and of affective evaluation 
happens in successive “waves” of neural activation from the sensorial areas of the brain 
to areas involved in affective evaluation and back, suggesting that each new iteration of 
the process contributes to the process of refining of the initial perceptual and affective 
predictions (Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007). 
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This conceptualization of perception as a process of prediction and sensory-affective 
integration has three important consequences. First, since the output of this process is 
not only cognitive but also affective, we are always in an affective state. Although we do 
not always reflect about it, there is always an affective tone underlying our experience 
of the present situation (Russell & Barrett, 1999). Second, cognition and affect are 
intrinsically related, because our affective and motivational states bias our experience of 
the world, and vice-versa. There is for example evidence that amygdala responses are 
modulated by the motivational state of the individual: LaBar and colleagues (2001) 
compared participants who were hungry with participants who were satiated, and found 
that the amygdala became more activated by the presentation of food-related stimuli in 
the hungry participants. Third, if affective, cognitive and motivational contexts bias our 
perception of every situation, then it does not make sense to assume that affective 
responses occur in a sequential way, starting with the detection of a completely “novel” 
stimulus, as claimed by appraisal theories (Lazarus, 1966; Scherer, 2009a; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), and as reflected in the procedure of most emotion experiments. 
The underlying affective tone that is constantly present in our waking life is called by 
Russell and Barrett (Russell & Barrett, 1999) core affect. This system is available to 
consciousness, especially when extreme or urgent changes in our homeostasis capture 
our attention and motivate us to engage in introspection. When it reaches 
consciousness, core affect is experienced along two dimensions: valence, that 
corresponds to feelings that we and/or the situation are pleasant, good, inviting, etc. or 
unpleasant, bad, aversive; and arousal, that corresponds to feelings of being activated 
(i.e. awake, energized) or deactivated (i.e. sleepy or tired) (Russell & Barrett, 1999). 
Since core affect integrates information from the world and from the body, fluctuations 
in this fundamental affective system are caused by multiple causes: external stimulation 
(such as sudden sounds, or changes in the temperature of the environment), bodily 
processes (such as muscular pain, accelerated heartbeats, hormonal secretions, 
circadian rhythms, etc.), and psychological processes (such as learned conditioned 
responses, imagination, and thoughts) (Russell, 2003). 
Core affect can be thought of as an embodied and pre-reflective representation of 
our immediate relation to the environment. It constantly signals whether the situation is 
safe, helpful, rewarding, threatening, etc. (Russell & Barrett, 1999). Therefore, core 
affect underlies all the affective responses described in Chapter 1. When core affect is 
experienced only at the level of primary consciousness as a free-floating affective tone, 
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it corresponds to the mood category. When it is experienced as the inviting or repulsive 
property of an object, it corresponds to a basic category called differently by several 
authors: preferences, proto-affects, or automatic affects (Baumeister et al., 2007; 
Ortony et al., 2005; Scherer, 2000). And when core affect is experienced as intense and 
caused by an object, it corresponds to the emotion category. 
 
4.2.2 How do Emotions Become Differentiated? 
I have explained so far how our affective life is constituted by an ever present underlying 
state called core-affect. In this section I explain how this fundamental affective state is 
transformed into discrete emotional episodes. I describe Barrett’s Conceptual Act theory 
in more detail because, as will be evident below, it integrates and further develops the 
proposals from other constructionist theories. 
In Russell’s theory (2003), core affect is transformed into specific emotions thanks to 
a process of attribution that occurs after the changes in core affect are perceived. Much 
like James’ (1890), and Schachter and Singer’s (Schachter & Singer, 1962) theories, 
Russell’s model consists of two steps: a first step in which an antecedent event causes a 
change in core affect, and a second step in which the person attributes that change to 
the antecedent event (i.e. the object of the emotion). On most occasions, the event and 
the changes in core affect are so salient that the attribution is done quickly and 
automatically. But on other occasions, either core affect or the object is less clear, and 
the attribution process is done slowly, involving deliberate inferences. In both cases, 
even after the change in core affect is attributed to an object, the process of assessment 
of the object continues in aspects such as its relevance to the person’s goals, its causal 
antecedents, the formation of a plan to deal with the situation, etc. (Russell, 2003, p. 
150).  
For Clore and Ortony (2008) emotions occur when undifferentiated affect is 
transformed by appraisal. Unlike Russell, Clore and Ortony do not explain this process of 
transformation as depending only on attributing an object to the affective changes, nor 
do they consider that cognitive appraisals occur only after this attribution has been 
made. In their view, the undifferentiated affective reactions are progressively shaped 
into specific emotions by appraisals (Clore & Ortony, 2013). When affect is cognitively 
elaborated as an emotion, the psychologically relevant situation is redundantly 
represented in multiple modes at the same time: experiential, cognitive, and 
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behavioural (Clore & Ortony, 2008). The critical role that Clore and Ortony assign to 
cognitive evaluation makes their theory very close to appraisal models11. Nevertheless, 
the main difference between their model and appraisal theories is that they view 
appraisal as a process of interpretation of the situation and of one’s affective response, 
and not as a sequence of cognitive checks that trigger specific emotions according to a 
predetermined set of rules.  
Cunningham and colleagues (Cunningham et al., 2013, 2007) propose a similar 
account of the process of transformation of affect into emotion, but the focus of their 
theory is on the neural processes involved. According to these authors, any new 
stimulus (internal or external) is initially evaluated in terms of its valence and relevance, 
resulting in a basic affective state. Whenever the new affective state does not match the 
brain’s prediction, a sequence of more nuanced evaluative processes is initiated, in 
which the information about the situation and the body is interpreted and re-
interpreted in iterative cycles. The first iterations are produced by subcortical areas of 
the brain such as the amygdala and the ventral striatum, and result in unreflective 
motivational behaviours such as approach or avoidance. If the increased state of 
entropy provoked by the discrepancy between the prediction and experience is not 
resolved at this point, the situation continues to be re-interpreted in further iterations. 
These subsequent iterations involve progressively cortical areas of the brain such as the 
prefrontal cortex, and integrate more complex information such as rules and goals. For 
Cunningham and colleagues, there is no final state to this process, but the more the 
situation is cognitively elaborated, the more we experience our present situation as an 
emotion.12 
Barrett’s Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett, 2006) shares the basic assumptions of the 
other constructionist theories so far described. Specifically, her theory builds upon 
Russell’s (2003) conceptualization of emotions as constituted by two factors: core affect 
and categorisation, but in her model, categorisation of core affect does not happen after 
a change in core affect is detected. In Barrett’s model, core affect and categorisation are 
processes that continuously influence and constrain each other producing a variety of 
psychological states, among them, emotions (Barrett, 2006; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). 
                                                            
11
 Indeed, in some classifications of emotion, such as Moors’ (2009), Clore and Ortony’s model is 
included in the “appraisal theories” category.  
12 These authors also consider that sometimes additional iterations do not lead to more complex 
evaluations of the situation. Such is the case of rumination, where a dominant representation is 
repeated over and over without incorporating new useful information.  
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Barrett calls the process of categorisation of core affect a conceptual act, in order to 
emphasise the immediacy of the process, and its dependence on the existence of 
previously acquired knowledge, that she regards as “conceptual”. Thus, a conceptual act 
consists of a quick dynamic of summoning top-down knowledge from similar previous 
emotional experiences (i.e. concepts), which are integrated with the current sensorial 
and affective information, creating the emergent gestalt that is an emotional episode. 
This process is usually so quick that it escapes consciousness (it happens within 150ms), 
and is experienced as effortless, automatic, and involuntary.  
Similarly to Russell’s “attribution” construct, Barrett’s conceptual acts provide the 
present affective state with an object and a label. However, in Barrett’s model (as in 
appraisal theories), a conceptual act also integrates knowledge about the cause of the 
situation, its relevancy for the person’s goals, what is likely to happen next, what their 
behavioural reaction should be, etc. The difference between Barrett’s theory and (many) 
appraisal theories is that most appraisal theories regard this knowledge as organised 
into patterns that are common to all instances of an emotional category (Moors 2014) 
e.g. all episodes of fear involve evaluating a situation as dangerous and ourselves as 
defenceless. In contrast, Barrett proposes that the conceptual knowledge that is brought 
to bear in the construction of an emotional episode is tailored to the needs of the 
person in a given context (Barrett, 2006).  
One crucial consequence of this context-specificity of emotional knowledge is that 
different instances of the same emotional category do not necessarily share the same 
observable features: the feelings, expressive behaviours, action tendencies and patterns 
of neuro-physiological activity will vary according to every situation. For instance, the 
conceptual knowledge brought to deal with a situation in which we fear a dog barking at 
us, is different from the knowledge brought to deal with a situation in which we fear 
having to perform in front of an audience. However, at the same time, this variety does 
not imply that there are as many types of fear as there are frightening situations and 
people who experience them. On the contrary, according to the Conceptual Act Theory, 
we consider these diverse experiences as belonging to the same category because our 
culture labels them with the same word. Consequently, emotional linguistic terms play 
the crucial role of organising personal emotional knowledge into socially-shared discrete 
categories (Gendron, Lindquist, Barsalou, & Barrett, 2012). 
Two further differences between the Conceptual Act Model and other theoretical 
approaches are the assumptions it makes about the type of psychological processing 
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and the format of representations involved in emotional phenomena. Instead of 
emphasising rule-based processing as do appraisal theories, the Conceptual Act Theory 
proposes that on most occasions, conceptualization of core affect occurs through top-
down, associative processes. The emotional significance of the situation is in great part 
produced by quickly reinstatement of information from similar conditions in the past 
(i.e. heuristic or associative processing), rather than by a sequence of checks about the 
object’s relevance for the person’s goals and norms (i.e. rule-based processing). 
Regarding the format of representations, the Conceptual Act Theory draws from 
grounded cognition theories such as Barsalou’s (2003) to propose that information 
about emotional events is stored in the brain as modal, embodied representations. 
Concepts are not “abstracted from sensorimotor events and stored in some sort of 
propositional form, like in an encyclopaedia” […]; instead they are “partial re-
enactments or simulations of the sensorimotor states that occurred with previous 
instances of the [emotional] category” (Barrett, 2006, p. 33). These re-enactments are 
multimodal (visual, auditory, olfactory, introspective, etc.). 
Finally, the Conceptual Act Theory posits that besides core affect and 
conceptualization, a third core system is involved in the construction of emotion: 
controlled attention. The role of attention is to shape conceptualization by resolving 
conflicts between competing representations, and by inhibiting automatic prepotent 
responses when necessary (Barrett, 2011). Furthermore, in line with Lambie and 
Marcel’s theory of emotion consciousness (2002), the Conceptual Act Theory proposes 
that when the locus of attention is on ourselves, we tend to conceptualise the changes 
in core affect as property of the self, resulting in a reflective or self-focused emotional 
experience (e.g. “I am afraid”, “I am angry”); and when attention is focused on the 
external situation, we tend to conceptualise the changes in core affect as a property of 
the world (e.g. “this situation is threatening”, “this person is offensive”) (Lindquist & 
Barrett, 2008). 
4.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have outlined the main principles of psychological constructionist 
theories, and I explained how they account for the process of emotion elicitation. To 
conclude, I find it useful to note the compatibility of recent theories of musical meaning 
and musical emotions with those principles, as summarised below.  
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Writing from a musicological perspective, Cook (2001) refutes the notion that musical 
meanings are embedded in musical works, and proposes instead that musical meanings 
emerge from the interaction of the material constraints of the sounds, and the context 
in which the musical performance is received. This notion of musical meaning as 
emergent and context-dependent is also present in the ecological perspective to musical 
listening proposed by Clarke and colleagues (Clarke, 2005; Dibben, 2001; Windsor, 2004) 
who propose that our perception of music is not determined exclusively by our sensorial 
system nor by the physical characteristics of the sounds, but arises from the interaction 
of our interests and skills in the present situation, and the structure offered by the 
sounds.  
The sociological perspective offered by DeNora (2000) also shares this view of music 
as a physical and cultural object that affords (rather than carries) meanings. DeNora 
shows in her ethnographic studies how people use music as a resource for constructing 
subjective states and identities and for modifying their social circumstances.  
Regarding emotional experiences with music, the constructionist notion that 
emotions are constructed from bodily feelings that become emotions given an 
appropriate context is found in a passage of a paper by Sloboda. In a discussion about 
the nature of physical reactions to music such as tears, shivers down the spine and 
accelerated heartbeats, he suggests that “these sensations or feelings are not specific 
emotions, although they may easily give rise to specific emotions if appropriate contexts 
or associations are at hand” (Sloboda, 1998, p. 27). 
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5. A constructionist theory of 
musically-induced emotions 
In this chapter I introduce a theory of induction of musical emotions, grounded on the 
constructionist principles outlined in chapter four. In a nutshell, my proposal consists in 
that in any music-listening situation, some features of the sounds are processed quickly 
and automatically by perceptual processes, producing fluctuations in core affect. On 
most occasions, these fluctuations are experienced as low-intensity changes in mood, or 
as non-cognitively sophisticated affective responses such as preferences. On other 
occasions, the confluence of factors in the music, the person, and the context activate 
associative and appraisal processes which conceptualise the situation as personally-
relevant, producing the emergence of an emotional episode.  
This proposal integrates and reinterprets many of the claims of the BRECVEMA 
theory and the Multifactorial Process Model (Juslin, 2013a; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013). 
Just like those theories, my proposal is concerned with the psychological processes 
involved in the induction of musical emotions, rather than with the neural structures 
that support them13, and with circumstances of individual music listening, rather than 
with circumstances of collective listening, or of music making. 
This chapter is organised as follows: first, I present the premise that music perception 
is at the same time a process of prediction and affective evaluation supported by 
embodied mechanisms. Then, I show how this perceptual process produces changes in 
core affect, and I discuss the extent to which these changes can be mapped onto two or 
                                                            
13
 In terms of Marr’s classification of levels of analysis (1982), my proposal deals with the 
computational level, which identifies the task that a mental system is designed to perform, and 
with the algorithmic level, which specifies the mechanisms by which information is processed in 
order to perform the task, but not with the implementation level, which describes how the 
information is processed in brain structures and circuits. 
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more dimensions. Next, I explain how conceptual mechanisms transform core affect into 
discrete emotional episodes, and I explain the role of attention in shaping affective 
responses to music. Finally, I formulate ten empirical predictions derived from this 
theoretical framework. 
 
5.1 Musically-induced changes in core affect 
5.1.1 The Premises: A View of Music Perception as Affective and 
Embodied 
A starting point to understand how music impacts core-affect is to go back to the notion 
that perception is a process of prediction, affective evaluation, and integration (see 
section 4.2.1 of the previous chapter). Hence, perceiving music, just like perceiving any 
other event in the environment, consists of a constant process of detection of new 
sounds, prediction of what the next sounds are going to be, a process of affective 
evaluation of the accuracy of the predictions (Huron, 2006; Meyer, 1956), and a process 
of evaluation of the significance of the sounds for the person’s well-being. The results of 
this process are, therefore at the same time, cognitive and affective. 
A second premise is the embodied character of the representations involved in 
perception of music. Drawing from grounded cognition theories such as Barsalou’s 
Perceptual Symbol Systems (2003) and embodied cognition theories of music perception 
such as Leman and Maes’ (Leman & Maes, 2014), I submit that perception and cognition 
of music do not consist of a dynamic of “disembodied” information processing in which 
acoustic information is translated into abstract symbols (e.g. Krumhansl & Castellano, 
1983). Instead, I propose to embrace the notion that all psychological processes, 
(including mental operations that do not imply overt motor activities), are influenced by 
the body’s morphology, sensory systems, and motor systems (Glenberg, 2010). In this 
view, even “mental” operations such as perception and cognition are supported by 
analogical, modal-specific representations. This implies that perceiving music, thinking 
about music, and having an emotional experience with music all involve partially re-
activating the same neural activity in sensorimotor areas of the brain that was present in 
similar experiences with music in the past. This process of reactivation is called 
“embodied simulation” in these theories.  
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Adopting the two premises described above implies regarding musically-induced core 
affect as a sort of “resonance” or “attunement” of our brains with the structural and 
affective qualities of the music. Three further arguments can be presented to elaborate 
this notion of resonance. 
First, ecological theories of perception of music (Clarke, 2005; Windsor, 2004) 
propose that our perception of music arises from the interaction of the affordances of 
the musical sounds, and our capabilities, learning history, and present needs. 
Additionally, these theories regard perception as intrinsically linked to action: we 
perceive objects and events in the environment as informing us about not only about 
“what is out there”, but also about “what we can do about it”. Hence, it can be inferred 
that listening to music evokes states of action readiness (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 
1989), which are manifested in our bodily and affective state. These states of action 
readiness have an impact on our core affect even on those occasions when they are not 
conscious, or when they are not acted out. 
A second argument for the existence of a bodily resonance to music can be found in 
theories of embodied music cognition such as exemplified by Leman and Maes (2014), 
Cox (2011), and Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006; Overy & 
Molnar-Szakacs, 2009). According to this theoretical approach, perceiving musical 
sounds involves simulating (i.e. internally mirroring) the motor actions, gestures, and/or 
melodies produced by the musicians. These simulated actions can therefore impact our 
core-affect. Although this simulation process is in great part implicit, it can also give rise 
to action tendencies and overt behaviours such as pretending to play the instruments 
one listens to14.  
Finally, from a micro perspective, Large and colleagues have proposed that music 
perception arises from patterns of nonlinear neural resonance to the periodicity of 
musical events (Large & Almonte, 2012; Large & Kolen, 1994). According to this theory, 
the dynamic characteristics of these neural patterns underlie behavioural and 
perceptual responses to music (such as motor entrainment and tonal expectations). 
Moreover, Flaig and Large (2014) propose that these musically-induced neural 
resonance can communicate core affect by modulating the person’s activation (via 
increases in tempo and intensity), and by modulating the person’s valence (via violation 
of musical expectations). 
                                                            
14
 In Chapter 7, I describe with more detail these theories of embodied simulation, and I present 
new evidence for the role of this mechanism in the elicitation of musical emotions.  
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5.1.2 Processes and Mechanisms that Lead to Changes in  
Core Affect I: Arousal 
The constructionist theory I propose entails identifying two types of psychological 
mechanisms that become activated when we listen to music: first, those mechanisms 
that produce changes in core affect; and second, those mechanisms that transform core 
affect changes into full-blown emotions. In this section I describe the mechanisms that 
produce changes in core affect, starting with those that produce changes in 
physiological and experienced arousal. In the next section, I describe the mechanisms 
that produce changes in valence. 
The mechanisms that create fluctuations in core affect are inevitably activated every 
time we listen to music (even when it is not the focus of our attention), because they 
make part of the systems that we use to perceive and adapt to the world in any 
circumstance. These “core-affect mechanisms” produce perceptual gestalts and low-
level embodied affective evaluations of the music and the self. As will be evident below, 
this approach to affective responses to music involves reconceptualising some of the 
mechanisms that Juslin (2013a), Scherer (2013), and other authors have proposed.  
First, from this perspective, the mechanisms of musical expectancy, rhythmic 
entrainment, and Brain Stem Reflexes (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) can be thought of as 
arising from the same underlying processes of perceptual integration, so that they are 
ultimately, the same phenomenon observed at different neural and time-scales. They all 
involve process of neural and bodily resonance (i.e. sensorimotor processing), 
generation of percepts, predictions of the immediate sensorial future, and appraisals of 
the success of those predictions.  
Starting from a neural perspective, recent research has discovered that listening to 
music automatically induces nonlinear time-locking synchronization of neural 
oscillations onto the periodicity of the events in the music (Large, 2008; Lerud, Almonte, 
Kim, & Large, 2014). This neural resonance interacts with top-down information from 
similar musical experiences, generating predictions about how the music will unfold.  
One way affective information is integrated into this process of perceptual 
construction is the activation of quick processes of appraisal, where the goal is to predict 
how the music will continue. Thus, successful predictions are rewarded, reinforcing 
learning, and unsuccessful predictions are penalised, producing corrections in further 
predictions (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Colling & Thompson, 2013; Huron, 2006). The 
78 
 
affective responses generated by this process of appraisal can usually only be detected 
in variations in neuroelectric activity, and in peripheral physiological responses such as 
skin conductance and heart rate variability (Koelsch et al., 2008). However, on occasions 
the violations of expectations are large enough, and produce fluctuations in core affect 
that are experienced as changes in experienced arousal, and to a lesser extent in valence 
(Egermann et al., 2013; Steinbeis et al., 2006). A second, and parallel process that 
integrates affective information into the formation of musical percepts is the evaluation 
of the significance of the auditory stimulus for the person’s well-being. I return to this 
point later. 
How does the body enter this picture? There are several ways to answer this 
question. The first way of thinking about the role of the body in the musical expectancy 
and rhythmic entrainment mechanisms is by moving up one level in the brain 
architecture, to consider how music listening not only induces neural synchrony, but 
evokes motor action plans too. Colling and Thompson’s theory (2013) offers this 
perspective. In their view, the same motor neural network underlies perception and 
performance of music (Bangert et al., 2006; Grahn & Brett, 2007; Wilson & Knoblich, 
2005). Therefore, whenever we listen to music, mirror neuron systems generate action 
plans in motor areas of our brain, as if we were about to produce the musical sounds 
ourselves. In this sense, these simulated action plans can be considered as the motor 
counterpart of the predictive neural oscillations described in the previous paragraphs. 
The simulated action plans evoked by music listening also generate embodied 
sensations and changes in core affect. They are on occasions subjectively experienced as 
the feelings of tension that Huron (2006) associates with the anticipation of events in 
the music (i.e. the Tension phase of the ITPRA dynamic). On other occasions, such as 
when the musical rhythm violates a moderate number of expectancies, the action plans 
are subjectively experienced as an urge to move along with the music (Witek et al., 
2014). Moreover, the constant process of appraisal of prediction success adds up to 
these bodily sensations, generating further fluctuations of core affect. Again, the level of 
accessibility to conscious awareness of these fluctuations depends on how large the 
deviations from the predictions are. Since most of the times the music that we listen to 
is predictable, and violates a moderate number of expectations, the fluctuations in core 
affect are fleeting and non-conscious, and thus only detected by physiological measures 
of arousal such as skin conductance responses, or as feelings of increased tension or 
“emotionality” in the music (e.g. Steinbeis et al., 2006). At other times, these 
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fluctuations are larger and experienced more consciously as feelings of discomfort (i.e. 
negative valence), or as experiences of surprise.15  
A second way of answering the question about the effects of music perception on 
bodily states is by moving up an additional level in the biological hierarchy, to consider 
how patterns of bodily tension arise from primitive mechanisms of adaptation of the 
whole organism to the environment. This means that we do not only process music as 
sounds that can be organised into musical gestalts such as melodies, harmonic 
progressions, rhythmic sequences, etc. We also process music as acoustic information 
that specifies events in the world (Clarke, 2005). Thus, from this ecological perspective, 
it is conceivable that on a primitive and mostly preconscious level, musical events are 
appraised as providing signs that an event is safe or dangerous, that an object is 
approaching or moving away from us, the level of physical strain from the person 
making them, etc. Moreover, from this perspective, perception is regarded as a process 
of preparation for action, and therefore detecting this kind of information may also 
provoke patterns of bodily and mental activation, such as changes in muscular tension, 
changes in heart and respiratory rate, re-orienting of attention, and so on.  
Research on perception of musical tension can be interpreted as offering support to 
this hypothesis that bodily responses to music arise in part from adaptation responses. 
Investigators such as Illie & Thompson (2006), Granot & Eitan (2011), and Farbood 
(2012) have found that increased dynamics, faster or accelerating tempi, higher pitch 
register, and rising melodic contours are associated with higher ratings of perceived 
tension (as compared with the opposite patterns). For Granot and Eitan (2011), these 
experiences of tension are originated in evaluations of the acoustic events as specifying 
the presence of dominant, large and powerful objects (or their opposite), which in 
consequence, evoke the corresponding alarm or relaxation responses in the listener. 
Although this line of research has focused on perceived, rather than on induced tension, 
it can be argued that these two phenomena are closely related. For example, an 
experiment where participants were asked to squeeze on a pair of tongs to represent 
the tension they perceive in the music demonstrated how easy it is for listeners to 
translate perceived tension into muscular tension (Nielsen, 1987). In this line of 
argument, it is conceivable, as theories of embodied cognition propose (Barsalou, 2003; 
Glenberg, 2010), that even when tension is perceived as located in the music, this 
                                                            
15 See section 2.6 of Chapter 2 for a critical discussion of the evidence for the claim that the 
musical expectancy and the rhythmic entrainment mechanisms leads to fluctuations of arousal 
rather than to the induction of full-blown emotions. 
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percept involves activation of premotor areas of the brain, where bodily states of 
tension and relaxation are simulated. On most occasions, this simulation only works as 
preparation for quickly responding to the perceived environmental change, and is 
experienced as tension in the music. On other occasions, the musical event is so sudden 
and “urgent”, that it provokes an overt response which is observable as a surge in 
physiological arousal, and experienced subjectively as surprise. This is what the 
BRECVEMA theory labels the Brain Stem Reflex mechanism (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008). 
The close relation between perceived arousal in the music and induced arousal in the 
listener can also be inferred by observing that many of the musical qualities that are 
associated with the perception of arousal expressed by music (summarised in Table 3.1, 
in Chapter 3), coincide with the musical qualities that are associated with variations in 
levels of autonomic activation in listeners. Studies into physiological effects of music 
have found that compared to listening to relaxing or sedative music, music with 
stimulative qualities (e.g. with fast tempo, loud dynamics, rapid changes in dynamics, 
staccato articulation, etc.) is associated with increases in autonomic responses, such as 
increases in heart rate, blood pressure, skin conductivity, and respiration rate (Hodges, 
2010).  
Finally, it is important to stress that the mechanisms that lead to neural and motor 
resonance to music I described in the first part of this section interact with the 
mechanisms that produce fluctuations of autonomic and psychological arousal I 
described in the last paragraphs. This interdependence has been demonstrated in a 
series of experiments carried out by Leman and colleagues into the effects of music 
listening on walking (Buhmann, Desmet, Moens, Van Dyck, & Leman, 2016; Leman et al., 
2013; Styns, van Noorden, Moelants, & Leman, 2007). In these studies, even when 
listening to stimuli with the same rate of beats per minute, participants walked faster 
(i.e. took longer strides) with music than with metronomes, and with music of an 
arousing quality than with music with a relaxing quality. In other words, the participants 
in these experiments not only entrained their walking rate to the musical beat, they also 
adapted the vigour of their movements to the exciting or relaxing qualities of the music. 
In summary, in this section I have presented four processes that lead to fluctuations 
of the arousal dimension of core affect: nonlinear neural resonances to periodic events 
in the music, activation of simulation mechanisms that produce action plans in the brain, 
construction and appraisal of perceptual predictions, and psychophysiological 
adjustments to the tensing or relaxing character of the music. These processes subsume, 
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and at the same time, go beyond the musical expectancy, rhythmic entrainment, and 
brain stem reflexes mechanisms proposed in the BRECVEMA theory and the 
Multifactorial Process Model.  
 
5.1.3 Processes and Mechanisms that Lead to Changes in  
Core Affect II: Valence 
The processes and mechanisms I discussed in the previous section focused on how 
perceiving music leads to changes in arousal. Evidently, it is possible that these dynamics 
can also lead to changes in valence, but the evidence for this possibility is so far scarce 
and somewhat contradictory. First, regarding the musical expectancy mechanism, as 
discussed in section 2.6.1 of Chapter 2, most investigations have found that violations of 
musical expectancies correlate with physiological and experienced changes in arousal, 
but not of valence (Egermann et al., 2013; Koelsch et al., 2008; Steinbeis et al., 2006). 
Second, regarding the evidence for the effects of rhythmic entrainment on valence, the 
evidence is again partial, and contradictory: some studies have found significant effects 
(Labbé & Grandjean, 2014; Witek et al., 2014) while others have found no association 
(Janata et al., 2012) –See section 2.6.2 of chapter 2, and chapter 6 for a detailed review 
of this evidence. Finally, regarding the effects of music on experienced tension, perhaps 
the most informative evidence has been provided by Illie and Thompson’s experiment 
(2006) which manipulated and compared the effects of musical loudness, tempo, and 
pitch height (and their equivalents in vocalizations) and measured the participants 
affective experience in three dimensions: valence, tense arousal, and energetic arousal. 
Their results suggest that tension arousal and valence are largely orthogonal 
dimensions: the musical parameters that are associated with ratings of tension did not 
present the same patterns of association with ratings of valence.  
How does music induce changes in the valence dimension of core affect, then? I 
submit that rather than depend on mechanisms of sensorimotor processing and 
appraisals of prediction accuracy (described above), musically-induced valence occurs in 
part thanks to the activation of quick appraisals of “goodness”/“badness” in the music, 
and to associative mechanisms derived from implicit learning.  
A starting point is again, the premise that perceptual processing involves evaluation 
of the significance of the present situation for the person’s well-being. As explained in 
section 4.2.1 of chapter 4, this evaluation happens so quickly that it contributes to the 
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construction of the perceptual gestalt itself, and occurs under the threshold of conscious 
awareness (Lebrecht, Bar, Barrett, & Tarr, 2012). This appraisal, which corresponds to 
the intrinsic pleasantness appraisal check in Scherer’s CPM theory (Scherer, 2009a), is 
also present in music perception. Some of these valence appraisals may have innate 
origins, such as the preference for consonant over dissonant intervals, which has been 
observed in infants as young as 4 months of age (Trainor & Heinmiller, 1998; Zentner & 
Kagan, 1998). Other appraisals may originate in cross-modal associations, such as the 
above-mentioned association of low-pitched, loud sounds with the presence of large, 
powerful objects or entities (Granot & Eitan, 2011), or the association of rough timbres 
with physical states that involve bodily tension or exertion (Scherer, 1986) such as lifting 
a heavy weight, enduring physical pain, or striking an object.  
Although it could be assumed that these quick and primitive appraisals are hardwired 
to produce the same positive or negative evaluation every time they encounter the 
same stimuli configuration, there is evidence that they interact with the previous 
psychological state of the individual, suggesting that they are susceptible of adapting 
their response according to different contexts. Thus, as mentioned in section 4.2.1 of 
chapter 4, even amygdala responses are modulated by motivational states (LaBar et al., 
2001), and by the type of task performed by the individual (Hariri, Bookheimer, & 
Mazziotta, 2000). In the case of music, the observation that evaluating dissonant 
intervals and rough timbres as unpleasant depends on historic and musical contexts is 
common place. For instance, this type of harmonies and timbres are valued in musical 
genres such as jazz and rock, correspondingly, and avoided in musical styles such as 
baroque music. Furthermore, it is easy to envision how assuming a second person, 
defenceless “subject position” towards the music (Clarke, 2005) can lead a listener to 
perceive loud, low-pitched musical sounds as specifying the presence of a menacing 
entity, whereas assuming a first-person subject position, can lead the listener to feel 
powerful or menacing him or herself. 
A second group of mechanisms that produce changes in valence while listening to 
music arise from processes of implicit learning. First, the phenomenon of mere 
exposure, in which liking towards an object increases after repeated exposure, has been 
observed for music (Margulis & Simchy-Gross, 2016; Schellenberg, Peretz, & Vieillard, 
2008). The two theories proposed to explain this phenomenon rely on an implicit 
process of learning. In the Two Factor model, repeated exposure increases familiarity 
with the music, which is therefore interpreted as non-threatening, and more pleasant 
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(Berlyne, 1971). Similarly, in the Perceptual Fluency model, repeated exposure to the 
music facilitates its perceptual processing. Since unexpected fluency is inherently 
pleasant, preference for the music arises (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). 
Two more mechanisms can also be classified in the group of learning-based 
mechanisms. First, the mechanism called evaluative conditioning in the BRECVEMA 
theory in which simply having listened to a piece of music while undergoing a positively 
or negatively valenced experience biases our future affective responses to the same or 
similar music. Second, there are culturally-specific cues to the expression of musical 
emotions that are learned in the process of familiarisation with the music from our 
social environment, known as enculturation. For example, the association between 
major mode and the expression of positive affective states, and minor mode and the 
expression of negative ones, emerged gradually along the last seven centuries in 
Western classical music (Parncutt, 2014), and becomes internalised by children by age 8 
(Gregory et al., 1996). Research has also found how listeners from different cultures are 
more sensitive to musical cues to emotion that are specific to their musical traditions, 
such as the association of the melodic modes with different moods in classical 
Hindustani music (Laukka et al., 2013). (See sections 33.2 and 3.3.3 of Chapter 3 for a 
critical review of evidence from cross-cultural and developmental studies). 
In summary, in this section I have described several mechanisms that become quickly 
activated in music perception, and that lead to changes in the valence dimension of core 
affect: quick appraisals of the intrinsic goodness of the stimulus, and mechanisms that 
develop from learning processes, such as mere exposure, evaluative conditioning and 
enculturation. To conclude, I submit that unlike the close relationship between musical 
structure and changes in arousal explained in the previous section, fluctuations of 
valence are harder to predict on the basis of the musical structure only. A person’s 
valence state while listening to music emerges from the interaction of these 
“goodness/badness” appraisals and associations with many other factors: the person’s 
circadian rhythms, bodily sensations, present goals, aesthetic preferences, narratives 
presented while listening to the music, the significance of the event in which the 
listening takes place, etc. All of these interactions can easily overrule the effects of the 
primitive appraisals and associations, amplifying them or even contradicting them.  
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5.1.4 Musically-induced Experiences of Motion 
There is an additional source for music’s impact on our imagined, simulated or overt 
bodily states: the way musical sounds can specify or evoke experiences of motion. These 
experiences range from perceiving the movements of a virtual object or persona in the 
music (Eitan & Granot, 2006; Karl & Robinson, 1995), to first person experiences, in 
which we feel as if moving in a virtual environment, or we feel objects moving around us 
(Clarke, 2005). From my point of view, these musically-induced experiences of virtual 
motion can only have an impact on our core affect to the extent that they: a) are 
perceived from a first person perspective, producing the type of motor action plans (i.e. 
embodied simulations) that I discussed in section 5.1.2 above; or b) are evaluated as 
specifying pleasant or unpleasant object or agents (either from a first or second person 
perspective), and therefore activate the appraisals of pleasantness I discussed in section 
5.1.3  
  
5.2 Affective dimensions of musically-induced core affect 
In the first three sections of this chapter I have explained how the interaction of 
perceptual processes and material properties of music give rise to fluctuations of core 
affect, defined as fluctuations of valence and arousal. Several authors, by contrast, have 
proposed further distinguishing arousal as constituted by two dimensions: energetic 
arousal, and tense arousal. They argue that the two types of arousal emerge from 
different physiological processes (Thayer, 1989), and that people can easily describe 
their experiences separating the wakefulness/tiredness component of their feelings, 
from the tension/relaxation component (Schimmack & Grob, 2000). Yet other authors, 
drawing upon a linguistic perspective (Fontaine et al., 2007), have proposed that 
affective responses are better described in four dimensions: valence, arousal, power or 
control, and novelty. I examine these three possibilities in this section. 
In the context of musically-induced emotions, it can be useful to conceptualise 
arousal as comprised of two dimensions, because we can intuitively conceive relations 
between variations in tense-arousal and perceptions of harmonic tension; and between 
variations in energetic-arousal and variations of tempo and loudness, for example. 
Additionally, discriminating energetic arousal from tense arousal can help differentiate 
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musically-induced emotions with similar levels of valence and energy such as sadness 
and anxiety, which imply different levels of tension (Illie & Thompson, 2006). 
Despite this potential usefulness of the three-dimensional approach, the majority of 
music and emotion studies that have implemented a dimensional approach, have 
adopted the traditional dimensions of valence vs. arousal (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 2013); 
and only handful of studies have distinguished the two types of arousal (Eerola & 
Vuoskoski, 2011; Illie & Thompson, 2006; van der Zwaag, Westerink, & van den Broek, 
2011). These studies have reported high levels of agreement in the participants’ ratings 
of tense and energetic arousal, suggesting that listeners can discriminate the two 
dimensions; but at the same time, they have found high levels of correlation between 
these two dimensions, suggesting that they can parsimoniously be collapsed into a 
single one. To my knowledge, the power or control dimension has only been explored in 
three studies, and they do not completely agree in the way they defined this construct. 
In Huron and colleagues’ experiment (2006), participants rated submissiveness and 
dominance expressed by music using synonyms like “politeness”, “timidity”, and 
"aggressivity," "threateningness," and "heaviness", correspondingly. In Schubert’s (2007) 
study, participants rated felt and expressed “dominance” using a seven point scale from 
submissive to dominant. And in Luck et al. (2007), participants were asked to rate 
perceived “strength” using a slide that range from weak to strong. In consequence, 
more research is needed to establish the extent to which the power/control dimension 
is relevant in emotional experiences with music. To my knowledge, the novelty 
dimension proposed by Fontaine and colleagues (2007) has not been explicitly included 
in any music psychology studies. However, it can be assumed that studies on musical 
expectancy have implicitly addressed this dimension. 
In contrast to the arguments for the advantages of using a three-dimensional model, 
there are also arguments for adopting the view that musically-induced core affect 
arousal and valence constitute the most prominent dimensions in musically-induced 
core affect. First, in a recent fMRI experiment that aimed to establish the relationship 
between ratings in the factors of the GEMS and brain activity, Trost and colleagues 
(2012) found that the patterns of brain activation could be mapped onto four groups, 
corresponding to the four quadrants that constitute the arousal and valence 
dimensional space. Second, Eerola & Vuoskoski (2011) found that reducing the three 
dimensions into two did not significantly decrease the amount of explained variance. 
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And third, it is more parsimonious to use two dimensions (than three, four or more) to 
account for the variability of musically-induced affective responses. 
In conclusion, the evidence so far suggests that musically-induced fluctuations of 
core affect can, at the very least, be described as variations in valence and arousal. The 
possibility that listeners experience more dimensions such as variations in power, 
energy and tension is still an open empirical question, which I address in the 
experiments reported in chapters 6, 7 and 8. Nevertheless, it is possible to speculate 
that the possibility of experiencing distinctions in these further dimensions depends on 
the material characteristics of the music, and the characteristics of the listening 
situation. For example, watching a contingent of soldiers march to military music can 
make the power dimension more prominent, whereas listening to electronic dance 
music while jogging can make the energy dimension more relevant, but not necessarily 
the dimensions of tension, and power. Future studies attempting to establish the best 
way to describe the dimensions that underlie affective responses to music need to 
establish the musically-structural and contextual conditions under which these 
dimensions become more salient and differentiated. Additionally, it is necessary to 
establish if the dimensions are to be defined on the basis of physiological systems (i.e. 
the architecture of the nervous system), or on the basis of the terms listeners use to 
describe their subjective feelings. 
 
5.3 How do musically-induced changes in core affect 
become discrete emotional episodes? 
I have discussed so far the processes and mechanisms that lead to fluctuations in core-
affect when we listen to music. Based on the evidence I reviewed in section 1.3 of 
Chapter 1, I submit that on most occasions, our affective responses to music do not go 
beyond this basic level. That is, many times musically-induced affect has low intensity, 
and is experienced only at the level of primary consciousness. These affective 
experiences consist in fleeting and mostly un-memorable reactions (i.e. preferences, 
proto-affect or automatic affect according to the classification proposed in Chapter 1), 
or in more lasting, but barely noticeable changes in our diffuse, underlying affective tone 
(i.e. moods). In this section I explain the processes and mechanisms that make our 
musically-induced affective responses go beyond this basic level, to become intense, 
full-blown, discrete emotional episodes.  
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As explained in section 4.2.2 of the previous chapter, according to Barrett (2006b), 
the transformation of core affect into a discrete emotional episode occurs when core 
affect is categorised by a conceptual act, which consists in reinstating information from 
experiences of the same type in the past (i.e. activating processes of simulation), and 
adapting it to the demands of the present situation. Hence, for the Conceptual Act 
Theory, the processes involved in this transformation are basically associative (Moors, 
2009). In contrast, for Clore & Ortony (2013), and for Cunningham et al. (2013) the 
transformation of diffuse affective reactions in to discrete emotions also involves the 
progressive activation of rule-based mechanisms of appraisal. In my view, both type of 
mechanisms are involved in the transformation of musically-induced core affect into 
discrete emotions, as I go on to explain below. 
The situated character of emotions proposed by constructionist approaches means 
that the social significance of the musical event as a whole is the most important source 
of activation of the mechanisms that produce the conceptual act (henceforth called 
“conceptual mechanisms”). It can be argued that in every situation where we listen to 
music (even in solitary contexts), our experience is fundamentally shaped by culturally-
shared knowledge about the meaning of the situation. This knowledge present us with a 
set of pre-given expectations and implicit understandings about the role of the music in 
the event, about what the music is about, about the right listening attitude we should 
have, about the behaviour that is expected from us and from other participants in the 
event, and so on (Becker, 2010). These conventions in turn predispose us to take 
particular bodily and psychological attitudes towards the music and the rest of the 
elements in the situation (for instance, it can make it more likely that we dance and sing 
along instead of listening quietly, that we pay attention the lyrics or not, that we engage 
in nostalgic reminiscing or that we focus on the present situation, that we value the 
musicians’ virtuosity or not, etc.). In consequence, the conceptual mechanisms activated 
by the meaning of the social situation do not transform core-affect a posteriori, that is, 
once the changes in arousal and valence have been completely formed (as proposed by 
Russell, 2003). On the contrary, on a psychological level, the conceptual mechanisms can 
be regarded as constituting a bodily and psychological context that shapes the 
fluctuations of core-affect from the very beginning, even before the music has started to 
play16.  
                                                            
16
 A clear example of the importance that the social significance of the musical event has been 
provided by Bonini Baraldi (2009), who adopting an ethnographic methodology, found that gipsy 
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On some occasions, the combination of the demands of the situation and the bodily 
and psychological context of the listener produce the conceptual act that transforms 
core affect into discrete emotional episodes. In general terms, the effect of these 
conceptual mechanisms is to make our affective reaction to music more personally 
relevant and specific. If the changes in core affect I described in the previous sections 
can be regarded as a general representation of the importance and value of the present 
situation (Clore & Schnall, 2008), then the mechanisms that transform core affect into 
discrete emotions make that representation more specifically directed towards an 
object. It is important to note that although the activation of conceptual mechanisms is 
usually quick and implicit, their effects can be consciously experienced as contextual 
clues, narratives, explanations, and emotional labels about the cause of our emotional 
reaction, and about its relation to our personal history, our present goals, and the social 
significance of the present situation.  
 
5.3.1 Conceptual Mechanisms I: Associations Activated by Musical 
Sounds 
Evidently, the most important associative mechanism that can facilitate the induction of 
an intense and personal emotional reaction to music is the activation of episodic 
memories. This mechanism, included both in the BRECVEMA theory, and in the 
Multifactorial Process Model, consists in the restoration of the same emotional 
reactions that we originally experienced in past experiences with a piece of music (Juslin 
& Västfjäll, 2008; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013).  
There are abundant anecdotal recounts of this link between personal memories and 
musically-induced emotions (e.g. Hornby, 2003), but surprisingly little empirical research 
about it. An exception is the study carried out by Janata and colleagues (2007), which 
aimed to characterise music-evoked autobiographical memories. These researchers 
found that the songs that listeners rated as more autobiographically salient tended to be 
associated with emotional episodes, and with more intense emotional responses during 
the experiment. In a subsequent study specifically focused on musically-induced 
nostalgia, Frederick Barrett and collaborators discovered that nostalgia can be induced 
by music listening even when the evoked memories correspond to a general time in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
communities in Romania play the same musical pieces in weddings and funerals, but the pieces 
facilitate the expression and arousing of very different emotions in each context. 
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person’s past (e.g. listening to a song during high-school) and not to particular events 
(e.g. listening to the song at a particular party) (F. S. Barrett et al., 2010). However, as 
expected, these researchers also found a positive correlation between the participants’ 
ratings of the specificity of the evoked memories, and their ratings of intensity of 
induced nostalgia while listening to the music.  
The observation that memory associations with music do not need to be specific to 
evoke emotional responses suggests that semantic knowledge activated by music can 
also have emotional consequences. It can be argued that since music is a culturally 
constructed artefact, then musically-activated memories are never really completely 
idiosyncratic. Music makes part of many culturally significant events, and is used in 
many contexts to communicate meaningful connotations. In consequence, we tend to 
experience music as “loaded” with symbolic meanings, even when we listen to it in 
solitary settings. To the extent that these symbolic meanings have emotional 
connotations, their activation can contribute to the induction of emotional responses to 
music.  
Several lines of research have demonstrated how easy it is for listeners to access this 
culturally-constructed semantic knowledge when listening to music. First, in a study that 
aimed to explore the ecological character of music perception, Dibben (2001) asked 
participants to listen to sound clips of everyday and musical sounds, and asked them to 
simply describe what they heard. She found that many of their descriptions 
corresponded to the objects and materials that produced the sounds, but also to 
cultural information about the music, such as its genre (e.g. “classical music”, “horror 
movie soundtrack”), the musical function of the fragment (e.g. “musical ending”), the 
social context in which that type of music is listened to (e.g. “formal dinner dance”, 
“religious festival”), and stereotypical emotional associations (e.g. “depressing sad, 
piano music”). Second, a study that compared the extra-musical concepts associated 
with popular music genres in listeners from two cultures (Germany and the USA) Kristen 
and Shevy (2012) found high levels of agreement between listeners and across cultures, 
especially for internationally recognised genres. However, at the same time, they found 
more marked differences between the two cultures when the listeners described genres 
that they were more familiar with (e.g. German folksy music, and Hip Hop, 
correspondingly). Third, the use of music in advertisement and in commercial 
establishments also demonstrates how implicit semantic concepts activated by music 
have effects on consumers’ attitudes towards the products, and the store (North & 
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Hargreaves, 1998; North, Hargreaves, & McKendrick, 1997). And fourth, a series of 
experiments carried out by Koelsch and colleagues showed how listening to short 
musical excerpts conveys semantic information (Koelsch et al., 2004; Painter & Koelsch, 
2011; Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008). In all of these experiments, the researchers presented 
participants with pairs of musical and verbal stimuli, and found increased neural 
responses when the semantic information elicited by the verbal stimulus was 
incongruous with the information elicited by music. Importantly, in the second 
experiment (Steinbeis & Koelsch, 2008) the researchers used target words with affective 
connotations as primes (e.g. “love”, “hate”), suggesting that music can quickly convey 
semantic information of an affective character.  
How does the activation of semantic knowledge contribute to the induction of 
emotions? The answer lies in the embodied character of conceptual knowledge. Based 
on Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbols Systems theory (Barsalou, 2003), Niedenthal and 
Barrett have proposed that even abstract concepts, such as “love”, “joy”, “divinity”, 
“patriotism”, etc., are represented in the brain as embodied simulations of bodily states, 
sensations, introspective states, and action tendencies (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, 
Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011; Winkielman, Niedenthal, Wielgosz, Eelen, & Kavanagh, 
2015). And since according to Barrett (2006b), the conceptual act that transforms core 
affect into emotions consists in partially re-activating (i.e. simulating) sensorimotor and 
introspective states from similar past emotional experiences, it is conceivable that 
musically-evoked semantic concepts contribute to the induction of emotions by 
activating these embodied simulations. Thus, the cultural meanings associated with a 
musical piece or musical genre can influence our emotional responses to music, because 
those meanings predispose us to experience the “right” type of emotions associated 
with that type of music. For instance, a piece of classical music can activate the semantic 
notion of “solemnity”, and facilitate the partial re-activation of an experience of 
attending a classical concert where we felt admiration and awe; whereas a piece of pop 
music can activate the notion of “summer party”, and facilitate the partial re-activation 
of the experience of being in a BBQ where we felt joy and relaxation. –This hypothesis 
about the effects of semantic knowledge on musical emotions is tested in the 
experiments reported in chapters seven and eight. 
 
91 
 
5.3.2 Conceptual Mechanisms II: Associations Activated  
by “Extra-Musical” Factors 
The second group of associative mechanisms corresponds to semantic information that 
is not provided by personal or cultural connotations evoked by musical sounds, but by 
the immediate context in which music listening takes place. Cook has noted how our 
experiences of music are almost always embedded in multimedia contexts (1998): we do 
not only listen to sounds, we also see the performers’ gestures, the behaviour of other 
people listening to the music, or we see CD sleeves, visual narratives in a film or in music 
videos, etc. Just like the semantic connotations described in the previous section, these 
other sources of musical meaning influence our emotional reactions to music. 
Recent research has provided evidence that the visual information provided by the 
performers’ gestures has effects on the observers’ perception of music. In a series of 
experiments, Thompson and colleagues found that the performers’ gestures biased the 
perception of dissonance, interval size, and valence expressed by music (Livingstone, 
Thompson, & Russo, 2009; Livingstone, Thompson, Wanderley, & Palmer, 2015; 
Thompson, Graham, & Russo, 2005; Thompson, Russo, & Quinto, 2008). It is therefore 
probable that these gestures can also have effects on the elicitation of emotions by 
music, too, for example by facilitating emotional contagion and the induction of 
empathic responses to the emotions expressed by the performer17. A study carried out 
by Miu & Balteş (2012) supports this prediction. In this experiment, participants 
observed audiovisual performances of Cecilia Bartoli, an opera singer characterised by 
her histrionism. The researchers found that those participants who were instructed to 
adopt an empathic attitude towards the singer experienced more intense induced 
emotions, and had stronger physiological responses than those participants who were 
instructed to adopt a detached attitude. 
Despite the fact that most music that people listen to in daily life contains lyrics, few 
studies have investigated the influence of these verbal narratives on emotions 
expressed and induced by music; most research has been interested in their effects on 
social attitudes, instead (Anderson, Carnagey, & Eubanks, 2003; Fischer & Greitemeyer, 
2006; Guéguen, Jacob, & Lamy, 2010). To my knowledge, only three studies have 
attempted to disentangle the contribution of lyrics and music on emotional experiences. 
The first study, carried out by Thompson and Russo (2004) investigated the effects of 
                                                            
17
 I discuss the evidence for emotional contagion with other people’s expression in Chapter 7.  
92 
 
music on the interpretation of lyrics. In several experiments, they asked participants to 
either listen to music with lyrics, or to read the lyrics alone. They found that pairing lyrics 
with music was associated with higher ratings of expressed emotion in the stimuli, and 
that the more participants were familiarised with the music, the more music enhanced 
the perception of meaningfulness of the lyrics. Ali and Peynircioğlu’s study (2006), in 
contrast, focused on perceived emotions in the songs. In one of their experiments these 
researchers presented participants the same melodies with or without lyrics. They found 
(unlike Thompson and Russo, 2004), that the simultaneous presentation was associated 
with higher ratings of perceived emotion only in songs that expressed negative emotions 
(sadness and anger), but not in songs that expressed positive ones (happiness and calm). 
In three other experiments, they found that when the music expressed one emotion and 
the lyrics another, the participants’ perception of the message communicated by the 
song was always driven by the musical component. Finally, in the only experiment 
specifically aimed at testing the effects of lyrics and music on induced affect, Mori and 
Iwanaga (2014) asked participants to listen to two happy-sounding songs that contained 
sad lyrics. Crucially, both pieces were sung in languages that the participants could not 
understand. In one condition, participants listened to the songs without having any 
information about the meaning of the lyrics; in a second condition, they read the 
translation of the lyrics only; and in a third condition, they listened to the music while 
reading the translation. The authors reported three main findings. First, in general, the 
participants experienced positive feelings while listening to the songs independently of 
their awareness of the lyrics' meanings. Second, reading the lyrics alone was associated 
with higher ratings of induced negative feelings. And third, listening to the song while 
reading the translation of the lyrics did not lead the participants to experience more 
induced negative feelings than listening to the song while oblivious of the lyrics’ 
meaning. 
Taken together, the results of these experiments suggests that when music contains 
lyrics, the emotional meanings afforded by the musical materials take precedence in 
listeners’ perception of emotions expressed by the songs, and in the emotions that they 
arouse. Consequently, it is possible to hypothesise that lyrics can only produce nuances 
within the boundaries of core affect specified by the music materials. This is an 
interesting possibility, because it is somewhat contradictory to the claims of the 
Conceptual Act Theory about the role of language in emotional processes. According to 
this theory, language dynamically constrains and configures the process of emotion 
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perception and induction from the start (Barrett, Lindquist, & Gendron, 2007; Lindquist, 
2009); that is, the role of language is not limited to providing a label to an already 
formed emotional reaction (as claimed by Russell, 2003, p. 165). These experiments, in 
contrast, suggest that the effects of music on participants’ core-affect had more weight 
on the participants’ emotional percepts and affective reactions than the verbal content 
present in the lyrics. Future research is needed to test this hypothesis, carefully 
controlling and testing the influence of each factor (music and lyrics). 
A closely related line of research has investigated the effects of previously presented 
information about the music on listeners’ affective experiences. Two recent 
investigations have studied this phenomenon. First, interested in the effects of 
programme notes on listeners’ enjoyment of classical music, Margulis (2010; 2015) 
carried out two experiments in which she manipulated the content of the programme 
notes read by participants before a concert. The most significant finding across both 
experiments is that exposing participants to information about the music (compared to 
giving them irrelevant information about the venue, and to not giving them any 
information at all) decreased the participants’ enjoyment of the music. A second study 
was carried out by Vuoskoski and Eerola (2013), who were interested in the effects of 
previously presented information on the induction of emotional responses in listeners. 
In this experiment, three groups of participants listened to the same sad-sounding piece 
of music. Additionally, before listening to the music, the first group read a narrative 
describing a sad narrative, the second group read a narrative describing a neutral 
narrative, and the third group listened to the music without reading anything before. 
The results of the experiment suggest that compared to the other groups, participants 
who read the sad narrative experienced more induced sadness, and evoked more sad 
imagery while listening to the music. The authors interpreted these results as stemming 
from the activation of the visual imagery mechanism proposed by the BRECVEMA theory 
(Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008).  
The BRECVEMA theory defines this visual imagery mechanism as a process whereby 
a listener responds emotionally to the visual images that he or she conjures while 
listening to the music (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008, p. 566). In my view, there are two reasons 
to be sceptical about the power of this phenomenon. First, it is possible that the 
conjured images are just an epiphenomenon of music listening when we do not have 
any simultaneous visual stimulation that draws our attention (Thompson & Coltheart, 
2008). Second, research on cognition has found that visual imagery is not necessary for 
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reasoning, nor for language comprehension (Pecher, van Dantzig, & Schifferstein, 2009; 
Rommers, Meyer, & Huettig, 2013), suggesting that the evoked images might be a 
secondary process to non-conscious processes of activation of semantic knowledge. 
Despite these objections, it is also conceivable that on occasions, the evoked visual 
images configure narrative scenarios, and in this way, generate further simulations of 
past emotional experiences, which facilitate the induction of emotions18. 
An ideal starting place to investigate how imagined or observed visual narratives 
experienced along music influence people’s emotional responses would be to study 
people’s experiences with film music and music videos. Unfortunately, even though the 
last years have seen progress in understanding of the processes of perceptual 
integration of musical and visual narratives (Boltz, Ebendorf, & Field, 2009; Cohen, 2001; 
Tan, Spackman, Bezdek, & Paterson, 2007; Thompson et al., 2005), to my knowledge, 
there has been very little research on how these two sources of meaning interact to 
induce emotional responses in the spectators. Thus, researchers have found that 
musical soundtracks bias observers’ perception of the visual narrative, including their 
inferences about the emotions felt by the characters in the film (Tan et al., 2007). Most 
of this research has confirmed the well-established finding that when visual and 
auditory information are paired the visual information takes primacy (Bolivar, Cohen, & 
Fentress, 1994; Thompson, Russo, & Sinclair, 1994), but recent investigations have also 
found evidence that this effect is moderated by the degree of temporal and semantic 
congruence between the two sources of information. For instance, Boltz (2001) found 
that when the information provided by the visual component is ambiguous, the musical 
component disambiguates the intended message. Conversely, in a posterior study, Boltz 
and colleagues (2009) found that when the information provided by the music is 
emotionally ambiguous, the visual component disambiguates the message in a mood-
congruent manner. In contrast, Pavlović and Marković (2011) found a more complicated 
pattern of results. These researchers made emotionally incongruent pairs of film clips 
and music, and found that some of the pairings led to a negative effect of music (e.g. 
joyful music made a sad scene appear less sad), some led to positive effects (e.g. fearful 
music made an angry scene appear more angry), and some pairings did not produce any 
modulation (e.g. sad music did not make a joyful scene any less or more joyful).  
                                                            
18
 Chapter 8 presents an experiment testing these possibilities by expanding Vuoskoski and 
Eerola’s (2013) findings with pieces of music that express emotions other than sadness. 
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Regarding the effects of audiovisual musical stimuli on the induction of affective 
responses, there has been even less research19. To my knowledge, only four studies have 
directly researched this phenomenon. The first two studies, carried out by Geringer and 
colleagues (1996, 1997) compared participants’ experiences with pieces of classical 
music presented as audio alone, or accompanied by videos. These researchers found 
that two out of the four audiovisual stimuli were associated with higher scores of liking 
and emotional involvement with the pieces. Regrettably, the authors do not provide 
details about the mean scores for each of these dimensions, and it is not clear if the 
participants were instructed to rate induced or perceived emotions. The second group 
of studies, conducted by Baumgartner and collaborators found a similar additive effect 
of music and images (Baumgartner, Esslen, & Jäncke, 2006; Baumgartner, Lutz, Schmidt, 
& Jäncke, 2006). They presented participants with music only, images from the IAPS, or 
music combined with the images, and found that the music was associated with the 
lowest signs of emotional involvement, and that the combined stimuli were associated 
with the highest. 
In summary, the hypothesis that extra-musical information plays an important role in 
listeners’ affective responses to music still awaits to be thoroughly tested. It is likely that 
the induction of an emotional response will depend on a combination of factors such as 
the extent to which the music and the verbal or visual elements are congruent and 
facilitate the creation of a unified percept, how clear and absorbing the visual and verbal 
narratives are, and the extent to which the observer actively attends either the music or 
these other elements of the stimulus. It is urgent that researchers on music and emotion 
pay more attention to these phenomena, particularly considering that the vast majority 
of music that people listen to contains lyrics, and that in contemporary societies, 
people’s experiences with music increasingly involve the presence of visual and verbal 
elements such as music videos, photos, webpages, etc. There is evidence that watching 
music videos on services such as youtube.com has become one the predominant ways 
of accessing music during the last few years in the U.S.A (Nielsen, 2016), a trend that is 
probably paralleled in other countries with widespread internet access. 
 
                                                            
19 It is telling that there is no mention of studies of this type in the chapters dedicated to film 
music and emotion in any of the two volumes of the “Music and Emotion” book (Juslin & 
Sloboda, 2001, 2010a). 
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5.3.3 Conceptual Mechanisms III: Rule-Based Appraisals 
In the last two sections I have described several mechanisms that enrich the fluctuations 
in core-affect by relating them to meaningful associations and narratives. However, I 
submit that most of the time, the activation of these associative mechanisms does not 
lead to the induction of emotions, because as explained before, the transformation of 
core-affect into discrete emotions tends to occur when there is something in the 
situation, and/or in the music that is evaluated as personally relevant. In this sense, 
while all of these associative mechanisms make the musical event more meaningful, and 
thus increases the probability of having an emotional response, only the episodic 
memories mechanism can lead to the induction of emotions on its own, because it 
directly involves the simulation of situations that were personally significant in the past. 
Indeed, if the activation of semantic knowledge, or the presence of visual or verbal 
narratives could lead to the transformation of core affect into a discrete emotional 
episode on their own, then we would experience a full-blown emotional episode almost 
every time we listen to music! Since this is clearly not the case, I propose that on most 
occasions, the transformation of musically-induced core-affect into discrete emotions 
requires not only the contribution of associative mechanisms, but also the activation of 
appraisal mechanisms, which provide the needed element of personal relevancy to the 
situation. 
It is important to note that in this section I do not address appraisal mechanisms 
based on the activation of primitive, sensorimotor connections, and evaluations of 
perceptual predictions, because I already described them in section 5.1 above. Here I 
describe appraisal mechanisms that depend on the activation of propositional 
knowledge, and therefore, tend to be less automatic, slower, and at times, conscious. In 
the summary I present below, I integrate elements from Scherer’s CPM (Scherer, 2009a) 
and from Clore and Ortony’s theory (2000, 2013) about the types of appraisals involved 
in the elicitation of emotions. 
The first type of appraisal evaluates the extent to which the musical event is 
desirable or undesirable for our goals in the present situation. Since in contemporary 
Western societies, listening attentively to music is rarely the main activity when we are 
exposed to it (Juslin et al., 2008; Sloboda et al., 2001), then most of the times these 
appraisals consist in evaluating the extent to which the music facilitates or obstructs the 
other task we are doing at that moment. On other occasions, we listen to music with the 
explicit objective of regulating our affective and motivational states, therefore, the 
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appraisal becomes a meta-evaluation of the degree to which the music helps us reach 
the desired state. 
The second type of appraisal has to do with the degree of control that we have over 
the present situation (equivalent to Scherer’s coping potential checks, 2009). In musical 
contexts, Sloboda et al. (2001) and Krause and colleagues (2015) found that people are 
quite tolerant to the presence of music that they have not selected themselves, but they 
also found that the more people can handle the choice, the more likely they are to 
experience positive emotions. Of course, it is easy to imagine the opposite case. Even 
music that we usually like to listen to can be experienced negatively if it disrupts our 
present goals, and we cannot do anything to make it stop. 
The third type of appraisal consists of evaluations of the aesthetic value of the 
music, and/or the musicians’ ability, creativity, etc. (Juslin, 2013a; Scherer & Coutinho, 
2013). In this case, we make use of personal and socially-shared aesthetic criteria to 
approve or disapprove the music’s beauty, complexity, challenge, and the musicians’ 
gestures, technique, flair, deviance from stylistic standards, etc. While the two types of 
appraisals described above increase the probability of experiencing a wide range of 
positive or negative emotions, the appraisals of aesthetic value tend to produce 
emotions such as admiration, awe, or on the contrary, disdain, contempt, or boredom. 
 
5.4 The crucial role of attention in shaping affective 
responses to music 
In this section I add a final intervening element in the process of induction musical 
emotions: attentional deployment. Although attention is influenced by all the 
mechanisms described so far, the level and type of attention that a person dedicates to 
a musical event is not solely determined by those processes, because attention can be 
modified by volition (for example, we can decide to not pay attention to our physical 
sensation of tension, to not engage in nostalgic thoughts, or to ignore the presence of a 
beloved piece of music on the background which can distract us from the task we have 
at hand).  
My proposal is that the different levels and types of attention we devote to a musical 
event can make the difference between having a world-focused affective experience, an 
experience of perceiving emotions in the music, or an experience of undergoing an 
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emotional reaction ourselves. Drawing from Petti and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (1986), Barsalou and colleagues’ theory about levels of processing (Niedenthal, 
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005), from Dibben’s findings about 
people’s modes of hearing music (2001), and from Lambie and Marcel’s theory of the 
role of consciousness on emotion (2002)20, I submit that listening to music can be 
described as occurring on three different levels of attention, according to the degree of 
elaboration of meaningful relationships between musical sounds and the rest of the 
situation:  
A shallow-level. In this mode of attention we pay little attention to the music, or listen to 
it without engaging in elaborating its (personal and cultural) meaning. The music 
is so unrelated to our present goals and/or has so little personal resonance, that 
it is only experienced as a general sonic background. When we are engaged in 
this mode of attending, it is less likely we have any emotional reaction to the 
music, and when we do, our affective reaction tends to be diffuse, short-lived, of 
little intensity, and world-focused, rather than self-focused. Remember from 
chapter one, that in world-focused affective reactions, our attention is placed on 
the situation, and therefore, we perceive objects or events as having affective 
qualities (e.g. inviting or repulsive), rather than reflect on how the object 
changed our own affective state (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). 
A cognitively engaged, but emotionally detached-level. In this mode of attention we pay 
more attention to the music, but it does not evoke meaningful associations with 
personal events, we do not have the goal of using it to regulate our mood, or it 
is not relevant for our present goals. This could happen for example when our 
objective is to listen to music only focusing on “cold” structural aspects of it 
which do not have a personal resonance, like the changes in timbre or 
harmony.21 In this case we tend to experience emotions as if they were in the 
music, rather than in ourselves. Even though this mode of attention can 
correlate with changes in patterns of physiological activity, we do not 
consciously experience a shift in our affective state. 
                                                            
20
 This classification is also close to the way Clarke and Dibben have applied the concept of 
subject-position to music perception (Clarke, 1999, 2005; Dibben, 2006). 
21
 Of course, it is plausible that even this type of analytical listening may have personal resonance 
for some listeners if for example, the person engages in this type of “structural-analysis”-kind of 
listening, while at the same time feeling admiration (or on the contrary, contempt) for the skills 
of the musicians. 
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A deep, emotionally involved level. In this mode of attention we actively engage in 
constructing meanings out of the listening experience, because the music is 
relevant to our goals, and/or the associative mechanisms have established 
enough significant connections with personal events from our life. This could 
happen even in those cases in which music is not the main focus of attention, 
but is still an important part of the present situation, such as when we 
experience music embedded in multimedia such as T.V adverts and movie 
soundtracks. When we engage in this type of attending, it is more likely that we 
experience a discrete musical emotion, and that this reaction is moderately 
long, and intense. 
On some occasions, the emotional episode can be world-focused, such as when 
we experience an intense emotional reaction of admiration for a performer on 
stage, or when we are deeply engaged in watching a film, and the combination 
of the visual narrative and the musical soundtrack makes us empathise with the 
characters on the screen. On other occasions, the experience can be self-
focused, and therefore we realize that we are undergoing an emotional episode. 
In this last case, it is more likely that we engage in processes of emotion 
regulation (Gross & Barrett, 2011). 
 
5.5 Emergence of full-blown, discrete emotions 
In the second half of this chapter I have explained how the changes in core affect 
induced by music are shaped into discrete emotions thanks to associative mechanisms 
and rule-based appraisals. Additionally, I argued that different modes of attending to 
music relate to different affective responses to music. In line with the claims of the 
constructionist approach I described in the previous chapter, all of these mechanisms 
can be considered psychological and situational contexts, which shape and constrain the 
fluctuations of core affect into diffuse affective reactions or into discrete emotional 
episodes. 
There are probably other mechanisms that influence this process, which work as 
more “distal” contexts. These factors correspond to individual differences in cognitive 
and affective styles, whose activation and effect depend on the demands of the present 
situation. I include here differences in musical abilities (e.g. there is evidence that 
people with more musical training are more sensitive to dissonance, Dellacherie, Roy, 
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Hugueville, Peretz, & Samson, 2011); styles of listening and preferences (e.g. some 
people prefer to pay attention to the lyrics, others pay little attention to them), 
personality dispositions (e.g. people high in the neuroticism trait tend to experience 
more music-induce nostalgia, F. S. Barrett et al., 2010); and people with high openness 
and empathy traits tend to enjoy and respond with more emotional intensity to sad 
music (Vuoskoski, Thompson, McIlwain, & Eerola, 2012). 
As is probably already evident from the large number of processes and mechanisms I 
have discussed in this chapter, discrete emotional episodes emerge from complex 
interactions of many factors, which are only sporadically present in the right 
combination, producing the “perfect emotional cocktail”. In fact, although in the first 
chapter I presented a set of definitional criteria to establish the boundaries between 
diffuse affective responses and emotions proper, the question of how to empirically 
establish that threshold is still a matter of debate and investigation among affective 
scientists. For instance, Scherer and collaborators (Meuleman & Scherer, 2013; Sander, 
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005; Scherer, 2009a) have started to explore the validity of 
nonlinear dynamic systems analysis to determine the degree of connectivity or 
coherence between the components of emotional responses. Nevertheless, this 
complexity should not be taken as meaning that this phenomenon cannot be studied 
empirically. On the contrary, I finish this chapter by presenting ten hypotheses derived 
from the theoretical framework I laid out.  
 
5.6 Graphic model of the Constructionist Theory of 
Musically-Induced Emotions 
The diagram on page 102 summarises the process of elicitation of emotions by music 
according to the constructionist theory I proposed: 
 The musical event is represented in the two boxes on the leftmost side of the figure. 
This event can be thought of as constituted by two dimensions: the acoustic 
characteristics of the music, and its social and personal significance. Although these 
two dimensions are closely related, they activate two different types of 
mechanisms: automatic perceptual mechanisms that produce variations of core 
affect (represented on the top side of the figure), and conceptual mechanisms, that 
situate the musical event in the landscape of the cultural meaning of the music, the 
listener’s personal history, current goals, and aesthetic values.  
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 For the sake of clarity, the core affect mechanisms are grouped into two categories 
(represented by the two top funnels in the diagram): mechanisms that have effects 
on arousal, and mechanisms that have effect on valence. These mechanisms are 
activated automatically when we listen to music, and their interaction produces 
fluctuations of core affect. 
 The conceptual mechanisms, (represented by the two bottom funnels in the 
diagram) are also grouped into two large categories: associative mechanisms, that 
activate emotionally-relevant information from past experiences, and appraisal 
mechanisms, that evaluate the significance of the music according to the listener’s 
current goals and aesthetic values. The activation of these mechanisms and their 
interaction produce a conceptual act, which constantly shapes the variations in core 
affect producing different affective states. 
 The multiplication sign (“x”) in the centre of the diagram represents the notion that 
the emergent affective states interact with the type of attention that the listener 
devotes to the musical event. This interaction produces a variety of non-emotional 
and emotional responses to music, which can be grouped into three large categories 
(represented by the three ellipses on the rightmost side of the diagram): 
experiencing diffuse, world-focused affective responses to the music; experiencing 
emotions as expressed by the music (rather than aroused in the listener); and 
experiencing intense, discrete, self-focused emotions.  
 Finally, the arrow in the bottom represents the notion that this process is recursive: 
the affective response of the listener modulates the personal significance of the 
musical event, producing further cycles of activation of the conceptual mechanisms, 
and therefore, further interactions between conceptualisation and core-affect.
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5.6 Empirical predictions  
1. Music perception involves processes of neural resonance, motor planning, and 
musical expectancies which have embodied effects. Most of the time these effects 
are very subtle, and only detectable by physiological measures such as skin 
conductance response. Several researchers have proposed objective measures that 
can be used to quantify the relative power of structural properties of the music on 
these diffuse affective responses, and to establish the thresholds between non-
noticeable responses and noticeable ones. For example, Egermann et al. (2013) used 
an objective measure of musical unexpectedness in melodies based on Pearce and 
Wiggins’ computational model (2006); Farbood (2012) developed a model that 
predicts patterns of experienced musical tension; Witek et al. (2014), Parncutt 
(1994), Lee & Higgins (1984) have developed models that predict beat and 
syncopation salience, which can be used to predict listeners’ feelings of an urge to 
move to the rhythm (Witek et al., 2014); and Coutinho and Cangelosi (2011) have 
developed a computational model that predicts listeners’ physiological responses 
from psychoacoustic parameters in the music. 
2. On other occasions, the musical materials elicit more consciously-available changes, 
such as feelings of tension, startle reflexes, or urges to move-along to the rhythm. 
When a listener is asked to reflect on these embodied sensations, they report them 
as feelings that the music is more “emotional”, more “tense”, “groovier” or that 
they are having a more intense emotional response (Dibben, 2004; Janata et al., 
2012; Steinbeis et al., 2006).  
3. The mechanisms of musical expectancies, rhythmic entrainment, brain stem 
reflexes, and of bodily adaption to musical tension and intensity, lead only to 
fluctuations in arousal and, possibly, but to a lesser extent, also of valence. (This 
hypothesis is tested in chapter six). These mechanisms can lead to the induction of 
full-blown emotions only with the participation of “conceptual” mechanisms based 
on associative processing and rule-based appraisals.  
4. Since the perception of music and of music expressivity of emotion is supported by 
mechanisms of embodied simulation, then manipulating the listeners’ embodied 
states can facilitate or hamper the perception and the induction of musical 
emotions. (This hypothesis is tested in chapters seven and eight). 
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5. The changes in core affect induced by music interact with mechanisms that provide 
conceptual information (i.e. associations and appraisals) producing a variety of 
emotional responses. Although this variety tends to be limited by the levels of 
arousal and valence expressed and induced by the musical sounds, they are not 
restricted to a reduced set of so-called basic emotions; not even in the absence of 
an immediate meaningful social context (such as in the context of an experiment). 
(See chapters seven and eight for new empirical evidence for this claim). 
6. Even though associative mechanisms (such as the activation of semantic knowledge 
and the presence of narratives) increase the probability of having an emotional 
response to music, this probability depends on how personally specific the activated 
associations are. The more personal the associations, the more likely the listener will 
experience an emotion. (Importantly, assuming that some associations have 
personal relevance does not imply that they become accessible to consciousness 
while the person listens to the music). 
7. In the same sense, when several mechanisms of induction are activated at the same 
time, those mechanisms more directly related to the activation of personal 
meanings will tend to dominate.  
8. Extra-musical factors such as programme notes, lyrics and visual images tend to be 
more powerful the more they constitute narratives. Their effects, however, interact 
with the core affect specified by the musical material: the more congruent they are, 
the more powerful the effect of this extra-musical information.  
9. Given the cultural-relative character of some of the associative mechanisms (such as 
the activation of semantic knowledge, or the familiarity with the musical 
conventions), people from different cultural backgrounds have qualitatively 
different emotional experiences when they listen to the same piece of music. They 
have, however, some level of agreement in their responses, related to the level of 
arousal expressed and induced by the music. 
10. The quality and specificity of the affective response that a listener has from listening 
to a piece of music depends on the mode of attention they dedicate to the music, 
and to its personal and cultural connotations. The more a listener engages in a deep, 
engaged mode of listening, the more she will construct emotional meanings, and 
therefore, the more likely she will have a discrete emotional reaction to the musical 
event.  
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5.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have presented a constructionist theory of induction of emotions by 
music, integrating the proposals from several of the constructionist theories of emotion 
that I described in the previous chapter, and particularly, from Barrett’s Conceptual Act 
Theory.  
In my view, my proposal overcomes some of the shortcomings and difficulties that I 
identified in other contemporary theories in the first chapters. Nevertheless, it is evident 
that my proposal does not represent a paradigmatic revolution in the Kuhnian sense 
(Kuhn, 1962). On the contrary, I consider that my theory builds upon the claims of the 
BRECVEMA and the Multifactorial theories, integrating and re-interpreting their 
proposals, and at some points, contradicting them. Given the limitations of space, I leave 
the critical evaluation of my proposal for the Conclusions chapter. There, I analyse how 
my theory answers the main questions that every emotion theory should answer (see 
section 1.4 of Chapter 1, and Moors, 2009), and I evaluate the main differences and 
similarities between my theory and the BRECVEMA theory, and the Multifactorial 
Process Model. 
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6. Does rhythmic entrainment lead 
to changes in affective state?  
Sometimes we find the urge to move in time with music not only irresistible, but also 
pleasurable, especially when we listen to “groovy” music, which is characterized by 
marked and complex syncopated rhythms such as soul, funk, hip-hop, electronic dance 
music, and salsa (Janata et al., 2012; Madison, 2006). This phenomenon is not restricted 
to Western music: ethnomusicologists have documented how numerous cultures 
around the world use repetitive drumming patterns and movements to facilitate altered 
states of consciousness (e.g. Becker, 2010; Eliade, 1964; Rouget, 1985); and recently, 
Zentner and Eerola (Zentner & Eerola, 2010a) found that infants as young as 5 months of 
age move spontaneously to music. Nevertheless, in spite of a long tradition of research 
on the cognitive mechanisms that underlie rhythm and metre perception (Large & Jones, 
1999; London, 2012; Parncutt, 1994), the link between synchronization of movements to 
music and emotional experiences has been neglected, and only recently has it become 
an object of empirical research. This paper aims to fill this void, by presenting 
experimental evidence of affective experiences while moving in time with music that 
contains only rhythmic information.  
This phenomenon of synchronization, or sensorimotor coupling with music has been 
called “rhythmic entrainment”, a term taken from Physics, where it refers to “the 
tendency for rhythmic processes or oscillations to adjust in order to match other 
rhythms” (Will & Turow, 2011, p. 6). In the case of music, the coupling of a person’s 
bodily rhythms to the music can occur at different levels, depending on the subsystems 
involved. Thus, Trost and Vuilleumier (2013) distinguish between four phenomena: 
perceptual entrainment, in which neural firing patterns become synchronized with the 
hierarchical structure of the musical beats, producing the perception of rhythm; 
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physiological entrainment, whereby cardiovascular and respiratory patterns change in 
response to aspects of the musical structure, such as tempo (Khalfa, Roy, Rainville, Dalla 
Bella, & Peretz, 2008); social entrainment, which occurs when several individuals 
coordinate their movements to dance or make music together; and motor entrainment, 
in which overt bodily movements (of the limbs, the head, the fingers, etc.) are 
synchronized with aspects of a musical rhythm. 
Rhythmic entrainment is intrinsically related to the rhythmic complexity of the music. 
Music with periodic rhythmic patterns affords the perception of metre, which in turns 
facilitates the listener’s synchronization. The opposite happens when music contains 
high levels of syncopation, that is, when it contains frequent musical events that fail to 
occur in a strong metric position (Huron & Ommen, 2006; Witek et al., 2014). This type 
of music violates the listeners’ expectations, hindering the perception of metre, and 
their ability to synchronize their movements to the music (Fitch & Rosenfeld, 2007; 
Janata et al., 2012). Perhaps paradoxically, recent research has found that music 
characterised by having moderate levels of syncopation is experienced as more 
“groovy”, that is, as inducing a desire to move along to it (Witek et al., 2014). 
In recent years, researchers have started to investigate the relation between music-
induced movement and listeners’ affective experience. For instance, Maes & Leman 
(2013) showed that teaching children to dance a “sad” or a “happy” choreography to 
ambiguous music biases their perception of the emotion expressed by the music 
accordingly; and a team of researchers at the University of Jyväskylä have started to 
map the way the emotions we perceive in music, our musical preferences, and our 
current emotional state are reflected in the way we dance to music (e.g. Luck, 
Saarikallio, Burger, Thompson, & Toiviainen, 2014; Saarikallio, Luck, Burger, Thompson, 
& Toiviainen, 2013). In contrast, the possibility that music-induced movement leads to 
induced affective experiences has received less attention. Hence, the question about 
whether moving in time with music induces changes in the affective state of the listener, 
remains unanswered. Abundant evidence suggests that that the answer should be “yes”: 
ethnographic studies on musical cultures have found that people derive pleasure from 
dancing in public spaces such as clubs and concerts (e.g. Malbon, 1998; Waxer, 2002), 
intervention studies have shown that dancing brings beneficial effects to people 
suffering from depression (Koch, Morlinghaus, & Fuchs, 2007) and to elderly adults (e.g. 
Alpert et al., 2009; Hui, Chui, & Woo, 2009); and a recent psychophysiological study has 
shown that partner-dancing to tango has positive affective and hormonal effects 
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(Quiroga Murcia, Bongard, & Kreutz, 2009). Nevertheless, since none of these studies 
attempted to control the factors that interact in these positive experiences of moving to 
music (e.g. the live or recorded character of the music, the presence of a partner and 
other people, the characteristics of venue and the social occasion, the consumption of 
alcohol, etc.), they cannot really account for the specific contribution of musical sounds 
in these pleasurable experiences, nor they can illuminate the underlying psychological 
mechanisms therein involved.  
Two types of theories have been proposed to explain the link between movement, 
entrainment, and pleasure. The first type proposes that rhythmic entrainment with 
music induces changes in listeners’ arousal and/or valence levels, rather than discrete 
emotional states; a proposal which implies that, as Barrett and colleagues have 
suggested (Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross, 2007; Barrett, Mesquita, & Smith, 2010; 
Barrett, 2006b), these low-level affective changes can become discrete emotions given 
the presence of a relevant context. In contrast, the second type of theories proposes 
that rhythmic entrainment induces discrete emotions related to feelings of social 
bonding. From the first perspective, Juslin and Scherer have proposed that rhythmic 
entrainment leads to feelings of increased arousal through a process of spreading of 
activation, whereby physiological responses such a heart rate and respiration lock in to a 
common periodicity with music, and this activation in turn propagates to other 
components of the emotional system (Juslin et al., 2010; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; 
Scherer, 2004; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013). And from a neurophysiological perspective, 
Trost and Vuilleumier (2013) propose that music can induce feelings of pleasantness, 
since several motor pathways in the brain (like the basal ganglia, the cerebellum and the 
supplementary motor area) are consistently implicated both in rhythm perception and 
in pleasurable responses to music. From the second theoretical perspective, and also 
drawing from neuroscience, Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (2006) have suggested that 
music listening activates the mirror neuron system, which simulates the actions required 
to produce the heard sounds; consequently, this simulation mechanism induces a strong 
sense of being together with other human beings who produce the musical sounds. The 
implication is that these pleasant feelings of communion and affiliation would be 
intensified when the listener also synchronizes her own movements with the music, or 
with other people moving in time with it (e.g. Hove & Risen, 2009; Tarr, Launay, Cohen, 
& Dunbar, 2015). Finally, drawing from an evolutionary perspective, Ian Cross (Cross, 
2009) has proposed that musical entrainment has the adaptive function of 
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communicating the individual’s intention to cooperate with the other people engaged in 
the musical event. Along similar lines, Juslin has also suggested that rhythmic 
entrainment may arouse “feelings of communion”, “feeling connected” and “emotional 
bonding” (Juslin, 2013b). 
Recent studies have found that listeners’ ratings of groove (the extent to which a 
piece of music compels one to move), show considerable consistency (Madison, 2006); 
and that the groovier the music, the more people enjoy it (Janata et al., 2012). However, 
contrary to what could be expected, Janata et al. also found that participants’ 
enjoyment of the music was hampered by the requirement to tap along to it, and that 
they preferred to simply listen to it.  
This result seems to contradict the findings of two other recent studies that have 
tested the hypothesis that rhythmic entrainment induces feelings of pleasure. Labbé and 
Grandjean (Labbé & Grandjean, 2014) asked participants to listen to nine pieces for solo 
violin and to rate their feelings of being physically stimulated, of wanting to move along, 
their experience of being emotionally affected, and their emotional reactions along the 
nine dimensions of the Geneva Music Scale (GEMS) (Zentner et al., 2008). They found 
that the participants’ answers to the entrainment questionnaire rendered a two-factor 
solution: a Visceral Entrainment factor, constituted by items related to feelings of 
internal bodily agitation (e.g. “to what extent did you feel your own body resonate with 
the music?”); and a Motor Entrainment factor, constituted by items related to the desire 
to move in time with the music (e.g. “to what extent did you feel like dancing?”). Both 
factors were significantly related to the GEMS dimensions of Joyful activation, 
Transcendence, Wonder, Power, and Tenderness; but only Visceral Entrainment 
correlated with self-reported Nostalgia and Sadness, whereas only Motor Entrainment 
correlated with self-reported Peacefulness. Furthermore, both factors predicted the 
extent to which the participants reported feeling “moved” or “affected” by the piece, a 
finding that supports Juslin’s and Scherer’s hypotheses that entrainment leads to 
feelings of general arousal. Labbé and Grandjean, however, propose a different 
interpretation; for them, although entrainment is often related to positively valenced 
and arousing emotions, entrainment is best understood as a bidimensional 
phenomenon, in which each dimension contributes to the induction of a different set of 
discrete emotions. 
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Witek and colleagues (Witek et al., 2014) also found a positive association between 
listeners’ urge to move to music and the induction of pleasure in their study. These 
researchers asked participants to listen to 50 drum-breaks with different levels of 
syncopation, to rate their feelings of wanting to move along to the rhythm, and the 
amount of pleasure they experienced. The results showed an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the degree of syncopation of the stimuli and the participants’ 
affective experience, so that the stimuli with medium degrees of syncopation elicited 
the most desire to move and the most pleasure. Based on Berlyne’s psychobiological 
theory of aesthetics (Berlyne, 1971), and on theories of musical expectation (Huron, 
2006; Meyer, 1956), Witek and colleagues suggest that the urge to move and the 
pleasure associated with “groovy” music is caused by an optimal tension between the 
realization and the violation of metrical expectations. Thus, music with low degrees of 
syncopation facilitates metre perception and sensorimotor synchronization, but offers 
few opportunities to surprise the listener with violations of expectations, and to trigger 
the process of positive appraisal described by Huron (2006). Music with high levels of 
syncopation, in which few expectations are generated and confirmed, disrupts the 
perception of metre, makes synchronization difficult, and offers even fewer 
opportunities for pleasure elicitation. In contrast, groovy music, characterised by having 
a medium degree of syncopation, provides an optimal balance between violated and 
realized expectations, and “invites” the listener to “enact” the missing beats by moving 
her body in a beat-directed fashion. For Witek and colleagues, these feelings of enacting 
the missing beats with bodily movements are in themselves pleasurable. 
Despite the significance of these contributions, none of these studies unequivocally 
demonstrates that rhythmic entrainment leads to affective changes in listeners. First, 
both Labbé’s and Witek’s experiments studied the participants’ feelings of desire to 
move to the music, but they did not ask the participants to move along with it. It is 
possible that other factors involved in performing actual movements interfere in the 
affective experience of the listeners when they try to move in synchrony with the music. 
Second, neither Janata et al. nor Labbé et al. controlled the influence of other musical 
parameters in their participants’ experience (e.g. melody, harmonic progression, 
articulation, etc.), and therefore, there is no way of knowing whether the pleasurable 
feelings of being compelled to move to the music that they observed were driven by the 
rhythmic aspect of the stimuli or by other features. And finally, even though I agree with 
Labbé and Grandjean’s theory that the feelings of inner bodily agitation constitute a 
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central aspect of people’s musical experiences that had been previously neglected, I 
consider it misleading to categorise these “visceral feelings” as a form of “entrainment”; 
there is nothing in their data to indicate if there were any internal cyclical physiological 
processes in the participants’ bodies which became synchronized with the rhythm of the 
musical pieces. Perhaps it would be better to regard these subjective experiences as 
examples of virtual self-motion, that is, illusory sensations of one’s own body moving in 
an imaginary environment, thanks to the ability of music to specify movement 
(Bharucha, Curtis, & Paroo, 2006; Clarke, 2005).  
 
6.1 Overview of the present study 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether motor entrainment induces positive 
affect, and how this phenomenon interacts with the level of syncopation of the musical 
stimulus. For this, participants listened to drum-breaks that varied in their level of 
syncopation (low, medium, high). One group of participants was asked to listen to the 
music staying completely still (stationary condition), and another group to tap along with 
one foot to the pulse of the music (tapping condition). This is the first time, to my 
knowledge, that this phenomenon has been studied asking participants to produce overt 
movements to the music, and using musical stimuli which contain only rhythmic 
information (i.e. there were no variations of tempo, timbre, micro-timing, and no 
melodic nor harmonic elements present in the drum-breaks). 
The study investigated three competing hypotheses. The first is based on research 
that has found that the urge to move in time with music is pleasurable, (Janata et al., 
2012; Trost & Vuilleumier, 2013; Witek et al., 2014), from which it can be inferred that 
realizing that urge will feel more pleasurable than refraining from it. Consequently, I 
hypothesised that participants who tap along with the beat would experience overall 
more positive valence (i.e. pleasure) than participants who remain still; and that this 
change in experienced valence would be larger than the changes in experienced tense 
arousal (i.e. subjective feelings of relaxation/tension) and energetic arousal (i.e. 
subjective feelings of wakefulness/sleepiness) (Hypothesis 1P). Alternatively, based on 
Juslin and Scherer’s theories about how rhythmic entrainment induces affective changes 
in the listener thanks to increased arousal (Juslin, 2013; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013), I 
hypothesised that participants in the “tapping” condition would experience more 
tension (i.e. tense arousal), and higher levels of energy (i.e. energetic arousal) than 
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participants in the “stationary” condition. Furthermore, I also predicted that the effects 
of listening condition (listening while tapping vs. listening remaining stationary) on 
arousal ratings would be larger than the effects on pleasantness ratings (Hypothesis 1T 
and 1E).  
Concerning the effect of syncopation, three hypotheses were tested. Firstly, 
following Witek and colleagues’ hypotheses and findings (Witek et al., 2014) I predicted 
that in both groups of participants the relationship between the degree of syncopation 
of the stimuli and the experience of pleasantness would have an inverted U-shape such 
that stimuli with a medium-level of syncopation would be associated with more pleasure 
than stimuli with low and high levels of syncopation (Hypothesis 2P). Secondly, based on 
Huron’s musical expectations theory (2006), I predicted that the participants’ experience 
of tension and energy would increase with the degree of syncopation of the music, so 
that stimuli with low-syncopation levels would be associated with the highest relaxation 
and sleepiness ratings, and stimuli with high-syncopation levels would be associated 
with the highest tension and wakefulness ratings (Hypotheses 2T and 2E).  
As for the interaction effects, it was hypothesised that since tapping along with high-
syncopated stimuli would be experienced as more difficult than tapping along with low 
and medium syncopated stimuli, this would lead to the induction of more intense 
negative affective states. Particularly, it was predicted that when listening and tapping 
along with highly syncopated stimuli, participants in the tapping condition would 
experience less pleasantness (Hypothesis 3P), more tension (Hypothesis 3T) and more 
energy (Hypothesis 3E), than participants in the stationary condition, who listened to 
this stimuli without moving.  
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Table 6.1 Summary of experimental hypotheses 
 
 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
Seventy six participants aged between 18 and 63 (Mean = 29.75, SD = 10.87, 55 Women) 
took part in the experiment. They were recruited on a voluntary basis from the city and 
the University of Sheffield, UK. Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions: a 
tapping condition or a stationary condition. There were 36 participants in each 
condition. 
The level of musicianship of the participants was measured using two scales from the 
Goldsmith’s Musical Sophistication Index [Gold-MSI] (Müllensiefen, Gingras, Stewart, & 
Ji, 2013). The participants’ scores in the Musical Training scale ranged from 7 to 48 (the 
minimum possible score is 7, and the maximum 49), with a mean of 27.18 (SD = 12.25). 
The participants’ scores in the Music Engagement scale ranged from 12 to 60 (the 
minimum possible score is 9, and the maximum 63), with a mean of 39.64 (SD = 9.65). 
These scores suggest that overall, the participants had similar mean levels of 
musicianship (and SD’s) to those of the general population (Mtraining = 26.52, SD = 11.44; 
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Mengagement = 41.52, SD = 10.36), as documented by Müllensiefen et al. (Müllensiefen et 
al., 2013)22. 
Due to the relevance for the objectives of the experiment, I also measured the 
participants’ level of engagement with dance-related activities, using a 5-items ad-hoc 
questionnaire. The participants’ scores ranged from 8 to 33 (the minimum possible score 
was 5, and the maximum 33), with a mean of 23.34 (SD = 5.89). More than 90% of the 
participants had scores above the mid-point of the scale (i.e. above 14 points). Also of 
importance, 80.3% of the participants reported listening to and frequently enjoying 
groovy musical styles (such as Funk, Soul, and Rap). These data indicates that in general, 
the participants had a high level of engagement with dancing and of familiarity with 
syncopated musical genres. Importantly, no differences between the groups were 
observed in any of these variables. 
 
6.2.2 Design 
The experiment used a mixed design, with ‘movement’ as the between-subjects 
independent variable (two levels: Tapping, Stationary); Syncopation Level as within-
subjects independent variable (three levels: Low, Medium, High), and Valence, Tense 
Arousal and Energetic Arousal as dependent variables. 
 
6.2.3 Stimuli  
The musical stimuli consisted of 6 drum-breaks selected from a set of 50 developed by 
Maria Witek for a previous experiment. The stimuli were programmed in GarageBand 
5.1 (Apple, Inc.) using a synthesised drum-kit (bass-drum, snare-drum and hihat). The 
stimuli were in 4/4 metre, with syncopations occurring within the bass-drum and snare 
drum parts at the quaver and semi-quaver level of the meter, while the hihat remained 
at a constant quaver pulse. None of the stimuli included variations in microtiming. Every 
drum-break lasted 32 seconds, and consisted of a two-bar phrase looped eight times at 
120 bpm –a tempo within the range of tempi where synchronization is facilitated 
(Leman et al., 2013). (See Figure 6.1 for notational transcriptions). 
 
                                                            
22
 The participants are in the 50
th
 percentile in the Training scale, and in the 40
th
 percentile in the 
Engagement scale, according to the norms published by Müllensiefen et al. (2013). 
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The stimuli were chosen according to their degree of syncopation, and the mean 
ratings of induced pleasure and of motivation to move reported by the participants in 
Witek and colleagues’ study (Witek et al., 2014). Thus, the low syncopation stimuli in this 
experiment have syncopation degrees, ratings of motivation to move, and ratings of 
induced pleasure at least one standard deviation below the mean values obtained in 
Witek’s experiment; the high syncopation stimuli have ratings at least one standard 
deviation above the mean values; and the medium syncopation stimuli have ratings 
within 0.5 standard deviations above or below the mean values.  
The degree of syncopation of the drum-breaks was calculated using an index of 
syncopation also developed by Witek. This index, based on Longuet-Higgins and Lee’s 
model (Longuet-Higgins & Lee, 1984), uses instrumental weights, and a less hierarchical 
model of metre to account for the differences between rests and notes, and for the 
differences between notes played on different instruments of the drum-kit (for details, 
see Witek et al. 2014). Importantly, even though the stimuli differ in the number of 
onsets, they have an equivalent level of acoustic complexity, as measured by an index 
called “Joint Audio Entropy”. This index measures the probability that each wave sample 
occurs on the basis of the distribution of the wave data as a whole (Witek et al., 2014). 
Thus, all the stimuli in this experiment had a degree of complexity within one standard 
deviation below or above the mean rating of entropy observed in Witek and colleagues’ 
set of 50 stimuli. (Table 6.2 shows the values corresponding to each stimulus).  
 
Table 6.2 Audio properties stimuli and mean scores of urge to move and pleasure in 
Witek and colleagues’ study (2014) 
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Stimulus 1: Low syncopation 
 
 
 
Stimulus 2: Low syncopation 
 
 
 
Stimulus 3: Medium syncopation 
 
 
 
Stimulus 4: Medium syncopation 
 
 
 
Stimulus 5: High Syncopation 
 
 
 
Stimulus 6: High Syncopation 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Notational transcriptions of stimuli. 
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6.2.4 Measures 
The participants’ affective state was assessed using one indirect and one direct measure. 
The indirect measure was developed based on theories of emotion-congruence (e.g. 
Bower, 1981) and of emotional misattribution in the perception of faces (e.g. 
Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Margolin, 2000; Walbott, 1991), according to which the 
current affective state of an observer biases her perception of other people’s emotional 
expressions in a congruent manner. In this experiment, the technique consisted in 
asking the participants to rate the pleasantness expressed by photographs depicting 
affectively ambiguous facial expressions by using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
“very bad” to “very well”. This technique was created following a similar procedure to 
that used by Niedenthal et al. (2000): I took pictures from the FACS (Ekman & Friesen, 
1978) and from the ADFES (Van der Schalk, Hawk, Fischer, & Doosje, 2011) which 
showed an expression of joy and an expression of anger or disgust, and by using a video-
morphing software (Sqirlz Morph 2.1 Xiberpix), I created images displaying a “blended” 
facial expression which contained elements of both extremes (Figure 6.2). It was 
expected that participants who experience a negative affective state would perceive the 
ambiguous faces as expressing a more negative affective state than participants who 
experience a positive affective state, and vice versa; and therefore, that the participants 
ratings of perceived affect would work as a proxy measure of their own valence. 
The participants judged a total of 14 facial stimuli (2 during base line, and 2 per trial 
during 6 trials). This set of pictures was chosen out of an initial set of 70 which were pre-
tested with a web-based questionnaire in which 223 English-speaking participants and 
50 Spanish-speaking participants were asked to report their affective state, and to rate 
the valence expressed by each photo. The chosen stimuli were the ones with the highest 
correlation coefficients between the participants’ self-reported valence and their ratings 
of attributed valence to the photo. 
 In order to hide the true objective of the experiment from the participants, I used 
the same morphing technique to develop an additional set of 14 ambiguous facial 
stimuli in which it was difficult to tell the gender of the person in the photo, and asked 
the participants to decide to what extent they perceived the person to be male or 
female. These answers, however, were not analysed because they were not relevant for 
the purpose of the study.  
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The direct measure of affect consisted in questionnaires of self-report of valence and 
of arousal. Following Schimmack and Grob’s recommendations (Schimmack & Grob, 
2000), arousal was defined as composed by two dimensions: tension arousal (varying in 
degrees of relaxation-tension), and energetic arousal (varying in degrees of wakefulness-
tiredness). Thus, after each trial the participants rated their affective state with 6-items 
using 4-point Likert scales (1 = I do not feel…, 4 = I feel very… pleasant (positive, good); 
unpleasant (negative, bad); awake (alert, wakeful); sleepy (tired, drowsy); relaxed (at 
rest, calm); tense (restless, jittery)). All items were rated on unipolar scales, which were 
transformed into bipolar scales by subtracting ratings of the positive pole from ratings 
from the negative pole. 
 
6.2.5 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted individually. When participants arrived at the laboratory 
they were seated in a comfortable chair in front of a desk with a computer screen, and 
after reading and signing the consent forms, they received the following instructions on 
the screen: 
Welcome. During the experiment, you will be asked to do two simple perceptual 
tasks, to listen to short pieces of music, and to answer a few questions related 
to your listening experience. You will repeat this procedure several times. 
Then, they received the following instructions for the ambiguous faces task, and did a 
practice trial: 
In this task, you will look at a photograph of a person, and you have to decide 
how that person is feeling. You must do this as quickly as you can. 
Afterwards, they received the instructions for the gender-ambiguous faces, and did a 
practice trial as well: 
In this task, you will look at a photograph of a person, and you have to decide 
whether that person is male or female. Again, you must do this this as quickly as 
you can. 
At this point, the experimenter gave the following instructions to the participants in the 
Tapping condition: 
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During the experiment, you will listen to several short musical excerpts. When 
you listen to the music, please tap along to the beat, using your foot, in a regular 
and comfortable way. You can take a few moments to listen before starting 
tapping.  
The participants in the Stationary condition received the following instruction: 
During the experiment, you will listen to several short musical excerpts. When 
you listen to the music, all you have to do is to stay as still as possible. You don’t 
need to tense your body, but please try not to move at all while the music is 
playing. (These participants were reminded to remain still whenever the 
experimenter noticed that they had started to move along to the music).  
All the musical stimuli were presented through headphones (Bose AE2), and the 
listener could adjust the sound level for comfort23. The ambiguous faces stimuli and the 
participants’ responses were presented and recorded using a computer interface 
programmed in OpenSesame 2.8.1. Each stimulus was presented once to each 
participant, in a counterbalanced fashion. 
Immediately after the last trial, the participants responded to a questionnaire about 
their demographic information, musicianship, and engagement in dancing activities. 
After this, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Example of ambiguous facial stimulus used in the experiment, created from 
two opposite emotional expressions. 
                                                          
23
 Even though the different levels of loudness that the participants chose might be associated 
with higher or lower levels of induced arousal, it was decided that what each individual perceived 
as “appropriate level of loudness” was more important, because in in this way, all the 
participants had equivalent levels of comfort. In fact, very few participants asked to change the 
initial default level of loudness.  
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Judgement of Facial Stimuli 
The indirect measurement technique was based on the assumption that the 
participants’ own affective state would bias their perception of facial stimuli displaying 
ambiguous affective expressions (Niedenthal et al., 2000). Hence, it was predicted that 
participants in a positive affective state would perceive the ambiguous faces as 
expressing more positive valence, and participants in a negative affective state would 
perceive them as expressing more negative valence. 
I tested the validity of this technique by running non-parametric correlation analyses 
between the participants’ ratings of valence expressed by the faces and their self-
reported affective state (n = 75). All the correlations with self-reported valence, except 
one, were positive; but the coefficients are small (they range from -.13 to .32) and only 3 
(out 14) correlations are statistically significant. The correlations with self-reported 
relaxation were all positive, they range from .02 to .40, and 4 of them are significant. 
Ten of the correlations with self-reported energetic arousal were negative, they range 
from -.11 to .32 and only one of them is statistically significant. (See Table 6.4 for 
detailed information on correlation coefficients and p-values).  
The frequency distribution of the ratings of perceived valence in the ambiguous 
stimuli reveals that the participants had a negative bias when judging the ambiguous 
faces: the mean observed skewness is 0.28. (See Table 6.3 for a summary of the 
descriptive statistics) 
Taken together, these results indicate that there was wide inter-subjects variability in 
the ratings of perceived pleasantness in the facial stimuli, and that not all the stimuli 
were equally successful in displaying the predicted congruence effect.  
Despite these important limitations regarding the validity of the ambiguous faces 
technique, it was still possible that the participants’ judgements showed the predicted 
trends, so I tested the effects of the independent variables on these scores by running a 
mixed ANCOVA with syncopation (3 levels) as the within groups factor, listening 
condition (2 levels) as the between groups factor, and base line scores as covariate. 
Given that it is unclear at this point how long the misattribution effect lasts, and to what 
extent the perception of the first face in each pair has an effect on the perception of the 
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second face, I performed two analyses: one for the first facial stimulus of each pair, and 
one for the second. 
In the case of the first of the two ambiguous faces, contrary to the expectation of a 
positive effect of movement on experienced pleasure (Hypothesis 1P) there was no 
significant main effect of listening condition (Stationary/Tapping) on the participants’ 
judgements of the faces F(1, 71) = .423 p = .518. Regarding the prediction of an 
association between syncopation level and pleasure (Hypothesis 2P), there was a 
marginally significant main effect of syncopation level on participants’ judgements  
F(2, 142) = 2.7837 p = .062. Although these effects were in the predicted direction (i.e. 
showing an inverted U shaped trend), only the differences between low syncopated and 
medium syncopated effects were statistically significant: F(1, 71) = 6.153 p = .015, effect 
size r = .28; with the low syncopated stimuli associated with less positive ratings. The 
polynomial contrasts tests also suggest that these results fit a quadratic trend better 
than a linear one Fquadratic(1,71) = 4.459 p = .038; Flinear(1, 71) = .891 p = .348. Regarding 
the prediction that the highly syncopated stimuli would be associated with higher 
displeasure in the tapping condition (Hypothesis 3P), there was no evidence of this 
interaction: F(2, 142) = .792 p = .455. (Table 6.6 shows the means and standard 
deviations for all these analyses, and Figure 6.3 displays the effects of listening condition 
and syncopation on perception of the first ambiguous faces). 
The participants’ ratings for the second ambiguous face did not produce the 
predicted pattern of results: no significant main effect of listening condition (Stationary / 
Tapping) was observed (Hypothesis 1P), F(1, 72) = .014 p = .905. The main effect of 
syncopation level on the participants’ judgements (Hypothesis 2P) was also non-
significant, F(2, 144) = 1.377 p = .256. And there was no significant interaction between 
listening condition and syncopation level (Hypothesis 3), F (2, 144) = .097 p = .908. 
(Means and standard deviations in Table 6.5, and a summary of the effects of listening 
condition and syncopation on perception of the second ambiguous faces in Figure 6.4). 
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Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics for ratings of valence attributed to ambiguous facial 
stimuli 
 
 
Table 6.4 Correlations between perceived valence in facial stimuli and self-reported 
valence, tense-arousal and energetic arousal 
 
N= 76 
Correlation Coefficient: Spearman’s Rho 
* Correlation significant at p <.005 
** Correlation significant at p <.001 
 
   
Self-Reported 
Valence 
Self- 
Reported  
Tense  
Arousal 
Self- 
Reported 
Energetic 
Arousal 
Base Line Face1 .08 .06 -.09 
Face2 .02 .02 .20 
Low Syncopation Face1 .04 .14 -.03 
Face2 .07 .07 .32
**
 
Face1 .19 .19 .04 
Face2 .03 .25
*
 -.03 
Medium 
Syncopation 
Face1 -.01 .09 -.02 
Face2 .23
*
 .08 -.11 
Face1 -.13 .08 -.09 
Face2 .32
**
 .26
*
 -.01 
High Syncopation Face1 .01 .03 .13 
Face2 .21 .39
**
 -.10 
Face1 .24
*
 .28
*
 -.03 
Face2 .16 .16 -.03 
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6.3.2 Self-reports of Core Affect 
I tested the effects of the independent variables on ratings of experienced valence, 
tension, and energy by running mixed ANCOVAs with Syncopation (3 levels) as the within 
groups factor, Listening Condition (2 levels) as the between groups factor, and Base Line 
Scores as covariates. 
As expected from a three-dimensional model of affect (e.g. Schimmack & Rainer, 
2002) all the participants’ ratings of valence and tense arousal had positive and 
significant correlations (in the scale used, a higher score indicated higher relaxation); 
while the ratings of tense arousal and energetic arousal presented a mixture of positive 
and negative correlations. (None of these correlations was significant, nor larger than  
.15). This finding suggests that each dimension taps into a different aspect of the 
participants’ affective experience, and that the two ratings of arousal (tension, energy) 
are not interchangeable. 
 
6.3.2.1 Valence 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1P which predicted a main effect of movement on valence 
ratings, there were no significant differences in the participants’ ratings of valence in 
function of their listening condition (Stationary/Tapping) F(1, 73) = .150 p = .70 (Table 
6.5 shows the means and standard deviations). 
Concerning Hypothesis 2P, there was a marginally significant main effect of 
syncopation level on the participants’ self-reported ratings of pleasantness  
F(2, 146) = 3.053 p = .050. The observed ratings were in the predicted direction, and the 
polynomial contrast test supports the hypothesis of a quadratic trend F(1,73) = 6.012  
p = .017. (See Table 6.6 for means and standard deviations). However, within-subjects 
contrast test show that only the differences between high-syncopated and low 
syncopated stimuli were statistically significant F(1,73) = 6.012 p = .017, effect size  
r = .28, with the high-syncopated stimuli associated with lower ratings of pleasure than 
the low-syncopated ones.  
Finally, contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis 3P, there was no significant 
interaction between syncopation level and listening condition F(2, 146) = .826 p = .44. 
(Figures 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 display the effects of listening condition and syncopation on 
valence, and arousal ratings). 
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6.3.2.2 Tense arousal 
Hypothesis 1T was not supported by the data: there was no significant main effect of 
listening condition (Stationary/Tapping) on ratings of experienced tension  
F(1, 73) = .023, p = .881. 
Hypothesis 2T predicted an increase of tension associated with an increase in 
syncopation level. This prediction was supported by the data: a negative linear trend 
was observed, (suggesting that the more syncopated the stimuli, the less relaxed the 
participants felt): the polynomial contrast test revealed that the data significantly fit a 
linear trend, F(1, 73) = 7.4 p = .008; not a quadratic one F(1,73) = 1.404 p = .24. 
However, the ANCOVA test reveals that this trend was not marked enough to produce 
differences across all pairwise comparisons F(2, 146) = 4.340 p = .015. Thus, even though 
stimuli with a medium level of syncopation were significantly associated with lower 
tension ratings than stimuli with a high level of syncopation F (1, 73) = 5.945 p = .017, 
effect size r = .27, there were no significant differences between stimuli with low and 
medium levels of syncopation F(1,73) = .090 p = .766. (See Table 6.6 for means and 
standard deviations). 
Lastly, Hypothesis 3T predicted that tapping along with highly syncopated stimuli 
would lead to more experienced tension than listening without moving. This interaction 
was not observed in the data F(2, 146) = .1.059 p = .349. (Figure 6.6 displays the effects 
of listening condition and syncopation on tension ratings). 
 
6.3.2.3 Energetic arousal 
Contrary to the prediction in Hypothesis 1E, there was no significant main effect of 
listening condition (Stationary/Tapping) on energetic arousal ratings F(1,73) = 1.83  
p = .18. Nor did the results support Hypothesis 2E: there was no significant main effect 
of syncopation level F(2, 146) = .226 p = .798. Hypothesis 3E was not supported by the 
data either: there was no significant interaction between listening condition and 
syncopation level F(2, 146) = .269 p = .765. (Tables 6.4 and 6.5 display means and 
standard deviations, and Figure 6.7 shows the effects of listening condition and 
syncopation on energetic arousal ratings). 
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Table 6.5 Means and standard deviations for perceived affect in ambiguous faces, and 
self-reported valence, tense arousal and energetic arousal, as a function of listening 
condition 
 
Note: Standard deviations are printed in parentheses. 
*Higher ratings indicate higher self-reported relaxation. 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 Means and standard deviations for perceived affect in ambiguous faces, and 
self-reported valence, tense arousal and energetic arousal, as a function of syncopation 
level 
 
Note: Standard deviations are printed in parentheses. 
*Higher ratings indicate higher self-reported relaxation. 
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Figure 6.3 Perceived valence ratings in first ambiguous faces as a function of listening 
condition and syncopation level. (Error bars are standard errors) 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Perceived valence ratings in second ambiguous faces as a function of listening 
condition and syncopation level. (Error bars are standard errors) 
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Figure 6.5 Self-reported valence ratings as a function of listening condition and 
syncopation level. (Error bars are standard errors) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Tense arousal ratings as a function of listening condition and syncopation 
level (Higher ratings represent higher relaxation. Error bars are standard errors) 
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Figure 6.7 Energetic arousal ratings as a function of listening condition and syncopation 
level (Error bars are standard errors) 
 
6.3.3 Ratings of Perceived Difficulty and Other Mediating Variables 
According to Witek et al. (2014), an important factor that underlies people’s affective 
responses to groovy rhythms is the interplay between their expectations about when 
the next rhythmic event is going to sound, and the realization of these expectations in 
the music. An optimal tension between these two factors leads to increased feelings of 
pleasure and of wanting to move along with the music. Based on these considerations, I 
measured two aspects of the participants’ experience that could work as mediators 
between syncopation and their affective responses. I asked participants in the Stationary 
condition to rate how difficult they found it to stay still while listening to the stimuli, and 
participants in the Tapping condition to rate how easy they found it to tap along with 
the beat. In order to test whether these ratings displayed the predicted trend, I ran one 
repeated-measures ANOVA per group (Stationary, Tapping), with Syncopation level as 
the within subjects variable, and difficulty ratings as the Dependent Variable. 
In the Stationary group, there was a main effect of syncopation on ratings of 
“Difficulty to Stay Still” F(2, 42) = 9.344 p < .000 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). As 
predicted, participants reported finding it significantly more difficult to stay still while 
listening to medium syncopated stimuli than to stimuli with high F(1, 21) = 12.977  
p = .002) or low syncopation F(1, 21) = 15.634 p = .001. There were no significant 
differences between low and high levels of syncopation. 
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In the Tapping group, there was a main effect of syncopation on participants’ ratings 
of “Easiness to Tap Along with the Beat” F(2,70) = 47.207 p<.000 (Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction). Contrasts tests support the prediction, suggesting that the more syncopated 
the stimuli, the more difficult the participants found it to tap along to them: they 
reported finding it significantly more difficult to tap along with high syncopated stimuli 
than with low syncopated ones F(1,35) = 52.718 p<.000, and than with medium 
syncopated ones F(1,35) = 60.87 p<.000; and easier to tap with medium syncopated 
stimuli than with low syncopated ones F(1,35) = 4.432 p = .043.  
 
6.3.3.1 Regression analyses: do any variables mediate the observed 
results? 
In the analysis of the results presented so far, I have shown how listening condition 
(tapping vs. stationary) did not produce any significant effects on the measured 
outcomes, whereas syncopation level (low, medium, high) did produce significant effects 
on self-reported ratings of valence and tense arousal. In this section, I carry out further 
analysis of the data in order to assess the contribution of several mediator variables in 
the participants’ affective experience.  
This analysis consisted of multiple hierarchical regressions with scores of valence, 
tense arousal and energetic arousal as dependent variables, and as factors: syncopation 
level, version of stimulus, difficulty-to-stay-still/ easiness-to-tap-along, musical training, 
engagement in musical activities, engagement in dancing-related activities, and 
familiarity with groovy rhythms. These factors were introduced in each step of the 
hierarchical regression as follows: 
First step: Syncopation Level 
Second step: Syncopation Level 
Difficulty-to-stay-still / Easiness-to-tap-along 
Third step: Syncopation Level 
Difficulty-to-stay-still / Easiness-to-tap-along 
Musical-Training 
Engagement-in- musical-activities 
Engagement-in-Dancing-related activities 
Enjoyment of groovy music. 
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Once the significant predictors were identified in each of these models, I ran further 
analyses including only those identified factors, in order to find the most parsimonious 
regression equation, and to confirm whether the identified factors still predicted a 
significant portion variance in the dependent variables, even in the absence of the 
discarded factors. All confidence intervals were calculated using bootstrap sampling 
(1000 samples). 
In the following paragraphs, I show the results of these regression analyses for each 
dependent measure, identifying the significant mediating predictors. (See Table 6.7 for a 
summary of these results). 
 
First Ambiguous Facial stimuli. In the stationary condition, the best model explains 
only 3.3% of the variance in the scores of perceived valence in the first 
ambiguous face (R2 = .033, adjusted R2 = .026). This model contains only the 
predictor difficulty-to-stay-still (Beta = .224) suggesting that the harder the 
participants found it to stay still while listening to music, the more they 
experienced pleasure, as measured by the ambiguous face task. In the tapping 
condition, none of the models explains a significant portion of the variance. 
 
Second Ambiguous Facial stimuli. In the stationary condition none of the models is 
significant. In the tapping condition, the best model includes one factor, and 
explains only 2.6% of the variance in ratings of perceived pleasantness in the 
first ambiguous face (R2 = .026, Adjusted R2 = .021): easiness-to-tap-along  
(Beta = .167) suggesting a positive linear relationship between ratings of 
easiness to tap along and experienced pleasure. 
 
Self-reported valence. In the case of the stationary condition, the best model explains, 
12.4% of the variance in the scores of self-reported valence. This model 
indicates that the variables difficulty-to-stay-still (Beta = .21) and dancing-
engagement (Beta = .078), are significant predictors of the variance in valence 
ratings. This suggests that the harder the participants found it to stay still, and 
the more they are engaged in dancing activities, the more they experienced 
pleasure. 
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In the tapping condition, the best model includes two factors, and explains 
11.8% of the variance in valence ratings: easiness-to-tap-along (Beta = .228), 
and dancing-engagement (Beta = .027). This model suggests that the easier 
participants found it to tap along with the music, and the more they engage in 
dancing activities, the more they experienced pleasure. 
 
Self-reported tense arousal. In the stationary condition, the independence of errors 
assumption is not met in the model (Durbin-Watson test <1), and none of the 
factors significantly predicts the variance in self-reports of tense arousal. 
In the tapping condition, the best model includes the factors: easiness-to-Tap-
Along (Beta = .228), dancing-engagement (Beta = .035), and enjoyment-of-
groovy-music (Beta = -.283). This model explains 19.3% of the variance. This 
model suggests that participants’ ratings of relaxation increased as the 
perceived easiness to tap along with the music increased, that participants who 
engage in dancing activities frequently found the task more relaxing than 
participants who do not, and that they felt tenser if they were familiarized with 
groovy music styles.  
 
Self-reported energetic arousal. In the stationary condition, the independence of 
errors assumption is violated (Durbin Watson = .979), and even though 
difficulty-to-stay-still (Beta = .304) appears to be a significant predictor of the 
variance in energetic arousal ratings, running a regression analysis with only this 
variable as predictor does not produce a significant model (p > .05). 
In the tapping condition, the best model includes musical engagement  
(Beta = -.019) and musical training (Beta = -.013) as predictors, and explains 
5.1% of the variance. This model suggests that the more the participants had 
musical training, and the more they engaged in musical activities in their 
everyday lives, the less awake or energized they felt. 
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Table 6.7 Summary of regression analyses 
 
6.4 Discussion 
This experiment aimed to investigate the relationship between motor entrainment and 
induced affective states in listeners, by asking participants to listen to musical stimuli 
with different levels of syncopation, while either staying completely still, or tapping 
along with the beat. In the following paragraphs I examine what the findings contribute 
to current understanding of the topic, and the possible reasons for them in relation to 
each of the three sets of hypotheses of the study. 
The first set of hypotheses concerned the effect of synchronized movement on the 
participants’ affective experience. I predicted that participants who tapped their feet 
along to the music would experience higher levels of induced positive valence (i.e. 
pleasure), and higher levels of tense arousal (i.e. tension) and energetic arousal (i.e. 
wakefulness), than participants who listened to the stimuli while staying still. None of 
these hypotheses were supported by the data.  
There are number of reasons that might explain these null findings. First, it is possible 
that the movements of the participants in the tapping condition were so small that they 
did not produce large-enough effects on the participants’ arousal levels, and therefore 
the spreading of activation predicted by Juslin (2013) and Scherer and Coutihno (2013) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Condition R2 Sig. 
Change 
in R 
Significant Coefficients Beta; CI Sig. 
(Beta) 
Ambiguous Face 1 Stationary .033 .037 Difficulty-to-stay still .22 .017 
Tapping .010 .153 (None)   
Ambiguous Face 2 Stationary .044 .419 (None)   
Tapping .026 .019 Easy-to-tap-along .17 .026 
Valence Stationary .124 .000 Difficulty-to-stay-still 
Dancing engagement 
.21 
-.08 
.034 
.003 
Tapping .118 .000 Easy-to-tap-along 
Dancing engagement 
.23 
.03 
.001 
.007 
Tense Arousal Stationary .067 .493    
Tapping .193 .000 Easy-to-tap-along 
Dancing Engagement 
Enjoyment-groovy-music 
.28 
.04 
-.28 
.001 
.002 
.008 
Energetic arousal Stationary .063 .680 Difficulty-to-stay-still .30 .047 
Tapping .002 .001 Easy-to-tap-along 
Musical Engagement 
Musical Training 
.30 
.04 
-.32 
.001 
.001 
.004 
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did not occur, or it occurred in such a small scale that it did not produce noticeable 
changes in the participants’ subjective feelings. A related explanation is that although 
motor entrainment did produce a spreading of activation in the participants in the 
tapping condition, this effect was masked by the difficulty of the synchronization task, as 
implied by the observed negative correlation between participants’ ratings of difficulty-
to-tap-along with the stimuli, and their ratings of valence and tense arousal. 
Unfortunately, since this experiment did not take objective measures of the participants’ 
physiological activation levels, it is not possible to empirically examine this conjecture. 
An important task for future research is to design experimental techniques that allow 
this type of measures to be taken in a non-intrusive way while the participants are 
performing bodily movements. 
A second explanation of the null results is that the instruments used to measure the 
participants’ affective state (the ambiguous faces technique and the self-report scales) 
were not sensitive enough to produce significant differences between the groups, 
particularly because the participants were distributed in a between-subjects design 
across the two levels of the movement variable. Future studies should use a within-
subjects design which would allow the participants to reflect and report any subjective 
difference between listening to the music while staying still, as compared to their 
experience while moving along to it. 
A third possible way to account for these results is that participants in the tapping 
condition felt that moving their foot to the beat was a too-restrictive instruction, and 
that had they made free-movements with any part of their body, the effect of motor 
entrainment would have been noticeable. Although this is a plausible explanation, it 
should be noticed that there was no evidence of this in the participants’ spontaneous 
comments, and that a previous experiment which compared participants who stayed 
still with participants who tapped along or moved freely while listening to groovy music, 
found that participants preferred listening to the music without moving along in any way 
(Janata et al., 2012). 
Finally, an alternative interpretation of the null results is that perhaps, as predicted 
by Maes and colleagues (Maes, Dyck, et al., 2014), people’s bodily synchronization with 
music is not driven by the rhythmic qualities of the music, but by its implied expression. 
Since the stimuli used in this study consisted of drum-breaks with no melodic or 
harmonic elements, and no variations in micro-timing, then they can be assumed to 
contain very little, if any, expressiveness. Indeed, several participants in the study 
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spontaneously commented that they found the stimuli to be not “musical enough” –one 
participant in the tapping condition said: “to me this isn’t actually music, this is just a 
rhythm, it sounds artificial”. It is therefore possible that moving along with these 
inexpressive stimuli would not make any difference in the participants’ affective state 
when compared to listening to them while staying still. This possibility is an open 
empirical question to be explored in future studies, which could compare how listening 
to stimuli containing only rhythmic information (such as the ones used here), versus 
stimuli containing carefully manipulated harmonic and melodic elements relates 
differently to the participants’ urges to move and to their affective experience. 
It is important to note that explaining the negative findings as caused by a lack of 
musicality in the stimuli contradicts Witek and colleagues’ findings (Witek et al., 2014). 
They used the same drum-breaks (along with 44 other stimuli), and found that their 
participants rated the stimuli with intermediate levels of syncopation as eliciting more 
pleasure than the rest. A possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that 
perhaps when participants in Witek’s study answered the question: “How much pleasure 
do you experience listening to this rhythm?”, they actually rated their preference for 
some stimuli over others, rather than induced feelings of pleasure. With these 
considerations in mind, future studies on this phenomenon should include measures of 
perceived musicality of the stimuli, and measures of both preference and induced 
pleasure, in order to discriminate how these different dimensions of the listeners’ 
experiences interact in the entrainment phenomenon. 
The second set of hypotheses concerned the effect of the degree of syncopation on 
the participants’ affective experience. Firstly, based on Witek and colleagues’ research 
(Witek et al., 2014), I predicted that stimuli with intermediate degrees of syncopation 
would be associated with higher ratings of pleasantness, so that the relationship 
between syncopation and valence could be described as following a negative quadratic 
trend (i.e. an “inverted U” shape). And secondly, based on Huron’s theory (2006), I 
predicted positive linear relationships between the degree of syncopation of the stimuli 
and the levels of tense arousal and energetic arousal experienced by the participants.  
The first of these three predictions was supported by the data. The ratings from the 
first of the pair of facial stimuli and from the participants’ self-reports of valence show 
that their levels of pleasure can be better described by a negative quadratic trend than 
by a linear one. However, these two measures provide conflicting conclusions about the 
symmetry and width of this inverted curve (i.e. how marked the differences between 
135 
 
 
 
the different levels of syncopation are): whereas in the results from the facial technique 
there are significant differences between the low and the medium syncopated levels, in 
the results from the self-report ratings there are significant differences between the 
high and low syncopation levels. Future experiments should include a larger number of 
stimuli in every category, and a larger sample of participants in order to clarify this issue.  
The predictions about the effects of syncopation level on participants’ ratings of 
tense arousal and energetic arousal were only confirmed partially: the results suggest 
that the participants’ levels of tension, but not of wakefulness, increased with the level 
of syncopation of the stimuli. These results confirm the usefulness of distinguishing 
between these two dimensions of arousal, because they do not correlate highly, they 
are not experienced as equivalent, and they probably engendered by different 
physiological processes (Schimmack & Rainer, 2002). 
Taken together, this second set of results offers support to Witek’s interpretation of 
Huron’s musical expectancy theory (2006), according to which, compared to music with 
low and high levels of syncopation, music with intermediate levels of syncopation 
provides an ideal level of predictability about when the next rhythmic event is going to 
sound, and therefore induces moderate feelings of tension, and a pleasurable urge to 
move (Witek et al., 2014, p. 8). Furthermore, an analysis of the participants’ reports of 
difficulty while listening to the music supports this interpretation in the stationary 
group: these participants found it significantly more difficult to stay still while listening 
to stimuli with intermediate syncopation levels, which were also associated with higher 
ratings of pleasantness. However, this interpretation does not fit with the data from the 
participants in the tapping condition, who tended to find it more difficult to tap along 
with the music as its syncopation level increased, and accordingly, to experience 
decreasing levels of pleasure. Consequently, Witek’s theory seems to be only valid when 
listening to the music is not accompanied by acting out the urge to move. 
A re-interpretation of Colling and Thompson’s model of the relationship between 
music, action and affect (2013) offers a plausible integrative explanation for this 
disparity. According to this model, listening to music induces attentional entrainment 
(equivalent to perceptual entrainment in Trost & Vuilleumier's classification, 2013), a 
type of neural synchronization made possible by the common coding that underlies 
perception and action (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), and the 
correspondent activation of simulation mechanisms (Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006). 
This overlap of perception and action systems generates action plans which are 
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experienced subjectively as an urge to move along with the music (Chen, Penhune, & 
Zatorre, 2008). In this model, these action plans work as expectations about when the 
next rhythmic event is going to happen, and are appraised by two feedback loops: a first 
one in charge of adjusting the accuracy of the predictions, and a second one in charge of 
producing positive affective experiences when the prediction is correct, or negative ones 
when the prediction is flawed (as in Huron’s theory, 2006). It is possible that in the case 
of passive listening to groovy music (a case not considered by Colling and Thompson), 
perceptual entrainment generates more intense feelings of pleasure if the music has an 
intermediate syncopation level, because the action plans work as a virtual fulfilment of 
the missing rhythmic events. In contrast, if the music has a high syncopation level, 
almost every action plan is contradicted by the musical input, so the second feedback 
loop produces mostly negative valence. And if the music has a low syncopation level, the 
effect of habituation gradually lessens the pleasure feedback provided by this loop. 
It can be speculated that this process of synchronization, monitoring and affective 
feedback is further complicated once the listener enacts the evoked action plans by 
engaging in motor entrainment. Since perceptual entrainment is a mostly involuntary 
process, it is probable that the feedback loops are more lenient whenever the 
predictions are flawed, allowing for a greater degree of imprecision. However, when the 
listener engages in motor entrainment, the feedback loops have to fine-tune their 
appraisal function, by comparing the onset of the predicted sound event in the music 
with the proprioceptive information provided by the moving body. When the onset of 
these two events tends to mismatch, the first loop produces subjective feelings of 
difficulty, and the second loop produces subjective feelings of frustration and negative 
valence, which in the case of this experiment seemed to have been powerful enough to 
overshadow any possible pleasure derived from mere perceptual (attentional) 
entrainment. 
This interpretation of Colling and Thompson’s model, along with the observations 
about the participants’ ratings of difficulty, suggest that rather than the objective 
properties of the rhythm, the factor that better explains people’s experiences of 
pleasure and relaxation with groovy music is their subjective motivation and/or difficulty 
to move with the music, which are in turn modulated by their expertise and familiarity 
with groovy music. Accordingly, the regression analyses indicated that the more 
frequently the participants engage in dancing activities the less they experienced 
pleasure staying still with the music in the stationary condition, and the more they 
137 
 
 
 
experienced it in the tapping condition; and the more they enjoy groovy musical styles, 
the tenser they felt while tapping along with the stimuli. 
The final set of hypotheses concerned the interaction effects of movement and 
syncopation levels. These predictions were not supported by the data.  
 
6.4.1 Limitations  
Some limitations of the study should be noted. First, as mentioned above, a more 
precise examination of the effects of rhythmic entrainment on listeners’ arousal levels 
implies measuring the participants’ patterns of physiological activation, and not just 
their subjective experience of arousal by means of self-report questionnaires, as in this 
experiment. While the self-report technique here utilised proved to be informative 
about the way the two dimensions of experienced arousal (tension, energy) vary 
independently, it is well known that people’s reports of their bodily state do not 
necessarily correlate with their patterns of physiological change, and depend on 
individual differences in interoception skills (Barrett, Quigley, Bliss-Moreau, & Aronson, 
2004; Wiens, 2005). 
The perception-of-ambiguous-faces technique here implemented to indirectly 
measure the participants’ valence does not appear to be reliable in its current form: the 
scores presented large between-subject variability, their correlation with self-reported 
pleasantness was small, and the effects of musically induced affect in the perception of 
this facial stimuli seemed to be quite short-lived: they were only observable in the first 
pair of the faces that the participants rated, but not in the second. That said, the 
easiness of the application of the technique (compared to techniques such as Facial 
EMG), and its relative independence from demand effects, suggest that this could 
become a practical instrument, whose psychometrical properties should continue to be 
assessed and improved in future research. 
Third, this study did not ask participants to report if they felt any induced feelings of 
“social bonding”, “communion”, or “emotional bonding”, etc., as predicted by Overy and 
Molnar-Szakacs (2006) and Juslin (2013b), so this hypothesis is left to be examined in 
future studies. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the solitary context in which this 
study was carried out would have evoked this type of affective experiences, (previous 
experiments that have reported affiliation effects of synchronization to music have 
138 
 
 
 
included at least two people moving in time with the music: e.g. Hove & Risen, 2009; 
Tarr et al., 2015).  
6.5 Conclusion  
The results of this study confirm previous findings that listening to music with 
intermediate syncopation levels evokes pleasant urges to move in time with it. However, 
the results also suggest that realizing this urge by engaging in motor entrainment does 
not automatically lead to increased subjective feelings of pleasure, tension, or 
wakefulness, probably because any positive change in affect associated with the 
syncopation of the music is outweighed by the perceived difficulty of the 
synchronization task. 
  
 
  
139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The role of embodied simulation 
and semantic associations in 
emotional contagion with music 
Emotions seem to be contagious: on many occasions we “catch” other people’s 
emotional states, reacting to their emotions by feeling the same emotional states24. In 
the case of music, the observation that when we perceive a piece as expressive of a 
particular emotion we frequently feel the same emotion ourselves suggests the 
possibility that emotional contagion can also occur as a response to musical sounds. 
Indeed, several scholars have speculated that the same neural and psychological 
mechanisms underlie both emotional contagion with people and with music (Davies, 
2010; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009; Schubert, 2013). The two 
experiments reported in this chapter and the next examine the causal role that one of 
the proposed mechanisms plays in this type of emotional experience with music, namely 
embodied simulation. 
The phenomenon of emotional contagion is well established in contemporary 
affective science: there is accumulating evidence for our tendency to mimic and share 
emotions that we perceive in a wide range of stimuli: facial expressions (Blairy, Herrera, 
& Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Wild, Erb, & Bartels, 2001); vocalizations (Hatfield, 
Hsee, & Costello, 1995; Hawk, Fischer, & Van Kleef, 2012; Neumann & Strack, 2000); and 
even films (de Wied, Zillmann, & Ordman, 1995). Evidence for emotional contagion with 
music has also been reported in a large number of studies in psychology of music: 
listeners not only report perceiving that music expresses emotions, but that music 
induces in them the corresponding emotional feelings – albeit that these induced 
                                                            
24 Admittedly, we sometimes react to other people’s emotional displays with complementary or 
reciprocal emotions (for example, feeling pity when we learn that someone is sad, or becoming 
afraid when we see someone’s expressions of anger). 
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feelings tend to be experienced less intensely than those perceived (Egermann & 
McAdams, 2013; Evans & Schubert, 2008; Hunter, Schellenberg, & Schimmack, 2010; 
Kallinen & Ravaja, 2006).  
Strictly speaking, emotional contagion with music is paradoxical, because music is not 
a sentient being capable of feeling emotions (Davies, 2013). However, this paradox is 
dissolved if we assume that listening to music always involves the experience of 
perceiving a human agency that produced the sounds (Launay, 2015), and/or if we 
assume that listening to music somehow “tricks” our brains into perceiving those sounds 
as resembling the expression of emotions in real human beings (Cochrane, 2010a). 
Furthermore, both emotional contagion with human expressions and emotional 
contagion with music have been explained as sharing the same causal mechanism: a 
type of internal mimicry known as embodied simulation (Cochrane, 2010a; Juslin & 
Västfjäll, 2008; Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013) 
 
7.1 Embodied simulation in social cognition and perception 
of music 
Several theories have converged in the proposal that there is an overlap between the 
neural and cognitive systems in charge of planning and executing actions, and those in 
charge of perceiving the actions of others: the mirror neurons theory (Gallese & 
Sinigaglia, 2011; Iacoboni, 2009), the common coding theory of perception and action 
(Hommel et al., 2001; W. Prinz, 1997) and embodied theories of cognition (Barsalou, 
2008; Glenberg, 2010). These theories also coincide in that the key mechanism that 
supports action planning, the perception of other people’s actions, and mentalizing 
(understanding other people’s mental states) is a kind of internal mimicry known as 
embodied simulation, whereby the perceiver achieves a non-conceptual and direct 
understanding of the other person’s thoughts, feelings and actions by “mirroring or re-
enacting their mental states and activities” (Springer, Parkinson, & Prinz, 2013). 
Importantly, these theories not only predict that simulation occurs by default, 
facilitating tasks such as social understanding and emotional contagion, but they also 
predict that blocking or inhibiting simulation has the opposite effect: for example, 
Michael et al. (Michael et al., 2014) found that using transcranial magnetic stimulation in 
141 
 
 
 
the participants’ hand area of the premotor cortex, resulted in difficulty understanding 
pantomimed hand gestures. 
Drawing upon these theoretical developments, researchers of music cognition have 
also proposed that perception of music is based on embodied simulation of the motor 
actions and gestures executed by the musicians who produce the musical sounds (Cox, 
2011; Leman & Maes, 2015; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009, Colling & Thompson, 2013). 
Several recent studies have found evidence that supports this claim. For example, 
Leman et al. (2009) found that listeners’ arm movements while listening to music played 
on the guqin (a traditional Chinese plucked-strings instrument) matched the patterns of 
movements of the performers’ shoulders. Neuro-imagining studies have found 
activation of brain areas associated with perception of music and areas associated with 
producing vocalizations and with motor planning: namely the supplementary motor 
area, mid-premotor cortex, and cerebellum (Brown & Martinez, 2007; Callan et al., 
2006; Chen et al., 2008). And Novembre and colleagues (Novembre, Ticini, Schütz-
Bosbach, & Keller, 2014) have recently provided evidence of motor simulation in 
musicians: in their study, pianists either practiced or not the left-hand part of several 
musical pieces. Subsequently, they received transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), 
which inhibited their left-hand motor areas, and were asked to play the right hand part 
while simultaneously listening to the left-hand part. The researchers found that the TMS 
had a disruptive effect on the pianists’ performance only when they played pieces in 
which they had practiced the left-hand part before. This suggests that even when they 
were playing only the right hand part, their brains were inevitably simulating the 
movements of the left hand part in these previously practiced pieces. 
7.1.1 Embodied Simulation in Affective Phenomena  
The theories reviewed so far claim that action perception, social cognition, and music 
perception can be explained in terms of embodied simulation. But does this mechanism 
underlie emotional phenomena as well? Two lines of research suggest that this is the 
case: both Niedenthal and colleagues (Niedenthal et al., 2005; Niedenthal, Winkielman, 
Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009) and Barrett and colleagues (Barrett, 2006b; Wilson-
Mendenhall et al., 2011) have proposed that embodied simulations are activated not 
only when people respond to present emotional stimuli (e.g. Niedenthal, Brauer, 
Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 2001), but also when they think about emotional concepts and 
symbols (e.g. Oosterwijk, Rotteveel, Fischer, & Hess, 2009). 
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It is important to note that, in spite of the growing supporting evidence for the role 
of embodied simulation in emotional processes (Glenberg, 2010; Niedenthal et al., 2005; 
Winkielman et al., 2015), the majority of research so far has suggested that adopting or 
mimicking emotional postures, gestures, vocalizations, etc. modulates, rather than 
completely changes the emotional state of participants. Thus, studies on mimicry and 
emotional contagion have demonstrated that being exposed to and/or mimicking a 
positive or negative stimulus (e.g. an expression of fear, anger, disgust, joy, etc.) leads to 
changes in participants’ ratings of induced affect, that is, to changes in experienced 
valence in the same direction as the valence of the stimulus, but not to the induction of 
the same discrete emotion as the one observed (Flack, 2006; Hatfield et al., 1995; Hess & 
Blairy, 2001; Mcintosh, 2006; Neumann & Strack, 2000). Indeed, in all these studies the 
participants’ ratings of induced emotion showed a “bleeding effect”, that is, when a 
participant reported feeling a negative emotion (e.g. disgust) they also reported feeling 
other negative ones simultaneously (e.g. anger and fear). To my knowledge, so far only 
one study (Hawk et al., 2012) has found that hearing emotional vocalizations of discrete 
emotions leads to both mimicry and induction of the corresponding discrete emotions in 
the participants. Taken together, these findings cast doubt on the notion that engaging 
in behaviours that facilitate embodied simulation can by itself lead to the induction of 
discrete emotions. 
 
7.1.2 Embodied Simulation in Musical Emotions 
If perception of others’ actions and emotions, perception of music, and even elicitation 
of emotions are based upon embodied simulation, then it follows that musical emotions 
can also be explained in these terms. Indeed, several theorists in Philosophy and 
Psychology of Music (Cochrane, 2010a; Davies, 2013; Jackendoff & Lerdahl, 2006; Juslin 
& Västfjäll, 2008; Molnar-Szakacs & Overy, 2006; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013) have 
concurred with the proposal that: a) some features of musical sounds resemble the 
expression of emotions (or even the proprioceptive feelings) in the voice and the body 
(cf. Coutinho & Dibben, 2012; Juslin & Laukka, 2003); and b) perceiving those expressive 
musical features elicits internal mimicry, which in turns, leads to emotional contagion 
with the emotion expressed by the musical piece. 
Psychological theories differ in regards to the aspect of music proposed to elicit 
simulation, and therefore, in the type of internal mimicry they implicate. For Juslin and 
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colleagues (Juslin, 2013b; Juslin et al., 2010; Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008) the melodic aspect 
of music can elicit internal mimicry when particular instrumental timbres (such as the 
violin or the cello) are heard as “super-expressive voices” resembling the expression of 
basic emotions in vocalizations (Juslin & Laukka, 2003, p. 803). This resemblance 
activates subvocalization processes supported by mirror-neuron brain systems, leading 
to the induction of the corresponding basic emotions in the listener. In contrast, Scherer 
and colleagues (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013; Scherer & Zentner, 2001), emphasise the 
observation or imagination of motor expressions of the (implied) performing musicians 
as the stimuli that elicit muscular and neural mimicry, and subsequently, emotional 
contagion.  
It is plausible that these two theories are not mutually exclusive, and that both types 
of simulation operation simultaneously facilitating emotional contagion with music. 
Whereas simulation via subvocalization may be responsible for the perception of 
emotional qualities associated with variations in timbre, pitch, and melodic contour (i.e. 
prosody), simulation of motor gestures may be responsible for the perception of 
emotional qualities associated with bodily movements, like strength, speed, and energy. 
Indeed, Overy and Molnar-Szakacs’ SAME model of affective experience (Molnar-
Szakacs & Overy, 2006; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009) predicts that both mimicry of 
physical gestures and vocal mimicry can be simultaneously activated by music listening, 
and play a central role in the perception and induction of musical emotions. 
To my knowledge, no empirical research has attempted to test the hypotheses that 
derive from these theories. However, four lines of research have provided evidence that 
suggests the involvement of embodied simulation mechanisms in emotional experiences 
with music. 
First, a neuroimaging study led by Koelsch (Koelsch et al., 2006) found that listening 
to pleasant pieces of music (compared to dissonant, unpleasant versions of the same 
pieces) activated brain areas associated with the formation of premotor representations 
of vocal sound production (Rolandic operculum, anterior superior insula, and ventral 
striatum). 
Second, a variety of studies have found that listening to music can elicit a pleasant 
motivation to mimic some aspect of it, suggesting that embodied simulation can be 
simultaneously a cause and a consequence of emotional engagement with music. For 
example, it has been shown that rhythmic music elicits a pleasurable urge to move in 
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time with the sounds (Janata et al., 2012; Labbé & Grandjean, 2014; Witek et al., 2014) 
that singing along is a very common response to listening to favourite music (DeNora, 
2000; Dibben & Williamson, 2007), and that audio-visual presentations of emotional 
singing elicits facial mimicry in observers (Chan, Livingstone, & Russo, 2013). 
Third, a couple of studies have suggested that people’s movements while listening to 
music affect their preferences and their perception of emotions expressed by that 
music. Sedlmeir et and colleagues (2011) found that asking participants to make 
positively or negatively-associated facial, head, or arm movements while listening to a 
piece of music (i.e. smiling, nodding or flexing the arms vs. not-smiling, head-shaking or 
extending the arms), had systematic effects on their preferences: those participants who 
made positive-associated movements reported enjoying the music more than 
participants who made negative ones. Similarly, Maes and colleagues (2013) asked two 
groups of children to learn either a “sad” or a “happy” dance choreography to an 
ambiguous piece of music, and found in a later test, that the type of choreography the 
children learned biased their perception of the emotion expressed by the music.  
Finally, two experiments on cross-modal perception of emotions found parallels 
between perception of emotions in music and in movement. In the first one, conducted 
by Sievers and colleagues (Sievers, Polansky, Casey, & Wheatley, 2012) the researchers 
asked participants from two different cultural backgrounds to manipulate several 
parameters in a computer program in order to make either a piece of music, or a virtual 
ball, sound or move in an emotionally expressive way. They found that in both cultural 
groups, the participants used an equivalent set of features to make the virtual ball and 
the musical piece represent the same target emotions. The second experiment, carried 
out by Giordano and colleagues (Giordano, Egermann, & Bresin, 2014), compared the 
use of expressive sound features in music and in walking, and found that the sound 
features that people use to express and perceive emotions in walking sounds coincided 
with the musical features used to express emotions in music (as reported by Juslin & 
Laukka, 2003).  
 
7.1.3 Is Embodied Simulation Mediated by Other Factors? 
As mentioned above, research has found that manipulating people’s facial, vocal or 
bodily expressions can bias their emotional state, but it cannot by itself lead to the 
induction of discrete, full-blown emotions. In consequence, it is also unlikely that any 
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type of mimicry (either behavioural or implicit) by itself can lead to the induction of 
emotional contagion without the influence of other factors, such as the context, or the 
present goals of the individual. Indeed, constructionist approaches to emotion such as 
Russell’s Core Affect model (2003) and Barrett’s Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett, 2006b) 
have emphasized that contextual information, and the accessibility of linguistic 
categories are critically involved in the perception of emotions (Barrett, Lindquist, et al., 
2007; Barrett, Mesquita, Gendron, & Kensinger, 2010; Carroll & Russell, 1996) and in the 
elicitation of emotional episodes (Fugate & Barrett, 2014; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; 
Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2013). Furthermore, research reviewed by Hess 
and Fischer (2013) and by Carr & Winkelman (2014) indicates that mimicry is flexible and 
mediated by factors such as social affiliation: for example, participants are more likely to 
mimic other people’s expressions if the person making the gestures is perceived by the 
observer as cooperative, and as belonging to the same social group. 
Regarding emotional contagion with music, two of the most influential contemporary 
theories, the BRECVEMA (Juslin, 2013b), and the Multifactorial Process Model (Scherer 
& Coutinho, 2013) propose that emotional responses to music emerge from the 
interaction of multiple psychological mechanisms which are activated by contextual, 
personal, and musical factors. Thus, in any instance of emotional contagion with music, 
it is unlikely that embodied simulation be the only mechanism responsible for a 
listener’s emotional reaction to a piece of music. In the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 
2013b), the mechanism that most clearly reflects the listener’s encoding of the context 
where the music takes place, is visual imagery; a mechanism whereby the listener reacts 
emotionally to the images that he or she visualises while listening to the music. 
 
7.2 Overview of the present study 
The previous review demonstrates that although there is accumulating evidence that 
embodied simulation is causally involved in both emotional processing and in music 
perception, we do not have yet evidence that embodied simulation plays a causal role in 
the phenomenon of emotional contagion with music, nor of the extent to which this 
mechanism might be mediated by other factors. 
The first aim of the two experiments that constitute this study (reported in this 
chapter and the next) is to respond to this gap in knowledge by testing the role of 
embodied simulation in emotional contagion with music. Specifically, I compared two 
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competing hypotheses derived from the theories reviewed above: the BRECVEMA 
theory (Juslin, 2013b), which claims that implicit mimicry of the melodic aspects of the 
musical material leads to emotional contagion, and the Multifactorial Process Model 
(Scherer & Coutinho, 2013), which claims that implicit mimicry of the musician’s 
gestures when producing the music drives the contagion response. 
The second aim of this study is to examine the extent to which emotional contagion 
with music is mediated by other factors such as the activation of mental imagery and the 
activation of semantic information and personal associations. Additionally, the second 
experiment also explored the possibility that considerations of social affiliation and 
empathic attitudes worked as important mediators in this phenomenon.  
 
7.3 Experiment 1 
Since embodied simulation can be facilitated or hampered by engaging in behavioural 
activities associated with the respective neural resources, I asked participants to listen 
to music and to perform behavioural tasks which either facilitated or prevented 
simulation. Thus, two groups of participants performed simulation-facilitating tasks: one 
group was instructed to mimic the music’s melody (i.e. to sing along with the piece), and 
another to mimic the gestures necessary to produce the music (i.e. to pretend to play 
the instruments doing “air-playing”). A third group of participants performed a 
simulation-hampering task: they were instructed to use their arms and their voice in a 
mildly distracting task while the music played. Finally, a fourth group of participants was 
recruited in order to examine the effect of embodied simulation when it is neither 
facilitated nor blocked (i.e. they constituted a control condition): they were instructed to 
remain completely quiet and still while the music played.  
The hypotheses of the experiment were as follows. I predicted that participants in 
the two simulation groups (vocal, motoric) would experience more intense perceived 
and induced emotions while listening to the music in comparison to the other groups 
(Hypothesis 1A), that the participants in the distracting task group would experience the 
least intense perceived and induced emotions (Hypothesis 1B); and that the scores of 
perceived and induced emotions of the participants in the control group would fall 
between the scores of the two simulation groups and the distracting group (Hypothesis 
1C). Additionally, since past research on embodied simulation has found that expertise 
in a given task facilitates simulation (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, 
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Passingham, & Haggard, 2005), I predicted that participants who can play a musical 
instrument present in the music would experience more intense perceived and induced 
emotions than those who cannot (Hypothesis 1D).  
The role of personal associations and visual imagery in emotional contagion was 
examined by using pieces of music that could be simultaneously perceived as expressive 
of different emotions (e.g. as expressive of sadness or tenderness), and by asking the 
participants to report what they thought while listening to each piece. Based on Juslin’s 
theory about the role of visual imagery in the induction of musical emotions (Juslin, 
2013b), I predicted that there would be a correspondence between the content of the 
participants’ imagery and their ratings of perceived and induced emotions (Hypothesis 
2).  
 
Table 7.1 Summary of hypotheses 
 
  
Effect of 
Simulation 
Hypothesis 1A Participants in the Motor Simulation and Vocal 
Simulation groups will experience more intense 
induced and perceived emotions than participants in 
the Control and Distracting Task groups.  
Hypothesis 1B Participants in the Distracting Task group will 
experience the least intense perceived and induced 
emotions compared to the other groups.  
Hypothesis 1C Scores of perceived and induced emotions in the 
Control group would fall between the scores of the 
Simulation groups and the Distracting Task group.  
Hypothesis 1D There will be a positive and significant correlation 
between scores of being-able-to-play-an-instrument-
present-in-the-piece, and scores of most intensely 
perceived and induced affects.  
Effect of visual 
Imagery 
Hypothesis 2 The content of the participants’ narratives about what 
they imagined while listening to the pieces will have 
the same emotional content as the emotions they 
reported in the questionnaires about perceived and 
induced emotions. 
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7.4 Method 
7.4.1 Participants 
A total of 127 participants aged between 19 and 66 (Mean = 29.9, SD = 9.5, 79 Women) 
took part in the experiment. They were recruited on a voluntary basis from the city and 
the University of Sheffield, UK. Three participants were excluded from the analysis 
because they did not follow the instructions correctly. All the instructions and 
questionnaires were in English, which was the first language for 59.7% of the 
participants; however, those participants for whom English is a second language were all 
students at the University of Sheffield. 
The participants’ musicality was measured by using two scales from the Goldsmith’s 
Musical Sophistication Index [Gold-MSI] (Müllensiefen et al., 2013). Their scores in the 
Musical Training scale had a mean of 25.74 (SD = 6.65). Their level of Musical 
Engagement, had a mean of 38.7 (SD = 8.18). These scores suggest that overall, the 
participants had a similar mean level of musicianship to the sample used to develop this 
instrument (Mtraining = 26.52, SD = 11.44; Mengagement =41.52, SD = 10.36), as documented 
by Müllensiefen et al. (Müllensiefen et al., 2013). 
Given the objectives and the procedure of this experiment I asked the participants to 
report how often they sing along when they listen to music, and how often they pretend 
to play the instruments they hear when they listen to music. Their mean scores for the 
first question were of 3.66 (SD = 0.92) and for the second of 2.13 (SD = 1.35).  
Participants were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions (31 per 
condition): vocal simulation, motor simulation, distracting task, and control task. 
 
7.4.2 Design 
The experiment used a between-subjects design, with Type of simulation as the 
between-subjects independent variable (four levels: Vocal Simulation, Motor Simulation, 
Distracting Task, Stationary); and Perceived and Induced affective states as dependent 
variables. 
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7.4.3 Stimuli  
The musical stimuli consisted of three instrumental pieces identified from the Movie 
Soundtrack Database developed at the University of Jyväskylä (Eerola & Vuoskoski, 
2011), and chosen because they could be perceived as moderately expressive of 
emotions25 in the four quadrants of Two-Dimensional Affective Space (Russell & Barrett, 
1999). Since I used longer versions of the pieces than those found in the Database, I pre-
tested their ability to express the target emotions in a pilot study with 28 participants 
who did not take part in the main experiment. 
 “Kip’s lights” from the movie The English Patient (1997). This piece is perceived as 
expressive of sadness or tenderness. The piece consists of a piano playing a slow, 
right-hand melody accompanied by a small ensemble of strings, clarinet and celesta. 
Major mode. Tempo = 60 BPM. The stimulus can be listened to on: 
https://soundcloud.com/julian-cespedes-guevara/1a-2/s-Z7aG5 
 “Max” From the movie Cape Fear (1991). Perceived as expressive of fear or anger. 
The piece starts with the brass playing two loud semibreve notes with a 7th major 
interval. After a quiet moment played by the strings, the brass instruments play loud 
descending phrases, including a tri-tone interval (Bb to E). These phrases are then 
answered by the strings playing descending chromatic scales with fast tremolo. 
Minor mode. Tempo = 60 BPM. The stimulus can be listened to on:  
https://soundcloud.com/julian-cespedes-guevara/22a/s-1BLdK 
 “Oliver learns the hard way” from the movie Oliver Twist (2005). Perceived as 
expressive of joy or excitement. The piece is characterised by a solo clarinet 
repeatedly playing a simple, cantabile melody accompanied by small ensemble of 
strings playing a syncopated rhythm. A percussion instrument (probably an Irish 
bodhran) plays a small roll at the end of each phrase from the clarinet. Minor mode. 
Tempo = 120. The stimulus can be listened to on:  
https://soundcloud.com/julian-cespedes-guevara/3a-2/s-7yyPx 
In the main experiment each participant listened to the pieces twice in a row, so that 
the participants in the simulation conditions had a chance to become familiarized with 
                                                            
25 I chose moderately expressive pieces rather than pieces with the highest scores in order to 
prevent having a ceiling effect, which would make the effects of the independent variable 
unobservable.  
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how the music unfolded. The pieces were edited together with no silence between start 
and end, and therefore the stimuli had a mean duration of 137.33 seconds (SD = 8, 02). 
 
7.4.5 Measures 
The participants’ affective experience was measured with a combination of direct and 
indirect techniques. First, their induced affective state was measured by using an 
indirect technique developed by Niedenthal and colleagues (2000)in which participants 
are asked to control a computerised movie displaying a facial expression which changes 
from an initial positive expression into a negative one, and to detect the offset of the 
initial expression (See Figure 7.1). Participants were told that they could control the 
movie with the arrows of a keyboard to go forward and backwards as many times as 
they wanted, and to stop it at the point in which they perceived that, “for the first time, 
the face no longer expressed its initial emotion” (Niedenthal et al., 2000, p. 857). The 
experimenter then registered the frame number (out of 100) in which the participant 
decided to stop the movie. (The frame numbers were hidden from the participants). It 
was expected that participants in positive affective states would see the offset of the 
happy expression at an earlier point than participants in negative affective states. 
The second measure of participants’ induced affective state was a 15-items ad-hoc 
questionnaire developed by the experimenter to test the possibility that emotional 
states induced by music may elicit subjective feelings similar to regular, everyday 
emotions (Frijda et al., 1989). Unlike other existing questionnaires this one captures 
action tendencies – an important but often-overlooked component of emotion in music 
studies-, physical sensations, and appraisals. (See Table 7.2 for the complete list of 
items). 
The third measure of induced affect was a 14-items questionnaire including core 
affect adjectives (i.e. valence, tense arousal, and energetic arousal), discrete emotional 
adjectives taken from the GEMS-25 (Zentner et al., 2008) and items from a 
questionnaire used by Juslin and colleagues in a recent experiment on induction of 
musical emotions (Juslin et al., 2013). Importantly, taking in consideration that folk 
emotional concepts are probably organized as fuzzy sets rather than as clearly defined 
categories (Russell & Fehr, 1994; Scherer, 2005), each item of the questionnaire 
included two or three adjectives related to the same emotional category (for example: 
anxious/scared; sad/sorrowful; happy/cheerful).  
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The participants’ perception of emotions expressed by the music was measured by 
using a 15-items questionnaire containing pair of adjectives corresponding to the same 
categories as the ones used in the induced emotions questionnaire. (For example, the 
item “fear, dread” in this questionnaire corresponded to the item “anxious, scared” in 
the induced emotions questionnaire). (Table 7.2 presents the items of the three 
questionnaires).  
The participants were also asked to report how much they liked the piece they 
listened to, and how familiar they were with it; how difficult they found the task that 
was assigned to them while listening to the music, and how embarrassing they found 
performing the task. (For the participants in the Stationary condition, this question was 
changed to report whether they felt uncomfortable with the presence of the experiment 
behind them while doing the experiment).  
Due to the potential mediating role of empathic attitudes in emotional contagion 
with music (Egermann & McAdams, 2013; Vuoskoski et al., 2012), the participants’ Trait 
Empathy was measured with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), which 
evaluates four facets of empathy: Fantasy, Empathic Concern Personal Distress, and 
Perspective Taking.  
The participants’ thoughts while listening to the music were explored with a short 
interview at the end of the experiment. Additional measures consisted of a 
questionnaire of demographic information, the Engagement and Musical Training scales 
from the Goldsmith’s Musical Sophistication Index [Gold-MSI] (Müllensiefen et al. 2013), 
and a question asking the participants to report which, if any, musical instruments they 
can play. 
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Table 7.2 Items in the self-report questionnaires 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Example of the facial stimuli used in the indirect measure of affect. The 
photos show the process of morphing of the facial expression from the first frame 
(leftmost photo), at the 25th frame, at the 50th frame, at the 75th frame, and at the last 
frame (100th).  
 
7.4.6 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in one session. When they arrived at the laboratory 
they were informed that the experiment concerned the psychological effects of listening 
to short instrumental pieces of music, and they were seated in a comfortable chair in 
front of a desk with two computers; one was used to show the instructions and 
questionnaires, and one to display the movies from the indirect measurement 
technique. Additionally, the participants in the Distracting Task condition found a box 
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with colour cubes on the desk, and two other boxes located at arm’s length: one on the 
right side, over the desk, and one on the left side, on the floor (See bottom left panel in 
figure 7.2). The experimenter was present during the whole procedure, sitting at 
another desk behind the participants.  
After reading and signing the consent forms, a message on the main screen informed 
the participants that during the experiment they would listen to three short 
instrumental pieces of music, while doing something else at the same time, and that 
after each piece, they would do a simple “visual task” (i.e. the indirect measurement), 
and then answer some questionnaires. Then they read the instructions to do the indirect 
measurement of affect: 
The computer screen on your left will display the photo of a person who 
gradually changes from one emotion to another. Please use the right and left 
keys in the keyboard to see how the expression in the face changes. Stop at the 
first moment in which you perceive that the face no longer expresses the initial 
emotion. 
Once the participants had satisfactorily practiced this task, the main computer screen 
displayed the instructions of their corresponding experimental condition. After being 
notified that they would listen to the piece of music twice, and that they had to try to 
“identify the message that it conveys”, they received the following instructions (See 
figure 7.2): 
 For the participants in the Vocal Simulation condition: “While you listen, please 
SING or HUM along to the melody while the music unfolds. It does not matter if 
you shift your attention from one instrument to another while singing. It is not 
important whether you can sing in tune or not, the experimenter will not be 
measuring or judging your singing. However, it is crucial that you sing sufficiently 
loud that the experimenter can hear you.” 
 For the participants in the Motor Simulation group condition: “While you listen, 
please PRETEND YOU ARE PLAYING THE INSTRUMENTS THAT YOU HEAR and 
make the movements you think the musicians would make while playing. It does 
not matter if you switch from one instrument to another along the way. It is not 
important if you know how to play these instruments or can pretend to play 
them accurately. The experimenter will not be measuring or judging your 
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pretend-playing. However, it is crucial that your movements are sufficiently 
large so that the experimenter can see you making them.”  
 For the participants in the Distracting Task condition: “While you listen, please 
MOVE THE CUBES from the box in front of you to the other boxes, one at a time. 
Put the blue ones in the box to your left, and all the others in the box to your 
right. COUNT OUT LOUD each cube that you move.”  
 For the participants in the control condition: While you listen, please stay 
completely still and silent. You do not have to be tense, but it is important that 
you do not things like humming the melody, tapping your feet, or swaying your 
body to the rhythm of the music.” 
All the participants practiced the corresponding task while listening twice to a 
fragment of Satie’s Gymnopedie No.1 (total duration = 82 seconds). After taking base-
line measures of affect with the indirect technique and a short questionnaire, the 
participants followed the same procedure for each trial: listening to a piece of music 
twice while performing the experimental task, completing the indirect measurement 
technique, and filling the self-report questionnaires of induced and perceived affective 
states. The musical stimuli were presented in a counterbalanced order through 
headphones (Bose AE2), adjusted at a comfortable sound level.  
Once the participants finished the third trial, the experimenter asked them to listen 
to a fragment of each stimulus once more, and to tell him “what when through their 
minds” while they listened to them in the experiment. After this, they filled the 
questionnaires about demographic information, musicality and trait empathy. The 
experiment ended by debriefing the participants, and by offering them a chocolate bar 
as a reward for their participation. The whole procedure took 50 minutes on average. 
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Figure 7.2 Enactment of the Motor Simulation and Distracting Task conditions. The 
panels above represent the typical gestures made by participants while listening to the 
music in the Motor Simulation condition. The panel on the bottom left corner shows the 
setting that participants in the Distracting Task found: notice the box with cubes in the 
middle, and the two boxes at the right and left of the computer. The middle and bottom 
right panels represent the way participants allocated the cubes in the boxes while 
counting out loud and listening to the music.  
 
7.5 Results  
The results section is organized as follows: 
1) The analysis of the validity of the two novel measures of affect: the perception 
of morphing faces task, and the questionnaire of subjective feelings and action 
tendencies. 
2) The manipulation check, i.e. an evaluation of the extent to which the three 
pieces communicated and elicited the target emotions.  
3) The results of the test of hypotheses. 
4) The analyses of the role of covariates in the results. 
5) The analysis of the qualitative data gathered from the question: “what went 
through your mind while listening to the music?” 
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7.5.1 Validity of Perception of Morphing Faces Technique 
As an indirect measure of induced valence, after each trial the participants performed a 
task consisting of seeing a pair faces in succession, each of which “morphed” from a 
positive to a negative emotional expression, and to detect the first point at which each 
face no longer expressed the initial emotion. Based on Niedenthal and colleagues’ 
findings using this technique (Niedenthal et al., 2001, 2000), it was expected that 
participants who were in a positive affective state would perceive the change earlier 
than those who were feeling unwell. The score was registered as the frame number 
which the participant chose as the inflexion point. There were 100 frames in each 
morphing video, therefore this scale ranged from 1 to 100. 
Since I observed a lot of variability in the use of the scale between participants (some 
chose to see the whole range of change in the morphing face before making their 
decision, whereas others made their decision based on their first impression), I 
transformed the scores into z-scores. A positive z-score indicates that the participant 
tended to feel more negative valence, and a negative z-score indicates that the 
participant tended to feel more positive valence.  
The correlations between these z-scores and the ratings from the questionnaires of 
induced and perceived affect are not compatible with the prediction. Only the data from 
the second face after listening to the Joy piece show the expected correlations: the 
scores of self-reported positive affective states correlate negatively with the morphing 
face scores, and the self-reported negative states show correlate positively with the 
morphing face scores. However, not all the observed correlations are statistically 
significant, and none of them is higher than .28 (mean correlation coefficient = 20.88). 
(See Table 7.3 for a summary of these correlation analyses). 
How to interpret these results? While it is possible that these low and non-existent 
correlations between the scores of the morphing faces technique and the self-report 
questionnaires may be due to the participants having reported higher levels of affective 
involvement in the questionnaires than they actually felt, a more conservative 
explanation is that the high variability in the way the participants approached the 
morphing faces task, and other individual differences in perception of emotions in facial 
expressions produced the observed results. In conclusion, in the context of this 
experiment, the morphing face technique cannot be assumed to be a reliable 
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measurement of the participants’ affective state, and therefore, I do not include this 
data in the subsequent analyses. 
 
Table 7.3 Correlation between z-scores from indirect technique and scores from self-
reports of induced and perceived core affect and discrete emotions 
 
N= 124 
Correlation statistic: Spearman’s Rho 
* = p < 0.05 level, ** = p <.001 (2-tailed). 
† = Observed correla ons in the predicted direc on. 
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7.5.2 Validity of the Subjective Feelings and Action Tendencies 
questionnaire 
This novel questionnaire was intended to constitute an additional technique to measure 
the extent to which the participants felt emotionally “moved” by the music, by exploring 
their experienced subjective feelings, physical sensations, and appraisals.  
 
7.5.2.1 Correlations between subjective feelings and induced emotions 
The correlation analysis between participants’ ratings in the Subjective Feelings & Action 
Tendencies questionnaire and their ratings in the Induced Emotions questionnaire 
reveals that the two questionnaires show a coherent pattern of correlation. For 
example, in all of the pieces, there are moderate to high positive correlations   
(Rho > .21, < .54) between scores of Needing-to-be-comforted and scores of Induced 
Sadness; between scores of Feeling-in-command-of-the-situation and scores of Induced 
Happiness and Induced Triumph; and of Wanting-to-attack-something and scores of 
Induced irritation. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that in most cases, the results of the Subjective 
Feelings & Action Tendencies questionnaire do not point to single, discrete emotions. On 
the contrary, several of these subjective sensations and action readiness states were 
associated with several discrete emotions, which importantly, have the same valence. 
For example, scores of Wanting-to-attack-something correlate positively with scores of 
Induced Sadness, Induced Anxiety and Induced Irritation, and negatively with scores of 
feeling Mellowed and of feeling Soothed; and scores of Wanting-to-dance correlate with 
Induced Happiness, Induced Triumph, and Induced Transcendence; and negatively with 
Induced Irritation. (Table 7.4 displays the results of the correlation analyses). 
In sum, these results suggest that the Subjective Feelings & Action Tendencies 
questionnaire worked as a valid measure of how emotionally moved the participants 
felt, and therefore, I include it in the hypothesis testing analyses.  
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Table 7.4 Significant correlations between scores from the Subjective Feelings & Action 
Tendencies Questionnaire and scores from the Discrete Induced Emotions questionnaire 
 
  
  Sad/Tender Piece Fear/Anger piece Joy Piece 
Needing to 
be 
comforted 
Sad .41** Sad .22* Nostalgic .21* 
Nostalgic .35** Happy -.18* Admiring .30** 
Anxious .23* Irritated .26** Transcendent .21* 
Transcendent .21* 
    
Wanting to 
dance 
Soothed .02* Mellowed .23* Soothed .29* 
Happy .03* Soothed .25* Nostalgic .22* 
Admiring .02* Happy .25* Happy .41* 
Transcendent .03* Triumphant .29* Triumphant .42* 
Irritated -.09* Transcendent .18* Transcendent .32* 
Uninterested -.03* 
    
Feeling like 
everything 
is fine 
Mellowed .31* Mellowed .26* Mellowed .24* 
Sad -.40** Sad -.19* Soothed .47** 
Soothed .59** Happy .45* Happy .64** 
Happy .61* Anxious -.50** Anxious -.29* 
Anxious -.32* Triumphant .34** Triumphant .32** 
Admiring .03* Irritated -.26* Admiring .46** 
Transcendent .33** 
  
Transcendent .32* 
Irritated -.23* 
  
Irritated -.28* 
Uninterested -.30* 
    
Not being 
able to 
concentrate 
Mellowed -.21* Mellowed -.24* Nostalgic .19* 
Triumphant -.04* Sad .33** Uninterested .24* 
Transcendent -.25* Anxious .40** 
 
Irritated .28* Irritated .37** 
 
Uninterested .20* Uninterested .33** 
  
Wanting to 
understand 
more 
Nostalgic .31* Sad .19* Soothed .22* 
Happy .22* Soothed .24* Nostalgic .33* 
Triumphant .25* Triumphant .27* Triumphant .39* 
Admiring .27* Admiring .23* Admiring .40** 
Transcendent .27* Transcendent .25* Transcendent .26* 
Uninterested -.27* 
  
Uninterested -.20* 
Feeling like 
things do 
not involve 
me 
Mellowed -.21* Mellowed -.04* Happy -.24* 
Soothed -.20* Sad .21* Triumphant -.19* 
Nostalgic -.26* Nostalgic .21* Uninterested .30* 
Triumphant .19* Irritated .24* 
  
Irritated .28* Uninterested .27* 
  
Uninterested .25* 
    
Wanting to 
avoid the 
situation 
Mellowed -.35** Mellowed -.22* None 
 
Sad .22* Happy -.30* 
  
Soothed -.34* Anxious .41** 
  
Happy -.22* Triumphant -.25** 
  
Anxious .23* Irritated -.34** 
  
Admiring -.31 Uninterested -.21* 
  
Irritated .34** 
    
Uninterested .30* 
    
Wanting to 
hide 
Mellowed -.19* Mellowed -.20* Happy -.23* 
Sad .27* Sad .26* Anxious .42** 
Soothed -.31* Happy -.42** Irritated .23* 
Happy -.31* Anxious .66** 
  
Anxious .31* Irritated .30* 
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Table 7.4 (continued) Significant correlations between scores from the Subjective 
Feelings & Action Tendencies Questionnaires and scores from the Discrete Induced 
Emotions Questionnaire 
 
N= 124 
Correlation statistic: Spearman’s Rho 
* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.001 (2-tailed). 
 
 
 Sad/Tender Piece Fear/Anger piece Joy Piece 
Wanting to 
attack 
something 
Mellowed -.22* Anxious .31* Anxious .26* 
Soothed -.20* Irritated .47** Irritated .23* 
Nostalgic -.14* Uninterested .19* 
  
Irritated .33** 
    
Wanting to 
make the 
experience 
longer  
Mellowed .49** Mellowed .21* Mellowed .28* 
Soothed .39** Soothed .28* Sad .20* 
Nostalgic .37** Happy .23* Soothed .32** 
Happy .39** Anxious -.24* Nostalgic .19* 
Anxious -.17* Triumphant .32* Happy .46** 
Triumphant .25* Admiring .29* Triumphant .42** 
Admiring .51* Transcendent .27* Admiring .52** 
Transcendent .46* Irritated -.21* Transcendent .39** 
Irritated -.27* 
  
Uninterested -.22* 
Uninterested -.55** 
    
Feeling like 
crying 
Sad .59** Sad .38** Sad .18* 
Soothed -.20* Anxious .41** Transcendent .25* 
Nostalgic .47** Irritated .29* 
  
Happy -.23* 
    
Uninterested -.23* 
    
Feeling like 
boiling 
inside 
none 
 
Anxious .25* Sad .22* 
  
Admiring .25* Triumphant .21* 
  
Transcendent .21* 
  
  
Irritated .34* 
  
Feeling in 
command 
of the 
situation 
Soothed .22* Happy .21* Soothed .26* 
Happy .36** Triumphant .54** Happy .40* 
Triumphant .23* Admiring .19* Anxious -.20* 
  
Transcendent .22* Triumphant .40** 
    
Admiring .32** 
    
Transcendent .27* 
Feeling 
frozen 
Sad .22* Sad .20* Anxious .22* 
Happy -.27* Happy -.25* 
  
Irritated .34** Anxious .51** 
  
  
Irritated .36** 
  
Wanting to 
jump 
around 
Sad -.32** Happy .27* Happy .40** 
Nostalgic -.24** Triumphant .26* Triumphant .37** 
Happy .30* Admiring .28* Admiring .40** 
  
Transcendent .23* Transcendent .29* 
Feeling like 
laughing 
Mellowed .20* Sad -.19* Mellowed .24* 
Sad -.23* Happy .21* Nostalgic .24* 
Happy .28* Anxious -.20* Happy .49** 
Uninterested -.21* Transcendent .22* Triumphant .31* 
    
Admiring .32* 
    
Transcendent .27* 
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7.5.3 Manipulation check I: Which emotions and Subjective Feelings 
were Associated with Each Stimulus? 
7.5.3.1 Sadness/tenderness piece: 
The induced emotions with mean scores above 1.0 after listening to the 
Sadness/Tenderness piece were: Mellowed, Soothed, Nostalgic, Filled-with-Admiration, 
and Transcendent. Contrary to expectation, ratings of induced Sadness were not among 
the highest (mean = 0.97), but ratings of Happiness were (mean = 1.40). It seems that 
most participants experienced emotions related to relaxation and bitter-sweet emotions 
(like nostalgia) rather than negative emotions while listening to this piece. This 
conclusion is supported by the analysis of the mean ratings of perceived emotions, 
which in descending order were: Peacefulness, Longing Tenderness, Spirituality, and 
Melancholy. (See Table 10.1, in Appendix 2 for means and standard deviations).  
An analysis of the mean scores from the Subjective Feelings & Action Tendencies 
questionnaire confirms that most participants had a relaxed and bitter-sweet experience 
while listening to this piece. (Means and standard deviations displayed in Table 10.2, in 
Appendix 2).  
 
7.5.3.2 Fear/anger piece: 
The two induced emotions with the highest ratings after listening to the Fear/ Anger 
piece were Anxious, and Triumphant, with means above 1.0; followed by: Admiring, 
Irritated, and Sad, with ratings between 0.51 and 0.98. The perceived emotions with the 
highest ratings were: Fear, Pride, Anger and Melancholy. (Table 10.3 in Appendix 2 
shows the means and standard deviations for all the items). This finding suggests that a 
large proportion of participants experienced this piece of music as expressive of “pride” 
and “power”, and this corresponded to the experience of feeling “strong” or 
“triumphant” themselves, rather than scared or irritated.  
The analysis of the most frequently reported Subjective Feelings and Action 
Tendencies also shows that some participants felt predominantly negative affective 
states, whereas other felt more positive ones. (See table 10.4, in Appendix 2 for means 
and standard deviations).  
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7.5.3.3 Joy piece: 
In line with the prediction, the induced emotions with highest ratings after listening to 
the Joy piece were: Happy, Triumphant, and Soothed. The next ones were: Mellowed, 
Admiring, and Transcendent (all with mean scores above 1.0). The perceived emotions 
with highest mean scores, (above 1.0) for this piece were: Joy, Peacefulness, Tenderness 
and Spirituality. (Table 10.5 in Appendix 2 presents the means and standard deviations).  
An analysis of the answers to the Subjective Feelings & Action Tendencies 
questionnaire confirms that the participants experienced mostly positive affective states 
while listening to this piece. (See Table 10.6, in Appendix 2 for means and standard 
deviations). 
 
It can be concluded, from the analyses presented above, that the three experimental 
stimuli were successful at expressing and inducing the target emotions.  
 
7.5.4 Manipulation Check II: Do Reports of Perceived and Induced 
Emotions Correlate? 
An essential condition for establishing that emotional contagion in music has occurred is 
that listeners’ reports of perceived and induced emotions while listening to music 
should be coherent. This condition is largely supported by the data: in all three pieces, 
the participants reported experiencing corresponding perceived and induced emotions. 
Overall, the Spearman correlation coefficients range from .20 to .69 (median = .45,  
all p values < .005). (See tables 10.7, 10.8 and 10.9 in Appendix 2 for summaries of the 
correlation analyses).  
 
7.5.5 Test of Hypothesis 1: Did the Participants in the Simulation 
Groups Experience More Intense Induced Emotions? 
Testing Hypotheses 1A, 1B and 1C involves establishing which were the most intensely 
induced and perceived affective states for each piece; to this end, I created the new 
following set of dependent variables: 
 Most Intense Induced Emotion: the highest score for each participant in the 
questionnaire of Induced Emotions, regardless of the type of emotion.  
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 Most Intense Induced Affect: in this case, I also included the ratings of induced 
core affect. I created this variable because I observed that some participants 
rated their emotional experience by using items related to core affect (e.g. 
“pleasant”) rather than using items related to discrete emotions (e.g. 
“mellowed”, “soothed” or “happy”). 
 Most Intense Action Tendency: the highest score for each participant in the 
questionnaire of Subjective Feelings & Action Tendencies. 
 Most Intense Perceived Emotion: the highest score reported by each participant 
in the questionnaire of perceived emotions, regardless of the type of emotion.  
 Most Intense Perceived Affect: In this case, I included the ratings of perceived 
affect. (The rationale for creating this variable is the same as for creating the 
“most intense induced affect” variable). 
Since none of these dependent variables were normally distributed, I used the non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test to compare the group means. Furthermore, as follow-up 
analyses, I also used this type of test to determine the effect of the simulation 
manipulation on the participants’ reports of core affect, and on the scores of the 
induced, perceived emotions, subjective feelings and action tendencies with the highest 
mean ratings (as described in the section 7.4.3). In order to control for the probability of 
making Type I errors, in all of these statistical tests, the Bonferroni correction was 
applied to the p-values in all the post-hoc comparisons. 
 
7.5.5.1 Sadness/tenderness piece: 
When examining the most intense affective states the prediction made in Hypothesis 1A 
is partially observed: the Motor Simulation group had slightly higher, but not statistically 
significant scores in almost all of these measures: Most Intense Induced Discrete 
Emotion, Most Intense Perceived Affect, Most Intense Perceived Discrete Emotion, and 
Most Intense Action Tendency (all p-values > .05). In contrast, the prediction is not 
observed in the Vocal Simulation group. Contrary to expectation, this group had the 
lowest scores in all of these dependent measures.  
Also contrary to the prediction made in Hypothesis 1B, the Distracting Task group did 
not have the lowest scores of all groups, on the contrary, this group had some of the 
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highest scores in these measures, although the differences with the other groups are 
not large enough to be statistically significant. 
Regarding Hypothesis 1C, which predicted that the Stationary group’s scores would 
fall between the scores of the Simulation groups and the Distracting Task groups, the 
observed trend supports the prediction in the case of induced states, but not in the case 
of the measures related to perception, where the Stationary group had the highest 
scores of all (all p-values > .005). (The means, standard deviations and standard errors 
are displayed in Table 7.5, and the results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests in table 7.9).  
The follow-up analyses of the effects of simulation on the participants’ induced 
discrete emotions yield a similar pattern of results.  
In line with Hypothesis 1A, the Motor Simulation group had slightly higher scores of 
feeling Mellowed, Transcendent, and Sad. The Vocal Simulation group presented the 
lowest scores of feeling Mellowed, Soothed, Nostalgic, Transcendent, and Sad. The 
difference is significant in the case of Mellowed, where the Vocal Simulation group had 
lower scores than the Motor Simulation group H(3) = 9.20, p = .019 (r = .38). 
The Distracting Task group only showed the trend expected from Hypothesis 1B (i.e. 
lowest scores) in the ratings of induced Nostalgia; and the Stationary group displayed 
the predicted trend in Hypothesis 1C in all of these measures, except on ratings of 
Induced Nostalgia, where it had the same scores as the Motor Simulation group, and 
ratings of Induced Happiness, where it had the lowest.  
Regarding the measures of perceived affective states, the Kruskal-Wallis tests do not 
yield a pattern of results coherent with the hypotheses. Thus, as could be expected from 
Hypothesis 1A, the Motor Simulation group had significantly higher scores of perceived 
Tenderness H(3) = 12.76 than the other groups: Vocal simulation p = .015, (r = .038), 
Stationary p = .024 (r = 0.36); and Distracting Task p = .028 (r = .36). (The Motor 
Simulation group also had the highest scores of perceived Spirituality and Melancholy, 
p’s > 0.05). Contrary to the expectation, the Vocal Simulation group had the lowest 
scores of perceived Peacefulness, Melancholy, Spirituality and Tenderness.  
The only cases where the Distracting Task group had the predicted lowest ratings 
were Perceived Longing, and Spirituality (Hypothesis 1B) (p’s > 0.05); and the Stationary 
group did not display mean scores that fell between the other groups’ (Hypothesis 1C). 
(See table 7.7 for means and standard deviations). 
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Regarding the participants’ reports of core-affect (valence, tense arousal and 
energetic arousal) the Kruskal-Wallis tests yields no significant differences between the 
groups. The observed trend was the following: both simulation groups had the lowest 
scores of Valence, while the Distracting Task group had the highest. The Motor 
Simulation group had the lowest scores of Tense Arousal (i.e. feeling more tension), 
while the Distracting Task had the highest (i.e. feeling more relaxed). The Stationary 
group had the lowest scores of Energetic Arousal (i.e. feeling more sleepy), while the 
Motor Simulation group had the highest (i.e. feeling more awake). (Table 7.6 displays 
the means and standard deviations). 
Finally, the Kruskal-Wallis tests for the ratings of subjective feelings and action 
tendencies are consistent with the ratings of core-affect: the Motor Simulation group 
had significantly higher scores of Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer than 
participants in the Stationary group H(3) = 10.28 p = .043 (r = .34); and participants in 
the Distracting Task group had significantly higher scores of Feeling-in-command-of-the-
situation than the Stationary group H(3) = 11.41 p = .006 (r = .42). (See table 7.8 for 
means and standard deviations). 
 
Table 7.5 Most intense induced and perceived affective states in Sadness/Tenderness 
piece, as a function of listening condition 
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Table 7.6 Core affect in Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a function of listening condition 
 
 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Mean 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Induced  
Valence  
Vocal Simulation 1.61 1.09 1.21 2.01 
Motor Simulation 1.61 1.41 1.74 2.78 
Distracting Task 2.23 1.50 1.68 2.78 
Stationary 1.97 1.74 1.33 2.61 
Induced 
Tense Arousal  
Vocal Simulation 1.65 1.20 1.21 2.08 
Motor Simulation 2.19 1.47 1.65 2.73 
Distracting Task 2.52 1.29 2.04 2.99 
Stationary 2.13 1.71 1.50 2.76 
Induced  
Energetic Arousal  
Vocal Simulation 0.13 1.52 -0.43 0.69 
Motor Simulation 0.26 1.24 -0.20 0.71 
Distracting Task 0.06 2.10 -0.70 0.83 
Stationary -0.32 1.49 -0.87 0.22 
 
167 
 
 
 
Table 7.7 Most frequently reported induced and perceived discrete emotions in 
Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a function of listening condition 
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Table 7.8 Most frequently reported subjective feelings in Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a 
function of listening condition  
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Figure 7.3 Means ratings of most intense induced and perceived affective states in 
Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a function of listening condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Mean ratings of core affect in Sadness/Tenderness piece as a function of 
listening condition. 
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Figure 7.5 Mean ratings of the most frequently induced and perceived discrete emotions 
in Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a function of listening condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Mean ratings of subjective feelings in Sadness / Tenderness piece, as a 
function of listening condition. 
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Table 7.9 Kruskal-Wallis test of most intense induced and perceived affects in 
Sadness/Tenderness piece 
 
 
7.5.5.2 Fear/anger Piece: 
Hypothesis 1A predicted that the simulation groups would have higher scores of 
induced and perceived emotions than the rest. This prediction is partially observed in 
the data, but the Kruskal-Wallis tests did not yield any significant differences between 
the groups in any of these dependent measures (all p-values > .005): the Motor 
Simulation group had the highest scores of Most Intense Induced Affect, and Most 
Intense Induced Discrete Emotion. Once more, the Vocal Simulation group showed a 
trend which was opposite to the prediction, with the lowest scores of Most Intense 
Induced Affect, Most Intense Induced Discrete Emotion, and Most Intense Action 
Tendency.  
Hypothesis 1B predicted that the Distracting Task group would have the lowest mean 
scores is observed in two of the measures, but these differences are non-significant. 
The prediction made in Hypothesis 1C is observed in most the cases, the Stationary 
group had scores that were between those of the Simulation group and the Distracting 
Task group in most of the measures. However, there were not any significant differences 
between the groups in these ratings. (See table 7.10 for means and standard deviations, 
and Table 7.14 for the results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests).  
The follow-up analyses of the participants’ ratings of discrete emotions shows that 
the participants in the Motor Simulation group condition tended to feel more intensely 
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those emotions that have to do with feeling empowered: they reported slightly higher 
ratings of feeling Triumphant, Admiring and Irritated, and Perceived Anger (but also of 
Perceived Melancholy). These differences are marginally significant in the case of 
Triumphant ratings H(3) = 9.14, p = .061. 
Contrary to what could be expected from Hypothesis 1A, the Vocal Simulation group 
had the lowest scores of Induced Anxious, Induced Admiration, Perceived Anger, 
Perceived Melancholy, Perceived Spirituality and Perceived Fear, where it had 
significantly lower scores than the Stationary group H(3) = 10.42 p = .036 (r= .35). 
Also contrary to what was expected from Hypothesis 1B, the Distracting Task group 
did not display the lowest ratings in any of these dependent measures. The prediction 
from Hypothesis 1C is not observed in the data either. Interestingly, the mean ratings of 
Perceived Fear in the Stationary group were significantly higher than in the Motor 
Simulation group H(3) = 10.42 p = .041 (r= .34). (See Table 7.12 for means and standard 
deviations).  
The analysis of the ratings of core-affect yielded no significant differences between 
the groups. The observed trend was the following: the Motor Simulation group had the 
highest mean scores of Valence, and the Stationary group had the lowest. The lowest 
scores of Tense Arousal were found in the Stationary group (i.e. they felt more tense), 
and the highest in the Vocal Simulation group (i.e. they felt more relaxed). The highest 
scores of Energetic Arousal were observed in the Motor Simulation group (i.e. they felt 
more awake), and the lowest in the Distracting Task group (i.e. they felt more drowsy). 
(Table 7.11 summarizes the means and standard deviations information). 
The results from the Subjective Feelings & Action Tendencies questionnaire confirms 
the finding that the participants in the Stationary group had the most negative 
experience of all the groups, and suggests that this was probably because the instruction 
of staying still while listening to this piece of music made them feel “helpless”. The 
Stationary group had lower scores of Feeling-in-command-of-the-situation than the 
Distracting Task group H(3) = 10.83 p = .022 (r = .37); higher scores of Wanting-to-avoid-
the-situation than the Vocal Simulation group H(3) = 9.61 p = .029 (r = .36); higher scores 
of Needing-to-be-comforted than the Vocal Simulation group H(3) = 12.15 p = .003  
(r = .44); and marginally higher scores of Wanting-to-hide than the Vocal Simulation 
group H(3) = 8.22 p = .053. (Table 7.13 presents the means and standard deviations).  
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Table 7.10 Most intense induced and perceived affective states in Fear / Anger piece, as 
a function of listening condition  
 
 
Table 7.11 Core affect in Fear/Anger piece, as a function of listening condition 
 
  
 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mean 
Std. 
Error Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Most Intense 
Induced Affect  
Vocal Simulation 2.74 0.16 2.41 3.07 
Motor Simulation 3.06 0.16 2.74 3.39 
Distracting Task 2.90 0.18 2.53 3.27 
Stationary 3.03 0.15 2.73 3.34 
Most Intense 
Induced Discrete 
Emotion 
Vocal Simulation 2.55 0.16 2.22 2.87 
Motor Simulation 2.84 0.18 2.47 3.21 
Distracting Task 2.68 0.19 2.29 3.06 
Stationary 2.61 0.18 2.25 2.98 
 Most Intense 
Action Tendency  
Vocal Simulation 2.77 0.17 2.41 3.13 
Motor Simulation 2.97 0.15 2.66 3.27 
Distracting Task 3.06 0.14 2.78 3.35 
Stationary 3.13 0.15 2.82 3.44 
Most Intensely 
Perceived Affect  
Vocal Simulation 3.52 0.11 3.29 3.75 
Motor Simulation 3.55 0.11 3.32 3.78 
Distracting Task 3.39 0.15 3.08 3.70 
Stationary 3.74 0.09 3.55 3.93 
Most Intensely 
Perceived Discrete 
Emotion 
Vocal Simulation 3.19 0.16 2.87 3.51 
Motor Simulation 3.35 0.12 3.08 3.63 
Distracting Task 3.19 0.17 2.82 3.57 
Stationary 3.58 0.15 3.33 3.83 
 
  
95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Induced Valence  
Vocal Simulation -0.16 0.34 -0.86 0.54 
Motor Simulation -0.23 0.33 -0.89 0.44 
Distracting Task -0.55 0.35 -1.26 0.16 
Stationary -0.77 0.35 -1.48 -0.07 
Induced Tense 
Arousal  
Vocal Simulation -1.06 0.31 -1.69 -0.44 
Motor Simulation -1.23 0.34 -1.92 -0.53 
Distracting Task -1.10 0.40 -1.91 -0.28 
Stationary -1.39 0.35 -2.09 -0.68 
Induced Energetic 
Arousal  
Vocal Simulation 1.61 0.25 1.10 2.13 
Motor Simulation 2.16 0.23 1.70 2.63 
Distracting Task 1.52 0.25 1.00 2.03 
Stationary 1.84 0.21 1.40 2.27 
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Table 7.12 Most frequently reported induced and perceived discrete emotions in Fear/ 
Anger piece, as a function of listening condition 
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Table 7.13 Most Frequently reported subjective feelings in Fear/ Anger piece, as a 
function of listening condition  
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Figure 7.7 Means ratings of most intense induced and perceived affective states in Fear/ 
Anger piece, as a function of listening condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Mean ratings of core affect in Fear/ Anger piece, as a function of listening 
condition. 
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Figure 7.9 Mean ratings of induced and discrete emotions in Fear / Anger piece, as a 
function of listening condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10 Mean ratings of subjective feelings in Fear/Anger piece, as a function of 
listening condition. 
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Table 7.14 Kruskal-Wallis test of most intense induced and perceived affects in Fear / 
Anger piece 
 
 
7.5.5.3 Joy piece: 
The trends predicted from Hypotheses 1A, 1B and 1C are not observed in the data: the 
Motor Simulation group had the highest mean scores only in one of the dependent 
variables; the Vocal Simulation group had the lowest scores in all the dependent 
measures; the Distracting Task group did not have the lowest mean scores in any of 
these variables; and the Stationary group did not have the expected intermediate scores 
either. The Kruskal-Wallis tests indicate that there were no significant differences 
between the groups in any of these dependent measures. (Table 7.15 displays the 
means and standard deviations, and Table 7.19 displays the results of the Kruskal-Wallis 
tests).  
The follow-up analyses of ratings of the most frequently reported discrete emotions 
yield results that do not completely coincide with the predictions either. Just like what 
could be expected from Hypothesis 1A, the Motor Simulation group had the highest 
scores in ratings of Triumphant (along with the Vocal Simulation group), and Admiring, 
and of perceived Joy, Tenderness, and Spirituality. The Vocal Simulation group, in 
contrast, had the lowest mean scores of all groups in ratings of: induced Happy, 
Soothed, and Mellowed; and of perceived Joy, Tenderness, and Spirituality. The 
differences are significant in the case of Induced Soothed, where the Vocal Simulation 
group had significantly lower scores than the Distracting Task group H(3) = 8.46 p = .039 
(r = .35); and in the case of Perceived Spirituality, where it had significantly lower scores 
than the Motor Simulation group H(3) = 9.08 p = .023 (r = .37). (See Table 7.17 for means 
and standard deviations). 
Dependent Variable df Test Statistic Sig. 
Most Intense Induced Affect 3 2.32 .510 
Most Intense Induced Discrete Emotion 3 1.76 .624 
Most Intense Action Tendency 3 2.76 .431 
Most Intensely Perceived Affect 3 3.83 .281 
Most Intensely Perceived Discrete Emotion 3 4.00 .261 
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The analyses of the scores of core affect, yielded significant differences in Tense 
Arousal H(3) = 11.17, where the participants in the Vocal Simulation group reported 
feeling less relaxed than the participants in the Distracting Task group p = .006 (r = .42). 
(Means and standard deviations in Table 7.16). 
Finally, the pattern of results from the Subjective Feelings and Action Tendencies 
questionnaire is partially coherent with the hypotheses. As could be expected from 
Hypothesis 1A, The Motor Simulation group had the highest scores of Wanting-to-
dance, Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, Wanting-to-understand-more, 
Wanting-to-jump-around, and Feeling-like-laughing. Contrary to the prediction, the 
Vocal Simulation group had the lowest scores in all of the dependent variables, except in 
Wanting-to-understand-more. These differences between the groups are significant in 
Feeling-like-everything-is-fine H(3) = 11.11 and in Wanting-to-dance H(3) = 16.72. In the 
case of Feeling-like-everything-is-fine, the Vocal Simulation group had lower scores than 
the Motor Simulation group p = .035 (r =.35), the Stationary group p = .031 (r = .36) and 
the Distracting Task group p = .020 (r = .37). In the case of Wanting-to-dance, the Vocal 
Simulation group had lower scores than the Stationary group p = .025 (r = .36), and the 
Motor Simulation group p = .001 (r = .49).  
Contrary to what could be expected from Hypothesis 1B, the Distracting Task group 
did not have the lowest scores in any of the variables. And finally, consistent with 
Hypothesis 1C, the Stationary group had intermediate scores in several variables, but 
these differences were nonsignificant. (Means and standard deviations in Table 7.18). 
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Table 7.15 Most intense induced and perceived affective states in Joy piece, as a function 
of listening condition 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.16 Core affect in Joy piece as a function of listening condition 
    95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Mean Std 
Deviation 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper Bound 
Most Intense Induced 
Affect  
Vocal Simulation 3.06 0.73 2.80 3.33 
Motor Simulation 3.19 0.87 2.87 3.51 
Distracting Task 3.35 0.71 3.09 3.62 
Stationary 3.39 0.92 3.05 3.72 
Most Intense Induced 
Discrete Emotion 
Vocal Simulation 2.68 0.87 2.36 3.00 
Motor Simulation 3.03 0.84 2.73 3.34 
Distracting Task 3.10 0.83 2.79 3.40 
Stationary 3.16 1.04 2.78 3.54 
Most Intense Action 
Tendency  
Vocal Simulation 3.00 0.69 2.69 3.31 
Motor Simulation 3.29 0.64 3.05 3.53 
Distracting Task 3.29 0.82 2.99 3.59 
Stationary 3.29 0.74 3.02 3.56 
Most Intensely 
Perceived Affect  
Vocal Simulation 3.32 0.65 3.08 3.56 
Motor Simulation 3.39 0.67 3.14 3.63 
Distracting Task 3.48 0.77 3.20 3.77 
Stationary 3.58 0.67 3.33 3.83 
Most Intensely 
Perceived Discrete 
Emotion 
Vocal Simulation 3.00 0.89 2.67 3.33 
Motor Simulation 3.16 0.82 2.86 3.46 
Distracting Task 3.03 0.87 2.71 3.35 
Stationary 3.06 1.00 2.70 3.43 
 
  95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Induced Valence  
Vocal Simulation 2.48 0.89 2.16 2.81 
Motor Simulation 2.61 0.84 2.30 2.92 
Distracting Task 2.68 1.22 2.23 3.13 
Stationary 2.97 1.11 2.56 3.37 
Induced Tense 
Arousal 
Vocal Simulation 1.23 1.43 0.70 1.75 
Motor Simulation 1.97 1.05 1.58 2.35 
Distracting Task 2.32 1.47 1.78 2.86 
Stationary 1.97 1.54 1.40 2.53 
Induced Energetic 
Arousal 
Vocal Simulation 2.16 1.59 1.58 2.75 
Motor Simulation 2.58 1.39 2.07 3.09 
Distracting Task 2.10 1.37 1.59 2.60 
Stationary 2.39 1.26 1.93 2.85 
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Table 7.17 Most frequently reported induced and perceived discrete emotions in Joy 
piece, as a function of listening condition 
 
  
  95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean 
    
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Happy 
Vocal Simulation 2.35 0.95 2.01 2.70 
Motor Simulation 2.77 0.92 2.44 3.11 
Distracting Task 2.74 0.96 2.39 3.10 
Stationary 2.87 1.20 2.43 3.31 
Triumphant 
Vocal Simulation 1.77 1.20 1.33 2.22 
Motor Simulation 1.77 1.26 1.31 2.24 
Distracting Task 1.74 1.24 1.29 2.20 
Stationary 1.48 1.46 0.95 2.02 
Soothed 
Vocal Simulation 1.19 0.83 0.89 1.50 
Motor Simulation 1.55 0.77 1.27 1.83 
Distracting Task 1.90 1.11 1.50 2.31 
Stationary 1.42 1.26 0.96 1.88 
Mellowed 
Vocal Simulation 1.19 0.95 0.85 1.54 
Motor Simulation 1.26 1.06 0.87 1.65 
Distracting Task 1.65 1.28 1.18 2.11 
Stationary 1.58 0.99 1.22 1.94 
Admiring 
Vocal Simulation 1.00 1.10 0.60 1.40 
Motor Simulation 1.84 1.21 1.39 2.28 
Distracting Task 1.39 1.15 0.97 1.81 
Stationary 1.35 1.31 0.88 1.83 
Perceived  
Joy 
Vocal Simulation 2.45 1.06 2.06 2.84 
Motor Simulation 2.87 1.06 2.48 3.26 
Distracting Task 2.81 0.95 2.46 3.15 
Stationary 2.81 1.17 2.38 3.23 
Perceived  
Peacefulness 
Vocal Simulation 1.35 1.02 0.98 1.73 
Motor Simulation 1.97 1.14 1.55 2.39 
Distracting Task 2.03 1.25 1.57 2.49 
Stationary 1.42 1.43 0.89 1.94 
Perceived  
Tenderness  
Vocal Simulation 1.10 0.79 0.81 1.39 
Motor Simulation 1.68 1.19 1.24 2.12 
Distracting Task 1.58 1.15 1.16 2.00 
Stationary 1.19 1.14 0.78 1.61 
Perceived  
Spirituality 
Vocal Simulation 0.84 1.19 0.40 1.27 
Motor Simulation 1.61 1.15 1.19 2.03 
Distracting Task 1.00 1.13 0.59 1.41 
Stationary 1.03 0.91 0.70 1.37 
Perceived  
Longing 
Vocal Simulation 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.37 
Motor Simulation 0.77 0.92 0.44 1.11 
Distracting Task 2.45 1.06 2.06 2.84 
Stationary 2.87 1.06 2.48 3.26 
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Table 7.18 Most Frequently reported subjective feelings in Joy piece, as a function of 
listening condition 
 
 
 
 
 
    95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Wanting to dance 
Vocal Simulation 1.13 1.12 0.72 1.54 
Motor Simulation 2.45 1.06 2.06 2.84 
Distracting Task 1.68 1.45 1.15 2.21 
Stationary 2.13 1.45 1.60 2.66 
Feeling like everything 
is fine 
Vocal Simulation 2.09 0.81 1.73 2.45 
Motor Simulation 2.81 0.95 2.46 3.15 
Distracting Task 2.84 1.00 2.47 3.21 
Stationary 2.81 1.01 2.43 3.18 
Wanting to make the 
experience longer 
Vocal Simulation 1.55 1.14 1.04 2.05 
Motor Simulation 2.58 1.18 2.15 3.01 
Distracting Task 2.10 1.58 1.52 2.68 
Stationary 2.13 1.38 1.62 2.64 
Wanting to understand 
more 
Vocal Simulation 1.95 1.17 1.43 2.48 
Motor Simulation 2.32 1.25 1.86 2.78 
Distracting Task 2.06 1.31 1.58 2.55 
Stationary 1.71 1.37 1.21 2.21 
Feeling in command of 
the situation 
Vocal Simulation 1.45 0.91 1.05 1.86 
Motor Simulation 1.45 1.21 1.01 1.89 
Distracting Task 2.29 1.10 1.89 2.69 
Stationary 1.68 1.33 1.19 2.16 
Wanting to jump 
around 
Vocal Simulation 1.23 1.15 0.72 1.74 
Motor Simulation 1.97 1.40 1.45 2.48 
Distracting Task 1.52 1.39 1.01 2.03 
Stationary 1.71 1.47 1.17 2.25 
Feeling like laughing 
Vocal Simulation 1.05 1.05 0.58 1.51 
Motor Simulation 1.81 1.17 1.38 2.23 
Distracting Task 1.42 1.23 0.97 1.87 
Stationary 1.71 1.40 1.20 2.22 
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Figure 7.11 Means ratings of most intense induced and perceived affective states in Joy 
piece, as a function of listening condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12 Mean ratings of core affect in Joy piece, as a function of listening condition. 
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Figure 7.13 Mean ratings of the most frequently induced and perceived discrete 
emotions in Joy piece, as a function of listening condition. 
 
 
Figure 7.14 Mean ratings of subjective feelings in Joy piece, as a function of listening 
condition. 
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Table 7.19 Kruskal-Wallis test of most intense induced and perceived affects in Joy piece 
 
 
7.5.6 Test of Hypothesis 1D: Did Any Covariates Significantly 
Mediate the Results? 
In this section, I analyse the potential role of several covariates in the observed results, 
starting with the hypothesised positive mediating role that the ability of participants to 
play an instrument present in the piece would have on the dependent measures 
(Hypothesis 1D); and continuing with the other variables included in the post-
experimental questionnaire. 
Importantly, even though the assumption of normality was not met in most of the 
dependent variables, I used MANCOVA tests, which have been shown to be robust to 
these type of violations (Finch, 2005). As strategies to reduce the probability of making a 
Type I error, I first ran MANCOVA tests for all the dependent variables including all of 
the covariates, and then ran confirmatory ANCOVAs including only those covariates 
which the MANCOVA analyses identified as significant. The aims of doing this additional 
step were avoiding overfitting the regression models with nonsignificant variables, and 
ensuring that the Beta coefficients were not “inflated” by spurious correlations with 
other predictors. Additionally, in all the analyses I used Bootstrapping (set to 1000 
iterations) to calculate the confidence intervals, I applied the Benjamini-Hochberg 
correction for multiple comparisons (Thissen, Steinberg, & Kuang, 2002), and I applied 
the Bonferroni correction to the p-values in the post-hoc tests.  
  
Dependent Variable df Test Statistic Sig. 
Most Intense Induced Affect 3 5.03 .170 
Most Intense Induced Discrete Emotion 3 7.25 .640 
Most Intense Action Tendency 3 3.32 .344 
Most Intensely Perceived Affect 3 3.93 .270 
Most Intensely Perceived Discrete Emotion 3 .585 .900 
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The covariates included in the tests were: 
 Extent to which the participant is able to play a musical instrument present 
in the musical piece. (The information provided by the participants about 
which instruments they can play was coded as an ordinal variable: not being 
able to play any instrument = 0; being able to play an instrument not 
present in the piece = 1; being able to play an instrument from the same 
category of instruments as those present in the piece = 2; being able to play 
an instrument present in the piece = 3). 
 Musical Engagement, 
 Enjoyment of the piece,  
 Familiarity with the piece, 
 Ratings of Perceived Difficulty in following the instructions for the task, 
 Ratings of Embarrassment experienced when carrying out the task, 
 Scores in each sub-scale from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index: Fantasy, 
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Perspective Taking. 
The dependent variables were the same ones as analysed in the previous section: 
ratings of most intense induced and perceived affective states (including action 
tendencies), ratings of core affect, and ratings of the induced and perceived discrete 
emotions with the highest mean scores. 
In order to test the assumption of independence of the covariates and the 
independent variable, I ran ANOVA tests (and Kruskal-Wallis tests where the normality 
assumption was not met) with Condition as IV, and the scores of each covariate as DV. 
As can be seen in Table 7.20, several of these covariates violate the assumption: the 
ratings of Difficulty and Embarrassment suggest that the participants in the simulation 
groups found the experimental task harder and felt more awkward doing it than 
participants in the other groups. Also, the ratings of Enjoyment also suggest that at least 
in the case of the Sadness/Tenderness piece, the Vocal Simulation group found the 
experience significantly less enjoyable than the other groups. 
Since the assumption of independence of the covariates and the independent 
variable is an interpretational, but not a statistical requirement (Field, 2013, p. 486), I 
proceeded to carry out the MANCOVA tests, keeping in consideration the identified 
biases in the results. 
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Table 7.20 Results of analysis of the assumption of independence of covariates and 
independent variables  
 
 
7.5.6.1 Effect of being able to play an instrument present in the piece: 
Hypothesis 1D predicted that the more a participant can play an instrument present in 
the piece, the more intense his or her affective experience. This prediction was not 
supported by the data in any of the dependent variables. (See table 7.21 for a summary 
of the regression analyses). Moreover, the only cases where the MANCOVA tests 
indicate that this variable explains a significant part of the variance are the ratings of 
Most Intense Induced Discrete Emotion and Induced Triumph in the Joy piece, where 
contrary to the prediction, the Beta coefficients indicate negative correlations between 
the variables (-.14 and -.21, correspondingly). 
The conclusion that being able to play an instrument present in the piece did not 
make any significant contribution to the results is valid even if the analysis is restricted 
to the participants in the Motor Simulation group condition, where the effect should 
have been more marked. Additional evidence for this conclusion is the finding that in 
the Motor Simulation group, the only significant correlation between participants’ 
reports of having-the-habit-of-pretending-to-play-the-instruments-they-listen and the 
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dependent variables is observed in the Sadness/Tenderness piece, where this variable 
correlates negatively with ratings of Difficulty (Rho = -.40, p = .028). Similarly, in the 
Vocal Simulation group, the participants’ ratings of having-the-habit-of-singing-along-to-
music only correlates significantly with ratings of Difficulty in the same piece (Rho = -.55, 
p = .010). 
 
7.5.7 Effect of Other Covariates on the Participants’ Affective 
Experience  
7.5.7.1 Sadness/Tenderness Piece: 
While the initial MANCOVA tests indicate the presence of several significant covariates, 
applying the Benjamini-Hochberg correction makes the p-values nonsignificant, except 
in the case of ratings of Enjoyment, which explained a significant portion of the variance 
in 9 out of the 19 examined dependent variables: Most Intense Action Tendency, Most 
Intense Perceived Discrete Emotion, Induced Soothed, Perceived Peacefulness, Perceived 
Tenderness, Perceived Spirituality, Valence, Tense Arousal, and Energetic Arousal. All of 
the regression models for these variables suggest that the more participants enjoyed the 
piece, the more they experienced these affective states. 
Importantly, controlling for the ratings of Enjoyment makes the main effect of the 
independent variable (Listening Condition) nonsignificant for all the dependent 
variables. In other words, the MANCOVA test yields no significant differences between 
the groups in any of these measures.  
 
7.5.7.2 Fear/Anger Piece: 
The results of the confirmatory MANCOVA test indicate that ratings of Enjoyment 
predict significant portions of the variance in ratings of Induced Triumphant, Admiring, 
and Irritated, indicating that the more participants enjoyed the piece, the more they felt 
“triumphant, strong” and “filled with admiration”, and the less they enjoyed it, the more 
they felt “irritated, frustrated”.  
Ratings of Difficulty were also significant covariates for the scores of Most Intense 
Action Tendency: the more difficult the participants found the task, the stronger they 
felt the subjective feelings and action tendencies described in the questionnaire. 
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7.5.7.3 Joy piece: 
The results of the confirmatory MANCOVA test indicate that the most important 
covariate was Enjoyment, which has significant and positive correlations with all of the 
evaluated dependent variables. Curiously, in the case of Perceived Joy, the regression 
model also indicates that the more difficult the participants found the experimental 
task, the more they perceived the piece as expressive of Joy. 
As mentioned above, the ratings of Being-able-to-play-an-instrument-present-in-the-
piece were significant and negative predictors of Most Intense Discrete Emotion and 
Induced Triumphant, suggesting that the more the participants are able to play an 
instrument present in the piece, the less strong their induced emotions were, and 
particularly, their feelings of being “triumphant, strong”. 
 
In summary, the analyses reported in this section indicate that the most important 
covariate that mediated the results was by far the participants’ rating of enjoyment. 
Importantly, contrary to what could be expected from previous findings (Vuoskoski et 
al., 2012), these analyses also indicate that the participants’ scores in the empathy trait 
test (the Interactive Reactivity Index) were not significant predictors for any of the 
dependent variables. (Table 7.21 summarizes the regression models yielded by all the 
MANCOVA tests).  
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Table 7.21 Summary of regression analyses yielded by the MANCOVA tests 
 
*= p<.05, **= p<.001 
 
 
  
Dependent variable 
R 
squared 
Significant 
Predictors 
B  
coef-
ficient 
Sa
d
n
e
ss
/T
en
d
e
rn
e
ss
 p
ie
ce
 
Most Intense Action Tendency 0.20** Enjoyment 0.22* 
Ind. Soothed 0.24** Enjoyment 0.54* 
Most Intense Perceived Discrete Emotion 0.17** Enjoyment 0.15* 
 Perceived Peacefulness 0.21** Enjoyment 0.40* 
Perceived Tenderness 0.18** Enjoyment 0.29* 
Perceived Spirituality 0.13* Enjoyment 0.35* 
Ind. Valence 0.32** Enjoyment 0.76* 
Ind. Tense Arousal 0.26** Enjoyment 0.64* 
Ind. Energy Arousal 0.10* Enjoyment 0.41* 
Fe
a
r/
A
n
ge
r 
p
ie
ce
 
Ind. Triumphant 0.20** Enjoyment 0.40** 
Ind. Admiring 0.12* Enjoyment 0.31** 
Ind. Irritated 0.14* Enjoyment -0.29* 
Perceived Spirituality 0.14* Enjoyment 0.35* 
Most Intense Action Tendency 0.08* Difficulty 0.19* 
Jo
y 
P
ie
ce
 
Most Intense Action Tendency 0.17** Enjoyment 0.28* 
Most Intense Perceived Affect 0.14* Enjoyment 0.24** 
Most Intense Perceived Discrete Emotion 0.19** Enjoyment 0.38** 
Ind. Happy 0.35** Enjoyment 0.54* 
Ind. Soothed 0.19** Enjoyment 0.38* 
Ind. Admiring 0.19** Enjoyment 0.45* 
Perceived Joy 0.33** 
Enjoyment 0.48** 
Difficulty 0.27** 
Perceived Tenderness 0.13* Enjoyment 0.32* 
Ind. Valence 0.35** Enjoyment 0.58* 
Ind. Tense Arousal 0.21** Enjoyment 0.46* 
Ind. Energy Arousal 0.16* Enjoyment 0.51* 
Most Intense Induced Discrete Emotion 0.28** 
Enjoyment 0.40* 
Able play instrument -0.14* 
Ind. Triumphant 0.21** 
Enjoyment 0.51* 
Able play instrument  -0.21* 
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7.5.8 Effect of Experienced Arousal in the Participants’ Affective 
Experience  
The instructions to the participants in the Motor Simulation and Distracting Task 
conditions required them to make bodily movements, while the instructions to the other 
two conditions required the participants to stay still. Therefore, it is possible that the 
participants’ different levels of arousal (particularly of energetic arousal) might have 
influenced their affective experience with the music. Indeed, previous research has 
found that listeners’ arousal while listening to music can have a positive effect on the 
intensity and valence of the emotions they feel and perceive in music (Dibben, 2004). 
I examined this possibility by running Kruskal-Wallis tests with Tense Arousal and 
Energetic Arousal scores as dependent variables, and listening condition as independent 
variable. These tests indicate that there were no systematic differences between the 
groups in these scores (all p-values > .005). The only exception is the ratings of Tense 
Arousal in the Joy piece, where participants in the Vocal Simulation group reported 
feeling significantly less relaxed than participants in the Distracting Task group H(3) = 
11.17 p = .006. These analyses suggest that the above-presented results (such as the 
higher scores of the Motor Simulation group in several dependent measures), were not 
due to potential effects of the experimental manipulation on the participants’ 
experienced arousal. 
 
7.5.9 Test of Hypothesis 2: Visual Imagery While Listening to the 
Music 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the content of the participants’ answers to the question: 
“what went through your mind while you were listening to the music” would have the 
same emotional content as the perceived and induced emotions reported by 
participants26. I analysed the content of each participant’s narrative, and created two 
new categorical variables to indicate whether there was a coincidence between the 
content of the narrative, and the participant’s highest scores of perceived, and induced 
emotions, correspondingly. I assigned a value of 1 if the content of the narrative 
matched the highest perceived/ induced emotion, and a value of 0, if they did not.  
                                                            
26
 Since this question was formulated at the end of the experiment, in order to facilitate recall, I 
asked the participants to listen to a fragment of each piece before answering. The majority of the 
participants had no problem in remembering their thoughts and answering the question. 
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The hypothesis is supported by the data. As expected from the ambiguous expressive 
character of the music, in every piece the contents of the participants’ narratives can be 
categorised in terms of two or three emotions with similar levels of arousal, and 
sometimes of valence. Importantly, on many occasions the correspondence between 
the perceived emotion and the induced one is not one-to-one, but rather one-to-
several. In some cases, they choose highly related adjectives to rate their feelings (e.g. 
soothed, mellowed, and nostalgic), but on other occasions they choose contrasting ones 
(e.g. anxious, sad, and triumphant).  
In the Sadness/Tenderness piece, the overall coincidence rate between the 
participants’ ratings of perceived emotions and their narratives was of 84.68%, and of 
79.84% for their ratings of induced emotions. The most frequent themes in the 
participants’ narratives were: images of nostalgia, sadness and romanticism, (several of 
them mentioned Jane Austen’s books, for example), and calm images of spending time 
in the countryside.  
“I had a very vivid visual image of revisiting a time in my childhood, I felt 
transported to a time before my mother died. I am in the garden, playing, 
exploring the garden. […] Even though I could identify the notes and the key, I 
was concentrated in these images.” 
Participant whose highest ratings were perceived Longing = 4, perceived 
Spirituality = 4, perceived Tenderness = 4, Induced Sad = 4 and Induced 
Nostalgic = 4 
“I'm on a field with flowers, and the weather is nice. A soothing feeling. Pride & 
Prejudice [The movie]” 
Participant whose highest ratings were  
perceived Tenderness= 3, perceived Peacefulness = 3,  
induced Mellowed = 3, and induced Soothed = 3 
 
In the Fear /Anger piece, the correspondence rate between the ratings of perceived 
emotions and the content of the participants’ narratives was of 91.13%, and of 72.58% 
for the ratings of induced emotions. The participants’ narratives usually described 
imagery related to horror movies (e.g. the suspense of something bad going to happen, 
or images of being chased by an evil character), and epic scenes of war from movies 
such as Gladiator, Ben-Hur or Star Wars. 
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“I didn't like it. It was something was trying to chase me, to catch me, to hurt me. 
I saw the image of a murderer… An episode from The Simpsons, when Bart is 
going to be killed.” 
Participant whose highest ratings were perceived Fear =4,  
and induced Anxious = 4 
“I imagined volcanoes, dramatic scenes on a mountain top, the climax of a fight 
between superheroes, thunder in the background… A Wagner opera.” 
Participant whose highest ratings were  
perceived Pride = 3, and induced Triumphant = 3 
 
In the Joy piece, the coincidence rate between the participants’ ratings of perceived 
emotions and their narratives was of 77.42%, and of 69.35% for their ratings of induced 
emotions. The participants’ narratives featured three themes: fantastic characters such 
as leprechauns, fauns or hobbits merrily dancing; excitement, purposefulness or feelings 
of determination before an adventure; and medieval scenes of a community of busy 
people (in a market, for example). 
The main instrument being played by an animal, a pig, super happy, jumping 
around, a bit childish and unreal… Fantasia [the movie], there's a scene with 
dancing mushrooms and flowers. Going to carnivals as a little kid. 
Participant whose highest ratings were  
Positive Feelings = 3, and induced Happy = 3 
 
It felt quite adventurous, going to an adventure in a positive way. A group of 
people going out, going hiking. The Hobbit.  
Participant whose highest rating were perceived Positive feelings = 3,  
induced Triumphant = 4, and induced Happy = 3 
 
Interestingly, a few participants (between 4.84% and 7.26%) reported abstract 
images, ideas or colours, rather than narratives or autobiographical memories while 
listening to the music: 
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Calm, bright colours. 
Participant whose highest ratings in the Sad /Tender piece were  
perceived Longing = 4, perceived Positive Feelings = 4,  
induced Mellowed = 4 and induced Soothed = 4 
 
It felt cinematic… Creativity, exploration, adventure, positivity, discovery.  
Q/ Were there images in your mind? 
A/ No, it was more like ideas, abstract thoughts.  
Participant whose highest ratings in the Joy piece were  
perceived Joy, induced Mellowed = 3,  
induced Happy = 3, and induced Triumphant = 3 
 
Dread, negative emotions, helplessness. 
Participant whose highest ratings in the Fear/Anger piece were  
perceived Fear =3, perceived pride =3, and induced Anxious = 2 
 
It is important to note that while theories of embodied simulation assume that 
simulation is an implicit process (Barsalou, 2008), it could nevertheless be speculated 
that the more embodied simulation is active in a listener’ brain, the more he or she 
should evoke images of the musicians (or themselves) playing the music while listening 
to it. This type of imagery was present in the data, but it does not represent the majority 
of cases. In the Sadness/Tenderness piece, it was present in 14.52% of the narratives, in 
the Fear/Anger piece it was present in 8.87%; and in the Joy piece, it was in 16.13%. 
Some examples: 
 
The orchestra, their movements, the tension in the orchestra. 
Participant whose highest ratings in the Fear/Anger piece were Pride = 
3, and induced Triumphant = 3 
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Someone at the piano, and strings players around in a circle, in a practice space. 
Participant whose highest ratings in the Fear/Anger piece were 
perceived Longing = 3, Peacefulness = 3, Positive feelings = 3, 
and induced Relaxed = 3 
 
Cheerful, I imagined myself in a theatre, watching the orchestra playing the 
tune… [Also] A movie of a particular historical period. 
Participant whose highest rating in the Fear/Anger piece were perceived 
Joy, induced Mellowed = 4 and induced Happy = 4 
Finally, it should be noted that many participants commented that the pieces 
sounded like they belonged to movie soundtracks, so this might have contributed to 
evoking images of characters and stories in their minds. These images were not inspired 
by specific memories from specific movies, but from associations of the music with 
particular movie genres (horror, romantic movies, adventures, etc.). Indeed, there were 
low ratings of reported familiarity overall (mean = 0.25 in a scale from 0 to 3), and only 
one of the participants (out of 124) correctly guessed the movie which one of the pieces 
belonged to. 
 
7.6 Discussion 
This experiment provided the first empirical test of the role of embodied simulation in 
the phenomenon of emotional contagion with music. The discussion of this first 
experiment is focused on a methodological interpretation of the results. I elaborate the 
theoretical interpretation of the findings from this and the second experiment in the 
final section of the following chapter.  
7.6.1 Effect of Embodied Simulation 
The first hypothesis of this experiment, based on the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 2013b), 
predicted that the type of simulation involved in emotional contagion with music is an 
implicit mimicry of the melody. The second hypothesis, based on Scherer’s Multifactorial 
Process Model (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013), predicted that an implicit mimicry of the 
musicians’ gestures triggers the contagion response. Additionally, it was predicted that 
performing a distracting activity that involved activation of motor and vocal brain areas 
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would obstruct stimulation mechanisms and lead to more subdued affective responses 
in comparison (Niedenthal et al., 2005). 
The results give little support to any of these hypotheses (hypotheses 1A, 1B and 
1C). There were very few significant differences between the groups, suggesting that the 
experimental manipulation did not have strong effects on the participants’ emotional 
experience. This was particularly true in the case of the Vocal Simulation group, which in 
most of the dependent measures displayed an opposite trend to the predictions. 
Likewise, the results do not support the prediction that engaging in a distracting task 
would have a hampering effect on the participants’ affect. Moreover, individual 
differences in musical skills (such as the ability to play a musical instrument), and in 
listening habits that involve mimicking the music (such as doing “air-playing” or singing 
along) did not play a significant mediating role in the dependent measures (hypothesis 
1D). 
Does this mean that the participants’ bodily behaviour had nothing to do with their 
emotional experience? In other words, should these results be taken as supporting a 
“disembodied” view of musical experiences? Probably not. The responses from the 
questionnaires reveal for example, that in the Fear/Anger piece the participants in the 
Stationary condition, (who were asked to remain completely still while listening to this 
“threatening” music) felt significantly more scared than the participants in the other 
conditions; and at the same time, the participants in the Motor Simulation condition 
tended to feel more “triumphant, strong”, and to perceive the piece as more expressive 
of “pride, power” than the rest. Furthermore, the results of the Action Tendencies and 
Subjective Feelings questionnaire also indicated that the participants experienced 
several bodily urges while listening to the music.  
 How to account for the observed null results? A number of explanations can be 
proposed. The first and simplest interpretation, is that the experimental tasks did not 
create the intended conditions. The tasks were undeniably difficult, particularly in the 
simulation conditions: even though the participants had the chance to listen to the piece 
twice, it is still difficult to follow a piece of music and to pretend to play it, or to sing 
along to it if one has never heard it before. Furthermore, perhaps singing along with the 
music prevented the participants in the Vocal Simulation group from actually hearing 
the piece very well. Indeed, in spite of the fact that the regression analyses did not 
indicate that ratings of difficulty or embarrassment were significant predictors of most 
of the dependent measures, the spontaneous comments of several participants suggest 
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that they found the tasks too demanding (e.g. “I found it hard to hum along”… “I wasn’t 
sure of which instrument to mimic”), embarrassing (e.g. “I felt self-conscious of the 
humming”) or even tedious (e.g. “I found the [counting cubes] task pointless and 
boring”). Thus, it can be speculated that these experiences of difficulty, embarrassment, 
and boredom prevented the experimental manipulation to have full effect (see Table 
7.20).  
Second, in the case of the Distracting Task group, which did not exhibit the expected 
hampering effect, it is possible to speculate that the participants in this condition 
somehow entrained their movements to the music, and therefore the task facilitated 
their emotional engagement with the pieces, rather than prevented it. 
A third, more optimistic interpretation is that at least in the case of the Motor 
Simulation condition, the null results were due to lack of statistical power. The 
participants in this group displayed the predicted trend in 52% of the evaluated 
variables, suggesting that pretending to play the musical instruments that we listen to 
has a positive effect on the intensity of our emotional responses, but that this effect is 
very small, and therefore the statistical tests did not detect it. 
A fourth interpretation of the null results is that embodied simulation is a necessary, 
but not sufficient condition for the perception and induction of musical emotions. That 
is, even though it is probable that perceiving sounds as “music” involves embodied 
simulation mechanisms, the effects of this internal mimicry are restricted to facilitating 
the perceptual experience of sounds as organised, intentional, humanly-produced 
musical sounds (Launay, 2015; Leman & Maes, 2014). These effects however, do not 
extend to producing affective responses to the music. Consequently, emotional 
responses to music would only happen when these (implicitly or explicitly) mimicked 
physical gestures and sounds have some sort of emotional connotation or emotional 
relevance for the listener. The second experiment in this study (reported in the next 
chapter) explores this possibility. 
7.6.2 Effect of Visual Imagery 
The null effects of the experimental manipulation, along with an analysis of the answers 
of the participants to the question “what went through your mind while listening to the 
music?” suggest that semantic associations played a determinant role in the emotional 
experiences of the participants. This analysis shows that even the participants in the 
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simulation conditions, who were actively mimicking the music, evoked images and 
narratives, instead of imagining the musicians playing the music (as could perhaps be 
expected from the fact that they were engaged in a sort of imitation of the musicians). 
Moreover, those narratives and images usually resembled, or were associated with 
movie genres, or with particular films or TV dramas. While this could be due to the fact 
that in effect, the stimuli were taken from movie soundtracks, other research has found 
that cinematic references are a common way in which people report their experiences 
with music (e.g. Dibben & Herbert, in press; Tagg & Clarida, 2003). This tendency to 
associate music with movie soundtracks might be due to the fact that in our 
contemporary societies, acousmatic listening in multimedia contexts has become the 
default way of experiencing music. Thus, it would not be surprising to find that this 
aspect of people’s subjective experience with music should take precedence over the 
simulation of the gestures necessary to perform it, or of the melody of the piece. 
In summary, the analyses of the participants’ answers largely support hypothesis 2, 
which predicted a correspondence between the contents of the participants’ narratives 
and their scores in the questionnaires of perceived and induced emotions. However, my 
claim is not that the narratives and imagery evoked by the participants caused the 
reported perceived and induced emotions. Instead, based on the assumption that 
having an emotion involves representing a personally-relevant situation in multiple 
modes at the same time –physiological, cognitive, motivational, and experiential- (Clore 
& Ortony, 2013), my interpretation is that these narratives and imagery were 
components of the participants’ emotional reactions, not their primary cause. 
Furthermore, since I did not manipulate the participants’ imagery and associations with 
the music, it is impossible to determine whether the narratives and imagery produced 
the observed emotional responses, or the aroused emotional states triggered the 
evoked narratives and imagery.  
My claim is rather that both the participants’ emotional responses, and the 
narratives and imagery they evoked, were at least partially caused by another 
underlying mechanism: the activation of semantic knowledge while listening to the 
music. Support for this interpretation can be found in the observation that about 25% of 
the participants did not include any emotional terms or connotations in their answers to 
the above-mentioned open question, but they still chose the same emotional adjectives 
in the questionnaires as those participants who used this kind of terms in their answers. 
The second experiment from this study (reported in the next chapter) tests this 
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alternative explanation by asking the participants to read narratives about the musical 
pieces before listening to them. 
7.6.3 The Potential Mediating Role of Empathy 
The mediation analyses showed that enjoyment was the main covariate in the observed 
results. This variable predicted the induction of positive emotions when the participants 
liked the music, and the induction of negative emotions when the participants disliked 
it. This effect was more marked in the case of the Fear/Anger piece, where disliking or 
liking the music made the difference between feeling “anxious” or “irritated” vs. feeling 
“strong”, “proud”, or “triumphant”, which are probably better adjectives to describe 
pleasant reactions to this type of music than the traditional dichotomy scared / angry.  
The implication of this mediation role of enjoyment is that what we call “emotional 
contagion” does not correspond to mere mimicry, but to a more complex phenomenon 
that is mediated by factors such as aesthetic appraisals of the musical sounds. This 
observation parallels the conclusions of Hess & Fischer (2013, 2014) who have found 
that emotional mimicry and contagion are mediated by social affiliation considerations, 
such as the extent to which we like the person we observe. Hence, it can be speculated 
that a similar dynamic occurred in this experiment: perhaps at some level, the 
participants experienced the musical sounds as specifying a more or less abstract “social 
other” (Cochrane, 2010b; Launay, 2015), or perhaps the musical sounds simply evoked 
social affiliation connotations (e.g. “this sounds like the kind of music that people like 
me enjoy listening to”). In either case, the consequence of this social dimension of the 
experience with music is that the participants could only become infected by the 
emotion expressed by these virtual “social others” if they liked them, or if they 
perceived them as belonging to the same in-group. An interesting implication of this 
rationale is that musical emotional contagion could be better characterised as 
“empathy” rather than as mere “contagion”. A similar proposal has been recently made 
by Clarke, Vuoskoski and De Nora (Clarke, DeNora, & Vuoskoski, 2015), who suggest that 
rather than involving mimicry of expressive gestures, musical emotional contagion 
should be described as the “mirroring of contextualized emotions” (p. 9). This possibility 
is explored in experiment 2, reported in the next chapter. 
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8. The role of embodied simulation 
in emotional contagion with music, 
experiment 2: Simulation, extra-
musical information and empathy 
This experiment has three aims: first, it represents a further attempt to test the 
hypothesis that embodied simulation facilitates the perception and induction of musical 
emotions. Second, it examines the role that the activation of semantic information has 
in determining the type of perceived and induced emotions that listeners experience. 
Third, it explores the possibility that empathic responses are involved in the so-called 
“emotional contagion” with music phenomenon.  
8.1 New methodological strategy 
One of the main results of the experiment reported in the previous chapter (henceforth 
referred to as “experiment 1”) was that the participants in the Motor Simulation 
condition displayed the predicted trend in more than 50% of the dependent measures. 
This suggests that the null results might have been due to a combination of lack of 
statistical power (due to an insufficiently large sample size), and the difficulty and 
embarrassment that the participants in this condition experienced while performing the 
experimental task. With this in mind, I decided to carry out the present follow-up 
experiment focused on motor simulation, and to design it as a web-based experiment.  
Web-based experiments have been recently implemented in music and emotion 
studies successfully (e.g. Egermann, Nagel, Altenmüller, & Kopiez, 2009; Tesoriero & 
Rickard, 2012; Witek, Clarke, Wallentin, Kringelbach, & Vuust, 2014). This method has 
the advantage of allowing for the quick collection of data from large samples, reducing 
researcher bias, and crucially, eliminating the potentially embarrassing or distracting 
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presence of the experimenter. They also have several disadvantages, such as a lessening 
of experimental control, dropout of participants, and variability in the listening devices 
used by the participants doing the experiment (Egermann et al., 2009). The strategies 
implemented in the present study to overcome these difficulties are explained in the 
Methods section. 
Furthermore, an additional measure was adopted to counter the negative effect of 
the difficulty of the task. In this experiment, instead of asking the participants to pretend 
to play the musical instruments they hear by doing “air-playing”, or to engage in a 
distracting motor task, the participants were asked to only imagine themselves either as 
musicians playing the instruments, or as sound engineers evaluating the quality of the 
recording (a task designed to prevent the participants from simulating). The decision to 
use this methodological strategy is validated by findings from neuroimaging studies, 
which have concluded that imagining and planning motor actions activates the same 
brain areas as actually performing the movements both in everyday tasks (Jeannerod, 
1995; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999), and in musical ones (Bangert et al., 2006; Zatorre & 
Halpern, 2005). 
As in experiment 1, the first hypothesis of this study is that, compared to the 
participants who will perform the distracting task, the participants in the simulation 
condition will experience more intense perceived and induced emotions while listening 
to the music. Likewise, it is expected that this effect will be moderated by musical 
expertise, that is, those participants who can play an instrument present in the musical 
piece will experience more intense emotions than those who cannot (hypothesis 2). 
8.2 Revised hypotheses I: semantic associations 
The results from experiment 1 suggested that even though the material properties of 
the music were the main factor that drove the participants’ emotional experiences, this 
factor by itself could not explain all the observed variation in the data. Hence, I 
speculated that this variation could be at least partially accounted for by the activation 
of semantic concepts, which worked as internal “contexts” biasing the participants’ 
perception of emotions expressed by the music, and the type of emotions aroused in 
themselves. 
Constructionist theories of emotion such as Russell’s (2003) and Barrett’s (2006b) 
emphasise the central role that situational and internal contexts play in emotional 
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experiences. Unlike Basic Emotion theories, which explain emotions as resulting from 
activation of innate affective programs (Ekman, 1992; Panksepp, 2000), and unlike 
Appraisal theories, which emphasize explain emotions as driven by the evaluation of a 
new stimulus (Scherer, 2009a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), psychological constructionist 
theories propose that emotions emerge from the interaction of primitive psychological 
processes and the personal and situational context of the individual. 
Recently, Vuoskoski and Eerola carried out an experiment more directly aimed at 
testing the influence of extra-musical information on induced musical emotions 
(Vuoskoski & Eerola, 2013). They asked participants to listen to a piece of music that 
conveys sadness, after having read a sad narrative, a neutral narrative, or not having 
read any description. They found that compared to the other groups, participants who 
read the sad narrative showed more signs of induced sadness, and that the content of 
the descriptions about what they thought while listening to the music contained more 
sad imagery. The authors interpreted these results as stemming from the activation of 
the visual imagery mechanism proposed in the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin & Västfjäll, 
2008).  
The results of experiment 1 also showed that in the majority of cases, participants 
evoked mental visual images while listening to the music. However, unlike Vuoskoski 
and Eerola’s (2013), I suggested that this phenomenon was secondary to the activation 
of the activation of semantic knowledge while listening to the music. In other words, the 
musical sounds activated relevant cultural knowledge about the music’s meanings and 
uses in contexts such as film soundtracks, and this in turn, triggered the construction of 
visual imagery and narratives in the participants’ minds.  
The present experiment aims to continue exploring the validity of this interpretation 
by testing the effect of actively manipulating information about the pieces. Thus, 
following a similar procedure to that used by Vuoskoski and Eerola (2013), before 
listening to each piece, the participants will read a description that I predict will bias 
their perceived and aroused emotions in a coherent manner (Hypothesis 3). However, 
unlike their experiment, this study will test this effect in pieces expressive of three types 
of emotions: fear and joy in addition to sadness. Also, this experiment will compare the 
effect of a neutral description versus the effect of two alternative emotional ones. In 
other words, some participants will read a description of the music emphasising 
emotionally neutral technical characteristics, and other participants will read a 
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description which suggests that the composer wrote the music inspired either by an 
emotion A, or by an emotion B.  
The fourth hypothesis is based on the argument that the results from experiment 1 
were in part due to fact that the mimicked gestures performed by the participants 
lacked an emotional connotation for the listeners. Thus, it is predicted that the two main 
independent variables in this experiment will produce an interaction: those participants 
who perform the simulation task and read the emotional descriptions of the pieces will 
experience more intense emotions than those participants who perform the non-
simulation task and who read the neutral descriptions (Hypothesis 4).  
 
8.3 Revised hypotheses II: empathy 
The results of Experiment 1 suggested the possibility that what researchers call 
“emotional contagion” with music is actually a type of empathy. Recent findings suggest 
that in cases where people seem to “automatically” become infected by the mere 
observation of another’s emotional expressions, are actually moderated by evaluations 
of social affiliation. For example, observers are more likely to become to sympathise 
with someone else if the observed individual belongs to their same social group 
(Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010), or if they perceive the observed 
individual as a fair player in a competition game (Singer et al., 2006). 
In the case of music, several recent theories and empirical studies suggest that 
implicit and explicit empathic attitudes moderate emotional experiences with music. 
Vuoskoski and colleagues found that trait empathy moderates the enjoyment and 
intensity of emotional responses evoked by sad-sounding music (Vuoskoski et al., 2012). 
Similarly, Wöllner (2012) found that participants with higher levels of the affective 
component of the empathy trait were better at identifying the moments where the 
members of a string quartet played more expressively in visual-only, and audiovisual 
versions of a performance (but not in the auditory only version). Scherer and Coutinho 
have proposed that empathy towards the musicians constitutes a route to the induction 
of emotions, particularly in live performances and social listening contexts, where the 
listeners would imagine the feelings and motivations of the observed performers, and 
feel compassion as a consequence (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013, p. 139). Support for this 
hypothesis can be found in Miu and Balteş’ study (2012) where the researchers 
manipulated the attitude of the participants (empathic vs objective) while watching 
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audiovisual extracts of opera performances. They found that those participants who 
adopted an empathic attitude had more intense physiological responses and induced 
emotions, which matched the emotions expressed by the music and the performer’s 
gestures. Finally, using a web-based methodology, and audio-only stimuli, Egermann 
and McAdams (Egermann & McAdams, 2013) found that participants’ ratings of the 
extent to which they “empathised with the musicians [they] just heard” (p. 144) 
positively predicted the coincidence between ratings of perceived and induced valence 
and arousal. 
Based on these theories and findings I speculate that if we adopt a broad definition 
of empathy (e.g. Clarke, DeNora, & Vuoskoski, 2015; Preston & de Waal, 2002), then the 
results of Experiment 1 should be regarded as instances of empathy, and not of mere 
contagion. If we assume a more narrow definition of empathy instead (e.g. Coplan, 
2011; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006), then we can only consider an instance of 
emotional contagion as an instance of empathy, if the person becoming infected by the 
observed emotion realizes that the feelings he or she is experiencing belong to someone 
else originally.  
Since experiment 1 did not provide data to decide between these two possibilities, 
the last aim of this experiment is to test them. For this, after each trial, the participants 
were asked to answer two questions evaluating the extent to which the music they just 
listened to evoked social affiliations. Hence, it is expected that the more the participants 
report that the music evoked positive feelings of social affiliation, the more intense their 
emotional reactions will be (Hypothesis 5). Moreover, I will analyse the participants’ 
answers to the question about what they thought while listening to the music, in order 
to observe if they explicitly mention that the music communicated the composer’s 
feelings. If this is the case, then it will be taken as evidence that the participants 
underwent an experience of “empathy”, as defined by Coplan (2011) and de Vignemont 
& Singer (2006). 
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Table 8.1 Summary of experimental hypotheses 
 
 
8.4 Method 
8.4.1 Participants 
The experiment was carried out as a web-based experiment. Participants were recruited 
by personal invitation via e-mail, by snowballing sampling, and by links to the study from 
several social media websites and mailing lists (Twitter, Facebook, Reddit, auditory.org, 
musicology.org). All participants could take part in prize draw to win one £30 Amazon 
voucher. 
The first page of the website asked them to choose the “language that they 
understood better” (English or Spanish), and to indicate their month of birth. 
Participants were allocated to the corresponding version of the questionnaire according 
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to their language, and to the 6 different conditions and counterbalancing groups 
according to their month of birth.27 
A total of 447 people took part, but almost half of them were excluded from the 
analysis, due to the measures I took control for due commitment to the experiment. The 
first measure consisted in asking the participants four questions about the level of 
difficulty and concentration they experienced after each trial:  
a) My attention was focused entirely on the listening task, I forgot about 
everything else while listening to the music. 
b) I was interrupted and distracted by other things while listening to the music. 
c) I was able to avoid moving, tapping, dancing or singing while listening to the 
music. 
d) I found it difficult to imagine myself… playing the instruments I listened to / as a 
sound engineer evaluating the quality of the recording.  
I calculated a compound score by adding the scores from items a and c, and 
subtracting the scores from items b and d (Mean = 4.36, SD=2.09). I excluded those 
participants whose compound scores of were lower than 4.  
The second measure to control for due commitment was to exclude those 
participants who took too much or too little time doing the experiment, defined as one 
standard deviation above or below the mean duration (<19 mins or > 42 mins).  
As a result from these measures, 212 participants were excluded from the analysis 
(47% of the initial sample), leaving a final sample of 235 participants. This represents an 
exclusion rate comparable to other web experiments (Egermann, Nagel, et al., 2009). 
The participants included in the analysis had a mean age of 28.8 years (SD = 9.43); 
(58.7% Female, 40.4 Male, 0.9% chose not to state their gender). They had 26 different 
mother tongues, but most of them had either Spanish (47.23%) or English (28.09%) as 
their first language. Similarly, although participants came from 42 different nationalities, 
more than half were either from Colombia (32.77%), or the United Kingdom (21.28%). 
The English version was completed by 128 participants (54.5%) and the Spanish version 
by 107 (45.5%). 
                                                            
27
 In order to guarantee that the Spanish version was a faithful translation of the English version, 
a bilingual native Spanish person was asked to translate the English version into Spanish; then the 
experimenter and the translator versions were compared, and any differences were discussed 
and agreed upon. 
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As mentioned above, the participants were allocated to the experimental conditions 
based on their month of birth. This strategy resulted in a fairly even distribution of the 
groups, as shown in table 8.2.  
 
Table 8.2 Distribution of participants into experimental groups 
 
 
8.4.2 Musicianship 
I measured the participants’ musical engagement and training with 8 items. The results 
suggest that the participants had a rather high level of musical engagement, and of 
musical training: 
 45.1% of the participants reported listening to music at least 1 hour per day. 
 67.7% agreed to some extent with the statement: “I spend a lot of my free time 
doing music-related activities”. 
 75.7% agreed to some extent with the statement: “Music is kind of an addiction for 
me - I couldn't live without it”. 
 46.8% disagreed to some extent with the statement: “I would not consider myself a 
musician”. 
 70.2% disagreed to some extent with the statement “I have never been 
complimented for my talents as a musical performer”. 
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 51.9% of the participants have received at least 3 years of musical training. 
 78.7% of the participants reported being able to play at least one musical 
instrument to some level of ability. 
 
8.4.3 Design 
The experiment used a between-subjects design, with two independent variables: 
Simulation (two levels: Simulation, Non-Simulation), Type of Description of the piece 
(three levels: Emotional description 1, Emotional description 2, Neutral description); and 
Perceived and Induced affective states as dependent variables. 
 
8.4.4 Musical Stimuli and Descriptions of the Pieces 
The musical stimuli consisted of the same three instrumental pieces used in experiment 
1, but in this experiment their duration was shorter (around 60 seconds), in order to 
prevent dropout of participants due to boredom28. As in experiment 1, the pieces were 
edited so that every participant would listen to them twice in a row. 
Based on the imagery and narratives that the participants spontaneously evoked 
while listening to the music in experiment 1, I created three types of descriptions for 
each piece: two descriptions suggesting that the piece was composed during an 
emotionally-important episode of the composer’s life, and one describing the piece in 
neutral, technical terms. In each piece, the two emotional descriptions can be mapped 
onto the same areas of the two-dimensional space (arousal vs. valence) (Russell & 
Barrett, 1999). 
The two emotional descriptions of the first piece (“Kip’s lights” from the movie The 
English Patient), suggested that the feelings of the composer at the moment of writing 
the music were either of sadness, or tenderness:  
Sadness description: The composer wrote this piece towards the middle of his career, in 
what proved to be one of the most difficult years of his life. His young wife died 
while giving birth to their first child, and a few months later he had to leave his 
                                                            
28
 Even though the pieces are the same as in experiment 1, due to the content of the descriptions 
that the participants read, in this experiment I call the second and third pieces with slightly 
different names: “Fear/Pride” (instead of “Fear/Anger”) and “Joy/Determination” (instead of 
Joy). 
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position as lecturer of composition in a prestigious university and travel to a 
different country as a political refugee, because the start of war in his home 
country made the political climate too dangerous to remain there. 
Tenderness description: The composer wrote this piece towards the middle of his career, 
in what proved to be one of the most productive years of his life. He was 
appointed as lecturer of composition in a prestigious university, and a few 
months later, his wife gave birth to their first son. The composer wrote this 
piece during the spring of that year, when he moved with his new family to a 
country house to spend as much time as possible with their new-born child. 
Technical description: You will now listen to a short extract from a piece from the end of 
the last century. The piece is an adagio, characterized by a simple melody and a 
slow accompaniment. 
The emotional descriptions of the second piece (“Max” from the movie “Cape Fear”), 
suggested that the composer wrote the piece of music intending to communicate 
feelings of either pride or of fear:  
Pride description: The composer wrote this piece to commemorate the tenth 
anniversary of the victory of his country against an invading army. He took 
inspiration from his memories of the bravery and sacrifice that his countrymen 
displayed during the decisive battle. 
Fear description: The composer wrote this music to commemorate the difficult times 
that his country lived during the war. He was inspired by his childhood 
memories of having his sleep interrupted by the sounds of the enemy’s 
airplanes dropping the bombs that destroyed large parts of his home town. 
Technical description: You will now listen to an extract from a 20th century symphony. It 
is characterized by the alternation of loud and descending sounds with quieter 
and ascending ones. 
In the third piece (“Oliver learns the hard way” from the movie “Oliver Twist”), the 
emotional descriptions suggested that the composer intended to portray feelings of 
either joy or determination:  
Joy description: The composer wrote this piece for the scene of a ballet that portrays 
folk traditions in his home country. Inspired by traditional tales, he wrote this 
piece for a scene full of fantastic animals dancing in the woods. 
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Determination description: Inspired by fantastic novels, the composer wrote this musical 
piece for the scene of a ballet in which the bold characters prepare to embark 
on the epic adventure that will be portrayed during the rest of the work. 
Technical description: This piece of music has a moderate speed and a syncopated 
rhythm, and features a simple and repetitive melody. 
 
8.4.5 Measures 
The participants’ affective experience was measured the same set of questionnaires 
used in experiment 1: the action tendencies and subjective states questionnaire, the 
questionnaire of induced emotions and core affect, and the questionnaire of perception 
of emotions expressed by the music. They were also asked to report their liking, and 
their familiarity with the piece, and how difficult they found it to concentrate and follow 
the experimental instructions (as described in the section 8.4.1 above). In order to 
explore if the pieces evoked any feelings of social affiliation, the participants were asked 
to answer these two questions, using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to 
“very much”:  
 How much do you consider yourself to be similar to the typical person who 
enjoys this kind of music? 
 Do you think you it would easy for you to befriend someone who loves this kind 
of music? 
Additionally, after each trial, the participants were asked to write down a brief 
summary of what went through their minds while listening to the music. At the end of 
the experiment the participants filled in the questionnaire about their demographic 
information, musical engagement and training, and the musical instruments they could 
play. 
 
8.4.6 Procedure 
The experimental procedure comprised eight sections (see Figure 8.1) that altogether 
took on average 29.21 minutes to complete (SD = 5.54).  
The  experiment started by asking the participant to select their preferred language 
and to indicate their month of birth. According to their answer to these questions, they 
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were assigned to their corresponding version of the procedure. Then they read the 
instructions for the procedure, emphasizing the need to make it in a noiseless 
environment, without interruptions, and listening to the music through headphones. 
Subsequently, they did a practice trial to familiarize themselves with the mental task, 
with the interface that played the music, and to adjust the volume. After this, they 
started the main section of the experiment. In this section they read the description of 
the piece, then they listened to it while performing the assigned mental task, and then 
they answered to the questionnaires about their listening experience. Finally, after 
having completing the main section with the three pieces, they answered the 
demographic and musicianship questionnaires. (A copy all the texts and questionnaires 
can be found in Appendix 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 Flowchart of procedure. 
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The instructions for the participants in the Simulation condition were the following:  
Please listen to the piece while imagining that you are one of the musicians 
playing the music. (You can choose to imagine playing only one of the 
instruments, or if you prefer, you can imagine switching from one instrument to 
the other as the music progresses). Please avoid moving, tapping, dancing or 
singing while listening to the music.29 
The instructions for the participants in the Non-Simulation condition were:  
Please listen to the piece while imagining that you are a sound engineer, who is 
in charge of checking that the recording does not contain any glitches or errors, 
before it is copied to a CD. Please avoid moving, tapping, dancing or singing 
while listening to the music. 
As in experiment 1, the practice trial consisted in listening to a fragment of Satie’s 
Gymnopedie No.1 twice (total duration = 82 seconds) and asking two questions to make 
sure the participants understood the difference between perceived and induced 
emotions. 
 
8.5 Results 
The presentation of the results is organized as follows: 
1) The manipulation check, analysing the extent to which the stimuli elicited the target 
emotions, and the correlation analyses of perceived vs. induced emotions. 
2) The results of the test of main hypotheses: interaction effects, main effect of 
simulation, main effect of description. 
3) The analyses of the moderating role of covariates on the dependent measures, 
including the effect of expertise, and social affiliation attitudes evoked by the music.  
4) The analysis of the qualitative data gathered from the question: “what went through 
your mind while listening to the music?” 
 
                                                            
29 The instruction of not singing along aimed at preventing the activation of vocal simulation 
mechanisms, and the instruction of not moving, tapping or dancing aimed at preventing the 
activation of the rhythmic entrainment mechanism. 
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8.5.1 Manipulation Check I: Did the Stimuli Elicit the Target 
Emotions and Subjective Feelings? 
The analysis of the participants’ answers to the questionnaires indicates that the musical 
pieces elicited the intended perceived and induced emotions. 
The induced emotions in the Sadness/Tenderness piece with the highest mean 
scores (above 1.0) in the Sad/Tender piece were, in descending order: Mellowed, 
Nostalgic, Inspired (transcendent), Admiring, Happy and Sad. The perceived emotions 
with the highest means scores were: Longing, Tenderness, Spirituality (otherworldliness) 
and Melancholy. (See table 11.1 in Appendix 4 for means and standard deviations). 
In the Fear/Pride piece, the induced emotions with the highest mean ratings were: 
Anxious, Irritated, Triumphant, Sad, and Admiring. The perceived emotions with the 
highest mean ratings in this piece were: Fear, Anger, Pride/power, and Melancholy/ 
Misery. (See table 11.3 in Appendix 4 for means and standard deviations). 
The emotions with the highest mean ratings in the Joy/Determination piece were: 
Happy, Triumphant, Admiring, Transcendent, and Mellowed. The perceived affective 
states with highest mean ratings were Joy, Pride, Tenderness, and Spirituality. (See table 
11.5 in Appendix 4 for means and standard deviations). 
 
8.5.2 Manipulation Check II: Did Reports of Perceived and Induced 
Emotions Correlate? 
As in experiment 1, the assumption that the participants experienced “emotional 
contagion” implies the existence of high and significant correlations between the 
emotions they perceived and the corresponding induced emotions. This assumption is 
largely met by the data: overall, the Spearman correlations coefficients range from .20 
to .67 (median = .49, all p-values < .005). Tables 11.7, 11.8 and 11.9 in Appendix 4 
display the summaries of these correlation analyses.  
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8.5.3 Hypotheses testing 
The descriptive analyses of the dependent variables showed that none of them is 
normally distributed. However, given the large size of the sample, it can be assumed 
that these characteristics are unlikely to be due to errors in sampling. At the same time, 
the variables do not display the same degree or type of skewness; therefore applying a 
data transformation to all the data does not seem to be a viable alternative. Given the 
fact that ANOVA is a robust test when the normality assumption is not met (Finch, 
2005), and since there are not non-parametric alternatives to 2-way ANOVA, I decided 
to run 2-Way Factorial ANOVA tests to analyse the data. 
 
8.5.4 Interaction Effects  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants in the Simulation condition who read an 
emotional description would experience higher perceived and induced affective states 
than participants in the Non-Simulation condition who read the technical description. 
The MANOVA test indicates that no interactions between the two independent variables 
(simulation and type of description) were statistically significant. It also reveals that 
there were no significant differences in the intensity of the participants’ emotional 
reactions to the music as a function of whether they read emotional descriptions or 
technical descriptions of the pieces (all p-values >.005).  
From this point on, I examine the main effects of each independent variable 
separately. However, since it is unlikely that the interaction between the main variables 
had absolutely no effect on the dependent variables, I used Type III Sum of squares in all 
the subsequent analyses, a procedure in which the main effects are calculated after 
accounting for the interaction effects, and which is also more appropriate when the 
sample sizes for each condition are unequal (Scholer, 2016). Also, all comparisons were 
adjusted using the Bonferroni procedure. 
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8.5.5 Main Effect of Simulation 
8.5.5.1 Sadness/tenderness piece: most intensely experienced affective 
states 
When examining the most intense affective states, the prediction that the Simulation 
group would have higher scores than the Non-simulation group (Hypothesis 1S) is 
observed in almost all of the dependent variables, but as can be seen from the effect 
sizes in Table 8.3, the differences between the groups are too small to be statistically 
significant, (all p-values > .005). 
 
Table 8.3 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of the most 
intense affective states as a function of simulation condition in the Sadness / Tenderness 
piece 
 
  
Mean SE 95% CI F (1, 229) p 
B-H 
corrected 
p values 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Most 
Intense 
Induced 
Affect  
Non-Simulation 3.22 0.09 [3.05, 3.39] 
0.07 .799 .801 .00 
Simulation 3.19 0.08 [3.04, 3.35] 
Most 
Intense 
Induced 
Discrete 
Emotion 
Non-Simulation 3.25 0.08 [3.09, 3.41] 
0.06 .801 .801 .00 
Simulation 3.28 0.07 [3.13, 3.42] 
Most 
Intense 
Action 
Tendency  
Non-Simulation 3.11 0.08 [2.96, 3.27] 
1.76 .185 .446 .01 
Simulation 3.26 0.07 [3.11, 3.40] 
Most 
Intensely 
Perceived 
Affect  
Non-Simulation 2.42 0.12 [2.18, 2.66] 
1.87 .173 .446 .02 
Simulation 2.65 0.11 [2.43, 2.87] 
Most 
Intensely 
Perceived 
Discrete 
Emotion 
Non-Simulation 3.33 0.08 [3.18, 3.48] 
3.48 .064 .446 .01 
Simulation 3.52 0.07 [3.38, 3.66] 
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Figure 8.2 Most intense induced and perceived affective states per Simulation condition 
in Sadness/Tenderness piece 
 
8.5.5.2 Fear / pride piece: most intensely experienced affective states 
The Analysis of Variance of the most intense and perceived affective states only shows 
the trend predicted in Hypothesis 1 in the scores of Most Intensely Perceived Affect and 
of Most Intensely Perceived Discrete Emotion. However, these differences are not 
statistically significant (all p-values > .005). (Table 8.4 displays the means and the results 
of the ANOVA test). 
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Table 8.4 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of the most 
intense affective states as a function of Simulation Condition in the Fear/ Determination 
piece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Mean SE 95% CI 
F  
(1, 229) p 
B-H 
corrected 
p values 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Most 
Intense 
Induced 
Affect  
Non-Simulation 2.60 0.10 [2.99, 0.10] 
0.099 .754 .908 .000 
Simulation 2.58 0.09 [2.94, 0.09] 
Most 
Intense 
Induced 
Discrete 
Emotion 
Non-Simulation 2.65 0.10 [3.04, 0.10] 
0.013 .908 .908 .000 
Simulation 2.65 0.09 [3.01, 0.09] 
Most 
Intense 
Action 
Tendency  
Non-Simulation 3.00 0.08 [3.34, 0.08] 
0.099 .754 .908 .009 
Simulation 2.85 0.08 [3.16, 0.08] 
Most 
Intensely 
Perceived 
Affect  
Non-Simulation 1.66 0.14 [2.23, 0.14] 
1.966 .162 .81 .009 
Simulation 1.96 0.13 [2.48, 0.13] 
Most 
Intensely 
Perceived 
Discrete 
Emotion 
Non-Simulation 3.25 0.08 [3.55, 0.08] 
0.17 .681 .908 .001 
Simulation 3.31 0.07 [3.58, 0.07] 
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Figure 8.3 Most intense induced and perceived affective states per Simulation condition 
in Fear/Pride piece 
 
 
8.5.5.3 Joy / determination piece: most intensely experienced affective 
states 
The trend predicted in Hypothesis 1S is observed in all of the dependent measures: the 
Simulation group had higher scores than the Non-Simulation group; however, none of 
the differences between the groups is statistically significant (all p-values >.005). (See 
Table 8.5 for a summary of the between-subjects tests). 
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Table 8.5 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of the most 
intense affective states as a function of Simulation Condition in the Joy / Determination 
piece 
 
  
Mean SE 95% CI 
F  
(1, 229) p 
B-H 
corrected 
p values 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Most 
Intense 
Induced 
Affect  
Non-Simulation 3.15 0.09 [3.33, 0.09] 
0.06 .804 .804 .00 
Simulation 3.18 0.08 [3.34, 0.08] 
Most 
Intense 
Induced 
Discrete 
Emotion 
Non-Simulation 3.19 0.08 [3.35, 0.08] 
1.10 .296 .493 .01 
Simulation 3.31 0.08 [3.46, 0.08] 
Most 
Intense 
Action 
Tendency  
Non-Simulation 3.28 0.08 [3.44, 0.08] 
0.11 .741 .804 .00 
Simulation 3.32 0.07 [3.47, 0.07] 
Most 
Intensely 
Perceived 
Affect  
Non-Simulation 2.89 0.09 [3.08, 0.09] 
3.76 .054 .135 .02 
Simulation 3.14 0.09 [3.31, 0.09] 
Most 
Intensely 
Perceived 
Discrete 
Emotion 
Non-Simulation 3.15 0.08 [3.31, 0.08] 
5.48 .020 .100 .02 
Simulation 3.41 0.07 [3.56, 0.07] 
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Figure 8.4 Most intense induced and perceived affective states per Simulation condition 
in Joy/Determination piece 
 
8.5.6 Main Effect of Description 
8.5.6.1 Sadness / Tenderness piece: induction and perception of sadness, 
nostalgia, and tenderness 
As predicted in Hypothesis 2D, participants who read the Sadness description 
experienced stronger induced feelings of Sadness than participants who read the 
Tenderness description F(2, 229) = 10.63 p < .000. Accordingly, the Sadness description 
group also perceived that the piece expressed Melancholy more intensely than 
participants who read the Tenderness description F(2, 229) = 18.18 p < .000, and than 
participants who read the Technical description (p = .033). 
Also as predicted, the ratings of Induced Mellowness and of Perceived Tenderness 
were the highest in the group of participants who read the Tenderness description, but 
these differences are only significant for Perceived Tenderness F(2, 229) = 28.44 
(compared to the Sadness description group, p = .001, and to the Technical description 
group, p <.000).  
Participants who read the Tenderness description also experienced positive 
subjective feelings and action tendencies more intensely, and negative ones less 
intensely than participants who read the other two descriptions. Their scores of Feeling-
in-command-of-the-situation F(2,234) = 9.51 were higher compared to the Sadness 
description group (p = .002) and to the Technical description group p < .000; they had 
higher scores of Feeling-like-everything-is-fine F(2,234) = 20.25 than the Sadness 
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description group (p <.000); and than the Technical description group (p = .001). The 
group who read the Tenderness description also had lower scores of Needing-to-be-
comforted F(2,234) = 4.85 than the Sadness description group (p = .015), and than the 
Technical description group (p = .048). Contrary to the prediction, participants who read 
the Sadness description did not report higher scores of Feeling-Like-Crying than 
participants who read any of the other two descriptions.  
An examination of other induced and perceived discrete emotions more highly rated 
by the participants shows a trend which is consistent with the hypothesis. Participants 
who read the Tenderness description reported higher ratings of Induced Happiness  
F(2, 229) = 18.19 and of Perceived Joy, F(2, 229) = 27.27 than participants who read the 
other two descriptions (p < .000 in all comparisons). Accordingly, participants who read 
the Sadness description had slightly lower scores of Induced Valence than participants 
who read the Tenderness description F(2, 229) = 4.45 p = .064; and these participants in 
turn had significantly higher scores than participants who read the Technical description, 
who had the lowest scores of all (p = .020). 
Even though the participants’ ratings of Perceived Longing were significantly higher 
for the group who read the Sadness description than for those who read the Tenderness 
description F(2,229) = 7.68 p < .000; there were no significant differences between the 
groups in their ratings of Induced Nostalgia. There were not any other significant 
differences between the groups for the resting scores of induced and perceived 
emotions. 
(Table 8.6 displays the marginal estimated means and the results of the ANOVA tests for 
all the results described above).  
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Table 8.6 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of discrete 
emotions as a function of Description Condition in the Sadness/Tenderness piece 
 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .001 
  
Type of 
Description 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI 
F  
(2, 229) 
p Ƞ
2
 Sig. 
Induced 
Sad  
  
 1 Sadness 1.30 0.13 [1.05,1.55] 
10.63 .000 .09 
1 > 2 ** 
2 > 3** 
 2 Tenderness 0.59 0.11 [0.37,0.81] 
 3 Technical 1.18 0.12 [0.94,1.42] 
Induced 
Mellowed 
 1 Sadness 2.27 0.15 [1.97,2.57] 
0.68 .506 .01 (none)  2 Tenderness 2.5 0.14 [2.23,2.77] 
 3 Technical 2.34 0.15 [2.04, 2.63] 
Induced 
Nostalgic 
 1 Sadness 2.13 0.16 [1.81, 2.45] 
0.01 .986 >.000 (none)  2 Tenderness 2.11 0.15 [1.83, 2.4] 
 3 Technical 2.09 0.16 [1.78, 2.4] 
Induced 
Happy 
 1 Sadness 0.86 0.13 [0.60, 1.11] 
18.18 .000 .14 
2 > 1** 
2 > 3** 
2 > 3** 
 2 Tenderness 1.86 0.12 [1.63, 2.09] 
 3 Technical 1.12 0.13 [0.87, 1.37] 
Perceived 
Melancholy  
 1 Sadness 2.12 0.14 [1.84, 2.40] 
28.44 .000 .20 
1 > 2** 
1 > 3* 
2 > 3* 
 2 Tenderness 0.72 0.13 [0.46, 0.97] 
 3 Technical 1.62 0.14 [1.35, 1.89] 
Perceived 
Tenderness 
 1 Sadness 2.58 0.13 [2.32, 2.83] 
9.62 .000 .10 
2 > 1** 
2 > 3** 
 2 Tenderness 3.19 0.12 [2.96, 3.42] 
 3 Technical 2.53 0.12 [2.28, 2.77] 
Perceived 
Longing 
 1 Sadness 2.86 0.15 [2.58, 3.15] 
7.68 .001 .06 1 > 2**  2 Tenderness 2.11 0.13 [1.85, 2.37] 
 3 Technical 2.56 0.14 [2.28, 2.84] 
Perceived 
Joy 
 1 Sadness 0.52 0.12 [0.28, 0.76] 
27.27 .000 .19 2 > 1**  2 Tenderness 1.64 0.11 [1.43, 1.86] 
 3 Technical 0.74 0.12 [0.51, 0.98] 
Induced 
Valence 
 1 Sadness 1.90 0.16 [1.58, 2.22] 
4.45 .013 .04 2 > 3*  2 Tenderness 2.41 0.15 [2.12, 2.7] 
 3 Technical 1.82 0.16 [1.51, 2.13] 
Induced 
Tense 
Arousal 
 1 Sadness 2.12 0.17 [1.79, 2.46] 
2.05 .132 .02 (none)  2 Tenderness 2.46 0.15 [2.16, 2.76] 
 3 Technical 2.03 0.17 [1.70, 2.35] 
Induced 
Energetic 
Arousal 
 1 Sadness -0.07 0.2 [-0.46, 0.31] 
1.66 .191 .01 (none)  2 Tenderness 0.04 0.18 [-0.31, 0.38] 
 3 Technical -0.42 0.19 [-0.80, -0.05] 
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Table 8.7 Marginal Estimated Means and ANOVA of most frequently Induced Subjective 
Feelings and Action Tendencies as a function of Description Condition in 
Sadness/Tenderness piece 
 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. * = p < .05, ** = p < .001 
  Type of 
Description 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI 
F  
(2, 229) 
p Ƞ
2
 Sig.  
Wanting to 
make the 
experience 
longer  
 1 Sadness 2.53 0.17 [2.20, 2.86] 
5.05 .007 0.04 1 > 3*  2 Tenderness 2.3 0.15 [2.01, 2.60] 
 3 Technical 1.81 0.16 [1.49, 2.13] 
Wanting to 
understand 
more 
 1 Sadness 2.21 0.15 [1.92, 2.50] 
6.88 .001  0.06 1 > 3*   2 Tenderness 1.81 0.13 [1.55, 2.07] 
 3 Technical 1.45 0.14 [1.17, 1.73] 
Feeling like 
things do 
not involve 
me 
 1 Sadness 0.6 0.12 [0.37, 0.84] 
0.35 .705 0.00 (none)  2 Tenderness 0.6 0.11 [0.39, 0.81] 
 3 Technical 0.48 0.11 [0.26, 0.71] 
Feeling like 
crying 
 1 Sadness 0.76 0.12 [0.52, 1.00] 
0.72 .488 0.01 (none)  2 Tenderness 0.69 0.11 [0.47, 0.91] 
 3 Technical 0.88 0.12 [0.65, 1.12] 
Needing to 
be 
comforted 
 1 Sadness 1.28 0.14 [1.00, 1.55] 
4.85 .009 0.04 
1 > 2* 
3 > 2*  
 2 Tenderness 0.74 0.13 [0.49, 0.99] 
 3 Technical 1.19 0.14 [0.92, 1.46] 
Feeling in 
command of 
the situation 
 1 Sadness 1.2 0.16 [0.90, 1.51] 
9.51 .000 0.08 
2 > 1* 
2 > 3**  
 2 Tenderness 1.94 0.14 [1.66, 2.22] 
 3 Technical 1.14 0.15 [0.84, 1.44] 
Not being 
able to 
concentrate 
 1 Sadness 0.66 0.11 [0.44, 0.89] 
2.72 .068  0.02 (none)   2 Tenderness 0.31 0.1 [0.11, 0.51] 
 3 Technical 0.53 0.11 [0.31, 0.74] 
Feeling like 
everything is 
fine 
 1 Sadness 1.51 0.14 [1.23, 1.80] 
20.25 <. 000 0.15 
2 > 1** 
2 > 3* 
3 > 1* 
 2 Tenderness 2.73 0.13 [2.48, 2.99] 
 3 Technical 2.00 0.14 [1.73, 2.28] 
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Figure 8.5 E Mean ratings of the most frequently induced and perceived discrete 
emotions in Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a function of description condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.6 Mean ratings of subjective feelings in Sadness/Tenderness piece, as a 
function of listening condition.  
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8.5.6.2 Fear / Pride piece: induction and perception of fear, pride, and 
irritation 
Hypothesis 2D predicted that the highest levels of Induced Anxiety and Perceived Fear 
would be observed in the participants who read the Fear description; and the highest 
ratings of feeling Triumphant and of Perceived Pride in participants who read the Pride 
description. All of these trends were found in the data, but the differences between the 
groups are only statistically significant in the case of Perceived Fear  
F(2, 234) = 9.88 p < .000, where the Fear description group had significantly higher 
scores than the Pride description group. 
It was also predicted that participants’ subjective feelings and action tendencies 
would be influenced by type of description they read. The results support this 
hypothesis: participants who read the Fear description reported higher ratings of 
Needing-to-be-comforted F(2, 229) = 6.29 than the participants who read the Pride 
description (p = .004), and than the participants who read the Technical description  
(p = .021). They also had higher scores of Feeling-Frozen F(2, 229) = 4.23 than 
participants who read the Technical description p = .012; and higher ratings of Feeling-
like-crying F(2, 229) = 7.17 than participants who read the Pride description (p = .011), 
and than participants who read the Technical description (p = .02). This trend is also 
observed in scores of Wanting-to-avoid-the-situation, and Wanting-to-hide-away, and in 
scores of Wanting-to-attack-something, where the participants who read the Pride 
description had higher scores. (All p’s > 0.05).  
Furthermore, consistent with the prediction, the participants who read the Fear 
description reported significantly higher ratings of Induced Sadness than participants 
who read the Pride description F(2, 229) = 9.88 p = .001; and higher rating of Perceived 
Melancholy than participants who read the Technical description F(2, 229) = 3.96  
p = .031. This trend is also observed in the case of Induced Valence, where the Fear 
description had the lowest scores of all, (p > 0.05).  
Finally, although the participants who read the Pride description reported higher 
ratings of Energetic Arousal than participants who read the Fear description, they did 
not have the highest ratings of Induced Irritation, nor of Perceived Anger, which were 
actually reported by the participants who read the Fear description. These trends, again, 
are non-significant (all p-values >.005). (Table 8.8 presents a summary of the Descriptive 
data and the ANOVA tests for the results herein presented). 
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Table 8.8 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of ratings of 
discrete emotions as a function of Description Condition in the Fear / Pride piece 
 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni * = p < .05, ** = p < .001 
  
Type of 
Description Mean 
Std. 
Error 95% CI 
F  
(2, 229) p Ƞ
2
 Sig. 
Induced 
Triumphant  
1 Pride 1.07 0.14 [0.79, 1.35] 
1.51 .224 0.01 
 
(none) 
2 Fear 0.75 0.13 [0.50, 1.01] 
3 Technical 0.81 0.14 [0.53, 1.08] 
Induced 
Anxious 
1 Pride 2.17 0.16 [1.85, 2.49] 
1.49 .227 0.01  (none) 2 Fear 2.2 0.15 [1.91, 2.50] 
3 Technical 1.86 0.16 [1.54, 2.17] 
Induced 
Irritated  
1 Pride 0.88 0.14 [0.60, 1.16] 
1.78 .172 0.02  
 
(none) 
2 Fear 1.21 0.13 [0.95, 1.46] 
3 Technical 0.92 0.14 [0.64, 1.19] 
Induced 
Sad 
1 Pride 0.66 0.12 [0.43, 0.90] 
9.88 .000 0.08  2 > 1** 2 Fear 1.24 0.11 [1.03, 1.45] 
3 Technical 0.61 0.12 [0.38, 0.83] 
Perceived 
Pride  
1 Pride 1.95 0.17 [1.61, 2.29] 
0.92 .399 0.01 
 
(none) 
2 Fear 1.64 0.15 [1.33, 1.94] 
3 Technical 1.77 0.17 [1.44, 2.10] 
Perceived 
Fear 
1 Pride 2.41 0.15 [2.12, 2.69] 
8.86 .000 0.07 2 > 1** 2 Fear 3.23 0.13 [2.97, 3.49] 
3 Technical 2.8 0.14 [2.52, 3.08] 
Perceived 
Anger 
1 Pride 1.88 0.16 [1.57, 2.19] 
2.77 .065 0.02 
 
(none) 
2 Fear 2.17 0.14 [1.89, 2.45] 
3 Technical 1.69 0.15 [1.39, 1.99] 
Perceived 
Melancholy 
1 Pride 1.13 0.15 [0.84, 1.43] 
3.96 .020 0.03 2 > 3* 2 Fear 1.58 0.14 [1.31, 1.85] 
3 Technical 1.06 0.15 [0.77, 1.35] 
Induced 
Valence  
1 Pride -0.71 0.23 [-1.15, -0.26] 
1.19 .308 0.01 (none) 2 Fear -1.04 0.2 [-1.44, -0.63] 
3 Technical -0.6 0.22 [-1.03, -0.16] 
Induced 
Tense 
Arousal 
1 Pride -2.01 0.19 [-2.39, -1.62] 
0.39 .675 0.00 (none) 2 Fear -1.77 0.18 [-2.12, -1.43] 
3 Technical -1.87 0.19 [-2.25, -1.50] 
Induced 
Energetic 
Arousal 
1 Pride 1.23 0.17 [0.88, 1.57] 
2.95 .054 0.03 
 
(none) 
2 Fear 1.03 0.16 [0.72, 1.34] 
3 Technical 1.59 0.17 [1.25, 1.92] 
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Table 8.9 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of ratings of 
subjective feelings as a function of description condition in the Fear / Pride piece 
 
Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .001 
  
  
Type of 
Description 
Mean Std. Error 95% CI 
F  
(2, 229) 
p Ƞ
2
 Sig. 
Wanting to 
make the 
experience 
longer  
1 Pride 1.10 0.16 [0.78, 1.42] 
0.66 .517 0.01  2 Fear 1.33 0.14 [1.04, 1.61] 
3 Technical 1.13 0.16 [0.83, 1.44] 
Wanting to 
avoid the 
situation 
1 Pride 1.49 0.18 [1.15, 1.84] 
0.22 .802 0.00  2 Fear 1.56 0.16 [1.25, 1.87] 
3 Technical 1.40 0.17 [1.07, 1.74] 
Wanting to 
understand 
more 
1 Pride 1.37 0.16 [1.06, 1.68] 
1.87 .156 0.02  2 Fear 1.78 0.14 [1.50, 2.06] 
3 Technical 1.54 0.15 [1.24, 1.84] 
Needing to 
be comforted 
1 Pride 0.39 0.13 [0.14, 0.64] 
6.29 .002 0.05 
2>1* 
2>3* 
2 Fear 0.96 0.12 [0.73, 1.18] 
3 Technical 0.49 0.12 [0.25, 0.74] 
Wanting to 
attack 
something 
1 Pride 0.98 0.14 [0.71, 1.26] 
0.9 .410 0.01  2 Fear 0.74 0.13 [0.49, 0.98] 
3 Technical 0.82 0.13 [0.55, 1.08] 
Feeling like 
boiling inside 
1 Pride 0.90 0.13 [0.64, 1.16] 
0.74 .477 0.01  2 Fear 0.96 0.12 [0.73, 1.19] 
3 Technical 0.75 0.13 [0.5, 1.00] 
Feeling in 
command of 
the situation 
1 Pride 0.81 0.13 [0.55, 1.07] 
0.06 .938 0.00  2 Fear 0.76 0.12 [0.53, 1.00] 
3 Technical 0.74 0.13 [0.49, 0.99] 
Wanting to 
hide away 
1 Pride 2.00 0.17 [1.68, 2.33] 
0.34 .712 0.00  2 Fear 2.06 0.15 [1.77, 2.36] 
3 Technical 1.89 0.16 [1.57, 2.20] 
Feeling 
frozen 
1 Pride 1.15 0.14 [0.87, 1.43] 
4.23 .016 0.04 2>3* 2 Fear 1.42 0.13 [1.17, 1.67] 
3 Technical 0.88 0.14 [0.61, 1.15] 
Not being 
able to 
concentrate 
1 Pride 0.72 0.15 [0.43, 1.01] 
2.8 .063 0.02  2 Fear 1.15 0.13 [0.89, 1.42] 
3 Technical 1.12 0.14 [0.84, 1.40] 
Feeling like 
crying 
1 Pride 0.28 0.10 [0.08, 0.47] 
7.17 .001 .06 
2>1* 
2>3* 
2 Fear 0.67 0.09 [0.49, 0.84] 
3 Technical 0.21 0.10 [0.02, 0.40] 
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 Figure 8.7 Mean ratings of the most frequently induced and perceived discrete 
emotions in Fear/Pride piece, as a function of description condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.8 Mean ratings of subjective feelings in Fear/Pride piece, as a function of 
listening condition.  
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8.5.6.3 Joy / Determination piece: induction and perception of joy and 
pride 
The results of the Factorial ANOVA suggest that, contrary to expectations, the 
participants who read the Determination description perceived it as more inspiring of 
positive and happy feelings than the participants who read the Joy description. 
Consequently, the trend predicted by Hypothesis 2D is only partially observed: the 
participants who read the Determination description experienced the strongest induced 
feelings of being Triumphant, strong, and higher ratings of Perceived Pride than the 
participants who read the Joy description, but they also reported the highest ratings of 
Induced Happiness and of Induced Valence. Nevertheless, only the ratings of Valence 
were significantly different: the Determination description group had higher scores than 
the Technical description group F(2, 229) = 4.19 p = .025. 
An analysis of the answers to the questionnaire of subjective feelings and action 
tendencies reveals that as expected, compared to participants who read the Joy 
description, participants who read the Determination description had slightly higher 
scores than the other groups of Feeling-in-command-of-the-situation (marginally higher 
than the Technical description group F(2,234) = 3.14 p = .051). But, unexpectedly, the 
Determination description group also had the highest ratings of Wanting-to-make-the-
experience-longer (significantly higher than the Technical description group  
F(2,234) = 3.80 p = .022); and of Feeling-like-everything-is-fine (significantly higher than 
the Technical description group F(2,234) = 4.10 p = .019). These results confirm the 
conclusion that the participants who read the Determination description had the most 
positive affective experience while listening to this piece. (See tables 8.10 and 8.11 for a 
summary of the descriptive data and the ANOVA tests). 
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Table 8.10 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of ratings of 
discrete emotions as a function of Description Condition in the Joy / Determination piece 
 
  
Type of 
Description Mean 
Std. 
Error 95% CI 
F  
(2, 229) p Ƞ
2
 Sig. 
Induced 
Happy  
1 Joy 2.68 0.14 [2.40, 2.95] 
3.17 .044 .03 (None) 2 Determination 2.74 0.13 [2.49, 2.98] 
3 Technical 2.30 0.13 [2.03, 2.57] 
Induced 
Triumphant 
1 Joy 1.53 0.16 [1.21, 1.85] 
2.21 .112 .02 (None) 2 Determination 1.97 0.15 [1.68, 2.25] 
3 Technical 1.90 0.16 [1.59, 2.21] 
Induced 
Mellowed 
1 Joy 1.15 0.14 [0.88, 1.43] 
1.11 .332 .01 (None) 2 Determination 0.97 0.13 [0.72, 1.21] 
3 Technical 0.86 0.14 [0.60, 1.13] 
Induced 
Admiring 
1 Joy 1.46 0.15 [1.16, 1.76] 
1.16 .317 .01 (None) 2 Determination 1.45 0.14 [1.18, 1.72] 
3 Technical 1.18 0.15 [0.89, 1.47] 
Induced 
Transcen-
dent  
1 Joy 1.10 0.14 [0.82, 1.38] 
0.63 .536  .01 (None) 2 Determination 1.09 0.13 [0.84, 1.34] 
3 Technical 0.91 0.14 [0.64, 1.18] 
Perceived 
Joy 
1 Joy 2.88 0.15 [2.59, 3.17] 
3.07 .048 .03 (None) 2 Determination 2.79 0.13 [2.53, 3.05] 
3 Technical 2.41 0.14 [2.13, 2.69] 
Perceived 
Pride 
1 Joy 1.22 0.16 [0.91, 1.53] 
2.90 .057 .02 (None) 2 Determination 1.53 0.14 [1.25, 1.81] 
3 Technical 1.75 0.15 [1.45, 2.05] 
Perceived 
Tenderness 
1 Joy 1.08 0.12 [0.84, 1.32] 
0.33 .716  .00 (None) 2 Determination 0.97 0.11 [0.75, 1.18] 
3 Technical 0.95 0.12 [0.72, 1.19] 
Perceived 
Spirituality 
1 Joy 1.06 0.14 [0.80, 1.33] 
0.81 .446 .01 (None) 2 Determination 0.97 0.12 [0.73, 1.21] 
3 Technical 0.83 0.13 [0.57, 1.09] 
Induced 
Valence 
1 Joy 2.76 0.15 [2.48, 3.05] 
4.19 .016 .04 2 >3* 2 Determination 2.80 0.13 [2.54, 3.06] 
3 Technical 2.29 0.14 [2.01, 2.57] 
Induced 
Tense 
Arousal 
1 Joy 1.79 0.19 [1.42, 2.16] 
1.56 .213 .01 (None) 2 Determination 1.67 0.17 [1.34, 2.01] 
3 Technical 1.35 0.18 [0.99, 1.71] 
Induced  
Energetic 
Arousal 
1 Joy 2.05 0.19 [1.68, 2.42] 
2.10 .125 .02 (None) 2 Determination 2.21 0.17 [1.88, 2.55] 
3 Technical 1.71 0.18 [1.34, 2.07] 
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Table 8.11 Estimated marginal means, standard errors and ANOVA tests of ratings of 
subjective feelings as a function of description condition in the Joy / Determination piece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Type of 
Description 
Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% CI 
F  
(2, 229) 
p Ƞ
2
 
Sig. 
Compa-
risons 
Wanting to 
make the 
experience 
1 Joy 2.23 0.16 [1.91, 2.55] 
3.80 .024 .032 2 > 3 * 2 Determination 2.39 0.15 [2.10, 2.68] 
3 Technical 1.81 0.16 [1.5, 2.120] 
Wanting to 
understand 
more 
1 Joy 1.74 0.16 [1.42, 2.06] 
1.37 .257 .012 (None) 2 Determination 2.06 0.15 [1.77, 2.35] 
3 Technical 1.77 0.16 [1.46, 2.08] 
Feeling in 
command of 
the situation 
1 Joy 1.88 0.16 [1.56, 2.20] 
3.14 .045 .027 (None) 2 Determination 2.26 0.15 [1.97, 2.55] 
3 Technical 1.75 0.16 [1.44, 2.06] 
Not being 
able to 
concentrate 
1 Joy 0.49 0.12 [0.26, 0.73] 
2.57 .079 .022 (None) 2 Determination 0.41 0.11 [0.20, 0.62] 
3 Technical 0.76 0.12 [0.53, 0.99] 
Wanting to 
dance 
1 Joy 2.03 0.16 [1.71, 2.34] 
1.10 .334 .01 (None) 2 Determination 2.09 0.14 [1.81, 2.37] 
3 Technical 1.79 0.15 [1.49, 2.09] 
Feeling like 
laughing 
1 Joy 1.17 0.14 [0.90, 1.45] 
0.58 .562 .005 (None) 2 Determination 1.28 0.13 [1.04, 1.53] 
3 Technical 1.09 0.14 [0.82, 1.35] 
Feeling like 
everything is 
fine 
1 Joy 2.79 0.13 [2.53, 3.04] 
4.10 .018 .035 2>3* 2 Determination 2.89 0.12 [2.66, 3.12] 
3 Technical 2.42 0.13 [2.17, 2.66] 
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Figure 8.9 Mean ratings of the most frequently induced and perceived discrete emotions 
in Joy/Determination piece, as a function of description condition. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.10 Mean ratings of subjective feelings in Joy/Determination piece, as a function 
of listening condition.  
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8.5.7 Test of Hypotheses 4 and 5: Did Any Covariates Significantly 
Mediate the Results? 
These hypotheses predicted two mediating effects: Hypothesis 4 predicted that being 
able to play an instrument present in the piece would correlate positively with reported 
emotional intensity; and Hypothesis 5 predicted that ratings of feelings of social 
affiliation evoked by the music would correlate positively with reported emotional 
intensity. 
In this section, I present the results of the tests of these hypotheses, and of the 
additional tests I carried out to examine whether any other covariates had a significant 
effect on the dependent measures. I will follow the same rationale and procedure that I 
used in the previous chapter, where I used MANCOVA tests, followed by confirmatory 
ANCOVAs, which included only the covariates that the initial MANCOVA test yielded as 
significant. I also used Bootstrapping (set to 1000 iterations) to calculate the confidence 
intervals, I applied the Benjamini-Hochberg correction for multiple comparisons, and I 
applied the Bonferroni correction to the p-values in the post-hoc tests. 
The covariates included in the tests are: 
 Extent to which the participant is able to play a musical instrument present in the 
musical piece. (As in experiment 1, the information provided by the participants 
about which instruments they can play was rated as an ordinal variable: not 
being able to play any instrument = 0; being able to play an instrument not 
present in the piece = 1; being able to play an instrument from the same 
category of instruments as those present in the piece = 2; being able to play an 
instrument present in the piece = 3). 
 Ratings of similarity to the typical person who listens to this kind of music, and 
ratings of finding it easy to befriend someone who likes this music. 
 Musical Engagement, 
 Enjoyment of the piece,  
 Familiarity with the piece. 
The dependent variables were the same ones as analysed in the previous section: 
ratings of most intense induced and perceived affective states (including action 
tendencies), ratings of core affect, and ratings of the induced and perceived discrete 
emotions with the highest mean scores. 
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In order to test the assumption of independence of the covariates and the 
independent variable, I ran ANOVA tests (and Kruskal-Wallis tests where the normality 
assumption was not met) with Condition as IV, and the scores of each covariate as DV. 
As can be seen in Table 8.12, several of these covariates violate the assumption: 
Enjoyment, Level of attention to the task, Musical Engagement, Perceived Difficulty, 
Social Similarity and Musical Engagement. However, it is also clear from these results 
that there was not a consistent pattern where one of the experimental groups displayed 
the same kind of bias in all of these variables. Since the assumption of independence of 
the covariates and the independent variable is an interpretational, but not a statistical 
requirement (Field, 2013 p. 486), I proceeded to carry out the MANCOVA tests, keeping 
in consideration the identified biases in the results. 
 
Table 8.12 Results of analysis of the assumption of independence of covariates and 
independent variables  
 
 
 
Variable Piece Significant differences 
Enjoyment 
Sadness / Tenderness Sadness Description > Technical Description (p = .029) 
Joy / Determination Simulation > Non-Simulation (p= .014) 
Level of Attention to 
the task 
Joy / Determination 
Sadness Description > Technical Description (p = .037) 
Tenderness Description > Technical Description (p = 0.20) 
Musical Engagement Joy / Determination Sadness Description > Technical Description (p= .019) 
Difficulty  Sadness / Tenderness Non-Simulation > Simulation (p = .032) 
Social Similarity Sadness / Tenderness Sadness Description > Technical Description (p = .022) 
Musical Engagement Sadness / Tenderness Sadness Description > Technical Description (p = .025) 
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8.5.7.1 Hypothesis 4: Effect of being able to play an instrument present in 
the piece 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the more a participant could play an instrument present in 
the piece, the more intense his or her affective experience would be. This prediction was 
not supported by the data in any of the dependent variables. (See table 8.13 for a 
summary of the regression models).  
 
8.5.7.2 Hypothesis 5: Effect of evoked feelings of social affiliation 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the more the pieces evoked feelings of social affiliation in 
the participants, the more intense their emotional reactions would be. Social affiliation 
was measured using two questions: one asking the participants to rate how similar they 
thought they were to the typical person who enjoys that kind of music (I named this 
variable “Social Similarity”); and a question asking them to rate how easy they would 
find it to befriend someone who likes that kind of music (I named this variable 
“Befriending easiness”). 
The first MANCOVA analyses revealed that none of these covariates were significant 
mediators. However, once I remove the ratings of Enjoyment from the model, these two 
variables do show significant effects on several of the dependent measures. Indeed, I 
found high positive correlations between ratings of enjoyment and these two social 
affiliation variables (ranging from .32 and .62 in the three pieces, median = .37). 
The MANCOVA analyses excluding ratings of enjoyment indicate that, contrary to the 
prediction in Hypothesis 5, the ratings of Social Similarity and Befriending Easiness were 
not significant covariates for the variables measuring intensity of the participants’ 
affective experience (Most Intense Induced and Perceived Affect and Emotions). 
However, these analyses also indicate that these social affiliation variables were 
significant covariates in several variables related to positive affective states (See table 
8.13 for a summary of the regression models): 
 In the Sadness/Tenderness piece, the ratings of Social Similarity were positive 
and significant predictors of ratings of Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer 
and of Wanting-to-understand-more; and the ratings of Befriending Easiness 
were positive and significant predictors of ratings of Perceived Tenderness, 
Feeling-in-command-of-the-situation and of Feeling-like-everything-is-fine. 
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 In the Fear/Pride piece, the ratings of Social Similarity were positive and 
significant predictors of ratings of Induced Triumphant, Perceived Pride, 
Valence, Tense Arousal, Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, Wanting-to-
understand-more; and negative significant predictors of Tense Arousal, 
Wanting-to-avoid-the-situation and of Needing-to-be-comforted. The ratings of 
Befriending Easiness, by contrast, were not significant predictors. 
 In the Joy/Determination piece, the ratings of Social Similarity were positive 
and significant predictors of ratings of Induced Triumphant, Induced Admiring, 
Valence, Energetic Arousal, Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer and of 
Wanting-to-dance. The scores of Befriend Easiness were not significant 
predictors for any of the dependent variables. 
Importantly, controlling for these two variables does not affect the main results 
reported in the previous section. In other words, introducing these covariates does not 
render the differences between the Simulation Conditions significant; and the 
differences between the groups according to the Description Condition remain the 
same. In the next section I present the results of the MANCOVA analyses which 
indicated which other variables were significant covariates of the dependent measures. 
  
8.5.8 Effect of Other Covariates in the Participants’ Affective 
Experience  
8.5.8.1 Sadness / Tenderness piece: 
As mentioned above, ratings of Enjoyment were significant predictors of 16 out of 
the 24 analysed dependent measures. These scores were positive predictors of ratings 
of: Most Intense Discrete Emotion, Most Intense Perceived Affect, Most Intense 
Perceived Discrete Emotion, Induced Mellowed, Induced Nostalgic, Induced Happy, 
Perceived Tenderness, Perceived Longing, Valence, Tense Arousal, Energetic Arousal, 
Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, Wanting-to-understand-more, Feeling-in-
command-of-the-situation, and Feeling-like-everything-is-fine. The scores of Enjoyment 
were negative predictors only of ratings of Feeling-like-things-do-not-involve-me. 
The MANCOVA analyses also reveal that ratings of how much Attention to the task 
the participants had were positively related to scores of: Wanting-to-make-the-
experience-longer, Wanting-to-understand-more, Feeling-like-crying, Needing-to-be-
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comforted; and a negatively correlated with scores of Feeling-like-things-do-not-involve-
me. In the case of the ratings of Needing-to-be-comforted, perceived difficulty was a 
positive predictor. 
The ratings of the extent to which the participants were able to pay attention to the 
experimental task without distractions, along with ratings of Social Similarity, were 
positive predictors of scores of Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, and of 
Wanting-to-understand-more.  
Importantly, controlling for these covariates does not produce any substantial 
change in the main results: no effect of Simulation Condition is observed, and the effects 
of the Description condition remain the same. 
 
8.5.8.2 Fear / Pride piece: 
The MANCOVA analyses reveal that ratings of enjoyment were significant, positive 
predictors of ratings of: Induced Triumphant, Induced Irritated, Perceived Pride, 
Valence, Energetic Arousal, Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, Wanting-to-
understand-more; and negative predictors of Wanting-to-avoid-the-situation. 
Controlling for this covariate does not make the differences between the two simulation 
conditions significant (Hypothesis 1S), but it makes the ratings of Induced Triumphant 
significantly higher in the group who read the Pride description than in the group who 
read the Fear description F(2,228) = 3.36 p = .038.  
The ratings of Musical Engagement were, in turn, positive predictors of Perceived 
Anger. Controlling for this covariate does not produce a substantial change in the main 
effect of Simulation condition, nor in the main effect of Description condition. 
 
8.5.8.3 Joy / Determination piece: 
The ratings of Enjoyment are significant covariates in 20 out of the 24 analysed 
dependent variables. They are positive predictors of: Most Intense Action Tendency, 
Most Intense Discrete Emotion, Most Intense Perceived Affect, Most Intense Perceived 
Discrete Emotion, Induced Happy, Induced Triumphant, Induced Mellowed, Induced 
Admiring, Induced Transcendent, Perceived Joy, Perceived Pride, Perceived Tenderness, 
Valence, Tense Arousal, Energetic Arousal, Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, 
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Wanting-to-understand-more, Feeling-in- command-of-the-situation, Wanting-to-dance, 
Feeling-like-laughing, and of Feeling-like-everything-is-fine. 
Controlling for the Enjoyment covariate has no effect on the main effect of 
Simulation; but it makes the scores of Induced Triumphant and Perceived Pride higher in 
the Joy description group than in the Technical description group F(2,228) = 3.58 p= .049 
and F(2,228) = 3.79 p = .019, respectively. (These results do not coincide with the 
prediction made in Hypothesis 2D). 
Ratings of Familiarity were positive, significant predictors of Perceived Tenderness, 
while ratings of Attention to the experimental task were positive predictors of Energetic 
Arousal scores, and negative predictors of Not-being-able-to-concentrate-in-my-own-
thoughts. 
Importantly, ratings of Finding-it-hard-to-stay-still while listening to the music were 
all negative predictors of 10 dependent variables, almost all of them related to positive 
affective states: Most Intense Perceived Affect, Most Intense Perceived Discrete 
Emotion, Induced Happy, Induced Triumphant, Perceived Joy, Energetic Arousal, 
Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer, and of Wanting-to-dance. 
Finally, controlling for Familiarity, Attention, and being able to remain still do not 
produce any substantial changes on the main effects of Simulation condition, and on the 
main effect of Description condition.  
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Table 8.13 Summary of significant covariates yielded by the MANCOVA tests (excluding 
ratings of enjoyment) 
 
  Dependent variable R squared Significant Covariates B coeff. 
Sa
d
n
e
ss
 /
 T
e
n
d
e
rn
e
ss
 p
ie
ce
 
Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer  0.26** 
Social Similarity 0.45* 
Attention to the task 0.24* 
Wanting-to-understand-more 0.19* 
Social Similarity 0.28* 
Attention to the task 0.19* 
Perceived Tenderness 0.16** 
Befriending Easiness 
0.22* 
Feeling-in-command-of-the-situation 0.13** 0.25* 
Feeling-like-everything-is-fine 0.23** 0.25* 
Needing-to-be-comforted 0.12** 
Difficulty 0.23* 
Attention to the task 0.22* 
Feeling-like-things-do-not-involve-me 0.08* 
Attention to the task 
-0.22** 
Feeling-like-crying 0.09* 0.22* 
Fe
ar
 /
 P
ri
d
e
 p
ie
ce
 
Ind. Triumphant 0.10* 
Social Similarity 
0.26** 
Perceived Pride 0.09* 0.29** 
Valence 0.10* 0.43** 
Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer  0.25** 0.52** 
Wanting-to-avoid-the-situation 0.11** -0.37** 
Wanting-to-understand-more 0.19** 0.42** 
Perceived Anger 0.11** Musical Engagement 0.09** 
Jo
y 
/ 
D
e
te
rm
in
at
io
n
 p
ie
ce
 
Ind. Admiring 0.06* 
Social Similarity 
0.24* 
Valence 0.10** 0.24* 
Energy Arousal 0.07* 0.27* 
Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer  0.13** 0.33** 
Wanting-to-dance 0.09* 0.21* 
Most Intense Perceived Affect 0.07* 
Being able not to move 
-0.15* 
Most Intense Perceived Discrete Emotion  0.08* -0.015* 
Ind. Happy 0.11** -0.024* 
Ind. Triumphant 0.08* -0.025* 
Perceived Joy 0.10* -0.022* 
Energy Arousal 0.07* -0.026* 
Wanting-to-make-the-experience-longer  0.10** -0.021* 
Wanting-to-dance 0.12** -0.026* 
Energy Arousal 0.6* 
Attention to the task 
0.024* 
Not-being-able-to-concentrate 0.1** -0.017* 
Perceived Tenderness 0.08* Familiarity 0.54* 
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8.5.9 Visual Imagery and Semantic Associations Evoked by the 
Music and the Descriptions 
In this section, I analyse the qualitative data obtained from the answers to the open-
ended question: “what went through your mind while you were listening to the music”, 
that the participants filled after listening to each piece. The objective of these analyses is 
to better understand how manipulating the description of the piece affected the 
participants’ emotional experience, as predicted in hypothesis 2D.  
First of all, it is important to note that some participants chose not to answer this 
question: 10% in the Sadness/Tenderness piece, 15 % in the Fear/Pride piece, and 15% 
in the Joy/Determination piece). Also, five participants (equivalent to 2.5% of the 
sample) rejected the description provided before the piece, commenting that it did not 
seem to fit with the music. Two examples: 
“Didn't believe that the description of the composer and the compositional situation 
was true. Didn't match the music.” 
Participant in the Non-Simulation, Tenderness description condition, whose 
highest scores in the in the Sadness /Tenderness piece were Perceived 
Peacefulness = 2, Perceived Longing = 2; Induced Nostalgia = 3. 
 
“I was trying to correlate the description of the piece with what I was listening 
to, but to my ears the piece does not bring along pride and triumph, rather 
horror and agony.” 
Participant in the Non-Simulation, Pride description condition,  
whose highest scores in the in the Fear/Pride piece were  
perceived Anger = 4; Induced Irritated = 4. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be safely assumed that these cases of extreme discomfort with 
the provided description were a minority. Moreover, an analysis of the answers from 
the participants in the Technical description condition (who read neutral descriptions of 
the pieces), reveals that their imagery contained similar themes to the descriptions read 
by other two groups. This suggests that the provided emotional descriptions actually 
matched the type of semantic associations that a listener might spontaneously evoke 
while listening to these pieces. Some examples: 
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 “A sad scene. The end. If it was in a movie, a main character could have 
just died and the music will go with scenes of people mourning.” 
Participant in the Simulation, Technical description condition, whose highest 
scores in the Sadness /Tenderness piece were perceived Melancholy = 4,  
Perceived Spirituality = 3; Induced Sad = 3. 
 
“Preparación para batalla, un mal presagio, suspenso, derrota” 
(Translation: “Preparation for a battle, a bad omen, suspense, defeat”) 
 Participant in the Simulation, Technical description condition, whose highest 
scores in the Fear/Pride piece were perceived Anger = 3, Perceived Fear = 3; 
Induced Anxious = 3. 
 
“I thought it was very strong, powerful, determined. Like someone was about to embark 
on a mission, or to start a task, but not a scary one. I liked it, it was exciting, but it isn't 
the sort of music I usually listen to in my own time. I could imagine it being used in a 
film” 
Participant in the Simulation, Technical description condition, whose highest 
scores in the Joy / Determination piece were perceived Pride = 4,  
Perceived Joy = 2; Induced Triumphant = 3, Induced Admiring = 3. 
 
I used the same procedure as in experiment 1 to analyse the extent to which the 
participants’ narratives coincided with the emotion they reported in the questionnaires. 
I coded the qualitative data into three categorical variables. The first two variables 
indicate whether there was a coincidence between the content of the narrative, and the 
participant’s highest scores of perceived, and induced emotions, correspondingly. I 
assigned a value of 1 if the content of the narrative matched the highest perceived/ 
induced emotion, and a value of 0, if they did not. The third variable indicates whether 
there were explicit elements from the provided description in the participants’ 
narratives. Again, I assigned a value of 1 if the content of the narrative contained images 
or elements from the description, and a value of 0, if it did not. Importantly, this third 
analysis excludes the participants from the “Technical description” condition, because 
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the descriptions they read did not contain any hint that the music communicated an 
emotion. 
In the Sadness/ Tenderness piece, the coincidence rate between the participants’ 
ratings of perceived emotions and their narratives was of 65.88% and of 60.19% for their 
ratings of induced emotions. These rates are lower than the ones observed in 
experiment 1 (84.68% and 79.84%, correspondingly). The analysis of the presence of 
elements from the provided description in the participants’ narratives (restricted to 
Description groups 1 and 2) shows that only a third of the participants (32.62%) explicitly 
mentioned an element of the description in their narratives. Some examples of the 
participants’ narratives: 
“Actually I imagined a child being wrapped up in a quilt, and being cuddle [sic] by his 
mom.” 
Participant in the Non-simulation, Tenderness description condition,  
whose highest scores in the Sadness /Tenderness piece were  
perceived Joy = 4, Tenderness = 3, Peacefulness = 3;  
and Induced Mellowed = 4. 
  
“I felt very far away from something I loved very much. I wanted to be soothed 
and told it would be ok. Both of these however were quite enjoyable feelings.” 
 Participant in the Simulation, Sadness description condition, whose highest 
scores in the Sadness /Tenderness piece were perceived Longing = 4, Melancholy = 4,  
Tenderness = 3; and Induced Mellowed = 4,  
Induced Sad = 4, Induced Nostalgia = 3. 
 
“It started sad, but seemed to become more uplifted. Reminded me of spring and 
the seasons changing.” 
Participant in the Non-Simulation, Sadness description condition, whose highest scores 
in the Sadness /Tenderness piece were perceived Peacefulness = 3, Longing = 3; 
Tenderness = 3; and Induced Mellowed = 4,  
Induced Nostalgic = 3, Relaxed = 3. 
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In the Fear/Pride piece, the coincidence rate between the participants’ narratives 
and their scores of perceived emotions was of 71.86%, and of 69.85% for their scores of 
induced emotions. Again, these rates are lower those of experiment 1 for the same 
piece (91.13% and 72.58%, correspondingly). The presence of elements from the 
provided description in the participants’ narratives (description groups 1 and 2) was 
observed in 39.55% of the cases. Some examples: 
“This piece of music elicited intense emotions in me, of dread and anxiety. I felt 
tense and I could readily imagine the experiences which inspired this music- 
bombs dropping, war, fire... I think the composer certainly achieved his aim in 
that respect.” 
Participant in the Simulation, Fear description condition, whose highest scores in 
the Fear/Pride piece were perceived Fear = 4, Melancholy = 4, Anger = 3;  
and Induced Anxious = 3. 
 
“This track referred to me pictures of ancient or future battles. Like I was 
ready for them, like I needed to save someone.” 
Participant in the Simulation, Pride description condition, whose highest scores 
in the Fear/Pride piece were perceived Pride = 2; 
Induced Triumphant = 4, and Transcendent = 4. 
 
“It seemed like someone was trying to kill me with the knife” [sic] 
Participant in the Non-Simulation, Pride description condition, whose highest 
scores in the Fear/Pride piece were perceived Anger = 3,  
Perceived Fear = 4; Induced Anxious = 4. 
 
In the Joy / Determination piece, the coincidence rate between the participants’ 
ratings of perceived emotions and their narratives was of 61.50%, and of 63% for their 
ratings of induced emotions. (These percentages are lower than the percentages 
observed in experiment 1, which were of 77.42%, and of 69.35%, respectively). Elements 
from the provided description in the participants’ narratives were present in 40.14% of 
the cases (description groups 1 and 2). Some examples: 
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“A forest, animals trotting about together but also a bit of impending doom” 
Participant in the Non Simulation, Joy description condition, whose highest 
scores in the Joy / Determination piece were perceived Tenderness = 3,  
Perceived Pride = 2, Perceived Joy = 2; Induced Happy = 3,  
Induced Mellowed = 3, Induced Admiring = 3.  
 
 “I thought of myself on an adventure. I felt upbeat, excited and ready to explore. 
I imagined myself in woodlands, marching along with purpose.” 
Participant in the Non-Simulation, Determination description condition, whose 
highest scores in the Joy / Determination piece were perceived Pride = 4,  
Perceived Joy = 3; Induced Happy = 3, Induced Triumphant = 3. 
 
“It seemed like a motivational song, like after listening you wanted to get to 
work. It was very uplifting.” 
Participant in the Simulation, Determination description condition, whose 
highest scores in the Joy / Determination piece were perceived Pride = 4, 
Perceived Joy = 3;  
Induced Happy = 4, Induced Triumphant = 4. 
Finally, just like in experiment 1, many participants commented that the pieces 
reminded them of movie soundtracks (but only two participants explicitly guessed the 
movie were two the pieces belonged to). In most cases, the mental imagery that these 
associations evoked were not inspired by specific movies, but by associations with movie 
genres. The exception to this is the third piece where, just as in experiment 1, several 
participants commented that the music reminded it of the Lord of the Rings, or The 
Hobbit.  
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8.6 Discussion of results from experiment 2 
The aims of this experiment were to continue exploring the role of embodied simulation 
in emotional contagion with music, implementing an improved methodological 
strategy30; and to test new hypotheses about the mediating effects of contextual 
information, and of feelings of social affiliation in this phenomenon. 
 
8.6.1 Effects of Embodied Simulation, Musical Expertise, and 
Interactions 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that engaging in a mental task that activated motor simulation 
would lead to more emotional intensity than engaging in a mental task that prevented 
the activation of simulation mechanisms. The results of this experiment did not support 
this hypothesis. Just as in experiment 1, the predicted trend was observed in several of 
the dependent variables, but the effect was not large enough to be statistically 
significant. Similarly, hypothesis 4 predicted that being able to play an instrument 
present in the piece would facilitate simulation and be associated with stronger 
emotional experiences. This prediction was not supported by the results either.  
In my interpretation of the results of experiment 1, I speculated that only when the 
mimicry of the implied musicians’ gestures has some emotional connotation for the 
listener, would it facilitate the perception and induction of musical emotions. This 
interpretation led me to predict an interaction effect; namely, that participants who did 
the simulation task and read the emotional descriptions would have the most intense 
emotional experiences, and conversely, that participants who did the non-simulation 
task and read the neutral descriptions would have the least intense ones (hypothesis 3). 
This hypothesis was not supported by the data. In fact, reading an emotional description 
(as compared to reading a neutral description) did not have a significant effect on the 
intensity of the emotions reported by the participants. This finding suggests that other 
factors, not the presence or absence of emotional elements in the descriptions were 
more important in producing the participants’ emotional reactions. The emotional 
descriptions, as I explain in detail below, had an effect on the type of perceived and 
induced emotions, not on their intensity. 
                                                            
30
 I evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented methodology in the Conclusions chapter of the 
thesis.  
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Could these null results be attributed to the tasks having failed in generating the 
intended simulation and non-simulation conditions? I find this explanation unlikely. 
Previous research has shown that engaging in imagery of motor actions correlates with 
the activation of the same brain areas involved in performing those actions (Bangert et 
al., 2006; Jeannerod, 1995; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; Zatorre & Halpern, 2005), 
suggesting that the task designed to facilitate simulation was valid. And on the other 
hand, many of the free-descriptions provided by the participants of the non-simulation 
condition about what they thought while listening to the music, include comments 
about having noticed small glitches in the musical pieces, suggesting that they assumed 
the intended third-person perspective during the listening task. Moreover, these null 
results cannot be attributed to the participants having failed in performing the mental 
task adequately, because I only included in the analyses those participants who reported 
having followed the instructions correctly, without any distractions or interruptions.  
 
8.6.2 Effect of extra-musical information 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that providing participants with fictitious descriptions about the 
composer and his or her motivation to compose the music would bias the type of 
perceived and induced emotions they would experience. The results support this 
prediction. Even though reading an emotional description (as opposed to a neutral one) 
did not have an impact on the intensity of the reported emotions, the type of emotional 
description had a coherent effect on the quality of the perceived and induced emotions 
reported by the participants. This effect, however, was not equally marked in the three 
pieces: it was most clearly observed in the Sadness/Tenderness piece, where both 
perceived and induced emotions were biased by the descriptions. In the Fear/Pride and 
the Joy/Determination pieces the predicted trends are observed in the ratings of 
perceived and induced emotions and in the answers to the Action Tendencies 
questionnaire, but the differences between the groups are not always statistically 
significant. 
This mixed pattern of results can be in part attributed to the pieces having different 
levels of ambiguity: it is possible that the Sadness/Tenderness piece was more 
expressively ambiguous than the other two. In the case of the Fear/Pride piece, it is also 
conceivable that individual differences in the enjoyment of “scary” aesthetic stimuli and 
in musical training played an important role. Thus, participants with more musical 
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training and more tendency to enjoy dissonant and loud music probably found it easier 
to perceive this piece as expressive of pride, power, or triumph, and consequently to 
undergo the corresponding induced emotions. Whereas for participants who do not 
usually enjoy this kind of music, the stimulus was so aversive that they could only 
perceive it as “scary” and the music could only induce feelings of anxiety and fear. The 
results in the case of the Joy/ Determination piece in turn, may be due to the fact that 
there was not an adjective in the questionnaire explicitly asking participants to rate how 
“determined” they felt after listening to the piece. The closer option was to report 
feeling “triumphant, strong” but perhaps participants found it strange to report feelings 
of triumph when the description of the piece mentioned that the characters portrayed 
in the music were about to start their journey. Furthermore, these findings are also 
consistent with the fact that positive emotional states tend to be less differentiated, and 
that in most languages (including English) there are fewer emotional adjectives to 
describe nuances in positively valenced and high-arousal emotions than to describe 
negatively valenced emotions (Rozin, Berman, & Royzman, 2010).  
It is also worth noting that, in general terms the observed effect sizes were small, and 
that the significant differences were not always found between the neutral description 
group and the emotional description groups, but between the two emotional 
description groups. One possible explanation for this finding is that perhaps the 
emotional descriptions did not fit well with the musical materials. This possibility, 
however, is improbable. The results from the open-ended questions about what the 
participants thought about while listening to the music indicated that very few 
participants considered that descriptions did not match the music. Moreover, most 
participants who read the neutral descriptions evoked narratives and mental images 
that were compatible with the descriptions provided to the other two groups. Hence, a 
better interpretation of the results is that due to the artificial listening circumstances of 
the experiment, the descriptions had little power, but probably in real-life listening 
circumstances, many contextual and extra-musical clues can add up (e.g. the CD covers 
and booklets, lyrics, details about the musician’s biography, meaning of the social 
occasion, etc.), having a larger impact on the way listeners construct emotional 
meanings and emotional responses to the music. 
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8.7 General discussion 
8.7.1 Does Embodied Simulation Play a Crucial Role in Emotional 
Contagion with Music? 
Taken together, the results of these two experiments suggest that if motor embodied 
simulation plays a role in emotional experiences with music, this role is quite small, and 
probably masked by the effect of other mechanisms simultaneously activated during the 
listening episode. Indeed, the most influential contemporary theories on the induction 
of musical emotions, namely, the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 2013b) and the 
Multifactorial Process Model (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013) propose that there are multiple 
mechanisms or routes to emotion induction, but they have not fully specified under 
which circumstances each mechanism has predominant effects over others in the 
emotion-eliciting process. Future studies should therefore investigate which factors in 
the music, the person and the situation make embodied simulation the maximal 
mechanism for emotion induction. This line of research would help us understand why, 
for example, some people seem to derive great pleasure from “air-playing” while 
listening to music. Is this mimicry the cause, the consequence of the emotional reaction, 
or both? Is this effect only possible when music evokes positive emotional states? Is it 
due to a sense of enhanced personal agency, to a sense of synchronization with another 
real or virtual human being (Launay, Dean, & Bailes, 2013), or even to a sense of merged 
subjectivity with the music (Clarke, 2014)? To what extent does this pleasurable 
experience relate to the listener’s real ability to play the instruments? These are all 
interesting questions that await an empirical answer. 
My claim, however, is not that embodied simulation is not involved in music 
perception. The close link between perceiving, predicting, and executing motor actions 
has been demonstrated in several behavioural and neuroimaging studies (Chen et al., 
2008; Leman et al., 2009; Stupacher, Hove, Novembre, Schütz-Bosbach, & Keller, 2013); 
suggesting that perceiving musical sounds probably involves the activation of internal 
mimicry mechanisms, producing an implicit notion of music as an activity produced by 
human agency (Launay, 2015). In other words, it is likely that thanks to embodied 
simulation, we have an implicit understanding that the sounds (at least when coming 
from traditional musical instruments, not purely electronic ones) are the consequence of 
motor actions executed by other human bodies on sound-producing materials (including 
their own vocal tracts). 
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While it is possible that embodied simulation of motor actions plays a central role in 
music perception, my interpretation of the results of these two experiments is that this 
mechanism does not have consequences for the elicitation of emotional experiences 
with music, and if it does, its effects are very small. I dedicate the next paragraphs to 
articulate the arguments for this conclusion. These arguments resemble the criticisms 
independently proposed by several authors who have challenged the assumption that 
such complex psychological processes as empathy, mentalizing (i.e. “mind reading”), and 
social cognition in general, depend on internal mimicry of motor actions supported by 
mirror-neuron systems (Decety, 2010; Jacob, 2008; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005).  
The first argument is that having a first-person notion of the motor actions involved 
in playing a musical instrument or in producing a melody does not involve perceiving 
those actions and their associated sounds as embedded with emotional meanings. For 
example, it is conceivable that embodied simulation helps us understand that in order to 
make a musical instrument sound loud, the musician has to make a powerful bodily 
movement, but this implicit understanding of the immediate goal behind the musician’s 
action does not equate to inferring that the loud sound intends to communicate an 
emotion of anger, joy, despair, fear, hope, etc. According to this account, motor actions, 
like gestures, only acquire emotional meaning when they are placed in relation to the 
wider context in which they are observed or produced. While there is empirical evidence 
about this in the case of perception of faces (Barrett et al., 2011; Carroll & Russell, 1996) 
simply doing a mental experiment similar to the one proposed by Jacob and Jeanneord 
(Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005) demonstrates that the same principle can be applied to the 
case of bodily gestures and musical actions: consider how the same observed action 
(e.g. frowning, cutting someone’s abdomen with a scalpel, playing a trumpet loudly) has 
very different emotional goals and meanings according to the context in which they 
occur (frowning can communicate anger to an adversary, or physical exertion when 
lifting a heavy weight; cutting someone with a scalpel can be done by a psychopath 
torturing another person, or by a surgeon performing a surgery; playing a loud note in a 
trumpet loudly can have the intention of communicating joy, but also anger, etc.). 
Although the embodied mechanism explains how we perceive these actions as produced 
by human agents who performed particular bodily movements, it cannot by itself, 
explain what the emotional intention of the agents was. Inferring that intention requires 
accessing and processing more information about the observed person (or about the 
listened musical sound) and the context where the action (or music) takes place. 
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In the context of music listening, this argument has to be refined even further. The 
results from the second experiment suggest that the presence of a relevant emotional 
context, such as learning about the emotional intentions of the composer, is not enough 
to reinforce the effect of simulation. The participants who engaged in simulation and 
read emotional descriptions of the pieces, did not report more intense emotions than 
the participants who did not engage in simulation and read neutral descriptions. This 
observation suggests that if simulation is to have a reinforcing effect on the listeners’ 
emotional experience, it is necessary that they map the simulated movements and 
melodies onto emotional meanings. For instance, it is not enough that the listeners 
perceive that the piece expresses anger in general, it is necessary that they associate the 
specific movements that make the instruments sound loud and fast with the experience 
of producing an aggressive discharge of physical power against a rival. 
A second argument for the claim that motor simulation plays a small role in musical 
emotions, is that theories like that of Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (Molnar-Szakacs & 
Overy, 2006; Overy & Molnar-Szakacs, 2009), Jackendoff and Lerdahl (Jackendoff & 
Lerdahl, 2006) and Davies (Davies, 1994, 2013) reduce emotional experiences to 
behaviours or gestures, mistaking the part for the whole. Gestures and expressive 
behaviours are merely one of the components of emotional experiences, which always 
include the evaluation of an event as personally relevant for our goals within a given 
context (Clore & Ortony, 2013; Scherer, 2005). It follows that simulating or mimicking 
gestures or behaviours can only be at most, one contributing mechanism to the 
perception and induction of musical emotions amongst others, as proposed by the 
Multifactorial Process Model (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013) and the BRECVEMA theory 
(Juslin, 2013b). 
This reasoning can also help explain the finding that mimicry has limited effects on 
emotional elicitation. Both the experiments here reported, and previous studies in 
which participants mimicked observed emotional expressions, have found that this 
manipulation facilitates and biases the perception and induction of coherent affective 
states (i.e. changes in valence and arousal), but it does not lead to the induction of full-
blown emotional experiences (Flack, 2006; Hatfield et al., 1995; Hess & Blairy, 2001; 
Mcintosh, 2006; Neumann & Strack, 2000). This is true even in studies where 
participants observed and mimicked facial expressions, which are the type of stimuli 
with the greatest ability to communicate affective states (Russell et al., 2003). Hence it 
can be expected that more ambiguous stimuli like vocalizations, bodily gestures, and 
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musical sounds, should be even less effective in communicating and inducing discrete 
emotions via mimicry mechanisms. 
So far, my arguments have focused on the motor type of simulation, which consists 
in an internal mimicry of the actions performed by the musicians, not on vocal 
simulation, which consists in an internal mimicry of melodies. Admittedly, the results of 
the second experiment do not rule out that embodied simulation of the melodic aspects 
of the music has a role in the induction of emotional responses to music (as proposed by 
the BRECVEMA theory, Juslin, 2013b). However, it is worth noting that the results of 
experiment 1 do contradict this possibility: the participants who engaged in vocal 
simulation tended to have the least intense emotions of all the groups.  
Finally, my assertion that motor simulation makes a small contribution to emotional 
contagion with music does not preclude the possibility that other types of embodied 
mappings between music and motion occur while listening to music. It is probable, as 
Clarke has proposed (2005) that listening to music evokes the perception of objects in 
movement (including the listener’s own body), or that musical sounds involves the 
projection of the perceived sounds into supra-modal embodied metaphors as proposed 
by Johnson and Larson (2003). However, even if these theories are correct, they still face 
the same challenge that in my view, simulation theory has not met so far: specifying in 
detail how these virtual or metaphoric experiences of motion in music relate to, or 
acquire emotional meanings, and how they contribute to the induction of emotions. 
Clarifying how these embodied processes become “emotional” will allow researchers to 
test hypotheses in future studies.  
 
8.7.2 What Is the Role of Visual Imagery and Extra-Musical 
Semantic Information in Emotional Contagion with Music? 
In both experiments, the analyses of the participants’ answers to the question about 
what they thought while listening to the music indicate that the majority of them 
evoked visual images, and that the content of that imagery coincided with the type of 
perceived and induced emotions they experienced. These findings parallel the results of 
the experiment carried out by Vuoskoski and Eerola (2013), where the participants 
reported imagining scenes related to the narratives these researchers provided before 
listening to the music. For Vuoskoski and Eerola, this visual imagery mechanism (Juslin & 
Västfjäll, 2008) was activated by an interaction of the music and the provided narratives, 
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and led to the induction of emotional responses in the participants. In my view, the 
results of the present experiments make this explanation plausible, but incomplete. 
My interpretation is that while the visual imagery evoked by the participants might 
have contributed to their emotional experiences, this visual imagery was actually a 
consequence of a more basic process: the activation of semantic information primed by 
the musical materials, and by the descriptions. I based this conclusion in the following 
observations: first, it is possible that the visual imagery that the participants experienced 
was simply a consequence of the fact that the experiments did not have provided them 
with any meaningful visual stimulation while listening to the music (Thompson & 
Coltheart, 2008). Second, past research has shown that mental imagery can be 
considered an epiphenomenon, and is not directly implicated in tasks involving the use 
of abstract concepts (Pecher et al., 2009). Third, although there were high levels of 
agreement in the emotions they reported, in both experiments there was room for 
individual differences within the narratives and imagery that the participants evoked. 
Moreover, in the second experiment, the percentage of participants who explicitly 
mentioned (at least some) elements from the provided descriptions reached less than 
41% of the sample. This variation suggests that personal associations were powerful 
factors that drove the participants’ affective experience. However, at the same time, the 
high levels of agreement in the reported emotions indicate that these idiosyncratic 
narratives and imagery were first primed by shared cultural knowledge activated by the 
music (and by the provided descriptions, in the second experiment). 
 
8.7.3 Do the Observed Results Correspond to Emotional Contagion 
or to Empathy? 
The finding in experiment 1 that the ratings of enjoyment were the most important 
covariate in the results led me to suggest that the participants experienced the music as 
specifying a social other, and that this in turn might have provoked in them empathic 
attitudes towards this “virtual other”. In the second experiment, based on these 
considerations, I asked the participants about the social attitudes evoked by the musical 
pieces, in order to explore the possibility that what has been called emotional contagion 
with music can be better characterised as musical empathy. I discuss these two 
alternatives in this section.  
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8.7.3.1 The contagion alternative: 
According to the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 2013b), observing a correspondence 
between perceived and induced emotions is explained by an automatic process of 
internal mimicry whereby perceiving an emotion expressed by the music leads to the 
induction of the same discrete emotion. This theory claims that this mechanism leads to 
the induction of basic emotions, because the phylogenetic importance that these 
emotions have had in our evolution as a species is reflected in the way we perceive 
emotions in vocalizations and in music (Juslin, 2013c). If this theory is correct, it follows 
that basic emotions should be more easily perceived and aroused by music than other 
emotions, and that it should be less possible to change the type of emotion perceived 
and induced by manipulating the contextual information that the listener has access to.  
The results of the present experiments do not support these predictions, for several 
reasons. First, both experiments showed a “bleeding” effect: most participants did not 
choose only one category to rate their perceived and induced emotions; they chose 
several categories which were always compatible in terms of valence and/or arousal. 
While these results could be attributed to the ambiguous character of the stimuli used in 
these experiments, it should be noted that this effect has been found in many 
experiments on mimicry of facial and vocal expressions (Flack, 2006; Hatfield et al., 
1995; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Mcintosh, 2006; Neumann & Strack, 2000), and in previous 
experiments on induction of musical emotions in which the researchers used clearer 
stimuli (e.g. Juslin et al., 2013; Kallinen & Ravaja, 2006; Lundqvist, Carlsson, Hilmersson, 
& Juslin, 2009). 
A second argument against the claims of the BRECVEMA theory of emotional 
contagion is that the participants readily chose non-basic emotions to describe both the 
affective states expressed by the music, and aroused in themselves (e.g. Nostalgia, 
Pride, Transcendence, Mellowness). This cannot be attributed to the effect of the 
provided emotional descriptions in experiment 2, because this effect was also observed 
in the group of participants who read the neutral descriptions, and in experiment 1, 
where no descriptions were provided. It seems that just as it has been found in research 
with the perception of faces and voices (Russell et al., 2003), finding that basic emotions 
are privileged in the participants’ answers depends largely on using only basic emotions 
in the list of adjectives they have to choose from. 
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Third, the results of these two studies indicate that rather than mere perception and 
mimicry, appraisal mechanisms mediated the participants’ responses, producing 
emotions that did not correspond to the perceived emotion. In both experiments, the 
most evident example of this was the finding that many participants perceived the 
Fear/Pride piece to be expressive of “anger”, and reported feeling “anxious”. This type 
of responses cannot be attributed to mimicry (which would lead to induced “irritation” 
or feelings of “power, pride”) but to an evaluation of the musical stimulus as 
“threatening”, which elicited a defensive response of fear or anxiety.  
The activation of appraisal mechanisms can also be demonstrated in the mediating 
role that aesthetic evaluations and estimations of enjoyment had in the results, which in 
many cases made the difference between not responding emotionally to the music, and 
responding with a more or less strong emotion. For instance, some participants had the 
experience of perceiving that a piece of music expressed a particular emotion (e.g. joy, 
sadness, or pride), but reported feeling mostly “admiration, wonder” in response. Other 
participants in contrast, reported disliking the music, and in consequence they reported 
that it did not elicit any induced emotions, or at most, feelings of boredom and/or 
irritation. Furthermore, enjoyment ratings not only made the difference between having 
subdued or strong responses, but also influenced the type of induced emotions: for 
example, those participants who enjoyed the Fear/Pride piece reported feeling “strong, 
powerful, proud”, whereas those who did not, reported feeling either “anxious” or 
“irritated”. 
The authors behind the BRECVEMA theory, just like authors who defend the Basic 
Emotion theory in general (Ekman, 1992; Izard, 2009; Panksepp, 1992), would probably 
respond to these criticisms by arguing that this type of variability in participants' 
responses is to be expected because musical emotions (like emotions in general) 
interact with other mechanisms and contextual factors producing nuances in what was 
originally a basic emotion. However, in the face of this argument, one is left wondering: 
under which precise circumstances is the predicted correspondence between the 
perception and induction of basic emotions observable? Unless these circumstances and 
interactions are fully specified, the logical conclusion from this debate is that these 
authors are using what Popper called an ad-hoc hypothesis (1935/1992), that is, a 
strategy where a researcher evades the falsification of their original hypothesis by 
proposing unsupported adjustments.  
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An alternative, more parsimonious and fruitful alternative is to assume that music is 
only capable of expressing diffuse affective states, and therefore, if emotional contagion 
with music happens, we should expect to observe correspondence of expressed and 
induced emotions in terms of variations in core affect (i.e. valence and arousal), but not 
of discrete emotions. In fact, several authors have used the term “contagion” in this 
sense in their research (e.g. Egermann & McAdams, 2013; Evans & Schubert, 2008). In 
my view, in order to advance in the research of this phenomenon, it is necessary that 
future researchers make their theoretical assumptions more explicit. They need to 
specify if they are using the term “emotional contagion” in a merely descriptive sense 
(without any commitment to explaining how the observed correspondence is produced), 
or if they are using the term in a theoretical sense; and if so, whether they subscribe to a 
Basic Emotion approach, or to a Dimensional one. 
 
8.7.3.2 The empathy alternative: 
What evidence is there in these experiments for the presence of empathic responses in 
the participants? The answer depends on the definition of empathy one embraces.  
If we define empathy in a broad sense, namely, as sharing emotions that we perceive 
in another social agent (Preston & de Waal, 2002), then there is some evidence for the 
presence of empathy experiences in the second experiment: the two variables 
measuring social affiliation were significant covariates for several dependent measures 
(after removing ratings of enjoyment from the regression model). This finding parallels 
the results of Egermann & McAdams’ study (2013), who found that ratings of the extent 
to which the participants “empathised” with the musicians predicted a significant 
portion of the variance in felt valence and arousal, after removing the effect of 
preference.  
To some extent, the finding that social affiliation attitudes mediated the participants’ 
responses is not surprising. After all, there is abundant evidence that some of the 
functions that music fulfils in people’s lives are “social”: music works as a referent for 
the construction of social identity (DeNora, 2000; MacDonald, Hargreaves, & Miell, 
2002; Schäfer & Sedlmeier, 2010), music can enforce social communication (Livingstone 
& Thompson, 2009) and facilitates social cohesion (Schubert, 2009). From a wide 
perspective on empathy, then, it can be argued that since the listeners implicitly 
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experienced the music as evocative of social referents, then we can assume that 
emotional contagion with music involves the activation of empathic mechanisms.  
Despite these arguments, I find this conclusion unsatisfactory. In my view, adopting 
such a broad definition of empathy does not allow us to distinguish instances of 
contagion from instances of empathy, making the empathy construct less useful. I 
propose, following the proposals of Coplan (2011) and of de Vignemont and Singer 
(2006) that we reserve the term “musical empathy” for those cases in which the listener 
is explicitly aware of the presence of another (real or imagined) social agent, to whom 
he or she attributes the ownership of the feelings that the music portrays. Hence, in an 
empathic response, the listener activates both cognitive mechanisms, (in order to 
distinguish oneself from the observed other, and to simulate the observed person’s 
appraisal of the emotional event); and affective mechanisms, in order to feel the same 
as the other person. 
If we adopt this narrow definition, then the results of these experiments do not 
support the empathy hypothesis, as indicated by three pieces of evidence. First, in the 
first experiment, the ratings of trait empathy did not significantly correlate with any of 
the dependent variables. Second, in the second experiment, having or not having 
information about the composer’s motivations did not make a difference in the intensity 
of the participants’ emotional reactions. Third, less than half of the participants who 
read the emotional narratives explicitly mentioned elements from them in the 
descriptions of their thoughts while listening to the music. And even among those who 
included elements from the provided narratives in their descriptions, the number of 
participants who explicitly mention the composer is a minority. If empathy involves 
making a distinction between self and other, and explicitly assuming that the feelings 
aroused in oneself belonged to someone else originally, then empathic responses were 
the exception, rather than the rule in these experiments.  
This conclusion contradicts somewhat the findings of previous research into music 
and empathy. Vuoskoski and colleagues (2012) have found that trait empathy is related 
to more intense emotional reactions and enjoyment of sad music. Nevertheless, while 
this finding can be interpreted as indicating that listeners somehow empathise with the 
sad-sounding musicians (or virtual personae), it is also plausible that empathic people 
are simply more emotionally susceptible to displays of suffering in art, without 
necessarily engaging in imagining a real or virtual person undergoing the painful 
experience. Miu & Baltes (2012) found that listeners who adopted an empathic attitude 
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towards an observed singer had stronger physiological responses and more intense 
induced emotions. However, these authors did not control the effect that watching the 
performer’s gestures could have in the empathic responses, and therefore, it is not 
possible to attribute the effects to the music only. Similarly, Wöllner (2012) found that 
participants with higher degrees of trait empathy were better at identifying the 
moments when the musicians of a string quartet were playing more “expressively”, but 
only in the visual and audiovisual versions of the stimuli. Moreover I consider Wöllner’s 
definition of empathy inappropriate. In his study, he regarded empathy as the ability to 
identify the intensity of an observed emotion, without considering the correct 
identification of that emotion, nor the induction of the same response in the observers.  
To my knowledge, the only previous study where there is evidence of the mediation 
of empathic attitudes in emotional responses to music using auditory-only stimuli is the 
above-mentioned study by Egermann and McAdams (2013).These authors found that 
the ratings of the extent to which the participants empathised with the listeners were 
significant predictors of induced affect. This is an intriguing finding, but it does not settle 
the discussion, because their study does not provide all the information needed to 
establish empathy, according to the narrow definition proposed above. First, in 
Egermann and McAdam’s study, the participants’ induced emotions were only measured 
in terms of valence and arousal, so it is not possible to evaluate the extent to which a 
one-to-one correspondence between observed and induced emotion occurred. Second, 
the authors did not explore the participants’ thoughts and imagery while listening to the 
music, so it is not possible to know if they were imagining a real or virtual person whose 
feelings were being portrayed by the music. And third, the authors included musical 
stimuli with and without lyrics, making it impossible to know whether the participants 
reacted empathically to the stories portrayed in the lyrics, or to the musical sounds.  
What can we conclude from this discussion about whether the results should be 
regarded as contagion or as empathy? 
First, it is safe to conclude that in most cases, the results of these experiments 
corresponded to instances of contagion, not of empathy. This emotional contagion, 
however, does not correspond to an automatic, unmediated one-to-one-mirroring 
response as proposed by the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 2013b) and the Perception-
Action model (Preston & de Waal, 2002). On the contrary, emotional contagion in these 
experiments was mediated by preferences, aesthetic appraisals, considerations of social 
affiliation, and by the activation of personal associations and culturally-shared semantic 
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concepts. This observation suggests that just like previously found in mimicry responses 
to facial stimuli (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008), emotional contagion with music is always a 
contextualized response (Hess & Fischer, 2014; A. Miu & Vuoskoski, in press). 
Consequently, explanations of emotional contagion in terms of only simulation or 
mimicry cannot account for how bottom-up responses (driven by the perception of a 
stimulus) interact with previous knowledge (driven by the activation of semantic 
information about the music’s meaning, its aesthetic value, and its social affiliation 
connotations), producing the emergence of an emotional response that matches the 
emotion expressed by the music.  
A second conclusion from this discussion is that in order to advance in this line of 
research, adopting a rather “narrow” definition of empathy could prove to be more 
useful than adopting a wide one. This would allow us to clearly distinguish these two 
phenomena, and similar ones, like the experiences of subjectivity blending with music 
described by Clarke (2014). Moreover, it can be argued that only this level of theoretical 
clarity will allow us to answer important questions such as whether and how it is 
possible that music elicits empathic (or sympathetic) responses towards other human 
beings, and/or motivate altruist behaviours. 
Future studies should also continue exploring how social affiliation connotations of 
music relate to, and are different from aesthetic judgements and enjoyment 
evaluations, using more direct manipulations to “disentangle” the effects of these 
factors (rather than statistical techniques like the ones used by Egermann and 
McAdams, 2013). One interesting possibility is to study the emotional responses to 
pieces of music that people experience as “guilty pleasures”, that is, music that people 
experience as enjoyable, but at the same time, of little aesthetic value, and/or as 
potentially shameful in the eyes of the members of their social group. Using this type of 
stimuli would allow researchers to weight the relative influence that perceiving 
emotions in the music, and the activation of social affiliation considerations has in 
emotional contagion. Likewise, in order to better understand the relation between 
contagion and empathy to music, it would be necessary to test the extent to which 
contagion responses can be prevented from occurring if the participant cannot 
empathise with the person portrayed in the music. For example, would listeners still 
become infected by the sadness expressed by a piece of music, if they learned that the 
music was composed by a morally despicable person (e.g. a rapist, a terrorist, a thief)? In 
all of these cases, it will be necessary to combine the use of direct and indirect measures 
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of affect, and open-ended questions, in order to have a complete picture of the implicit 
and explicit mechanisms involved in these phenomena. 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
The results of the two experiments that comprise this study suggest that embodied 
simulation of melodies and of the implied motor actions performed by the musicians do 
not play a significant role in the phenomenon of emotional contagion with music. They 
also indicate that emotional contagion with music is a mediated phenomenon where 
factors such as contextual information about the composer, appraisals of social 
affiliation, estimations of enjoyment, evaluations of aesthetic value, personal 
associations, and socially-shared semantic concepts influence the intensity and quality 
of the perceived and induced emotions that listeners experience. These mediating 
factors, however, should not be regarded as evidence that emotional contagion with 
music corresponds to a type of empathic response. 
 
  
260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Conclusions, implications, and 
further directions 
This thesis had three aims. First, to propose a constructionist theory to explain induction 
of musical emotions. Second, to test some of the empirical predictions derived from this 
theoretical framework. And third, to explore the validity of alternative techniques for 
measuring musically-induced emotions. In this final chapter I evaluate the extent to 
which the thesis achieved these aims, I discuss their implications, and the questions that 
future research will need to address. 
 
9.1 Evaluation of my Constructionist Theory of Musically-
Induced Emotions 
The two most influential contemporary theories about the induction of musical 
emotions, Juslin and colleagues’ BRECVEMA theory (Juslin, 2013a; Juslin et al., 2010; 
Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008), and Scherer and colleagues’ Multifactorial Process Model 
(Scherer, 2004; Scherer & Coutinho, 2013; Scherer & Zentner, 2001), agree in the 
premise that emotional responses to music emerge from the interaction of factors in the 
music, in the listening situation, and in the individual. However, my examination of these 
theories in the second and third chapters revealed that their account of emotion 
elicitation comprises almost exclusively intra-individual processes. As a consequence of 
this psychological reductionist approach, these theories have neglected the cultural 
dimension of music as symbolic object, and the variability that is inherent to all 
emotional phenomena. The BRECVEMA theory, in particular, has two further limitations: 
it lacks details about how the mechanisms interact with each other, and it predicts that 
some of these mechanisms, on their own, can lead to the induction of discrete 
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emotions, regardless of any consideration about how the personal and situational 
context in which music listening occurs interact with them. 
The main challenge that this thesis took up was to propose a theoretical alternative 
that could overcome these limitations in the BRECVEMA and the Multifactorial Process 
theories. For this, I made use of the theoretical principles proposed by contemporary 
constructionist theories of emotion elicitation, (emphasising Barrett’s Conceptual Act 
Theory (Barrett, 2006b), and I adapted them to the phenomena of musical emotions. To 
my knowledge, this is the first time someone has attempted to propose a theory of 
musically-induced emotions based on these principles. I consider these to be the main 
achievements of my proposal:  
1. My theory assumes a non-reductionist approach. The central premise of my 
approach is that music is a cultural artefact that has effects on basic embodied 
processes of perception, and at the same time, on cognitively-sophisticated 
processes of meaning-making, which integrate personal and socially-shared 
referents. Hence, my theory integrates mechanisms beyond individual 
psychological processes. It provides detailed hypotheses about how musical 
emotions arise from the interaction of intra-individual mechanisms (e.g. neural 
resonance, motor simulation and goal-relevance), with mechanisms activated by 
the symbolic value of music (e.g. semantic concepts related to cultural 
connotations of music), and with mechanisms activated by situational and 
“extra-musical” factors (e.g. meaning of the listening situation, lyrics). 
2. My theory is well-suited for explaining emotional variability. Since my theory 
proposes that emotional experiences and musical meanings are not determined 
by structural factors in the listener’s biology nor in the acoustic characteristics of 
the music, it assumes that affective responses to music are characterised by 
their variety, and strives to explain it. My constructionist theory addresses 
emotional variation at several levels: it makes predictions about the processes 
that generate different levels of affective intensity (from mild and diffuse 
affective responses, to intense and full-blown emotions), predictions about the 
processes that produce qualitatively different affective responses (e.g. world-
focused vs. self-focused, perceived vs. induced, tenderness vs. sadness, etc.), 
and predictions about how situational and cultural variations are associated 
with different types of affective experiences with music, within the limits of the 
affordances of the musical materials. Moreover, this emphasis in variability also 
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suggests that the principles outlined in my theory can be extended to 
understand how listeners build non-emotional meanings when they listen to 
music. 
3. My theory represents a unified theoretical framework. My theory builds upon 
the proposals made by the BRECVEMA and the Multifactorial Process theories, 
by integrating several of the mechanisms they propose. However, unlike these 
theories, my proposal explains how the mechanisms interact with each other, 
shaping the person’s affective responses. 
4. My theory is parsimonious. Despite its apparent complexity, my theory can be 
regarded as a simplification of the proposals made by the BRECVEMA theory –
which proposes eight mechanisms of emotion induction, each one associated 
with particular affective responses (Juslin, 2013a), and three types of coding 
associated with expression of musical emotions (Juslin, 2013c); and of the 
Multifactorial Process Model –which proposes six routes to emotion elicitation, 
including nine appraisal checks (Scherer & Coutinho, 2013). My theory, by 
contrast, integrates mechanisms into two subtypes, corresponding to the two 
core systems proposed by Barrett, 2006). First, mechanisms that produce 
changes in core affect, (which correspond to processes of perceptual 
organisation, involving process of bodily resonance, prediction and primitive 
affective evaluation). Second, conceptual mechanisms that transform core-affect 
into a variety of emotional and non-emotional experiences, (which correspond 
to processes of personal and cultural meaning-making, involving associative 
processing and cognitive appraisals). Moreover, my theory assumes that the 
same principles underlie experiences of perceiving emotions in the music, and 
the elicitation of emotion by music, and proposes that experiencing one or the 
other depends on mechanisms of attention deployment. 
5. My theory integrates bodily and mental aspects of affective response to music. 
By embracing the proposals of embodied theories of cognition (Barsalou, 2003; 
Leman & Maes, 2014), and proposals about the embodied nature of the 
representations involved in affective processing (Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 
2011), my theory establishes links between bodily responses to music, such as 
patterns of muscular tension and motor entrainment (which tend to be 
primitive, non-conscious and involuntary), and “mental” responses, such as 
263 
 
 
 
personal memories and cultural connotations (which tend to be cognitively 
sophisticated, conscious, and susceptible to volition). 
In addition to these five features, my theory answers the three essential questions that 
according to Moors (2009), every theory of emotion elicitation should answer: 
The elicitation question arises from the observations that some but not all stimuli (in 
this case, not all musical stimuli) elicit an emotion; and that at times, the same 
stimulus leads to the emergence of an emotion, and on other occasion it does 
not.  
Although the emergence of an emotional episode is caused by so many factors 
that it is virtually impossible to model them all, my theory suggests that three 
decisive factors make it more probable that a person experiences an emotion 
while listening to music. First, that personal-relevant associations are activated 
by the music or by other elements in the listening situation. Second, that the 
appraisals of goal relevance evaluate something in the music and/or the 
situation as pertinent enough for the person’s goals. Third, that the person 
adopts a self-focused, deep mode of attention. 
The intensity question refers to the observation that emotions vary in magnitude from 
no intensity to very high intensity.  
The answer to this question in my theory is similar to the previous one. The 
more a musical event evokes personally-relevant associations, and is evaluated 
as central to the person’s goals, the more intense the emotional reaction will be. 
Additionally, variations in the intensity of affective experiences with music can 
also arise from changes in core affect produced by bodily states, such as 
variations in arousal induced by physical exertion (as demonstrated by Dibben, 
2004).  
The differentiation question concerns the variability in emotional quality, that is, the 
observation that emotions vary in valence (pleasurable and unpleasurable), and 
in type (e.g. joy, sadness, pride, etc.). 
According to my theory, variations in valence arise in part from quick appraisals 
of the goodness/badness specified by the musical materials, but valence is also 
constantly shaped by other factors in the music, the person, and the situation. 
Thus, associative processes such as conditioning, the activation of semantic 
concepts, and the evocation of personal memories all contribute to produce 
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changes in levels of pleasure and displeasure. Additionally, processes of 
appraisal, including evaluations of goal relevance, control, and aesthetic 
judgements, have an impact on valence.  
Similarly, the variability in the type of emotions that music can elicit depends on 
complex interactions between the fluctuations of core-affect induced by music, 
and the way those fluctuations are shaped into emotional and non-emotional 
experiences by associative and appraisal mechanisms. This variability, however, 
tends to be restricted by the variations in core affect specified by the musical 
materials.  
 
9.1.1 Similarities and differences with other theories 
It is necessary to acknowledge that my proposal does not constitute a completely new 
theory with radically different constructs and premises. On the contrary, there are 
probably as many points of encounter as there are differences between my theory and 
the BRECVEMA and the Multifactorial Process Model. I summarise the main ones below. 
 
9.1.1.1 The BRECVEMA and the Multifactorial Process theories: 
To a great extent, my theory consists of a reorganisation of the mechanisms proposed 
by the BRECVMA and the Multifactorial Process theories. However, I also include some 
mechanisms that are not present in those frameworks, such as the mechanisms of 
neural resonance, the learning mechanisms of mere exposure and enculturation, the 
activation of semantic concepts, and the activation of associative processes due to the 
influence of extra-musical information. Furthermore, unlike the BRECVEMA theory, (but 
like the Multifactorial Process Model), I explicitly include appraisal mechanisms. 
One of the main differences with the BRECVEMA theory is the premise, central to my 
proposal, that emotions always involve elements of personal relevance. This assumption 
implies that mechanisms that only produce low-level affective responses such as 
rhythmic entrainment and musical expectancy cannot lead to the induction of full-blown 
emotions without the contribution of associative processes. Therefore, unlike the 
BRECVEMA theory, I predict that no mechanism can lead to the induction of emotions 
on its own. (Except the episodic memories mechanism, which directly involves the 
reinstatement of past emotional experiences).  
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My theory includes the notion that our brains and bodies engage in a sort of 
“resonance” with the music. Even though this proposal keeps some similarities to the 
theory of emotional contagion proposed by the BRECVEMA theory, the two concepts are 
fundamentally different. The notion of resonance that I propose should be understood 
in terms of a neural and bodily attunement to the characteristics of the music, which 
involves processes of prediction and evaluation of the significance of the stimulus for 
the person’s well-being. This resonance is constantly modulated by conceptual 
mechanisms, producing a variety of emotional and non-emotional responses even when 
the music is perceived by the listener as expressive of particular emotions. The theory of 
emotional contagion proposed by Juslin and colleagues, by contrast, regards contagion 
as a process of “internal mimicry” of a basic emotion expressed by the music, which 
leads to the induction of the same basic emotion in the listener (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008, 
p. 565). Moreover, although this theory acknowledges that musical emotions are 
influenced by contextual and personal factors, it does not make any predictions about 
how emotional contagion is mediated by other mechanisms, giving the impression that 
the process of contagion is automatic and unavoidable. 
There are many similarities between my approach and Scherer’s Multifactorial 
Process Model. Besides the already-mentioned inclusion of appraisal mechanisms in my 
proposal, there is a resemblance between Scherer and Zentner’s classification of the 
mechanisms into peripheral and central (2001), and my proposal of organising them into 
core-affect and conceptual mechanisms. For Scherer and Zentner, the peripheral 
category includes effects of music on the autonomous nervous system, rhythmic 
entrainment, and facilitation of pre-existing emotions, whereas the central category 
includes appraisals, memory, and empathy. By contrast, my proposal of core-affect 
mechanisms includes primitive appraisal mechanisms, and details about how bodily 
resonance to music occurs, which are not present in their theory. Additionally, unlike 
their “central mechanisms” category, which constitutes a different route to emotion 
elicitation, the conceptual mechanisms category I propose is inherently related to the 
core affect category. In my view, conceptual mechanisms shape core affect fluctuations, 
and therefore, both types of mechanisms are always active in the emergence of an 
emotional episode.  
A further difference between my approach and the Multifactorial Process Model is 
that I do not explicitly include the facilitation and empathy mechanisms in my proposal, 
because I regard them as special cases that can be explained by the processes I included 
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in the rest of the theory. Thus, instances of facilitation of emotion are simply occasions 
where the combination of musical and contextual factors make the affective value of the 
situation be represented in several components at the same time (motor, somatic, 
cognitive, motivational, subjective feeling), producing the emergence of a discrete 
emotional episode (Clore & Ortony, 2008). Instances of empathy, on the other hand, can 
be regarded as situations where the listener focuses her attention on the (real or 
imagined) musician(s), and activates associative mechanisms such as narratives about 
the musician’s feelings, thus adopting an empathic attitude that increases the 
probability of undergoing an emotional episode. 
Another subtle, but important difference between my approach and the 
Multifactorial Process Model is that my theory, in line with the claims of the Conceptual 
Act Theory, puts more emphasis on associative mechanisms than on rule-based 
appraisals. One reason for this is that constructionist approaches assume that emotion 
elicitation rarely occurs because the evaluation of a completely new stimulus triggers a 
process of appraisal, as proposed by appraisal theories such as Scherer’s CPM (Scherer, 
2013). By contrast, theorists such as Russell (2003) and Barrett (2006b) emphasise that 
the previous context of the organism biases the ongoing evaluation and adaptation to 
the environment that is constantly reflected in core affect. Therefore, from this point of 
view there is never an affective-less “starting point” before an emotion is elicited (not 
even in the context of an experimental laboratory). This makes the sequence of 
appraisal checks that are central to Scherer’s theory unnecessary, because the organism 
has already “pre-appraised” the meaning of the situation even before the new stimulus 
is encountered, and this previous affective context biases the perception of the new 
stimulus from the very beginning (Lebrecht et al., 2012). A second reason for my 
emphasis on associative processing is that in my theory, I have adopted Barrett’s 
proposal that emotions involve the reinstatement of information from similar past 
experiences which becomes tailored to the present situation. This again implies that 
much of the information that appraisal checks provide in Scherer’s model is already 
contained in the information that becomes activated by the associative processes.  
A final difference with the Multifactorial Process Model is that my adaptation of the 
principles of constructionist theories implies that even everyday “regular” emotions are 
not exclusively determined by rule-based appraisals, and that musical emotions can be 
explained by ordinary processes such as perception, affective evaluation, and 
conceptual processing. Moreover, the consensual definition of emotion that I proposed 
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in the first chapter, and the inclusion of appraisals in my theory also imply that 
musically-induced emotions involve evaluations of personal relevance, just like ordinary, 
“utilitarian emotions” (Scherer, 2004). All of these considerations make the distinction 
between affective responses to aesthetic stimuli, and affective responses to other 
stimuli, circumstantial. In consequence, I do not deem it necessary to establish 
musically-induced emotions as a special “aesthetic” category, as Scherer has proposed 
(2004). I consider that establishing such a boundary increases the risk of isolating 
research into musical emotions from the developments of general affective science, to 
the detriment of both. 
 
9.1.1.2 Other theories of induction of emotion by music: 
Two other theories of induction of affective responses to music deserve mention 
because of their similarities to my proposals: Thompson and Coltheart’s dual processing 
proposal (2008), and Flaig and Large’s theory of dynamic musical communication of core 
affect (2014).  
The first of these theories appears in the comments section to Juslin and Västfjäll’s 
seminal paper from 2008, where Thompson and Coltheart suggest that the mechanisms 
proposed in the main paper should be organised into two categories: signal detection 
mechanisms, which induce emotion by “directly detecting emotive signals in music” 
(including brain stem responses, expectancy, and evaluative conditioning), and 
amplification mechanisms, which amplify (i.e. intensify) the output of signal detection 
mechanisms (including episodic memories, and visual imagery, and emotional 
contagion) (Thompson & Coltheart, 2008, pp. 597–598). There is a similarity between 
the notion that signal detection mechanisms tend to be automatic and focused on the 
music, and my proposal of core-affect mechanisms as perceptual mechanisms inevitably 
activated by music listening. However, not only do I provide many details about how this 
dynamic occurs which are absent in Thompson and Coltheart’s proposal, but also my 
proposal about the role of conceptual mechanisms goes beyond a mere amplification of 
an emotion that has already been generated. In my theory, conceptual mechanisms 
transform the musically-induced fluctuations in core affect by making them more 
personally relevant, specific, and intentional (i.e. providing them an object). 
Flaig and Large’s theory of communication of core affect (2014) proposes that the 
patterns of neural resonance activated during music perception can be disrupted by the 
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violation of musical expectancies in the musical material, leading to modulations of core 
affect. As I noted in chapter 5, my theory of how music perception emerges from 
patterns of neural resonance is based on proposals such as Large’s (Large & Almonte, 
2012; Large & Kolen, 1994). However, my identification of sources of fluctuation in core 
affect includes many mechanisms that Flaig and Large do not consider in their proposal. 
Moreover, the complete absence in their theory of mechanisms that provide affective 
responses to music with elements of personal, situational, and cultural specificity, make 
their proposal a psychological reductionist one, and therefore, very different from my 
approach. 
 
9.1.1.3 The Conceptual Act Theory: 
Evidently, this comparison of my theory with others would not be complete without 
evaluating its differences with Barrett’s Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett, 2006b), the 
main theoretical source on which I based my proposal.  
The main difference between my proposal and Barrett’s, is the explicit inclusion of 
appraisal mechanisms in my theory. One of the strongest criticisms that constructionist 
approaches like Barrett’s (2006b) and Russell’s (2003) have received, is that they do not 
specify how the changes in core affect come to happen, and in consequence, the 
identification of the eliciting object of the emotion seems to be a matter of 
interpretation or decision by the individual after the changes in core affect have 
happened (Deonna & Scherer, 2009; Scarantino, 2015). Although it could be argued that 
this criticism applies more to Russell’s than to Barrett’s approach (see section 4.2.2 in 
chapter 4 for more details), I sympathise with the observation that these theories should 
provide more details about the processes that generate changes in core affect.  
With these considerations in mind, I strived to specify the processes and mechanisms 
that produce changes in each of the two basic dimensions of core affect, a decision that 
distances my proposal from Barrett’s, and places it near appraisal theories31. However, 
at the same time, unlike appraisal theories, I suggest that appraisal processes are only 
one of the components involved in this dynamic, and probably not the main one. 
                                                            
31 These similarities between my theory and appraisal theories should not come as a surprise, 
if we consider that in general terms, constructionist and appraisal approaches have many 
elements in common, and the disagreements between them are not as large as the 
disagreements they both have with Basic Emotion theories (Brosch, 2013; Gross & Barrett, 2011). 
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Additionally, since I do not make assumptions about the chronological order in which 
appraisals occur, and I propose that the evaluations of the affective value situation tend 
to be largely produced by associative mechanisms, my proposal shares the assumption 
of other constructionist approaches such as Clore and Ortony, where appraisals are 
regarded as components of emotional experiences, but not their cause (Clore & Ortony, 
2013). 
9.2 Evaluation of empirical findings 
The constructionist theory of musically-induced emotions I presented is undeniably 
ambitious and encompassing. Therefore, I explored just a few of the hypotheses derived 
from this framework in the empirical studies. The decision as to which phenomena to 
explore was motivated by the opportunity they represented to test the central claim 
that core affect and conceptual mechanisms produce different types of variation in the 
listeners’ affective experience, and modulate each other producing a variety of 
emotional responses. Thus, the first and second experiments studied the core-affect 
mechanisms of rhythmic entrainment and embodied simulation, which involve engaging 
in explicit or implicit motor and vocal responses to music. And the second and third 
experiments studied how embodied simulation is modulated by associative mechanisms 
such as semantic concepts and extra-musical information. In this section I summarise 
the main conclusions from the empirical studies of the thesis, and I analyse their 
implications for my theory.  
 
9.2.1 Experiment 1: Rhythmic Entrainment and Pleasure 
The first aim of this experiment was to study the effects of bodily movements while 
listening to music on the elicitation of affective responses. For this, I compared a group 
of participants who listened to rhythmic musical stimuli while tapping along with their 
foot, with a group of participants who listened to the same stimuli while staying still. The 
second aim was to replicate the findings of Witek et al. (2014) in which listening to 
music with intermediate syncopation levels was associated with more intense 
experiences of induced pleasure, as compared with music with low and high syncopation 
levels. The findings indicated that, contrary to the prediction, listening to the music 
while engaging in motor entrainment, compared to listening while staying still (which 
involves perceptual but not motor entrainment), did not have a positive effect on the 
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participants’ ratings of core affect. In contrast, the prediction about the association of 
intermediate syncopation levels with higher ratings of pleasure was supported by the 
data. 
In spite of the methodological limitations that might have caused the partially null 
results, the discussion of the results of this experiment showed the fruitfulness of 
adopting the view that the phenomena of rhythmic entrainment, musical expectancy, 
and motor planning arise from the same perceptual principles. According to this 
interpretation, rhythmic entrainment emerges from the tendency to synchronize motor 
responses to oscillating events in the music (Colling & Thompson, 2013). This 
synchronization involves a process of prediction that generates subjective feelings of 
expectancy and urges to move along to the music. In turn, these predictions and motor 
planning responses can be disrupted by syncopated events, generating fluctuations in 
core affect (Flaig & Large, 2014), which as my findings suggested, are experienced as 
changes in pleasure and tension arousal (but not in energetic arousal). Additionally, 
engaging in overt synchronized movements to the music involves additional mechanisms 
of prediction-correction that produce subjective experiences of difficulty synchronizing 
with the music. The results of the experiment suggested that these feelings can be so 
powerful that they can overrun the pleasure derived from listening to music with 
intermediate levels of syncopation. 
One important implication of these findings for my theoretical proposal, is that 
contrary to what I speculated in chapter 5, the phenomenon of rhythmic entrainment 
(at least in the modality of perceptual entrainment) can produce changes in the valence 
component of core affect, and not only in the arousal component. Thanks to the 
involvement of quick and implicit processes of appraisal, stimuli with intermediate levels 
of syncopation generate an ideal level of tension between the confirmation and the 
violation of predictions about where the next rhythmic event will occur, and this in turn 
generates pleasurable urges to move in time with the music (Witek et al., 2014). Future 
studies should explore how musical stimuli that contain very few violations of 
expectancies (e.g. polka music) can still generate action tendencies to engage in motor 
entrainment, and positive changes in valence and arousal. 
Although in this experiment I did not explore the extent to which the affective 
responses of the participants could be better described in terms of diffuse fluctuations 
of core affect, or as discrete emotions, one observation suggests that the participants’ 
responses did not go beyond fleeting experiences of changes in valence and arousal. I 
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speculated that the null results were in part due to the fact that the participants did not 
find the drum-breaks “musical enough” (i.e. they perceived them as artificial, or lacking 
expressivity). Consequently, it can be assumed that the lack of personally-relevant 
elements in the music and the listening situation, prevented the re-instatement of past 
emotionally meaningful simulations, and therefore, the participants’ responses to the 
stimuli were limited to barely noticeable variations in core affect. A second interesting 
implication of this finding is that it highlights the importance that aesthetic appraisals of 
the quality of the music have in the elicitation of emotional responses. I return to this 
point later.  
 
9.2.2 Experiments 2 and 3: Embodied Simulation, Emotional 
Contagion, and Extra-Musical Information 
The study comprised by the two experiments reported in chapters 7 and 8 investigated 
the extent to which emotional contagion with music is engendered by embodied 
simulation, and by the activation of semantic concepts, two mechanisms associated with 
the core affect level of processing, and with the conceptual level, correspondingly.  
I examined two hypotheses about the type of embodied simulation involved in 
emotional contagion with music. The first was based on the theoretical suggestions I 
made in chapter 5, about how music perception involves processes of motor planning 
(i.e. motor simulation); and on Scherer and Coutinho’s (2013) proposal that observing 
the motor expressions of the musicians can induce motor mimicry, which in turn can 
lead to contagion responses. Thus, I predicted that if this type of mimicry was facilitated 
(by asking participants to either mimic or imagine themselves making the implied 
movements made by the performers), this bodily involvement with the music would 
generate higher levels of arousal, and therefore, more intense emotional responses. The 
competing hypothesis, based on a hypothesis from the BRECVEMA theory (Juslin & 
Västfjäll, 2008), predicted that asking participants to mimic the music’s melody would 
have the same facilitating effect, because this mimicry of acoustic features associated 
with the expression of a basic emotion would lead to the induction of the same emotion 
in the listener. 
The results of these experiments gave little support to these hypotheses. The results 
suggested that these simulation mechanisms do not have a significant effect on the 
intensity of the emotions that people experience while listening to music. In line with 
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the theoretical proposal I proposed, I interpreted this finding as evidence that embodied 
simulation could only have emotional effects if the listeners map the mimicked 
movements onto emotional meanings, (for instance, by experiencing the violinist’s 
actions necessary to make a crescendo as an intensification of feelings of power or 
anger). However, this facilitating effect was not observed when participants read 
emotional descriptions of the music. This suggests that contrary to the claims of my 
theoretical framework, the embodied processes that generate musical percepts are 
considerably independent of the associative processes that enrich the listening 
experience with emotional meanings.  
An alternative explanation of the finding that embodied simulation did not facilitate 
the elicitation of emotion, is that we do not really simulate the specific implied 
movements and melodies made by the musicians when we listen to music. This 
interpretation suggests that the activation of pre-motor brain areas that has been 
observed in neuroimaging studies (Brown & Martinez, 2007; Chen et al., 2008) 
corresponds to representations of abstract notions of movement, tension, release, etc. 
that are not necessarily associated with a single sensorimotor modality. This possibility, 
proposed by embodied metaphor theories such as Johnson and Larson (2003) implies 
that mimicking the specific movements and melodies performed by the musicians is not 
only difficult, but to some extent unnecessary, because the type of motion that is 
specified by music is better captured by movements similar to those observed in 
spontaneous dance (i.e. moving parts of the body in ways that represent patterns of as 
ascend, descend, acceleration, etc. specified by the music). This is an interesting 
possibility that should be explored in future investigations into the relationship between 
bodily movements and music, such as the ones conducted at the University of Jyväskylä 
(e.g. Luck et al., 2014). However, to my knowledge, no experiment so far has addressed 
the question of how these mappings of musical patterns onto movements acquire 
emotional significance, and contribute to the induction of emotional responses. 
Both experiments supported the hypothesis that personal associations, cultural 
connotations of music and extra-musical information shape the participants’ affective 
responses producing a variety of emotional experiences. In my interpretation of the 
results I argued that the main mechanism behind this effect was the activation of 
semantic associations, and that the visual imagery mechanism proposed by the 
BRECVEMA theory was secondary to these associations. Admittedly, however, these 
experiments provide only partial evidence for this claim. Stronger evidence for the 
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independence of these two mechanisms could be obtained from future experiments 
that isolate both processes, by for example, asking participants to listen to the music 
while observing a non-emotionally meaningful video (preventing the generation of 
idiosyncratic visual imagery and the construction of narratives), and examining if their 
emotional responses still suggest that the music activated semantic concepts that biased 
their perception and induction of emotions. 
The finding that semantic concepts mediated the participants’ responses supports 
my claim that emotional contagion is not exclusively determined by the acoustic 
characteristics of the music, or their resemblance to the expression of an emotion, but 
mediated by personal and socially shared associations. Contrary to the claims of the 
BRECVEMA theory (Juslin & Västfjäll, 2008), the participants perceived and underwent 
basic and non-basic emotions biased by the semantic information they had access to. 
Furthermore, it was observed that perceiving an emotion expressed by the music did 
not always correlate with the induction of the same type of emotion in the listener. The 
BRECVEMA theory (e.g. Juslin, 2013c) would probably explain these results arguing that 
listeners tend to perceive basic emotions in music (e.g. sadness), which become 
differentiated by virtue of associative coding, producing the observed variety (e.g. 
nostalgia, calm, etc.). My interpretation, in contrast, is that it is more parsimonious –and 
more consistent with the variety of meanings that music acquires in different contexts-, 
to assume that perception of music’s expressivity is not inherently organised into 
discrete emotional categories. Instead, perception of musical expression (much like 
perception of vocalisations) depends on the detection of variations in arousal and 
valence specified by the music, which can acquire a variety of emotional and non-
emotional meanings depending on the presence of relevant semantic cues in the 
listening situation. 
In addition to the activation of semantic concepts, these experiments revealed that 
aesthetic evaluations of the music were a crucial mediator in the participants’ 
responses. On many occasions, these evaluations determined the difference between 
having a positive and a negative emotional response to the music, or even between 
having an emotional reaction and reacting with indifference. This finding suggests that 
contrary to what theories of induction of musical emotions have assumed, it is likely that 
appraisals about the music’s aesthetic value (and the extent to which it facilitates or 
obstructs the listeners’ present goals) play a central role in shaping the quality and 
intensity of emotional responses to music. The role of aesthetic appraisals (which Juslin 
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and colleagues have started to explore recently: Juslin & Isaksson, 2014) represents an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
 
9.2.3 Other Implications of the Empirical Findings for my Theory 
Two of the constructionist theories on which I based my proposal have suggested that 
core affect is constituted by the dimensions of arousal and valence (Barrett, 2006b; 
Russell, 2003). However, I suggested in Chapter 5 that it is possible that musically-
induced variations of affect can be better described with further dimensions. 
Consequently, I asked the participants to report their feelings along the tense and 
energetic arousal dimensions in all the empirical studies; and I included questions 
related to the power dimension in the second and third ones. 
The participants’ ratings of tense arousal and energetic arousal in all the experiments 
were highly but not perfectly correlated, suggesting that listeners can readily 
differentiate these two dimensions of their experience, and that the two dimensions 
relate to different aspects of their affective experience. It is also likely that these 
variations of tense arousal and energetic arousal are associated with variations in 
different musical parameters. For example, it is conceivable that whereas variations in 
energetic arousal may be related to variations in loudness and tempo, variations in 
tense arousal may be related to variations in harmonic tension and violations of musical 
expectancies. Identifying these correspondences, and the way the variations in the three 
dimensions are mapped onto discrete emotions constitute interesting avenues for 
future research. 
Regarding the power dimension, the results from experiments 2 and 3 suggest that 
this dimension may be particularly relevant when the music is perceived as expressive of 
anger and/or fear. For instance, it was observed that participants who perceived the 
music as expressing pride or power, (but not those who perceived it as expressing fear) 
tended to report feeling triumphant or strong themselves. However, since I did not 
include items exploring the other end of this dimension (i.e. perceptions that the music 
expressed weakness, and induced feelings of impotence), my exploration of the power 
dimension is incomplete. Future research should investigate the validity of this 
dimension in listeners’ experience to music. This exploration should include the 
identification the musical parameters associated with variations in this dimension, the 
extent to which this dimension can be subsumed by variations in tense and energetic 
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arousal; and the dependence of this dimension on the type of listening attitude that the 
person assumes towards the music (e.g. experiencing from first person perspective vs. 
experiencing from a third person perspective). Exploring this musical power dimension 
can help us understand better why some people (particularly young subcultures) are 
attracted to music that sounds aggressive and/or scary (e.g. heavy metal, punk rock, 
gangsta rap). Thus, describing the phenomenology of these experiences can on the one 
hand, help us understand how musically-induced “anger” is different from everyday 
anger (similar to what researchers have found recently about musically-induce sadness, 
e.g. Van den Tol & Edwards, 2011; Vuoskoski, Thompson, McIlwain, & Eerola, 2012). On 
the other hand, it can help us elucidate how this type of music facilitates (or not) 
negative attitudes, moods, and behaviours such as violence, depression and self-
harming. 
The central claim in my theoretical proposal is that emotional responses to music 
only occur when the diffuse core affect induced by perceptual mechanisms is 
transformed into a full-blown emotion by the contribution of conceptual mechanisms. 
What evidence is there for this claim in the empirical studies of the thesis? Admittedly, 
the evidence they provided for this claim is indirect, because none of the experiments 
attempted to isolate, or to prevent the activation of conceptual mechanisms in order to 
examine their effects. In fact, since the Conceptual Act Theory predicts that these type 
of mechanisms are always “on” in every waking moment producing a variety of mental 
states (Barrett, 2009, p. 1292), it is practically impossible to completely block their 
effects. However, the second and third experiments did provide evidence that the 
listeners’ affective responses to the music varied influenced by mediating factors such as 
their aesthetic evaluations, cultural and personal connotations activated by the music, 
and extra-musical information provided in the form of programme notes. 
Did the experiments provide evidence for the alternative explanation, proposed by 
the BRECVEMA theory, that single mechanisms induce full-blown emotions? Perhaps it 
could be argued that the small effect of the manipulation of extra-musical information in 
the third experiment suggests that the descriptions could only bias emotions that were 
already induced by the music. This explanation, however, seems unlikely given the 
variety of emotional responses observed across the experiment, even in the group of 
participants who did not read an emotional description before listening to the music. At 
the same time, the finding that the extra-musical information had a small effect suggests 
that musically-induced variations in core-affect are the main factor that generates 
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affective responses to music. In other words, unless powerful personally-relevant 
mechanisms are activated (such as the appraisal that the music blocks an important 
present goal, or the evocation of specific episodic memories), the reaction of the listener 
will tend to coincide with the variations of core-affect specified by the music. (Some 
evidence for this conclusion has been provided in experiments mapping variations of 
psychophysiological responses and core affect to musical parameters, e.g. Coutinho & 
Cangelosi, 2011; Russo, Vempala, & Sandstrom, 2013). 
 
9.3 Evaluation of research methods 
The methods implemented in this research project were based on three assumptions of 
the constructionist theory I proposed:  
1. Having an emotion consists of a process of meaning-making, in which we 
construct affective meaning about the present situation, integrating information 
from the eliciting event, from the context, from past similar experiences, and 
from our bodily and psychological state.  
2. Many of our affective responses to music do not correspond to full-blown 
emotions, but to more basic, fleeting and world-focused fluctuations of affect.  
3. The presence of narratives, emotional labels, and other contextual information 
can transform these diffuse affective responses into discrete emotional 
experiences.  
One methodological implication of these assumptions is that understanding people’s 
affective responses to music involves obtaining objective data from carefully controlled 
stimuli (i.e. using experiments), but also obtaining qualitative data about the way they 
elaborate the meaning of the musical event. These assumptions also suggest that using 
ambiguous musical stimuli can help explore how emotional meanings and experiences 
are constructed, rather than directly determined by the musical stimulus. Additionally, 
these theoretical premises also entail that traditional techniques such questionnaires of 
emotional adjectives should be complemented by indirect measures of induced affect, 
and by techniques that tap into dimensions of affective experiences that are not 
optimally described by emotional adjectives, such as action tendencies. 
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9.3.1 Indirect Techniques Based on the Perception of Facial Stimuli 
The rationale behind this type of technique is that affective states have consequences 
for cognitive processing in a mood-congruent fashion (Bower, 1981). Thus, based on the 
findings of Niedenthal and colleagues that induced affective states bias the perception 
of ambiguous and of morphing facial expressions (Niedenthal et al., 2001, 2000), I 
decided to implement this type of technique in two of the experiments.  
In the first experiment I used ambiguous facial expressions. For this, I created 
“blended” facial pictures that contained both positive and negative expressive elements, 
and asked the participants to judge the valence experienced by the person in the photo. 
The results were not encouraging. Although the data indicated that the majority of the 
stimuli were perceived in the predicted mood-congruent fashion, most of the 
correlations between these scores and self-reports of valence were small and 
nonsignificant. Moreover, there was a large variation between subjects, and the results 
suggested that the mood-congruence effect did not last more than a few seconds. 
Since the limitations of the ambiguous-faces technique could have at least in part be 
due to the fact that I used stimuli developed by myself, in the second experiment I used 
stimuli that had been validated in a previous experiment (Niedenthal et al., 2001). This 
technique involves asking participants to observe videos displaying faces that change 
from a positive to a negative expression, and to detect the point where the positive 
expression is no longer present in the face. It was predicted that the more the 
participants were in a positive affective state, the earlier they would detect the change 
from a positive expression into a negative one. Once more, the results did not show 
robust and reliable patterns. The participants’ ratings exhibited large inter-subject 
variability, and the predicted correlations between the scores in the indirect technique 
and the scores from the questionnaires of induced emotion were the exception rather 
than the rule. 
Several conclusions can be extracted from the exploration of these two techniques. 
First, these techniques seem promising, particularly because they can potentially 
circumvent some of the problems associated with asking participants to report their 
affective states using verbal labels, such as demand characteristics, limitations in self-
reflective abilities, self-presentation biases, and translation issues (Juslin et al., 2010; 
Zentner & Eerola, 2010b). However, they also present several drawbacks which suggest 
that, in their present form, they do not represent reliable measures, as described below. 
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First, it is not clear the extent to which the participants perform this type of task 
based mainly on affective processes. The task that they have to perform is too atypical: 
the ambiguous faces are not only ambiguous, but also strange (they do not look like 
natural expressions), and the morphing faces tend to change in ways that normal faces 
would not. These characteristics of the stimuli create additional demands on the 
participants, who probably end up using rational, rather than spontaneous affective 
strategies to perform the task, thus eliminating the intended effect. Future research 
should explore if this difficulty can be overcome by asking the participants to perform 
the perceptual task as quickly as they can. 
Second, not only was there a large observed inter-rater variability, but also some of 
the stimuli seemed to show the expected effect better than others. This implies that 
investigators wishing to use these techniques have to spend considerable time creating 
and validating the set of stimuli that they use.  
Third, in their present form, these techniques only inform about the participants’ 
valence, but not about other dimensions of core affect, or about the presence of specific 
emotions.  
Finally, just like any other indirect technique, using these techniques creates 
additional problems when the information they provide is contradictory with the 
information provided by explicit self-reports of affect, (for instance, when the 
participant reports feeling well, but the indirect technique indicates the presence of 
negative valence). Which measure should the researcher trust when they find this type 
of mismatch? Could it be possible that they are both correct, but they respond to 
different aspects of affective processing, one implicit and world-directed, and one 
explicit and self-reflective? 
 
9.3.2 Questionnaire of Action Tendencies, Subjective Feelings and 
Appraisals 
The consensual definition of emotion I proposed in the first chapter describes it as made 
up of different components: cognitive, somatic, motor, motivational, and subjective 
feelings. Most psychological research on musical emotions (and emotion in general) has 
measured the feeling component in terms of discrete emotional adjectives intended to 
capture the whole subjective experience of the person. However, it can be argued that 
the feeling component is not exhausted by assigning an emotional label to the 
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experience, because it also contains subjective sensations associated with the other 
components, such as urges to behave in a certain way (motivational component), bodily 
feelings (somatic and motor components), and ideas about the meaning of the situation 
(cognitive component) (Scherer, 2009a, p. 3467).  
Based on these considerations, I decided to develop a questionnaire that measured 
these other dimensions of the feeling component, which have been previously 
unexplored in music psychology research32. The questionnaire consists of 15-items 
asking participants to rate their experience in terms of action tendencies, bodily 
sensations, and appraisals.  
The results from the second and third experiments showed coherent patterns of 
correlation between the answers to this questionnaire, and the questionnaires based on 
emotional adjectives. As expected, the informative value of the items varied according 
to the characteristics of the musical piece, and the type of emotions it evoked. For 
instance, the scores in the item “I felt like dancing” were more relevant when 
participants listened to a joyful-sounding piece, than when they listened to an angry-
sounding one, and the scores of the item “I felt like attacking something” showed the 
inverse pattern. Taken together, the results from both experiments suggest that this 
questionnaire constituted a valid measure of the participants’ affective experience. 
This instrument represents a potentially useful technique for research into musical 
emotions. Its main strength is that it circumvents one of the most important difficulties 
associated with demand characteristics in studies of musically-induced emotions, 
namely, the tendency of participants to report emotions they perceived, rather than 
emotions they underwent. With the use of this questionnaire, the researchers can make 
sure that, for example, when a participant reports feeling “sad”, they are also 
experiencing associated feelings such as “feeling like crying” or “feeling like I needed to 
be comforted”. 
Evidently, this instrument also has some limitations, too. First, it relies on self-report, 
and therefore, it is affected by the participants’ ability to reflect on their subjective 
experiences. Second, since the answers to the items in the questionnaire cannot be 
mapped, one-to-one, onto discrete emotions, this questionnaire complements, rather 
than replaces, questionnaires that use emotional adjectives to measure induced 
                                                            
32 I recently discovered that a team of researchers led by Klaus Scherer at the University of 
Geneva have started to work in the development of a similar instrument, but they have not 
produced any publications about it yet.  
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emotions. And finally, it is likely that the items in the present version of the 
questionnaire do not exhaust all the possible (or typical) action tendencies, somatic 
feelings, and appraisals evoked by music listening. Future research should continue 
exploring the necessity of including other in from the questionnaire, and evaluating the 
validity of the instrument as a whole. 
 
9.3.3 The Use of Ambiguous Musical Stimuli and Qualitative 
Information  
As reviewed in Chapter 3, most experimental research into perception of emotional 
expressions has used portrayed facial and vocal stimuli that look or sound like 
exaggerated expressions that do not resemble natural ones. Similarly, most music 
psychologists researching musical emotions have used musical stimuli that maximise the 
probability that the participants perceive or undergo the target emotion, and therefore 
their musical stimuli tend to sound like musical stereotypes. 
In contrast with this tendency, in the second and third experiment I decided to use 
music that had an emotionally ambiguous character. This decision was based on the 
consideration that although maximising the power of the stimuli has methodological 
advantages, using exaggerated expressions prevents us from understanding how people 
construct emotional percepts in everyday music listening circumstances, (where the 
music can be more ambiguous, and embedded in situations where lyrics, visual 
narratives and other contextual cues are usually present). Additionally, consistent with 
this aim of understanding the processes of meaning construction, I included open-ended 
questions about what the participants thought while listening to the music.  
The results of the experiments suggest that these two strategies were successful. The 
combination of the use of ambiguous musical stimuli and the collection of qualitative 
data from the open-ended questions allowed me to learn how musical emotions can be 
at the same time restricted by the variations of core affect specified by the musical 
materials, and influenced by associative processes such as personal memories, cultural 
connotations of the music, and written descriptions of the music.  
Evidently, these methodological strategies also have some disadvantages. The 
ambiguous character of the music makes it difficult to know exactly which musical 
parameters are associated with variations in the dimensions of core affect; and it can 
also reduce the effect of music on the participants’ affective responses, making it 
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difficult to extract clear conclusions. Obtaining qualitative information has the obvious 
disadvantage that it tends to take long time to analyse it. Additionally, the participants’ 
reports of what they thought while listening to the music is limited by their abilities of 
self-reflection and recall. And finally, it can be argued that the value of this information 
is always qualified by the consideration that many cognitive and affective processes are 
implicit, and therefore, not susceptible to detection by techniques based on self-report.  
 
9.3.4 The Use of Web-Based Experiments 
The third experiment was carried out using a web-based platform instead of a 
laboratory setting. The results suggest that overall, using this technique was a fruitful 
strategy. It enabled the recruitment of a large number of participants from many 
nationalities and cultural backgrounds in a very short period of time (less than two 
months from the moment the experiment was launched). It is also probable that the 
problems associated with the awkwardness and embarrassing feelings aroused by the 
presence of the researcher during the second experiment were eliminated by the fact 
that with this web-based platform the participants were able to do the experiment in 
their own time, and in places where they felt at ease. 
However, compared to a traditional laboratory-based experiment, this web-based 
methodology had the disadvantage of reduced experimental control. This involved 
collecting data from many participants, only to have to exclude a large proportion of 
them who did not follow the procedure correctly. However, in spite of these limitations, 
using this web-based technique represents an attractive alternative for studies on music 
and emotion, especially when one of the objectives is to gather conclusions with greater 
external validity. 
 
9.4 Implications, future directions and concluding remarks 
During this chapter I have suggested several avenues for future research. In this final 
section, I focus on the main themes that have emerged throughout this discussion. 
1. The relationship between overt bodily movement to music and induced emotions. 
There is accumulating evidence that suggests that overt and implicit motor 
responses play a substantial role in perception of music (Maes, Leman, Palmer, & 
Wanderley, 2014; Phillips-Silver & Trainor, 2008). However, there is comparably 
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much less evidence about how these bodily movements evoked by music contribute 
to the induction of emotional experiences. Although it seems obvious that moving in 
time with music is associated with pleasurable experiences, (as can be inferred by 
the close association between music and dance), this relationship should not be 
taken for granted. For instance, the results of the first experiment indicate that 
engaging in motor entrainment by itself is not enough to induce changes in valence.  
Future research should investigate the extent to which the effects of bodily 
movements on induced musical emotions depend on factors such as the presence of 
expressive elements in the music, the synchronization of the listener’s movements 
with musical elements, whether these movements are influenced by semantic 
connotations activated by the music, and whether there are some types of music 
which people prefer to listen to without moving. 
 
2. The role of internal embodied mechanisms such as motor simulation and embodied 
metaphors. The results of the second and third experiments suggest that embodied 
simulation of the implied motor actions performed by the musicians does not 
facilitate the induction of musical emotions. However, this hypothesis was tested in 
the context of musical pieces that the listeners were not familiar with. Is it therefore 
possible that the effect of this internal motor mimicry is only present when the 
participants are familiar with the piece? Would the expected effect of expertise (i.e. 
the ability to play the piece) be observable in this situation? This is an interesting 
possibility that should be explored in future research, including the question of how 
these simulation processes occur in listeners who cannot play any musical 
instrument.  
Alternatively, if we disposed of the notion that embodied simulation is involved in 
musical emotions, how could we reconcile this with the evidence of the activation of 
pre-motor brain areas from neuro-imagining studies? Should we interpret this as 
evidence of the activation of supra-modal embodied metaphors? Carrying out 
research to decide between these two hypotheses (embodied simulation vs. supra-
modal metaphors) can help us advance our understanding of these embodied 
processes which has consequences not only for music psychology, but for general 
theories of cognition and affect.  
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3. The influence of extra-musical information. Most music that people listen to in 
everyday circumstances contains or is embedded in “extra-musical” elements such 
as lyrics, videos, photographs, social events, the presence of other listeners, etc. It is 
likely, as suggested by the results of the third experiment, that all of this contextual 
information has effects on the listeners’ emotional experiences, but so far, no 
research programme has tried to map these influences in a systematic manner. 
The research I reviewed in section 5.3.2 of chapter five suggests that when music is 
paired with visual and verbal narrative, both sources of meaning interact producing 
a variety of perceptual effects, but little is known about how these two sources of 
meaning interact producing effects on listeners’ induced emotions. Hence, future 
research should explore how different types of contextual information presented 
along with the music (visual, verbal, etc.) interact with the material properties of the 
music, shaping the listeners’ emotional responses, and the role that the activation 
of mechanisms such as visual imagery and the activation of semantic knowledge 
play in this phenomenon. 
 
4. Empathic responses to music. An interesting implication of the second and third 
experiments is that what has been called emotional contagion with music, may 
correspond to a type of empathic response. Although the results did not clearly 
support this hypothesis, the possibility that emotional responses to music are 
mediated by empathy has been recently documented (Miu & Balteş, 2012; 
Vuoskoski et al., 2012). Future research should investigate to what extent, as I 
argued, these empathic responses to music can be explained by the same 
mechanisms as any other musical emotions, or they depend on other specific 
mechanisms. Furthermore, since several theories of social cognition have argued 
that processes such as mentalizing and emotional contagion depend on internal 
motor mechanisms (Iacoboni, 2009; Preston & de Waal, 2002), it would be 
interesting to establish if musically-induced empathy (and not only feelings of 
community, e.g. Hove & Risen, 2009) is modulated by embodied mechanisms such 
as rhythmic entrainment. This research should also explore the extent to which 
more cognitively-sophisticated mechanisms such as appraisals, or the construction 
of narratives have more weight in the induction of empathy than bodily mechanisms 
such as entrainment and motor simulation.  
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5. The role of attention modality and listening perspective. My constructionist theory 
predicts that the mode of attention that the listener devotes to the musical event is 
associated with different types of affective responses, which range from diffuse and 
world-focused affective responses, to discrete, self-focused emotions. Additionally, 
the results of the second experiment (reported in chapter seven) suggest that 
adopting a first or third person perspective when listening to “frightening” music 
can make the difference between undergoing feelings of power or of fear. Future 
research should explore the role that attention modality plays in musical emotions 
by manipulating the listeners’ attitude (from detached to engaged), and observing 
the extent to which these variations in attention are associated with different types 
of affective responses. For example: does adopting a detached attention increase 
the probability that the listener experiences emotions as expressed by the music, 
rather than as induced ones?  
Future investigations should also establish which factors in the music, the situation, 
and the person’s psychological state facilitate adopting a first or third person 
perspective on the music, and its affective consequences. For example, does the 
presence of a clear, cantabile melody facilitate adopting a first person perspective? 
Second, if adopting different listening perspectives modulates the phenomenon of 
“contagion” with frightening music, does this happen with other types of music, 
too? For example, does adopting a first person perspective while listening to sad 
music facilitate the induction of negative feelings of grief, whereas adopting a third 
person perspective facilitates experiencing positive feelings of calm and admiration 
of the music’s beauty? Answering these questions has broader implications beyond 
academic music psychology. For instance, it can advance our understanding of how 
the music that people chose to listen to regulate their moods has positive or 
detrimental effects on their affective state.  
 
6. Methodological implications. One of the main proposals of my theory is that several 
mechanisms usually produce only barely noticeable changes in core affect, and that 
they interact with conceptual mechanisms producing emotional and non-emotional 
responses. This implies self-report methods are not well-suited for studying this type 
of response. Future research should continue searching for alternative ways of 
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obtaining objective estimates of affective changes in listeners. Additionally, future 
studies should continue exploring ways of manipulating the interaction between 
these two types of mechanisms using different manipulations to the one 
implemented here (i.e. programme notes), such as the use of videos and lyrics.  
 
9.4.1 Concluding remarks 
Proposing a new theoretical perspective to account for the induction of emotions by 
music is undoubtedly a very ambitious enterprise. Therefore, although the 
constructionist theory I have presented intended to be as exhaustive and 
comprehensive as possible, the data from the empirical studies also showed it is 
necessary to continue refining the theoretical details of the theory, and the empirical 
hypotheses derived from it. Moreover, the evidence I presented for some of my claims is 
constrained by the limitations in the representativeness of the stimuli, the number of 
participants, and the shortcomings of the methods I implemented.  
Some of the shortcomings of my theory are in fact, common to every theory of 
emotion elicitation. For instance, although almost all theories contain theoretical details 
about how different processes lead to the induction of full-blown emotions, many of 
these theoretical details still await empirical confirmation, and the question of how to 
operationalise this boundary between diffuse affect and emotion, and how to model the 
complexity of the factors involved is still work in progress (Meuleman & Scherer, 2013; 
Raz et al., 2016). 
Conversely, other limitations of my proposal have to do with the multidimensional 
nature of music itself. In comparison to the traditional visual stimuli used in affective 
science, music evolves and changes in time, and even when we try to study it as a simple 
acoustic stimulus, we find that it is actually composed of several physical dimensions, 
that people experience it as loaded with symbolic and affective meanings, and that it 
has multiple effects at somatic, cognitive, and affective levels. All of these characteristics 
make the challenge of disentangling core-affect processes and conceptual ones a huge 
task.  
Despite these limitations, I consider that the constructionist theory I proposed offers 
useful insights about how musical emotions are created. This theory has not only 
provided specific hypotheses and avenues for future empirical research, but it also 
makes potentially useful suggestions to understand how musical meanings are 
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constructed in wider musical contexts such as musical videos, film music, the use of 
music in advertisement, and the way patients and therapists create emotional meanings 
in music therapy. In this sense, this theory is well suited for starting building much 
needed bridges between music psychology and other disciplines interested in 
understanding people’s affective experiences with music such as ethnomusicology, 
historical musicology, popular music studies, sociology of music, and music therapy. 
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Appendix 1:  
Complementary tables from Experiment 2: The role of 
embodied simulation and semantic associations in 
emotional contagion with music (Chapter 7) 
 
 
Table 10.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Induced and Perceived emotions and Core 
Affect in Sadness / Tenderness piece 
 
   
n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Induced 
Affective 
States 
Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate 123 2.09 1.23 
Sad, Sorrowful 123 0.97 1.05 
Soothed, Serene 123 2.16 1.18 
Nostalgic, Longing 123 1.89 1.30 
Happy, Cheerful 123 1.40 1.08 
Anxious, Scared 123 0.18 0.48 
Triumphant, Strong 123 0.56 0.96 
Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Overwhelmed 123 1.28 1.12 
Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of 
Spirituality 
123 1.53 1.22 
Irritated, Frustrated 123 0.27 0.67 
Uninterested, Indifferent 123 0.28 0.67 
Valence 124 2.02 1.46 
Tense Arousal (Relaxation) 124 2.12 1.45 
Energy Arousal (Wakefulness) 124 0.03 1.61 
Perceived 
Affective 
States 
Anger 123 0.04 0.20 
Boredom, Apathy 123 0.23 0.56 
Fear, Dread 123 0.21 0.48 
Joy, Amusement 123 0.98 1.01 
Longing, Reminiscence 123 2.47 1.22 
Melancholy, Misery 123 1.32 1.22 
Pride 123 0.52 0.83 
Spirituality, Otherworldliness 123 1.72 1.17 
Tenderness 123 2.47 1.01 
Peacefulness 123 2.60 1.04 
Perceived Valence 124 1.64 1.53 
Perceived Tense arousal 124 2.33 1.32 
Perceived Energy arousal 124 -0.29 1.32 
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Table 10.2 Means and Standard Deviations of scores from the Subjective Feelings and 
Action Tendencies questionnaire in the Sadness / Tenderness piece 
 
  
n Mean Std. Deviation 
Needing to be comforted 114 0.94 1.05 
Wanting to dance 114 0.79 1.10 
Feeling like everything is fine 114 2.17 1.17 
Not being able to concentrate 114 0.61 0.95 
Wanting to avoid the situation  114 0.37 0.80 
Wanting to hide away 114 0.37 0.74 
Wanting to attack something 114 0.06 0.36 
Wanting to make the experience longer  114 1.96 1.32 
Wanting to understand more 114 1.70 1.23 
Feeling like things do not involve me 114 0.67 0.97 
Feeling like crying 114 0.61 0.91 
Boiling 114 0.12 0.44 
Feeling in command of the situation 114 1.10 1.07 
Feeling frozen 114 0.30 0.69 
Wanting to jump around 114 0.18 0.57 
Feeling like laughing 114 0.35 0.62 
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Table 10.3 Means and Standard Deviations of Induced and Perceived emotions and Core 
Affect in Fear / Anger piece 
 
   
n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Induced 
Affective 
States 
Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate 124 0.16 0.39 
Sad, Sorrowful 124 0.80 1.00 
Soothed, Serene 124 0.22 0.63 
Nostalgic, Longing 124 0.30 0.66 
Happy, Cheerful 124 0.41 0.71 
Anxious, Scared 124 1.60 1.34 
Triumphant, Strong 124 1.53 1.34 
Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Overwhelmed 124 0.98 1.09 
Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of Spirituality 124 0.51 0.98 
Irritated, Frustrated 124 0.93 1.11 
Uninterested, Indifferent 124 0.29 0.62 
Valence 124 -0.43 1.89 
Tense Arousal (Relaxation) 124 -1.19 1.93 
Energy Arousal (Wakefulness) 124 1.78 1.33 
Perceived 
Affective 
States 
Anger 124 2.06 1.25 
Boredom, Apathy 124 0.09 0.31 
Fear, Dread 124 2.69 1.19 
Joy, Amusement 124 0.24 0.59 
Longing, Reminiscence 124 0.37 0.76 
Melancholy, Misery 124 1.13 1.03 
Pride 124 2.44 1.33 
Spirituality, Otherworldliness 124 0.99 1.16 
Tenderness 124 0.15 0.45 
Peacefulness 124 0.14 0.47 
Perceived Valence 124 2.06 1.25 
Perceived Tense arousal 124 0.09 0.31 
Perceived Energy arousal 124 2.69 1.19 
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Table 10.4 Means and Standard Deviations of scores from the Subjective Feelings and 
Action Tendencies questionnaire in the Fear /Anger piece 
 
  
n Mean Std. Deviation 
Needing to be comforted 124 0.73 1.08 
Wanting to dance 124 0.22 0.61 
Feeling like everything is fine 115 0.82 1.10 
Not being able to concentrate 115 1.28 1.19 
Wanting to avoid the situation  115 1.30 1.39 
Wanting to hide away 115 1.50 1.35 
Wanting to attack something 115 0.74 1.08 
Wanting to make the experience longer  115 0.97 1.10 
Wanting to understand more 115 1.57 1.24 
Feeling like things do not involve me 115 0.73 1.03 
Feeling like crying 115 0.32 0.63 
Boiling 115 0.71 1.06 
Feeling in command of the situation 115 0.94 1.05 
Feeling frozen 115 0.95 1.02 
Wanting to jump around 115 0.35 0.78 
Feeling like laughing 115 0.31 0.75 
 
 
  
318 
 
 
 
Table 10.5 Means and Standard Deviations of Induced and Perceived emotions and Core 
Affect in Joy piece 
 
   
n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Induced 
Affective 
States 
Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate 124 1.42 1.08 
Sad, Sorrowful 124 0.07 0.34 
Soothed, Serene 124 1.52 1.03 
Nostalgic, Longing 124 0.90 1.04 
Happy, Cheerful 124 2.69 1.02 
Anxious, Scared 124 0.10 0.35 
Triumphant, Strong 124 1.69 1.28 
Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Overwhelmed 124 1.40 1.22 
Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of Spirituality 124 1.06 1.24 
Irritated, Frustrated 124 0.12 0.43 
Uninterested, Indifferent 124 0.19 0.48 
Valence 124 2.69 1.03 
Tense Arousal (Relaxation) 124 1.87 1.43 
Energy Arousal (Wakefulness) 124 2.31 1.40 
Perceived 
Affective 
States 
Anger 124 0.09 0.36 
Boredom, Apathy 124 0.07 0.34 
Fear, Dread 124 0.04 0.20 
Joy, Amusement 124 2.73 1.06 
Longing, Reminiscence 124 0.95 0.99 
Melancholy, Misery 124 0.20 0.54 
Pride 124 1.48 1.17 
Spirituality, Otherworldliness 124 1.20 1.20 
Tenderness 124 1.39 1.09 
Peacefulness 124 1.69 1.24 
Perceived Valence 124 2.83 1.11 
Perceived Tense arousal 124 1.33 1.57 
Perceived Energy arousal 124 2.06 1.29 
 
 
 
  
319 
 
 
 
Table 10.6 Means and Standard Deviations of scores from the Subjective Feelings and 
Action Tendencies questionnaire in Joy piece: 
 
  
n Mean Std. Deviation 
Needing to be comforted 124 .17 0.59 
Wanting to dance 124 1.85 1.36 
Feeling like everything is fine 115 2.68 0.99 
Not being able to concentrate 115 .65 0.90 
Wanting to avoid the situation  115 .21 0.54 
Wanting to hide away 115 .06 0.33 
Wanting to attack something 115 .09 0.45 
Wanting to make the experience longer  115 2.13 1.37 
Wanting to understand more 115 2.02 1.29 
Feeling like things do not involve me 115 .61 0.91 
Feeling like crying 115 .03 0.16 
Boiling 115 .19 0.56 
Feeling in command of the situation 115 1.74 1.20 
Feeling frozen 115 .07 0.32 
Wanting to jump around 115 1.63 1.38 
Feeling like laughing 115 1.53 1.24 
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Table 10.7 Correlations between scores of Perceived Emotions and Induced Emotions in 
Sadness / Tenderness piece 
 
  Perceived Emotions 
   
Te
n
d
er
n
es
s 
M
el
an
ch
o
ly
 
P
ea
ce
fu
ln
es
s 
Lo
n
gi
n
g 
Jo
y 
 
Fe
ar
 
P
ri
d
e 
A
n
ge
r 
Sp
ir
it
u
al
it
y 
B
o
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d
o
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In
d
u
ce
d
 E
m
o
ti
o
n
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Mellowed .56** .02 .55** .24** .20* -.05 .01 -.19* .25** .09 
Sad .19* .54** -.15 .28** -.37** .31** -.14 .06 -.03 .11 
Soothed .32
**
 -.22
*
 .60
**
 .12 .32
**
 -.15 .03 -.14 .44
**
 -.04 
Nostalgic .32** .32** .12 .42** -.09 .24** -.04 -.01 .19* .11 
Happy .31** -.38** .43** .02 .50** -.16 .23* -.09 .33** -.13 
Anxious .00 .33** -.16 .08 -.25** .31** -.03 .03 -.16 .06 
Trium-
phant 
-.03 -.08 .09 -.19
*
 .27
**
 .10 .49
**
 .05 .23
*
 -.04 
Irritated -.07 .19* -.15 -.04 .02 .13 .08 .33** -.03 .11 
Trans-
cendent 
.28
**
 -.05 .41
**
 .08 .23
*
 .10 .03 .03 .67
**
 .10 
Admiring .35** -.16 .35** .09 .32** -.02 .19* -.17 .37** .06 
Unin-
terested 
-.16 .10 -.15 .02 -.10 -.07 -.10 .00 -.16 .21
*
 
Statistic: Spearman’s Rho. 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Table 10.8 Correlations between scores of Perceived Emotions and Induced Emotions in 
Fear/ Anger piece 
 
  Perceived Emotions 
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Mellowed .29
**
 -.11 .33
**
 .26
**
 .41
**
 -.15 .12 -.17 .18 -.03 
Sad .15 .46
**
 .03 .29
**
 -.02 .10 .01 .19
*
 .02 .27
**
 
Soothed .32** -.16 .43** .10 .38** -.13 .05 -.11 .14 .05 
Nostalgic .44
**
 .28
**
 .17 .59
**
 .14 -.04 .24
**
 .09 .26
**
 .21
*
 
Happy .33** -.07 .35** .26** .43** -.10 .24** .02 .22* -.04 
Anxious .04 .20
*
 -.21
*
 .04 -.17 .42
**
 -.02 .28
**
 -.05 .13 
Trium-
phant 
.18
*
 .10 .24
**
 .31
**
 .25
**
 -.16 .42
**
 .04 .22
*
 -.08 
Irritated .16 .14 -.18
*
 .08 -.08 .19
*
 .09 .41
**
 -.20
*
 .33
**
 
Trans-
cendent 
.43
**
 .08 .19
*
 .34
**
 .34
**
 -.09 .41
**
 -.04 .58
**
 .03 
Admiring .26* -.03 .26** .30** .20* -.15 .33** .00 .30** .02 
Unin-
terested 
-.07 .17 -.04 -.07 .02 .11 -.08 .02 -.13 .20
*
 
Statistic: Spearman’s Rho. 
N = 124 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Table 10.9 Correlations between scores of Perceived Emotions and Induced Emotions in 
Joy piece 
 
  Perceived Emotions 
   
Te
n
d
er
n
es
s 
M
el
an
ch
o
ly
 
P
ea
ce
fu
ln
es
s 
Lo
n
gi
n
g 
Jo
y 
Fe
ar
 
P
ri
d
e 
A
n
ge
r 
Sp
ir
it
u
al
it
y 
B
o
re
d
o
m
 
In
d
u
ce
d
 E
m
o
ti
o
n
s 
 
Mellowed .40** .04 .47** .20* .25** -.09 -.01 -.28** .33** .10 
Sad .17 .11 .11 .22* .07 .13 .12 -.06 .22* -.06 
Soothed .48
**
 -.05 .63
**
 .35
**
 .36
**
 -.14 .17 -.24
**
 .42
**
 .20
*
 
Nostalgic .37** .23** .31** .52** .23* -.03 .14 -.13 .24** .33** 
Happy .32
**
 -.16 .27
**
 .15 .62
**
 -.15 .13 -.28
**
 .14 -.03 
Anxious -.13 .13 -.22
*
 .01 -.13 .09 .00 .40
**
 -.08 .07 
Trium-
phant 
.17 .02 .15 .12 .23
**
 .08 .52
**
 .01 .13 .09 
Irritated -.04 -.05 -.09 -.10 -.16 .08 -.07 .52** -.05 -.07 
Trans-
cendent 
.46
**
 .10 .53
**
 .28
**
 .26
**
 .00 .22
*
 -.11 .65
**
 .14 
Admiring .39
**
 .13 .45
**
 .38
**
 .32
**
 .01 .36
**
 -.05 .56
**
 .15 
Unin-
terested 
-.05 .20
*
 .05 .00 -.10 -.09 .02 .08 .04 .11 
Statistic: Spearman’s Rho. 
N = 124 
* = p < .05, **= p < .001 
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Appendix 2:  
Transcription of user interface and questionnaires from the 
web-based experiment: Simulation, extra-musical information 
and empathy (Chapter 8) 
 
Page 1: Welcome  
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study, which has been approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Department of Music at the University of Sheffield.  
This research seeks to investigate people’s psychological experiences with instrumental 
music. Your participation in the study will involve listening to three pieces of music 
while doing a mental task, and then answering several questionnaires after each 
one. This is estimated to take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. All 
information collected in this study will remain confidential and anonymous. You will not 
be asked to provide any personal details that could be used to identify you. While your 
participation in the study is greatly appreciated, you are free to withdraw from this 
study at any time by simply closing the browser window.  
If you have any questions or concerns please contact Julian Céspedes-Guevara on 
07568188 562 / mup04jc@sheffield.ac.uk or Professor Nicola Dibben at 
nj.dibben@sheffield.ac.uk, who will be happy to discuss these with you.  
By going on to answer the following questionnaire you are giving your informed consent 
to participate. Please click on the ‘NEXT’ button to proceed.  
Page 2: Important Information before starting the Experiment  
It is strongly recommended that you take the survey in a quiet environment, and that 
you listen to the music with headphones. The experiment has to be completed 
individually, you should not discuss your answers with anyone else. Please make sure 
that you do the whole experiment without any interruptions, and not doing anything 
else at the same time. (For example, surfing the web, talking with another person, 
answering your phone, sending a text message, etc.) It is essential that you keep your 
concentration focused on the experiment all the time.  
If you are sure you can do the experiment under these conditions at this moment, 
please click on the 'NEXT' button to continue. If you prefer, you can come back and do 
the experiment at some other time by clicking on the link in the invitation e-mail.  
Page 3: Practice 
Before you do the actual experiment, we will have a short practice so you become 
familiar with the procedure. The task is very simple, it consists of three parts: Read the 
description about the piece that you will listen to, Listen to the piece, while imagining 
that you are one of the musicians who plays the piece. (You can choose to imagine 
playing only one of the instruments, or if you prefer, you can imagine switching from 
one instrument to the other as the music progresses). Please avoid moving, tapping, 
dancing or singing while listening to the music. The piece will sound two times, with a 
small pause in the middle. You can close your eyes, if you find this helps you 
concentrate.  
Please click on the “Next” button to practice this exercise.   
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Page 4: You will now listen to a fragment of a musical piece, twice. Please listen to the 
piece, while imagining that you are the musician playing the piece. Please avoid moving, 
tapping, dancing or singing while listening to the music. Click on the Icon to hear the 
music. (The file will be played in a new window)  
Page 5:  
1. You probably perceived that the piece you just listened to communicated some 
feelings or emotions, as if they were somehow in the music. (For example, that the piece 
was expressive of: melancholy, tenderness, peacefulness, love, etc.) Please click here if 
you had the experience of perceiving that the previous piece of music communicated or 
expressed an emotion: (Select one option)  
o Yes, I perceived that this piece expressed an emotion. 
o No, I did not perceive that this piece expressed an emotion.  
o I am not sure  
2. On the other hand, it is also possible that your emotional state changed while 
listening to the music. (For example, it is possible that you felt more or less relaxed, 
mellowed, nostalgic, sad, etc., after listening to the piece than before). Please click here 
if your emotional state changed while listening to the music: (Select one option)  
o Yes, my emotional state changed while listening to the music.  
o No, my emotional state did not change while listening to the music. 
o  I am not sure  
Page 6:  
Before we start the experiment, it is important to check how you are feeling now, in 
case this affects your performance.  
3. Please indicate how you are feeling right now 
 
Not at all Somewhat Moderately 
Quite a 
lot 
Very 
much 
*(a) Pleasant, Well (Select one option)       
*(b) Unpleasant, Bad (Select one option)      
*(c) Tense, Jittery (Select one option)       
*(d) Relaxed, At ease (Select one option)      
*(e) Sleepy, Drowsy (Select one option)       
 
We are now ready to start the experiment. Please click on the 'NEXT' button to 
proceed.  
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Page 7: Description of the piece you will listen to  
The composer wrote this piece towards the middle of his career, in what proved to be 
one of the most difficult years of his life. His young wife died while giving birth to their 
first child, and a few months later he had to leave his position as lecturer of composition 
in a prestigious university and travel to a different country as a political refugee, because 
the start of war in his home country made the political climate too dangerous to remain 
there.  
Page 8: Please listen to the piece, while imagining that you are one of the musicians 
playing the piece. Please avoid moving, tapping, dancing or singing while listening to the 
music. Click on the Icon to hear the music. (The file will be played in a new window)  
 
Page 9: Now some questions about your listening experience... Please indicate to what 
extent you felt the following sensations or urges while listening to the last piece of 
music:  
4. Please select an option for each row  
 Not 
at 
all 
Somewhat 
Modera-
tely 
Quite 
a lot 
Very 
much 
*(a) Like I wanted to listen more, to make the 
experience longer (Select one option)       
*(b) Like I didn't want to have anything to do with the 
situation, like staying away from it (Select one option)       
*(c) Like I wanted to understand or learn more about 
the situation (Select one option)       
*(d) Like things going on did not involve me, like not 
paying attention to them (Select one option)       
*(e) Like crying (Select one option)       
*(f) Like a need to be comforted, like needing a hug 
(Select one option)       
*(g) Like I wanted to attack something (Select one 
option)       
*(h) Like I was boiling inside (Select one option)       
*(i) Like I was in command of the situation (Select one 
option)       
*(j) Like I needed to protect myself, like hiding away 
(Select one option)       
*(k) Like I was paralysed, frozen (Select one option)       
*(l) Like I could not concentrate or order my thoughts 
(Select one option)       
*(m) Like bouncing around or dancing (Select one 
option)       
*(n) Like laughing (Select one option)       
*(o) Like everything was fine (Select one option)       
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Page 10: Please rate the intensity with which YOU FELT each of the following feelings 
while listening to the last piece of music: Do not describe the music (e.g., "this music is 
sad") or what the music may be expressive of (e.g., "this music expresses joy"). Describe 
YOUR OWN feelings while listening to the music.  
 
5. Please select an option for each row  
 Not 
at 
all 
Somewhat Moderately 
Quite 
a lot 
Very 
much 
*(a) Pleasant, well (Select one option)       
*(b) Unpleasant, Bad (Select one option)       
*(c) Tense, Jittery (Select one option)       
*(d) Relaxed, At ease (Select one option)       
*(e) Awake, Energized (Select one option)       
*(f) Sleepy, Drowsy (Select one option)       
*(g) Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate (Select 
one option)       
*(h) Sad, Sorrowful (Select one option)       
*(i) Soothed, Serene (Select one option)       
*(j) Nostalgic, Longing (Select one option)       
*(k) Happy, Cheerful (Select one option)       
*(l) Anxious, Scared (Select one option)       
 *(m) Triumphant, Strong (Select one option)       
*(n) Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Awed, 
Overwhelmed (Select one option)       
*(o) Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of 
Spirituality (Select one option)      
*(p) Irritated, Frustrated (Select one option)       
*(q) Uninterested, Bored (Select one option)       
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Page 11: Please rate the extent to which you perceived that the last piece of music 
EXPRESSED or COMMUNICATED the following feelings: DO NOT RATE YOUR OWN 
feelings, use the ratings to describe the feelings REPRESENTED by the music.  
6. Please select an option for each row  
 Not 
at 
all 
Somewhat Moderately 
Quite 
a lot 
Very 
much 
*(a) Positive feelings (Select one option)  
 
    
*(b) Negative feelings (Select one option)       
*(c) Peacefulness, Serenity (Select one option)       
*(d) Tension, Unease (Select one option)       
*(e) Alertness, Readiness (Select one option)       
*(f) Tiredness, Weariness (Select one option)       
*(g) Anger, Irritation (Select one option)       
*(h) Boredom, Apathy (Select one option)       
*(i) Fear, Dread (Select one option)       
*(j) Joy, Amusement (Select one option)       
*(k) Longing, Reminiscence (Select one option)       
*(l) Melancholy, Misery (Select one option)       
*(m) Pride, Power (Select one option)       
*(n) Spirituality, Otherworldliness (Select one 
option)       
*(o) Tenderness, Love (Select one option)       
 
Page 12:  
 7. How much did you like the music you just listened to? (Select one option)  
o Not at all  
o Somewhat  
o Moderately  
o Quite a lot  
o Very much  
8. How familiar were you with this piece of music before the experiment? (How well do 
you know the piece) (Select one option) 
o Unfamiliar  
o Somewhat familiar  
o Very familiar 
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Please rate your agreement with the following statements about your experience with 
the music:  
9. 
 Not 
at 
all 
Somewhat Moderately 
Quite 
a lot 
Very 
much 
*(a) My attention was focused entirely on the 
listening task, I forgot about everything else while 
listening to the music (Select one option)  
     
*(b) I was interrupted and distracted by other things 
while listening to the music (Select one option)       
*(c) I was able to avoid moving, tapping, dancing or 
singing while listening to the music (Select one 
option)  
     
*(d) I found it difficult to imagine myself playing the 
instruments I listened to (Select one option)       
 
Two questions about the people who usually listen to music like the piece you just 
listened to:  
10. Please indicate how you are feeling right now 
 Not 
at 
all 
Somewhat Moderately 
Quite 
a lot 
Very 
much 
*(a) How much do you consider yourself to be 
similar to the typical person who enjoys this kind of 
music? (Select one option)  
     
(b) Do you think you it would easy for you to 
befriend someone who loves this kind of music? 
(Select one option)  
     
 
11. Please summarize what went through your mind while you were listening to this 
piece of music (any thoughts, images, ideas, etc.)  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Page 25: Finally a few questions about yourself, and your relationship with music  
28. What is your age? (Enter a value between 10 and 99)  
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29. What is your gender (Select one option)  
o Female  
o Male  
o (I prefer not to answer)  
30. What is your mother tongue? (First Language) (Select one option)  
o English  
o Other (Please specify) __________  
31. What is your nationality?  
Page 26:  
32. I listen attentively to music for the following amount of time per day (Select one 
option)  
o 0 to 15 mins  
o 15 to 30 mins  
o 30 to 60 mins 
o 60 to 90 mins  
o 2 hrs  
o 2 to  
o 3 hrs  
o 4 hrs or more  
Please rate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
  
33. 
 
Complet
-ely 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Complet
-ely 
Agree 
(a) I spend a lot of my free 
time doing music-related 
activities (Select one 
option)  
       
(b) Music is kind of an 
addiction for me - I couldn't 
live without it (Select one 
option)  
       
(c) I would not consider 
myself a musician (Select 
one option)  
       
d) I have never been 
complimented for my 
talents as a musical 
performer (Select one 
option) 
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34. What type of musical training have you received? (Select one option)  
o None  
o Self-taught (no formal training)  
o Private (individual) music classes/ tuition  
o Group music classes / tuition  
35. I have had ____ years of formal training on a musical instrument (including voice) 
during my lifetime (Select one option)  
o 0  
o 0.5  
o 1  
o 2  
o 3 to 5  
o 6 to 9  
o 10 or more  
36. Which musical instruments can you play? (Including singing)  
_________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 3:  
Complementary tables from Experiment 3: Simulation, extra-
musical information and empathy (Chapter 8) 
 
 
Table 11.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Induced and Perceived emotions and Core 
Affect in Sadness / Tenderness piece 
 
   
n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Induced 
Affective 
States 
Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate 235 2.40 1.27 
Sad, Sorrowful 235 0.99 1.08 
Nostalgic, Longing 235 2.11 1.33 
Happy, Cheerful 235 1.34 1.16 
Anxious, Scared 235 0.20 0.55 
Triumphant, Strong 235 0.62 0.99 
Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Overwhelmed 235 1.38 1.33 
Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of Spirituality 235 1.71 1.35 
Irritated, Frustrated 235 0.15 0.49 
Uninterested, Indifferent 235 0.36 0.86 
Valence 235 2.08 1.38 
Tense Arousal (Relaxation) 235 2.24 1.44 
Energy Arousal (Wakefulness) 235 -0.11 1.63 
Perceived 
Affective 
States 
Anger 235 0.09 0.39 
Boredom, Apathy 235 0.23 0.66 
Fear, Dread 235 0.24 0.61 
Joy, Amusement 235 1.01 1.12 
Longing, Reminiscence 235 2.49 1.24 
Melancholy, Misery 235 1.42 1.32 
Pride 235 0.43 0.80 
Spirituality, Otherworldliness 235 1.97 1.34 
Tenderness 235 2.80 1.11 
Perceived Valence 235 1.81 1.68 
Perceived Tense arousal 235 2.29 1.56 
Perceived Energy arousal 235 -0.34 1.15 
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Table 11.2 Means and Standard Deviations of scores from the Subjective Feelings and 
Action Tendencies questionnaire in the Sadness / Tenderness piece: 
 
  
n Mean Std. Deviation 
Needing to be comforted 235 1.05 1.20 
Wanting to dance 235 0.26 0.65 
Feeling like everything is fine 235 2.14 1.30 
Not being able to concentrate 235 0.51 0.97 
Wanting to avoid the situation  235 0.32 0.78 
Wanting to hide away 235 0.26 0.66 
Wanting to attack something 235 0.02 0.13 
Wanting to make the experience longer  235 2.24 1.41 
Wanting to understand more 235 1.83 1.25 
Feeling like things do not involve me 235 0.55 0.98 
Feeling like crying 235 0.77 1.01 
Boiling 235 0.15 0.55 
Feeling in command of the situation 235 1.46 1.34 
Feeling frozen 235 0.39 0.79 
Feeling like laughing 235 0.34 0.78 
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Table 11.3 Means and Standard Deviations of Induced and Perceived emotions and 
Core Affect in Fear / Anger piece 
 
   
n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Induced 
Affective 
States 
Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate 235 0.10 0.39 
Sad, Sorrowful 235 0.87 1.03 
Nostalgic, Longing 235 0.33 0.73 
Happy, Cheerful 235 0.20 0.55 
Anxious, Scared 235 2.09 1.35 
Triumphant, Strong 235 0.89 1.20 
Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Overwhelmed 235 0.69 1.01 
Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of Spirituality 235 0.43 0.84 
Irritated, Frustrated 235 1.03 1.19 
Uninterested, Indifferent 235 0.30 0.77 
Valence 235 -0.81 1.87 
Tense Arousal (Relaxation) 235 -1.88 1.60 
Energy Arousal (Wakefulness) 235 1.26 1.46 
Perceived 
Affective 
States 
Anger 235 1.96 1.30 
Boredom, Apathy 235 0.13 0.49 
Fear, Dread 235 2.85 1.24 
Joy, Amusement 235 0.08 0.32 
Longing, Reminiscence 235 0.44 0.78 
Melancholy, Misery 235 1.31 1.28 
Pride 235 1.82 1.44 
Spirituality, Otherworldliness 235 0.43 0.82 
Tenderness 235 0.08 0.40 
Perceived Valence 235 -2.17 1.63 
Perceived Tense arousal 235 -3.08 1.15 
Perceived Energy arousal 235 2.05 1.57 
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Table 11.4 Means and Standard Deviations of scores from the Subjective Feelings and 
Action Tendencies questionnaire in the Fear /Anger piece: 
 
  
n Mean Std. Deviation 
Needing to be comforted 235 0.64 1.09 
Wanting to dance 235 0.06 0.33 
Feeling like everything is fine 235 0.27 0.63 
Not being able to concentrate 235 1.01 1.23 
Wanting to avoid the situation  235 1.49 1.45 
Wanting to hide away 235 1.98 1.36 
Wanting to attack something 235 0.84 1.15 
Wanting to make the experience longer  235 1.18 1.33 
Wanting to understand more 235 1.58 1.31 
Feeling like things do not involve me 235 0.54 0.97 
Feeling like crying 235 0.40 0.85 
Boiling 235 0.87 1.09 
Feeling in command of the situation 235 0.77 1.10 
Feeling frozen 235 1.17 1.18 
Feeling like laughing 235 0.06 0.31 
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Table 11.5 Means and Standard Deviations of Induced and Perceived emotions and 
Core Affect in Joy / Determination piece 
 
   
n Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Induced 
Affective 
States 
Mellowed, Softened-up, Affectionate 235 1.00 1.16 
Sad, Sorrowful 235 0.06 0.28 
Nostalgic, Longing 235 0.57 0.94 
Happy, Cheerful 235 2.58 1.18 
Anxious, Scared 235 0.14 0.48 
Triumphant, Strong 235 1.81 1.36 
Filled with Admiration, with Wonder, Overwhelmed 235 1.38 1.27 
Inspired, with feelings of Transcendence, of Spirituality 235 1.06 1.18 
Irritated, Frustrated 235 0.15 0.59 
Uninterested, Indifferent 235 0.33 0.85 
Valence 235 2.64 1.23 
Tense Arousal (Relaxation) 235 1.60 1.59 
Energy Arousal (Wakefulness) 235 2.01 1.58 
Perceived 
Affective 
States 
Anger 235 0.06 0.31 
Boredom, Apathy 235 0.09 0.42 
Fear, Dread 235 0.06 0.25 
Joy, Amusement 235 2.69 1.23 
Longing, Reminiscence 235 0.73 0.94 
Melancholy, Misery 235 0.13 0.40 
Pride 235 1.51 1.32 
Spirituality, Otherworldliness 235 0.97 1.12 
Tenderness 235 1.00 1.01 
Perceived Valence 235 2.81 1.12 
Perceived Tense arousal 235 1.06 1.47 
Perceived Energy arousal 235 1.56 1.41 
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Table 11.6 Means and Standard Deviations of scores from the Subjective Feelings and 
Action Tendencies questionnaire in Joy / Determination piece: 
 
  
n Mean Std. Deviation 
Needing to be comforted 235 0.06 0.29 
Wanting to dance 235 2.01 1.35 
Feeling like everything is fine 235 2.71 1.09 
Not being able to concentrate 235 0.57 1.02 
Wanting to avoid the situation  235 0.15 0.54 
Wanting to hide away 235 0.11 0.44 
Wanting to attack something 235 0.12 0.46 
Wanting to make the experience longer  235 2.18 1.38 
Wanting to understand more 235 1.86 1.34 
Feeling like things do not involve me 235 0.41 0.83 
Feeling like crying 235 0.03 0.23 
Boiling 235 0.23 0.62 
Feeling in command of the situation 235 1.99 1.36 
Feeling frozen 235 0.07 0.31 
Feeling like laughing 235 1.20 1.16 
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Table 11.7 Correlations between scores of Perceived Emotions and Induced Emotions in 
Sadness / Tenderness piece 
 
  Perceived Emotions 
   
Te
n
d
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n
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s 
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n
g 
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Fe
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P
ri
d
e 
A
n
ge
r 
Sp
ir
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d
u
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m
o
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o
n
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Mellowed .57** .01 .32** .29** -.05 .18** .03 .37** -.15* 
Sad -.07 .52** .28** -.23** .30** .04 .16* .05 .00 
Nostalgic .20** .28** .55** .01 .01 .13 .07 .27** .03 
Happy .39 -.24** -.01 .59** -.14* .42** -.06 .29** -.03 
Anxious -.09 .21** .13** -.13 .42** -.01 .25* -.12 .07 
Triumphant .22** -.10 .03 .43** -.03 .51** .16* .34** .07 
Irritated -.03 .04 .04 -.04 .13* -.04 .04 -.07 .23** 
Trans-
cendent 
.41** -.02 .21** .28** -.02 .25** .09 .69** -.16 
Admiring .35** -.04 .16* .34** .07 .28** .18** .51** -.08 
Unin-
terested 
-.10 -.02 -.01 .07 .07 -.03 -.07 -.03 .36** 
Statistic: Spearman’s Rho. 
N= 235 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Table 11.8 Correlations between scores of Perceived Emotions and Induced Emotions in 
Fear/ Anger piece 
 
  Perceived Emotions 
   
Te
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Mellowed .31** .09 .26** .05 .03 .08 .10 .30** .03 
Sad .01 .52** .29** -.08 .36** .10 .27** .09 .09 
Nostalgic .13* .26** .49** .08 .05 .06 .10 .19** .03 
Happy .19** -.06 .12 .37** -.15* .21** -.10 .18** .03 
Anxious -.09 .16* .08 -.12 .46** .00 .27** -.12 .10 
Triumphant .11 .03 .21** .24** -.14* .45** .19** .20** .01 
Irritated -.07 .23** .12 -.06 .31** .12 .49** -.07 .18** 
Trans-
cendent 
.18** .07 .33** .15* -.12 .25** .06 .48** .06 
Admiring .26** .01 .17** .27** -.08 .30** .08 .29** .00 
Unin-
terested 
.00 .10 .06 .02 -.04 -.01 .07 -.07 .34** 
 
Statistic: Spearman’s Rho. 
N = 235 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
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Table 11.9 Correlations between scores of Perceived Emotions and Induced Emotions in 
Joy piece 
 
  Perceived Emotions 
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Mellowed .54* .09 .32** .29** -.01 .12 -.03 .36** -.07 
Sad .09 .18** .22** -.04 -.05 -.04 .25** .10 .03 
Nostalgic .24** .06 .53** .05 -.03 .22** .04 .18** .01 
Happy .30** -.11 .10 .65** .07 .19** -.10 .26** -.05 
Anxious -.05 .10 .00 -.06 .22** -.01 .41** .03 .16* 
Triumphant .19** -.09 .15* .39** .10 .53** .03 .29** -.06 
Irritated -.06 .09 .05 -.10 .06 .11 .32** -.05 .13* 
Trans-
cendent 
.38** .03 .22** .26** .10 .22** .03 .58** -.12 
Admiring .34** -.02 .16* .30** .08 .28** .05 .36** .02 
Unin-
terested 
-.01 .16* .09 -.16* -.02 -.09 .13* -.08 .36** 
 
Statistic: Spearman’s Rho. 
N = 235 
* = p < .05, **= p < .001 
 
 
 
